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CHAPTER	  1	   INTRODUCTION	  
 
“In	  the	  pragmatics	  of	  cooperation,	  the	  questions	  that	  participants	  articulate	  over	  and	  
over	  emphasize	  the	  “how”	  of	  the	  process;	  these	  are	  questions	  that	  seek	  solutions:	  How	  can	  
we	  achieve	  cooperation	  in	  this	  context	  of	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  heterogeneity	  of	  interests?	  How	  do	  
we	  get	  all	  these	  differences	  (of	  people,	  institutions,	  nationalities,	  disciplines,	  components)	  to	  
work	  together?	  How	  do	  we	  tame/	  unleash	  diversity	   in	  the	   interests	  of	  mutual	  production?”	  
(Zabusky,	  1995:	  196)	  
 
 
1.1	   European	  Cooperation	  in	  the	  Defence	  Industry	  
 
The	   international	  development	  and	  production	  of	  weapons	  systems	   in	  Europe	  has	  become	  
an	  established	  practice	  during	  the	  last	  decades.	  Initially,	  international	  programs	  were	  often	  
launched	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  security	  and	  foreign	  policies.	  Later,	  economic	  incentives	  became	  a	  
driving	  force,	  as	  governments	  recognised	  that	  national	  development	  trajectories	  increasingly	  
became	  unviable	  because	  of	  the	  increasing	  costs	  of	  development	  and	  production	  of	  complex	  
weapons	   systems.	   The	   economic	   incentives	   became	  more	   important	   with	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
Cold	  War,	  when	  many	  nations	  witnessed	  a	  decline	  in	  defence	  spending.	  A	  military	  motive	  for	  
more	  international	  cooperation	  emerged	  after	  the	  military	  operations	  in	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  
Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan.	  Allied	   forces	  experienced	  difficulties	   in	  carrying	  out	   joint	  operations,	  
because	   their	   systems	   often	   proved	   incapable	   of	   communicating	   and	   connecting	   properly	  
with	  systems	  of	  other	  armed	  forces	  (e.g.	  Soeters	  and	  Manigart,	  2008).	  Hence,	  the	  need	  for	  
international	  programmes	  to	  develop	  and	  produce	  weapon	  systems	  gradually	  increased.	  
	   But	   many	   of	   these	   international	   programmes	   have	   suffered	   significant	   delays,	   cost	  
escalation,	  requirements	  downgrading,	  or	  outright	  cancellation	  (Cobble,	  2004;	  James	  2002;	  
Lorell,	  1980;	  Moravscik,	  1993).	  Technical	  constraints	  certainly	  have	  impacted	  the	  outcomes	  
of	   development	   and	   production	   programmes.	   Military	   requirements	   are	   often	   set	  
ambitiously.	  Weapons	  systems	  are	  designed	  to	  be	  able	  to	  operate	  under	  unusual	  conditions.	  
Taking	   the	   total	   development	   and	   production	   time	   (which	   may	   take	   several	   years	   if	   not	  
 4 
decades)	  into	  account,	  military	  planners	  have	  to	  look	  many	  years	  ahead	  to	  ensure	  that	  new	  
equipment	  has	  not	  already	  become	  obsolete	  the	  moment	  it	  is	  entering	  service	  in	  the	  armed	  
forces	  (Lorell,	  1980).	  	  
	   Besides	  technical	  constraints,	  political	  and	  economic	  interests	  have	  a	  strong	  impact	  on	  
the	  management	  and	  outcomes	  of	  programmes.	  In	  his	  case	  study	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  
French-­‐German	  Transall	  C-­‐160	  transport	  aircraft,	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  examples	  of	  European	  
collaboration	  on	   the	  development	  of	  military	  aircraft,	  RAND	  researcher	  Mark	  Lorell	   (1980)	  
illustrates	  the	  political	  tensions	  and	  conflicts	   inherent	  to	  many	  European	  weapons	  systems	  
development	  and	  production	  programs.	  He	  noted	  how	  political	  and	  industrial	  considerations	  
plagued	   the	   programme,	  which	   technologically	   should	   have	   presented	   few	   problems.	   The	  
aircraft	  closely	  resembled	  the	  Hercules.	  The	  difficulties	  that	  engineers	  encountered	  seemed	  
to	  have	  only	  marginally	  affected	  time	  schedule	  and	  costs.	  	  
	   Yet,	   for	   the	   French	   government	   collaboration	  with	  Germany	   served	   a	   larger	   political	  
end.	  It	  was	  a	  means	  to	  gain	  political	  influence	  in	  Germany.	  Lorell	  (1980:	  47)	  notes	  that,	  “[t]he	  
political	  value	  of	  the	  Transall	  program	  far	  outweighed	  its	  utility	  as	  an	  efficient	  and	  effective	  
acquisition	   strategy.	   Its	   importance	   as	   a	   symbol	   of	   Franco-­‐German	   solidarity	   and	   as	   a	  
challenge	   to	  U.S.	  aerospace	  and	   technological	  ascendency	   in	  Europe	  ultimately	   justified	   its	  
continuation.	   European	   countries	   concerned	   with	   efficient	   procurement,	   better	   military	  
performance	   and	   closer	   transatlantic	   relationships	   chose	   the	   Hercules	   (Lorell,	   1980).	   But	  
French	  diplomacy	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  Transall	  programme	  was	  able	  to	  block	  a	  European	  
NATO	  Hercules	   licensed	  programme	   in	   both	   1959	   and	   1963.	   As	   a	   result,	   European	   armed	  
forces	  operate	  two	  different	  aircraft	  with	  similar	  functions.	  	  
Armaments	   programs	   have	   often	   been	   plagued	   by	   political	   instabilities	   as	   actors’	  
interests	   diverge,	   political	   commitments	   change	   over	   the	   course	   of	   a	   program,	   and	  
institutional	   complexities	  become	   salient.	   These	  difficulties	   almost	   seem	   inherent	   in	   these	  
types	   of	   programmes.	   The	   development	   and	   production	   of	   advanced	   aircraft	   generally	  
covers	  long	  periods	  of	  time.	  The	  total	  life	  cycle	  of	  the	  Lynx	  helicopter	  covers	  roughly	  half	  a	  
century,	  beginning	   in	   the	  mid	  1960s	  as	   a	  development	  program	  by	   the	  British	  and	  French	  
governments	  and	  ending	  approximately	  around	  2015	  when	  the	  last	  Lynx	  helicopters	  will	  be	  
taken	  out	  of	  active	  service	   in	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  countries	   in	  which	  the	  helicopter	   is	  used.	  
Often	  requirements	  change	  during	  the	  course	  of	  a	  program,	  when	  new	  governments	  come	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into	   office,	   economic	   and	   budgetary	   conditions	   change,	   and	   some	   security	   threats	  
disappear,	  while	  others	  become	  more	  pending,	  or	  completely	  new	  ones	  emerge.	  	  
Some	   of	   these	   issues	   also	   occur	   in	   the	   problems	   that	   have	   plagued	   the	   European	  
Galileo	  Satellite	  system.	  The	  European	  Galileo	  system	  is	  being	  developed	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  
the	   U.S.	   Global	   Positioning	   System	   (GPS)	   and	   the	   Russian	   GLONASS	   system.	   The	   Galileo	  
system	   is	   meant	   for	   commercial	   applications	   but	   it	   could	   easily	   be	   used	   for	   military	  
purposes.	  It	  is	  designed	  to	  be	  more	  accurate	  than	  the	  U.S.	  GPS	  system	  –	  although	  the	  U.S.	  is	  
currently	   updating	   its	  GPS	   system.	  Not	   only	  would	  Galileo	   give	   a	   boost	   to	   Europe’s	   space	  
technological	   capabilities,	   it	   would	   also	   lessen	   its	   dependence	   on	   the	   GPS	   system,	   which	  
could	  –	  at	  least	  theoretically	  –	  be	  shut	  down	  by	  the	  Pentagon	  (Economist,	  May	  10th	  2007).	  	  
The	  Galileo	  program	  was	  initially	  set	  up	  as	  a	  public	  private	  partnership.	  In	  2002,	  the	  
European	  Commission	  and	   the	  European	  Space	  Agency	  agreed	   to	   fund	  €	  1.1	  billion	  of	   the	  
estimated	  €	  3	  billion	  total	  program	  costs.	  The	  remaining	  €	  1.9	  billion	  was	  planned	  to	  come	  
from	   the	   private	   consortium	   and	   the	   private	   investors.	   The	   private	   consortium	   that	  
eventually	  became	  responsible	   for	   the	  Galileo	  program	  emerged	  out	  of	   the	  merger	  of	   two	  
competing	  bidding	  teams	  –	  a	  political	  compromise	  to	  not	  offend	  the	  loosing	  companies.	  The	  
private	  consortium	   include	  eight	  major	  European	  aerospace	  groups:	  Franco-­‐German	  EADS,	  
France’s	   Thales	   and	   Alcatel-­‐Lucent,	   the	   UK’s	   Inmarsat,	   Italy’s	   Finmeccanica,	   Spain’s	   AENA	  
and	  Hispasat	  and	  the	  German	  consortium	  TeleOp,	  led	  by	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  (Economist,	  May	  
27th	  2007).	  	  
On	   December	   28th	   2005,	   the	   Giove	   A,	   the	   first	   of	   in	   total	   30	   satellites,	   was	  
successfully	   launched	   and	   placed	   in	   orbit.	   Not	   much	   later	   the	   Galileo	   program	   ran	   into	  
serious	  difficulties.	  Disagreements	  over	  the	  funding	  and	  governance	  crippled	  the	  program	  to	  
such	   an	   extent	   that	   for	   months	   almost	   no	   work	   could	   be	   conducted.	   To	   get	   out	   of	   the	  
impasse,	   the	   public	   private	   partnership	   construction	   was	   abandoned	   and	   the	   European	  
Parliament	   and	   the	   European	   Council	   have	   assumed	   overall	   political	   and	   program	  
responsibility.	   For	   the	   oversight	   a	   special	   commission	   was	   set	   up,	   the	   European	   Global	  
Navigation	  Satellite	  System	  Program	  Committee.	  The	  European	  Space	  Agency	  (ESA)	  has	  been	  
awarded	  prime	  contractor	  responsibility	  for	  the	  Galileo	  program	  (Aviation	  Week	  and	  Space	  
Technology,	  2007).	  	  	  
	   These	  examples	  clearly	  illustrate	  the	  tensions	  that	  often	  emerge	  during	  the	  course	  of	  
 6 
an	   international	   development	   program.	  However,	   these	   difficulties	   do	  not	   only	   emerge	   in	  
international	  collaborative	  programmes.	  Many	  nationally	  managed	  programmes	  also	  suffer	  
from	   cost	   overruns,	   delays,	   and	   requirements	   that	   eventually	   cannot	   be	  met.	   But,	   a	   1999	  
McKinsey	  &	  Company	  report	  does	  reveal	  that	  cost	  overruns	  and	  delays	  do	  occur	  more	  often	  
in	   multinational	   programmes.	   This	   review	   of	   75	   major	   European	   defence	   programmes	  
showed	  that	  cost	  overruns	  were	  30	  per	  cent	  higher	  on	  multinational	  programmes	  than	  on	  
similar	  national	  programmes.	   In-­‐service	  dates	  of	  multi-­‐national	  programmes	   slipped	  by	  on	  
average	   by	   40	   per	   cent,	   compared	   to	   a	   slippage	   of	   10	   per	   cent	   on	   nationally	   managed	  
programmes	  (Keohane,	  2002:	  21)	  
	   Note	   also	   that	   often	   these	   general	   indicators	   for	   effective	   and	   efficient	   programme	  
management	   are	   not	   the	   primary	   concerns	   for	   governments	   when	   entering	   collaborative	  
programmes.	   Some	   of	   the	   early	   post	  World	  War	   II	   programmes	   –	   like	   the	   Transall	   C160	  
programme	  mentioned	  previously	  –	  were	  grounded	  in	  different	  logics.	  It	  is	  no	  secret	  that	  the	  
early	  French-­‐German	  collaborative	  programmes	  were	  a	  means	  for	  the	  French	  government	  to	  
exert	   control	   over	   German	   post-­‐war	   rearmament,	   whereas	   for	   Germany	   it	   was	   an	  
instrument	  to	  rebuild	  its	  industrial	  technological	  capabilities	  (Uiterwijk	  and	  Kappert,	  2010).	  	  
	   Despite	   their	   economic	   and	   political	   impact,	   organisational	   theorists	   have	   rarely	  
studied	   these	  programmes.	  An	  exception	   is	   the	  study	  of	  Dussauge	  and	  Garrette	   (1995)	  on	  
the	   control	   and	   performance	   of	   international	   joint	   ventures	   in	   the	   global	   aerospace	   and	  
defence	   industry.	   However,	   they	   only	   covered	   the	   joint	   ventures	   between	   commercial	  
partners.	   Economists	   tend	   to	   look	   at	   the	   market	   conditions	   for	   explaining	   programme	  
performance	   (e.g.	   Hartley,	   2008),	   but	   tend	   to	   leave	   the	   origins	   and	   nature	   of	   conflicts	   of	  
interests	   out	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   their	   analyses.	   Political	   scientists,	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   have	  
developed	  better	  descriptions	  and	  explanations	  of	  the	  defence	  industrial	  policies	  of	  nations,	  
but	  mostly	  ignore	  their	  implications	  for	  individual	  programme	  management	  (e.g.	  Chin	  2004;	  
Reppy,	   2000).	   In	   this	   thesis	   we	   attempt	   to	   gain	   a	   deeper	   understanding	   of	   the	   origins,	  
consequences	   and	   resolution	   of	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   among	   the	   core	   partners	   in	   an	  





1.2	   The	  Multinational	  NH	  90	  Programme	  	  
 
The	  empirical	  setting	  of	  the	  case	  study	  central	   in	  this	  study	   is	  the	  NATO	  Helicopter	  for	  the	  
1990s	  (to	  be	  abbreviated	  as	  NH	  90).	   In	  the	   late	  1970s	  the	  aerospace	   industry	  was	  facing	  a	  
downturn	  and	  many	  aerospace	  companies	  were	   in	  need	  of	  new	  orders.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  
European	   governments	   had	   become	   concerned	   with	   the	   overcapacity	   that	   existed	   in	   the	  
industry	   and	   were	   looking	   greater	   industrial	   consolidation.	   This	   was	   accelerated	   by	   a	  
dissatisfaction	   of	   European	   governments	   and	   aerospace	   and	   defence	   companies	  with	   the	  
protectionist	  defence	  market	  policies	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
	   This	   dissatisfaction	   had	   emerged	   despite	   frequent	   talk	   of	   opening	   up	   a	   “two-­‐way	  
street”	  (Lovering,	  2001)	  for	  defence	  procurement	  not	  only	  allowing	  American	  equipment	  to	  
be	  bought	  by	  European	  governments,	  but	  also	  allowing	  European	  developed	  and	  produced	  
equipment	  to	  be	  bought	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  Thus	  far,	  the	  “Buy	  American”	  Act	  from	  1933	  
had	  prevented	  a	  more	  balanced	  approach	  in	  transatlantic	  procurement	  relations:	  European	  
governments	  purchasing	  American	  equipment	  had	  become	  the	  standard	  practice	  after	   the	  
Second	  World	  War.	  	  	  
	   By	  the	  1970s,	  many	  European	  governments	  realised	  that	  this	  situation	  was	  not	  going	  
to	   change	   anytime	   soon.	   In	   1976,	   the	   Independent	   European	   Programme	   Group	   was	  
established	   allowing	   European	   governments	   to	   seek	   closer	   cooperation	   in	   defence	  
equipment	  matters	  among	  themselves.	  A	  number	  of	  European	  development	  and	  production	  
programmes	   were	   launched	   shortly	   thereafter.	   Italy	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   started	   a	  
development	   and	   production	   programme	   for	   the	   15-­‐ton	   EH	   101	   helicopter.	   France	   and	  
Germany	   were	   setting	   up	   the	   PAH	   2	   Tigre	   attack	   helicopter	   programme.	   Italy,	   the	  
Netherlands,	   Spain	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   were	   planning	   to	   launch	   a	   development	  
programme	   for	   an	   upgrade	   of	   the	   A129	  Mangusta	   attack	   helicopter	   produced	   by	   Agusta	  
from	   Italy.	   And	   France,	   Germany,	   Italy,	   the	   Netherlands	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   were	  
discussing	   a	   joint	   programme	   for	   the	   9-­‐ton	   NH	   90	   helicopter.	   Originally,	   the	   intention	  
emerged	   to	   combine	   these	   different	   programmes	   into	   one,	   producing	   a	   family	   of	  
helicopters.	  This	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  first	  step	  towards	  rationalisation	  of	  the	  European	  helicopter	  
industry	  and	  to	  reduce	  the	  costs	  of	  development	  and	  production.	  	  
	   Yet,	   a	  number	  of	   subsequent	  events	  would	   inhibit	   the	  materialisation	  of	   the	  original	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intention	   to	  achieve	  greater	   rationalisation.	   France	  and	  Germany	  discovered	   that	   they	  did	  
not	  share	  a	  requirement	  for	  the	  EH	  101.	  Moreover,	  France	  and	  Germany	  decided	  to	  jointly	  
develop	  and	  produce	   the	  PAH	  2	  Tigre	  attack	  helicopter	  without	   the	  other	  partners.	   In	   the	  
United	   Kingdom,	   the	   main	   helicopter	   manufacturer	   Westland	   decided	   to	   team	   up	   with	  
United	   Technology	  Corporation’s	   Sikorsky	   to	   produce	  under	   licence	   and	   sell	   the	  American	  
UH-­‐60	  Black	  Hawk.	  In	  1986,	  this	  even	  led	  to	  a	  political	  scandal	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  known	  
as	   the	   “Westland	   Affair”,	   culminating	   in	   the	   resignation	   of	   State	   Secretary	   of	   Defence	  
Heseltine	  (Freedman,	  1987).	  
	   	  Italy	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  bilaterally	  continued	  the	  EH	  101	  programme.	  France	  and	  
Germany	   continued	   their	   bilateral	   PAH	   2	   Tigre	   attack	   helicopter	   programme.	   The	  
multilateral	  programme	  for	  the	  upgrade	  of	  the	  Agusta	  AW	  129	  Mangusta	  collapsed	  in	  1990	  
when	  both	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  decided	  to	  procure	  the	  American	  AH	  64	  
Apache	  attack	  helicopter.	  Only	  the	  NH	  90	  survived	  as	  a	  multilateral	  cooperative	  effort,	  even	  
though	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  abandoned	  the	  programme	  in	  1987	  after	  the	  “Westland	  affair”.	  
In	  1991,	  the	  governments	  of	  France,	  Germany,	  Italy	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  signed	  the	  General	  
Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  governing	  the	  development	  and	  production	  of	  the	  NH	  90.	  	  
	   The	   programme	   involves	   France,	   Germany,	   Italy,	   and	   The	   Netherlands	   as	   the	  
founding	   nations.	   In	   2001,	   Portugal	   also	   became	   a	   member	   of	   the	   NH	   90	   programme,	  
followed	   by	   Belgium	   in	   2004.	   These	   nations	   form	   the	   NATO	   Helicopter	   Management	  
Organisation	  (NAHEMO).	  The	  daily	  management	  became	  delegated	  to	  the	  NATO	  Helicopter	  
Management	   Agency	   (NAHEMA).	   The	   industrial	   partners	   responsible	   for	   the	   design,	  
development,	  and	  production	  of	  the	  NH	  90,	  were	  drawn	  from	  the	  participating	  nations	  and	  
involve	   Eurocopter	   France,	   Eurocopter	   Germany,	   AgustaWestland	   (Italy)	   and	   StorkFokker	  
Aerospace	   (The	  Netherlands).	   These	   four	   industrial	   partners	  have	  organised	   themselves	   in	  
NHIndustries	  (NHI).	  NHI	  serves	  as	  the	  contract	  partner	  for	  the	  respective	  industrial	  partners.	  
The	   NH	   90	   programme	   would	   become	   the	   largest	   European	   helicopter	   programme	   ever	  
launched.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  programme	  has	  not	  been	  without	  its	  controversies.	  The	  original	  
in-­‐service	  date	  of	  mid	  1990s	  slipped	  by	  almost	  a	  decade.	  In	  May	  2004,	  the	  first	  NH	  90	  built	  in	  
series	   production,	  was	   presented	   to	   the	   public	   at	   the	   ILA	  Air	   show	   in	   Berlin	   (StorkFokker,	  
2004).	  And	  at	  times	  the	  programme	  even	  came	  close	  to	  outright	  cancellation.	  In	  2011,	  more	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than	  10	  years	  after	  the	  original	   in-­‐service	  date,	  the	  full-­‐scale	  delivery	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  aircraft	  
has	  really	  started.	  
 
1.3	   Research	  Questions	  
 
	  Managing	   these	   types	   of	   networks	   involves	   a	   process	   of	   almost	   continuing	   negotiation,	  
commitment	  and	  action	  among	   the	  partners	   (Ring	  and	  Van	  de	  Ven,	  1994).	  Put	  differently,	  
actors	   need	   to	   continually	   align	   their	   expectations,	   interests,	   norms	   and	   values.	   It	   is	   this	  
alignment	   that	   forms	   the	  primary	  motivation	   for	  our	   study.	  Conceptually,	  we	  will	  draw	  on	  
neo-­‐institutional	  theory	  in	  organisational	  sociology.	  	  
	   Neo-­‐institutional	  theory	  stresses	  the	  importance	  of	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  context,	  i.e.	  
the	   social,	   economic,	   legal	   and	   historical	   reality,	   in	   which	   organising	   takes	   place.	   It	   is	  
therefore	  sceptical	  towards	  universal	  rational-­‐actor	  models	  of	  individuals	  and	  organisations.	  
But	  when	  exaggerated,	   it	  has	  a	  seamy	  side	  too:	  neo-­‐institutionalism	  has	  been	  criticised	  for	  
having	  an	  over	  socialised	  conception	  of	  human	  action	  (DiMaggio	  and	  Powell,	  1991:	  1-­‐15).	  	  	  
	   In	   addressing	   this	   criticism,	   a	   number	   of	   possible	   research	   directions	   have	   been	  
suggested	   to	   incorporate	   agency	   and	   interests	   more	   fully.	   Oliver	   (1991)	   developed	   a	  
typology	   of	   strategic	   responses	   to	   institutional	   pressures	   available	   to	   organisations	   by	  
injecting	  resource	  dependence	  (Pfeffer	  and	  Salancik,	  1978)	  arguments	  into	  neo-­‐institutional	  
theory.	  DiMaggio	  (1988)	  emphasised	  the	  role	  of	  institutional	  entrepreneurs,	  powerful	  actors	  
who	  are	  capable	  of	  introducing	  new	  ideas	  and	  practices	  and	  mobilizing	  sufficient	  support	  to	  
sustain	  them.	  	  
	   Additionally,	  Friedland	  and	  Alford	  (1991:	  248-­‐249)	  proposed	  the	  notion	  of	  institutional	  
logics	   defining	   them	   as	   “sets	   of	   material	   practices	   and	   symbolic	   constructions”	   that	  
constitute	   an	   institutional	   order’s	   “organizing	   principles”	   and	   which	   are	   “available	   for	  
individuals	   and	   organizations	   to	   elaborate…	   They	   are	   “symbolically	   grounded,	  
organizationally	  structured,	  politically	  defended	  and	  technically	  and	  materially	  constrained”.	  
They	   have	   taken	   the	   notion	   of	   logics	   of	   action	   (Karpik,	   1977)	   to	   the	   institutional	   level,	  
suggesting	   that	   societal	   sectors	   in	   western	   nations	   have	   a	   central	   institutional	   logic,	  
specifying	  not	  only	  what	  ends	  can	  legitimately	  be	  pursued	  but	  also	  the	  means	  for	  achieving	  
them	   (Friedland	   and	   Alford,	   1991).	   These	   institutional	   logics	   provide	   a	   base	   from	   which	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individuals	   and	   organisations	   derive	   their	   identities	   and	   interests	   (Friedland	   and	   Alford,	  
1991).	  	  	  
	   Much	  previous	  research	  on	  institutional	  logics	  has	  been	  conducted	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  
societal	  sector	  or	  the	  organisational	  field.	  The	  idea	  of	  nationally	  based	  institutional	  logics	  in	  
the	   defence	   industry	   we	   will	   propose	   here	   requires	   some	   elaboration.	   Indeed,	   neo-­‐
institutional	   theorists	   have	   stressed	   the	   contradictions	   and	   interdependencies	   between	  
societal	   sectors	   as	   providing	   both	   the	   means	   for	   institutional	   stability	   as	   well	   as	   change	  
(Clemens	   and	   Cook,	   1999;	   Friedland	   and	   Alford,	   1991).	   But	   here	  we	  would	   argue	   lies	   the	  
basis	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  national	   institutional	   logics	  since	  the	  degree	  of	  contradiction	  and	  
interdependency	   is	   likely	   to	   vary	   between	  different	   societies.	   By	   this	  we	  do	  not	   intend	   to	  
confuse	  societies	  with	  states,	  nor	  are	  we	  inclined	  to	  suggest	  that	  all	  institutional	  logics	  have	  
a	  national	  character.	  Yet,	  the	  key	  role	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  major	   institutional	  
sectors,	  cannot	  be	  denied	  in	  many	  social	  spheres.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  state	  as	  the	  central	  arena	  
for	   the	   development	   and	   perpetuation	   of	   key	   institutions	   such	   as	   laws	   and	   regulations,	  
property	  rights	  and	  the	  organisation	  of	  labour	  and	  capital	  is	  precisely	  the	  reason	  that	  many	  
central	   institutional	   logics	   that	   transcend	   national	   boundaries	   produce	   localised	   national	  
variations	  (Whitley,	  2007).	  	  
	   In	   some	   societal	   areas,	   particularly	   those	   that	   pertain	   closely	   to	   a	   nation’s	   ‘raison	  
d’être’,	   the	   national	   character	   is	   more	   strongly	   present.	   Financial	   economic	   and	   defence	  
policy	  making	  fall	  readily	  within	  that	  category.	  Issues	  of	  finance	  and	  defence	  have	  basically	  
dominated	  the	  development	  of	  states.	  Even	  the	  most	  liberal	  of	  all	   individuals	  would	  like	  to	  
retain	  state’s	  prerogative	  in	  these	  matters.	  Empirical	  evidence	  is	  abound.	  In	  the	  Euro-­‐crises	  
that	   has	   persisted	   through	   out	   2010	   the	   dominant	   actors	   are	   central	   governments.	   This	  
remains	   also	   true	   for	   defence	   policy	   matters.	   Although	   international	   forums	   such	   as	   the	  
United	  Nations	  and	  NATO	  play	  an	  important	  role,	  ultimately	  national	  governments	  have	  the	  
final	  voice.	  	  
	   The	  protection	  of	  a	  state’s	  sovereignty	  and	  borders	  against	  outside	  threats	  has	  led	  to	  
the	  situation	  that	  many	  states	  have	  developed	  armed	  forces	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  supplied	  with	  
equipment	  (Mullins,	  1987).	  This	  in	  turn	  has	  had	  the	  effect	  that	  many	  nation-­‐states	  have	  seen	  
the	   emergence	   of	   their	   own	   national	   defence	   industries.	   Indeed,	   highly	   sophisticated	  
weaponry	  such	  as	  aircraft	  carriers,	  aircraft	  and	  tanks	  have	  often	  more	  symbolic	  content	  than	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the	   aversion	   of	   foreign	   threat.	   They	   are	   often	   considered	   to	   be	   symbols	   of	   a	   nation’s	  
prowess	   and	   grandeur	   (Suchman	   and	   Eyre,	   1992).	   	   Henceforth,	   defence	   industries	   have	  
played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  technological	  and	  economic	  development	  of	  many	  nations,	  
although	  its	  influence	  has	  been	  waning	  since	  the	  1980s	  (Nelson,	  1993;	  Reppy,	  2000).	  Yet,	  its	  
key	  strategic	  importance	  for	  many	  nations	  is	  still	  reflected	  in	  the	  exemption	  of	  defence	  and	  
other	  strategic	  products	  from	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  internal	  market	  of	  the	  European	  
Union.	  	  
	   Capitalising	  upon	  the	  foregoing	  we	  suggest	  that	  nations	  are	  likely	  to	  possess	  distinctly	  
national	   institutional	   logics	   in	   defence	   industries	   matters.	   Our	   first	   research	   aim	   involves	  
identifying	   the	   different	   logics	   of	   the	   NH	   90	   stakeholders.	   Thus,	   we	   ask	   the	   following	  
question:	  
	  
1.	   What	   were	   (and	   are)	   the	   national	   logics	   of	   actions	   of	   the	   actors	   (i.e.	   national	  
governments	  and	  industrial	  companies)	  in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme?	  	  
	  
	   After	  we	  have	  identified	  the	  different	  institutional	  logics	  of	  the	  national	  stakeholders	  in	  
the	  NH	  90	  programme,	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  how	  they	  tried	  to	  align	  their	  logics.	  Bacharach,	  
Bamberger	  and	  Sonnenstuhl	  (1996)	  argued	  that	  parties	  involved	  in	  an	  exchange	  relationship	  
need	  at	  least	  some	  minimal	  degree	  of	  alignment	  in	  their	  logics	  for	  an	  exchange	  to	  occur.	  Put	  
differently,	  the	  logics	  of	  parties	  in	  an	  exchange	  relationship	  need	  to	  show	  some	  consistency	  
in	  the	  means-­‐ends	  relationships	  of	  the	  actors	  involved.	  The	  process	  through	  which	  the	  actors	  
in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  established	  this	  consistency	  is	  the	  second	  aim	  with	  which	  we	  are	  
concerned	  in	  this	  research.	  This	  leads	  us	  to	  our	  second	  research	  question,	  	  	  
	  
	   2.	   How	   did	   the	   process	   of	   aligning	   the	   logics	   of	   action	   of	   the	   various	   national	  
	   stakeholders	  unfold?	  
	  
In	   the	   following	   paragraphs,	   we	   will	   detail	   our	   theoretical	   rationale	   and	   our	   intended	  




1.4	   Theoretical	  Motivation	  
 
Institutional	   sociologists	   are	   attentive	   to	   the	   role	   of	   cognitive	   models	   as	   a	   means	   for	  
individuals	  and	  organisations	   to	   reduce	  environmental	  uncertainty,	   and	   to	  make	  collective	  
action	  both	  possible	  and	  meaningful	  (Hargrave	  and	  Ven	  de	  Ven,	  2006;	  Scott,	  2001;	  Thornton,	  
2004;	  Zucker,	  1977).	  Increasingly,	  scholars	  have	  invoked	  the	  concept	  of	  logics	  of	  action	  as	  a	  
mediator	  between	  environmental	  stimuli	  and	  individual	  mental	  structures	  (DiMaggio,	  1997;	  
Karpik,	   1977;	   Thorton;	   2002).	   Logics	   specify	   not	   only	   the	   means	   and	   ends	   that	   are	  
considered	   to	   be	   legitimate,	   but	   also	   which	   actors	   have	   the	   authority	   to	   enable	   and	  
constrain	  the	  possibilities	  of	  others	  (Lounsbury,	  2002:	  255).	  	  	  
	   While	  political	  contestation	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  to	  be	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  competition	  
between	   logics	   of	   action,	   few	   studies	   have	   addressed	   these	   empirically	   (DiMaggio,	   1988;	  
Lawrence,	  2008).	  In	  this	  connection	  Washington	  (2008:	  264)	  argued:	  “Using	  time	  periods	  to	  
demarcate	   shifts	   in	   institutional	   logics	   is	   the	   convention	   in	   research	  on	   institutional	   logics,	  
but	   this	   convention	   also	  makes	   a	   very	  messy	   process	   appear	   linear	   and	   clean…	   However,	  
empirically,	   logics	   are	   probably	  more	   ‘messy’	   and	   are	   hybrids	   or	   combinations	   of	   different	  
logics.	   Presenting	   institutional	   logics	   as	   distinct,	   separate,	   operating	   logics	   is	   also	  
symptomatic	  of	  the	  research	  in	  this	  field.	  Much	  of	  the	  writing	  on	  institutional	  logics	  portray	  
this	   ‘one	   logic	   at	   a	   time’	   idea	   of	   institutional	   logics	   and	   gives	   the	   impression	   that	   logics	  
replace	  each	  other	  due	  to	  an	  exogenous	  shock	  in	  a	  fairly	  orderly	  process.	  However,	  I	  wonder	  
if	  this	  is	  true.”	  
	   Scholars	   have	   repeatedly	   urged	   the	   need	   for	   research	   on	   the	   micro-­‐dynamics	   of	  
institutional	  change	  and	  stability	  (e.g.	  Bacharach,	  Bamberger	  and	  Sonnenstuhl,	  1996,	  2000;	  
Rodrigues,	   2006;	   Powell	   and	   Colyvas,	   2008;	   Thornton	   and	   Ocasio,	   2008).	   They	   claim	   that	  
environments	  and	  organisations	  consist	  of	  multiple	  potentially	  competing	  logics	  (Lounsbury,	  
2007;	  Thorton	  2002).	  Powell	  and	  Colyvas	  remarked	  that	  “rather	  than	  perspectives	  that	  either	  
highlight	  habitual	  replication	  or	  savvy	  change	  agents,	  we	  stress	  that	  most	  micro-­‐motives	  are	  
fairly	   mundane,	   aimed	   at	   interpretation,	   alignment,	   and	   muddling	   through.	   And,	   as	  
individuals	  and	  groups	  engage	  in	  such	  actions	  and	  resist	  others’	  attempts	  as	  well,	  they	  may	  
well	  transform	  logics	  and	  alter	  identities”	  (2008:	  277).	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To	  gain	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  alignment	  processes,	  we	  will	  take	  Weick’s	  sense-­‐	  
making	  perspective.	  Despite	  a	  common	  concern	  with	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  reality,	  neo-­‐
institutional	  theory	  and	  the	  literature	  on	  sense-­‐making	  (Weick,	  1969;	  1995)	  have	  developed	  
relatively	  independent	  from	  one	  another.	  Where	  neo-­‐institutional	  theory	  has	  been	  criticised	  
for	   its	   emphasis	   on	   structure	   over	   agency,	   the	   sense-­‐making	   perspective	   has	   often	   been	  
criticised	  for	  the	  opposite	  (Weber	  and	  Glynn,	  2006;	  Weick,	  Sutcliffe	  and	  Obstfeld,	  2005).	  We	  
will	   use	   the	   sense-­‐making	   perspective	   to	   inform	   our	   analyses	   of	   how	   logics	   in	   the	  NH	   90	  
programme	  have	  become	  aligned,	  if	  only	  limitedly	  so.	  	  
	   International	  public-­‐private	  networks	  provide	   fertile	   ground	   for	   institutional	   tensions	  
as	  a	  consequence	  of	  conflicting	  or	  competing	  institutional	  logics.	  First,	  the	  different	  societal	  
sectors	   (public	   versus	   private)	   to	   which	   the	   actors	   belong	   are	   governed	   by	   alternative	  
institutional	   logics	   (Friedland	   and	   Alford,	   1991;	   Thorton,	   2004).	   Bryson,	   Crosby	   and	   Stone	  
(2006)	  have	  argued	  that	  different	  institutional	  logics	  of	  the	  actors	  involved	  have	  detrimental	  
effects	  on	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  actors	  in	  cross-­‐sector	  collaborations	  are	  able	  to	  agree	  on	  the	  
design,	  conduct	  and	  outcomes	  of	  cross	  sector	  collaborations.	  They	  assert	  that	  in	  cross-­‐sector	  
collaborations	   “logics	   compete	   because	   actions,	   processes,	   norms	   and	   structures	   that	   are	  
seen	   as	   legitimate	   from	   the	   vantage	   point	   of	   one	   institutional	   logic	   may	   be	   seen	   as	   less	  
legitimate	   or	   even	   illegitimate	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   another	   logic”	   (Bryson,	   Crosby	   and	  
Stone,	  2006:	  50).	  	  
	   Second,	  we	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  background	  of	  the	  actors	  (i.e.	  the	  nations	  and	  private	  
defence	   companies)	   provides	   them	   with	   different	   nationally	   coloured	   institutional	   logics.	  
Although	  neo-­‐institutional	  theory	  in	  organisational	  sociology	  has	  for	  long	  tended	  to	  remain	  
rather	  silent	  on	  issues	  of	  nationality	  (see	  for	  a	  notable	  exception	  Luo	  (2007)),	  asserting	  that	  
nations	   may	   have	   different	   logics	   is	   certainly	   not	   inconsistent	   with	   the	   theory’s	   central	  
tenets.	   Many	   theorists	   in	   the	   adjacent	   fields	   of	   institutional	   economics	   and	   institutional	  
political	   science	   have	   described	   the	   wide-­‐ranging	   institutional	   frameworks	   of	   modern	  
capitalist	  nations	  (Quack	  and	  Morgan,	  2000;	  Hall	  and	  Soskice	  2001;	  Whitley	  1994).	  While	  the	  
majority	  of	  these	  studies	  take	  a	  comparative	  approach,	  focusing	  on	  the	  differences	  between	  
nations	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   role	   of	   institutions	   in	   the	   organisation	   of	   the	   economy,	   some	  
studies	   focus	  on	  how	   the	   institutional	   features	  of	   these	  economies	   influence	   the	   interests	  
and	   respective	  policy	  positions	  of	  governments	   in	   international	  negotiations	   (e.g.	  Fioretos,	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2001;	  Bremberg	  and	  Britz,	  2009).	  	  
	   Similarly,	   international	   management	   scholars	   have	   noted	   considerable	   variation	   in	  
national	  cultural	  values	  and	  norms,	  leading	  to	  important	  insights	  with	  regard	  to	  intercultural	  
business	  encounters	  (e.g.	  Hofstede,	  2001;	  Morris,	  Podolny	  and	  Sullivan,	  2008;	  Smith,	  Dugan	  
and	   Trompenaars,	   1996;	   Smith,	   Peterson	   and	   Schwartz,	   2002).	   This	   has	   produced	   a	  
flourishing	   tradition	   in	   the	   field	   of	   cross-­‐cultural	   management	   that	   is	   highly	   relevant	   for	  
international	  institutional	  analysis.	  
	   However,	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   relation	   between	   culture	   and	   institutions	   some	  
ambiguity	   seems	   to	   exist.	  We	  would	   like	   to	   note	   that	   the	   division	   of	   labour	   between	   the	  
social	   science	   disciplines	   is	   primarily	   on	   the	   emphasis	   placed	   on	   different	   dimensions	  
(regulative,	  normative	  or	  cultural-­‐cognitive)	  of	  institutions	  (Scott,	  2001).	  Without	  going	  into	  
a	   detailed	   discussion	   on	   the	   relation	   between	   institutions	   and	   culture	   as	   found	   in	   the	  
literature	   –	   for	   many	   of	   the	   definitions	   of	   these	   concepts	   have	   considerable	   overlap	   –	   it	  
appears	  that	  cultural	  researchers	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  ‘softer’	  side	  of	  culture,	  the	  norms	  and	  
values	  held	  by	  members	  of	  a	  cultural	  group.	   Institutional	  scholars	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  often	  
emphasize	  the	  ‘harder’	  side	  of	  culture,	  such	  as	  the	  laws,	  rules	  and	  policy	  arrangements	  that	  
apply	  to	  members	  of	  a	  group.	  Cultural	  and	  institutional	  approaches	  complement	  each	  other	  
more	   than	   they	  contradict.	  To	   illustrate,	  most	  people	  marry	  out	  of	   love	   for	   their	  partners,	  
pursuing	  ingrained	  cultural	  values	  of	  life,	  as	  they	  commit	  themselves	  more	  deeply	  into	  their	  
relationship.	   Yet,	   the	   institution	   of	  marriage	   also	   comes	  with	   a	   strong	   legal	   status	   and	   an	  
elaborate	  set	  of	  rules.	  	  
In	   sum,	   international	   public	   private	   programmes	   provide	   contexts	   conditioned	   by	  
“structural	  overlap”	  (Thornton	  and	  Ocasio,	  2008).	  Structural	  overlap	  occurs	  when	  “individual	  
roles	  and	  organizational	  structures	  that	  were	  previously	  distinct	  are	  forced	  into	  association”	  
(Thornton	   and	   Ocasio,	   2008:	   116),	   potentially	   generating	   contradictions	   and	   conflict.	   “In	  
these	   social	   locations,	   authority	   structures	   may	   be	   attenuated,	   roles,	   and	   boundaries	   are	  
often	   blurred	   or	   ambiguous,	   and	   participants	   are	   exposed	   to	   multiple	   models	   or	   logics,	  
creating	  opportunities	  and	  resources	  for	  actors	  to	  experiment	  with	  new,	  multiple,	  or	  hybrid	  
forms”	  (Schneiberg	  and	  Clemens,	  2006:	  218-­‐219).	  
	   In	   this	   study,	   we	   use	   an	   in-­‐depth	   qualitative	   case	   study	   on	   the	   development	   and	  
production	  of	  the	  NATO	  Helicopter	   for	  the	  1990s	  (NH	  90).	  We	  examine	  how	  differences	   in	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institutional	   logics	   have	   affected	   the	   cooperation	   between	   the	   different	   partners	   in	   the	  
programme	  and	  how	  actors	  have	  tried	  to	  reconcile	  potentially	  conflicting	  institutional	  logics.	  	  
 
1.5	   Contribution	  	  
 
With	  this	  study	  we	  believe	  to	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  general	  academic	  literature.	  First,	  
instead	  of	  focussing	  on	  the	   level	  of	  the	  organisational	   field,	  which	  has	  been	  for	  some	  time	  
the	   preferred	   level	   of	   analysis	   for	   neo-­‐institutional	   scholars,	   we	   focus	   on	   an	  
interorganisational	   network.	  Many	   field	   level	   studies	  have	  emphasised	  how	  organisational	  
fields	   –	   such	   as	   health	   care	   -­‐	   undergo	   institutional	   change	   when	   an	   institutional	   logic	  
dominating	   a	   particular	   historical	   period	   is	   replaced	  by	   a	   new	  dominant	   institutional	   logic	  
(e.g.	  Reay	  and	  Hinings,	  2005;	  Scott,	  Ruef,	  Mendell	  and	  Caronna,	  2000;	  Thorton,	  2004).	  	  
	   We	  will	  adopt	  a	  micro-­‐institutional	  approach	  (cf.	   Johnson,	  Smith	  and	  Codling,	  2000;	  
Wicks,	   2001),	   to	   see	   in	  what	  manner	   competing	   institutional	   logics	   influence	   cooperation	  
among	  actors	  in	  an	  international	  interorganisational	  network.	  Focusing	  on	  a	  lower	  aggregate	  
than	  societal	  sectors	  and	  organisational	  fields	  allows	  for	  a	  closer	  examination	  of	  the	  micro-­‐
institutional	   processes	   to	  which	   organisations	   and	   individuals	   are	   subjected,	   but	   to	  which	  
they	   also	   contribute;	   and	   which	   they	   in	   turn,	   in	   their	   capacity	   as	   social	   actors,	   may	  
potentially	  harm,	  both	  intentionally	  and	  unintentionally.	  In	  this	  sense,	  our	  study	  is	  based	  on	  
a	   multi-­‐level	   approach	   that	   tries	   to	   disentangle	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   macro-­‐
institutional	   environment	   and	   the	   enactment	   of	   that	   environment	   in	   the	   practices	   of	  
organisations	   and	   the	   individuals	   comprising	   them.	   In	   this	   respect,	  we	  honour	   calls	   in	   the	  
literature	   that	   emphasise	   the	   need	   to	   span	   levels	   (e.g.	   Johnson,	   Melin	   and	   Whittington,	  
2003).	  
	   Moreover,	  we	  aim	  to	  provide	  a	  stronger	  connection	  of	  the	  sense-­‐making	  perspective	  
and	   neo-­‐institutional	   theory.	   Calls	   in	   the	   literature	   have	   stressed	   the	   need	   for	   a	   deeper	  
integration	  of	  these	  streams	  of	  research.	  (Weber	  and	  Glynn,	  2004).	  Nevertheless,	  empirical	  
research	  has	  remained	  scarce.	  We	  believe	  that	  alignment	  could	  provide	  a	  useful	  concept	  to	  
bridge	  these	  different	  perspectives.	  	  
Additionally,	  our	  study	  aims	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  neo-­‐institutional	  theory	  
by	  focusing	  on	  institutional	  logics	  in	  an	  international	  context.	  Most	  work	  in	  neo-­‐institutional	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theory	   has	   focused	   on	   organisational	   fields,	   generally	   in	   a	   national	   context.	   Only	   recently	  
have	   neo-­‐institutional	   scholars	   started	   to	   conduct	   research	   in	   international	   settings,	   for	  
example	   the	   adoption	   of	   an	   organisational	   practice	   by	   subsidiaries	   of	   a	   multinational	  
corporation	   (Kostova	   and	   Roth,	   2002),	   the	   influence	   of	   national	   institutional	   logics	   on	  
employee	  training	  (Luo,	  2007)	  and	  on	  business	  group	  restructuring	   in	  emerging	  economies	  
(Chung	   and	   Luo,	   2008),	   and	   “institutional	   exceptions”	   in	   global	   projects	   (Orr	   and	   Scott,	  
2008).	   Unlike	   neo-­‐institutionalists,	   international	   management	   scholars	   have	   spent	  
considerable	   effort	   in	   examining	   the	   nature,	   persistence	   and	   consequences	   of	   natural	  
cultural	   traits	   (e.g.,	   Hofstede,	   2001;	  D’Iribarne	   1998,	  House	   et	   al.,	   2008).	  We	  will	   use	   this	  
literature	   for	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   values	   and	   beliefs	   of	   the	   governments	   and	  
industrial	  actors	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  nations.	  	  	  
 
1.6	   Structure	  of	  the	  Book	  	  
 
In	  chapter	  two	  we	  will	  elaborate	  on	  our	  theoretical	  background.	  We	  will	  discuss	  the	  origins	  
and	  development	  of	  institutional	  theory	  in	  general.	  Following,	  we	  will	  discuss	  the	  concept	  of	  
logics	  of	  action,	  a	  central	  concept	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  study.	  Finally,	  we	  will	  elaborate	  on	  
how	  sense-­‐making	  processes	  may	  facilitate	  the	  alignment	  of	  logics	  when	  actors	  are	  exposed	  
to	   potentially	   conflicting	   logics	   of	   action.	   In	   chapter	   three	  we	   examine	   the	  main	   cultural,	  
political	   and	   business	   traits	   of	   the	   four	   nations	   involved	   in	   this	   study,	   including	   their	  
industrial	  defence	  policies	  that	  have	  developed	  over	  the	  last	  decades.	  Chapter	  4	  is	  dedicated	  
to	  a	  description	  of	  our	  research	  design	  and	  methods.	  In	  chapter	  five,	  we	  will	  describe	  the	  NH	  
90	  programme	  based	  on	  the	  analysis	  and	  documentary	  material	  collected	  for	  this	  study.	  This	  
is	  a	  precise	  historical	  reconstruction	  of	  what	  has	  happened	  in	  the	  programme.	  Then	  follows	  
our	   analysis	   of	   the	   interviews	   we	   conducted	   with	   35	   key-­‐persons	   that	   are	   or	   have	   been	  
active	  at	  the	  political,	  administrative	  and	  industrial	  sides	  of	  the	  four	  participating	  nations.	  In	  
chapter	   six,	   we	   will	   present	   the	   analysis	   of	   our	   interview	   findings	   revolving	   around	   the	  
institutional	   logics	  of	   the	  nations	  examined.	  Chapter	   seven	  contains	   the	   interview	   findings	  
concerning	  the	  attempts	  to	  align	  the	  various	  logics	  at	  stake.	  In	  the	  concluding	  chapter	  eight	  
we	  will	  critically	  discuss	  the	  process	  of	  alignment	  in	  this	  study,	  highlight	  our	  contributions	  for	  
theory,	  present	  avenues	  for	  future	  research,	  and	  reflect	  on	  the	  practical	  implications	  of	  our	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findings.	  Figure	  1.1	  contains	  a	  schematic	  overview	  of	  the	  book’s	  structure	  and	  the	  relations	  
between	  the	  different	  chapters	  and	  paragraphs.	  	  
	  
	  














































CHAPTER	  2 	  	  	  	  THEORETICAL	  BACKGROUND	  
 
2.1	   Origins	  of	  (Neo-­‐)	  Institutional	  Theory	  	  
 
Interest	   in	  the	  creation,	  maintenance,	  and	  effects	  of	   institutions	  has	  a	   long	  tradition	  in	  the	  
social	   sciences.	   Hodgson	   (2006)	   traced	   the	   concept	   back	   to	   Giambatitsta	   Vico’s	   Scienza	  
Nuova	  of	  1725.	  	  This	  interest	  is	  also	  seen	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  different	  schools	  of	  thought	  in	  
the	   related	   fields	  of	   economics,	   political	   science,	   sociology,	   and	  philosophy.	   Each	  of	   these	  
disciplines	  has	  a	  subfield	  whose	  proponents	  call	   themselves	   institutionalists.	  Each	  of	   these	  
subfields	   also	   has	   a	   branch	   of	   scholars	   who	   call	   themselves	   neo-­‐institutionalists.	   The	  
common	   trait	   of	   neo-­‐institutionalists	   is	   the	   rejection	   of	   the	   rational	   actor	   model	  
characteristic	   of	  most	  mainstream	   economics,	   although	   some	   analysts	   use	   rational	   choice	  
models	  to	  explain	  the	  emergence	  of	   institutions.	   In	  general,	   institutions	  are	  defined	  as	  the	  
“humanly	  devised	  schemas,	  norms,	  and	  regulations	  that	  enable	  and	  constrain	  the	  behavior	  
of	  social	  actors	  and	  make	  social	  life	  predictable	  and	  meaningful”	  (Hargrave	  and	  Van	  de	  Ven,	  
2006:	  866).	  	  
	   This	   definition	   is	   purposively	   broad.	   It	   points	   to	   a	   number	   of	   dimensions	   of	  
institutions.	  These	  dimensions	  also	  reflect	  a	  general	  division	  of	  labour	  among	  institutionalists	  
across	   social	   science	   disciplines.	   Schemas	   refer	   to	   the	   cultural-­‐cognitive	   dimension	   of	  
institutions	   (e.g.	   Scott,	   2001).	   	   DiMaggio	   defined	   schemata	   as	   “knowledge	   structures	   that	  
represent	   objects	   and	   events	   and	   provide	   default	   assumptions	   about	   their	   characteristics,	  
relationships,	  and	  entailments	  under	  conditions	  of	  incomplete	  information”	  (DiMaggio,	  1997:	  
269).	  They	  are	  cultural	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  grounded	  in	  external	  symbolic	  frameworks	  
through	   which	   social	   reality	   is	   referenced	   and	   rationalized	   and	   they	   are	   cognitive	   in	   the	  
sense	   that	   “social	   reality	   is	   interpreted	   and	   constructed	   through	   internalized	   frames	   of	  
meaning	  making”	  (Orr	  and	  Scott,	  2008:	  566).	  	  
Behaviour	   is	   seen	   as	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   interaction	   among	   external	   rituals	   and	  
stimuli,	  and	  internal	  mental	  representations	  (DiMaggio,	  1997:	  277).	  This	  is	  the	  dimension	  of	  
institutions	   that	   organisational	   sociologists	   tend	   to	   focus	   on.	   Norms,	   values,	   codes	   of	  
conduct,	   traditions,	   habits	   and	   customs	   reflect	   the	   normative	   dimensions	   of	   institutions.	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Values	   specify	   what	   is	   preferred	   and	   norms	   how	   things	   should	   be	   done	   (Scott,	   2001).	  
Political	   scientists	   have	   tended	   to	   focus	   upon	   this	   dimension	   of	   institutions.	   Rules	   and	  
regulations,	  as	  for	  example	  found	  in	  the	  Law,	  constitute	  the	  final	  dimension	  of	  institutions.	  
This	  is	  the	  dimension	  most	  frequently	  addressed	  by	  economists.	  What	  are	  at	  stake	  here	  are	  
explicit	  regulatory	  processes	  involving	  rule	  setting,	  monitoring	  and	  sanctioning.	  	  
In	   an	   effort	   to	   integrate	   the	  different	   perspectives	  on	   institutions,	   Scott	   (2001:	   48)	  
provided	  the	  following	  omnibus	  conception	  of	  institutions:	  	  
- institutions	  are	  social	  structures	  that	  have	  attained	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  resilience;	  	  
- institutions	  are	  composed	  of	  cultured-­‐cognitive,	  normative	  and	  regulative	  elements;	  
that,	  together	  with	  associated	  activities	  and	  resources,	  provide	  stability	  and	  meaning	  
to	  social	  life;	  	  
- institutions	  are	  transmitted	  by	  various	  types	  of	  carriers,	   including	  symbolic	  systems,	  
relational	  systems,	  routines,	  and	  artefacts;	  	  
- institutions	   operate	   at	   multiple	   levels	   of	   jurisdiction,	   from	   the	   world	   system	   to	  
localized	  interpersonal	  relationships.	  	  
Institutions	   by	   definition	   connote	   stability	   but	   undoubtedly	   they	   are	   subject	   to	  
change	   processes	   too.	   The	   common	   interest	   is	   in	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   institutions	   provide	  
stability	  and	  meaning	   to	   social	   life.	   In	   the	   following	  paragraphs,	  we	  will	  briefly	  discuss	   the	  
uses	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  institution	  as	  it	  is	  used	  across	  the	  different	  disciplines.	  	  
First,	  we	  will	   focus	  upon	   the	   “old”	   institutionalisms	  within	   the	  different	  disciplines.	  
Then,	   we	   will	   focus	   upon	   the	   neo-­‐institutional	   traditions	   within	   economics	   and	   political	  
science.	   Neo-­‐institutional	   theory	   as	   developed	   by	   organisational	   sociologists,	   which	   is	   the	  
main	   theoretical	   focus	   of	   this	   dissertation,	   will	   be	   discussed	  more	   in	   depth	   in	   a	   separate	  
section.	  	  
Yet,	  before	  we	  proceed	  we	  would	  like	  to	  justify	  our	  focus	  on	  institutions	  rather	  than	  
on	   culture.	   Obviously	   there	   is	   much	   overlap	   between	   the	   definitions	   of	   culture	   and	  
institutions.	   The	   emphasis	   on	   culture	   as	   values,	   schematic	   representations,	   knowledge	  
structures,	  belief	  and	  meaning	  systems	  transmitted	  through	  various	  carriers	  mimics	  to	  a	  high	  
degree	   Clifford	   Geertz’	   definition	   of	   culture.	   Culture,	   Geertz	   (1973:	   89)	   notes,	   “denotes	   a	  
historically	   transmitted	   pattern	   of	   meanings	   embodied	   in	   symbols,	   a	   system	   of	   inherited	  
conceptions	  expressed	  in	  symbolic	  forms	  by	  means	  of	  which	  men	  communicate,	  perpetuate,	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and	   develop	   their	   knowledge	   about	   and	   attitudes	   toward	   life.”	   It	   is	   also	   close	   to	   the	  
conception	  of	  culture	  offered	  by	  Geert	  Hofstede	  (2001:	  9)	  as	  “the	  collective	  programming	  of	  
the	  mind	  that	  distinguishes	  the	  members	  of	  one	  group	  or	  category	  of	  people	  from	  another.”	  
The	   emphasis	   placed	   on	   institutions	   in	   this	   study	   is	   predominantly	   driven	   by	   the	   relative	  
importance	  of	  the	  regulative	  aspects	  of	   international	  cooperation.	  Laws,	  policies,	  rules	  and	  
regulations	  exert	  a	  strong	  on	  these	  programmes.	  	  
  
2.1.1	   Economic	  Institutionalism	  
The	  origins	  of	  institutional	  theory	  in	  economics	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  “Methodenstreit”,	  the	  
discussion	  concerning	   the	  appropriate	   scientific	  methods	   in	   the	   social	   sciences,	   in	   the	   late	  
nineteenth	  century	  (Scott,	  2001).	  A	  group	  of	  German	  and	  Austrian	  scholars,	  drawing	  on	  work	  
from	  Hegel	  and	  Kant,	  challenged	  the	  main	  assumptions	  underlying	  the	  classical	  convention	  
in	   economics,	   that	   economics	   could	   be	   reduced	   to	   a	   set	   of	   universal	   laws	   and	   principles.	  
These	  scholars	  emphasized	  that	  economic	  activity	  was	  rooted	  in	  a	  social	  framework,	  shaped	  
by	   a	   set	   of	   cultural	   and	   historical	   patterns.	   These	   scholars	   eschewed	   the	   classic	   notion	   of	  
“economic	  man”,	  and	  advocated	  an	  economics	  informed	  by	  more	  realistic	  models	  of	  human	  
behaviour.	  	  Carl	  Menger,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  defenders	  of	  the	  classical	  approach,	  insisted	  on	  the	  
value	  of	  simplifying	  assumptions	  and	  economic	  models	  that	  could	  span	  both	  time	  and	  space.	  
While	   he	   did	   not	   deny	   the	   importance	   of	   broader	   historical	   and	   institutional	   forces	   in	  
shaping	  economic	  life,	  he	  rather	  argued	  that	  social	  phenomena	  themselves	  deserved	  greater	  
theoretical	  explanation	  (Scott,	  2001:	  2).	  	  
Reconciliation	   between	   the	   protagonists	   and	   antagonists	   of	   an	   institutionally	  
informed	   economics	   proved	   impossible	   and	   it	   was	   a	   couple	   of	   decades	   later	   that	   a	   few	  
institutional	  economists	  gained	  prominence	  in	  the	  field.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  criticisers	  of	  “Homo	  
Ecomomicus”	  was	  Thorstein	  Veblen.	  He	  took	  stance	  with	  the	  “hedonistic	  conception	  of	  man	  
as	  that	  of	  a	  lightning	  calculator	  of	  pleasures	  and	  pain”	  (1898/1998:	  403).	  Instead,	  he	  argued	  
that	  much	  behaviour	  was	  governed	  by	  habits	  of	  thought	  and	  conventions.	  	  
Another	  prominent	  figure	  among	  institutional	  economists	  was	  John	  R.	  Commons.	  He	  
too	   was	   unsatisfied	   with	   conventional	   wisdom	   of	   economics,	   and	   argued	   that	   the	  
transaction	  would	  be	  a	  more	  suitable	  unit	  of	  analysis	  for	  economics.	  “The	  transaction	  is	  two	  
or	   more	   wills	   giving,	   taking,	   persuading,	   coercing,	   defrauding,	   commanding,	   obeying,	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competing,	   governing,	   in	   a	   world	   of	   scarcity,	   mechanisms	   and	   rules	   of	   conduct”	   (Cited	   in	  
Scott,	  2001:	  3).	  	  As	  Van	  de	  Ven	  (1993)	  remarked	  in	  this	  notion	  of	  the	  transaction,	  Commons	  
went	   further	   than	   the	   accounts	   of	   the	   transaction	   given	   by	   most	   neo-­‐institutional	  
economists	   working	   within	   the	   transaction-­‐costs	   theory	   as	   developed	   decades	   later	   by	  
Williamson	   (1981).	   “To	   Commons,	   the	   institutions	   existing	   at	   a	   specific	   time	   represent	  
nothing	  more	   than	   imperfect,	   and	  pragmatic	   solutions	   to	   reconcile	   past	   conflicts;	   they	  are	  
solutions	  that	  consist	  of	  a	  set	  of	  rights	  and	  duties,	  an	  authority	  for	  enforcing	  them,	  and	  some	  
degree	  of	  adherence	  to	  collective	  norms	  of	  prudent	  reasonable	  behavior”	  (Van	  de	  Ven	  1993:	  
142).	  Commons	  paid	  careful	  attention	  to	  how	  collective	  action	  both	  constrained	  and	  enabled	  
individual	  action.	  	  
In	  many	  respects	  the	  interests	  of	  these	  early	  economic	  institutionalists	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  
affinity	  with	   the	  neo-­‐institutional	   tradition	   in	  organisational	   sociology	  and	   its	   emphasis	  on	  
the	   role	   of	   habit	   and	   convention	   in	   economic	   processes.	   Not	   surprisingly,	   the	   previously	  
mentioned	  Thorstein	  Veblen	  is	  also	  known	  as	  one	  of	  the	  founding	  fathers	  of	  sociology.	  	  This	  
approach	  stressing	  the	  role	  of	  habit	  and	  convention,	  however,	  is	  less	  common	  in	  the	  work	  of	  
current	  neo-­‐institutional	  economists	  (Scott,	  2001).	  They	  tend	  to	  place	  much	  more	  emphasis	  
on	  questions	  related	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  institutions	  based	  on	  rational-­‐actor	  models.	  Mancur	  
Olson,	   for	   example,	   in	   his	   formulation	   of	   the	   collective	   action	   draws	   heavily	   on	   rational-­‐
economic	  principles,	  when	  he	  proposes	  that	  rational	  self-­‐interested	  individuals	  as	  members	  
of	  large	  organisations	  will	  not	  act	  collectively	  when	  there	  is	  no	  alternative	  incentive	  involved	  
besides	  the	  obtainment	  of	  the	  common	  interest	  (Olson,	  1965).	  	  
 
2.1.2	   Political	  Institutionalism	  
In	  political	   science,	  around	   the	   turn	  of	   the	   century,	   a	  number	  of	  prominent	   scholars	  were	  
engaged	   in	   the	   examination	   of	   institutions.	   Most	   notable	   are	   two	   Ivy	   League	   university	  
presidents,	   Woodrow	   Wilson,	   who	   would	   later	   become	   President	   of	   the	   U.S.,	   and	   T.D.	  
Wilson.	  Both	  were	   interested	   in	   the	  examination	  of	  workings	   and	   functioning	  of	   the	   state	  
(Peters,	  2005).	  However,	  as	  Peters	  (2005:	  5)	  noted,	  later	  the	  state	  was	  generally	  left	  out	  of	  
the	   scope	   in	   American	   political	   science	   until	   Theda	   Skocpol	   and	   others	   (Evans,	  
Rueschemeyer	  and	  Skocpol,	  1985)	  revived	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  state	  during	  the	  mid	  1980s.	  In	  
Europe,	  political	  science	  was	  emerging	  as	  a	  separate	  field	  of	  inquiry	  around	  the	  turn	  of	  the	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century	  (Peters,	  2005).	  Political	  institutions	  were	  generally	  studied	  within	  other	  fields,	  most	  
notably	  law.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  much	  of	  the	  work	  relied	  on	  the	  formal	  analysis	  of	  institutions	  
(Peters,	  2005).	  
	  
2.1.3	   Sociological	  Institutionalism	  	  
Sociologists	  have	  historically	  displayed	  a	  more	  consistent	  emphasis	  on	  institutions	  during	  the	  
former	  century	   (Scott,	  2001).	  As	  one	  of	   the	  earlier	  authors	   in	  American	  sociology,	  Herbert	  
Spencer	  developed	  an	  influential	  conception	  of	  institutions,	  which	  is	  still	  reflected	  in	  writings	  
in	  current	  mainstream	  sociology.	  He	  viewed	  society	  as	  an	  organic	  system	  evolving	  through	  
time.	  Adaptation	  of	  the	  system	  to	   its	  context	  was	  achieved	  via	  the	  functions	  of	  specialized	  
“organs”	  structured	  as	  institutional	  subsystems.	  “Not	  only	  has	  a	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  a	  power	  
of	  growth	  and	  development,	  but	  each	  institution	  set	  up	  in	  it	  has	  the	  like	  –	  draws	  to	  itself	  units	  
of	   the	   society	   and	  nutriment	   for	   them,	   and	   tends	   ever	   to	  multiply	   and	   ramify.	   Indeed,	   the	  
instinct	  of	  self-­‐preservation	  in	  each	  institution	  soon	  becomes	  dominant	  over	  everything	  else;	  
and	   maintains	   it	   when	   it	   performs	   some	   quite	   other	   function	   than	   that	   intended,	   or	   no	  
function	  at	  all”	  (Spencer,	  1894/2006:	  19).	  
The	  ideas	  of	  Spencer	  are	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  works	  of	  William	  Graham	  Sumner.	  He	  
defined	   institutions	   as	   consisting	   of	   a	   concept	   and	   a	   structure.	   The	   concept	   defines	   the	  
purpose	   or	   function	   of	   the	   institution,	   and	   the	   structure	   is	   the	   materialisation	   of	   the	  
concept,	  i.e.	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  idea	  is	  put	  into	  practice	  (see	  Scott,	  2001:	  Ch.1).	  Among	  
European	   theorists	   especially	   Max	   Weber	   has	   had	   a	   profound	   influence	   on	   institutional	  
theory.	  Although	  he	  did	  not	  use	  the	  term	  institutions,	  he	  often	  showed	  a	  concern	  with	  how	  
cultural	  and	  institutional	  understandings	  shape	  social	  structures	  and	  behaviour.	  	  
	  
2.1.4	   New	  Institutional	  Economics	  	  
Nobel	  Prize	  winner	  Ronald	  Coase	  (1937)	  is	  broadly	  acknowledged	  to	  be	  the	  father	  of	  the	  new	  
institutional	  economics.	  His	  essay	  “The	  Nature	  of	  the	  Firm”	  asks	  if	  markets	  are	  so	  efficient,	  
why	  do	  we	  see	  so	  many	  firms?	  Basically,	  he	  was	  motivated	  to	  find	  an	  answer	  to	  why	  some	  
economic	  exchanges	  are	  carried	  out	  in	  firms	  instead	  on	  markets.	  His	  principle	  answer	  is	  that	  
there	  must	  be	  “a	  cost	  of	  using	  the	  price	  mechanism”	  (1937:	  390).	  These	  “transaction	  costs”	  
 24 
consists	  of	  “the	  costs	  of	  negotiating	  and	  concluding	  a	  separate	  contract	  for	  each	  exchange	  
transaction	  which	  takes	  place	  on	  a	  market”	  (1937:	  390-­‐391).	  	  
Much	  later	  Oliver	  Williamson	  picked	  up	  the	  ideas	  and	  extended	  them	  in	  what	  is	  now	  
widely	   known	   as	   transaction	   cost	   economics	   (TCE).	   Williamson	   (1981)	   departs	   from	   neo-­‐
classical	   economics	   by	   assuming	   that	   humans	   are	   (1)	   boundedly	   rational,	   as	   well	   as	   (2)	  
opportunity	   seekers	   with	   guile	   (Williamson	   1981:	   533).	   Williamson	   proposed	   that	  
transactions	   can	   be	  mediated	   trough	   a	   continuum	   of	   governance	   structures	   ranging	   from	  
markets	  to	  organisations,	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  hybrid	  forms,	  such	  as	  alliances	  and	  joint	  ventures	  
constituting	  the	  intermediate	  range	  of	  the	  continuum.	  The	  choice	  of	  a	  governance	  structure	  
to	   carry	   out	   a	   particular	   transaction	   depends	   on	   a	   number	   of	   characteristics	   of	   the	  
transaction,	   including	   the	   repetitive	   nature	   of	   the	   transaction,	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   a	  
transaction	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  organisation,	  and	  uncertainty	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  final	  outcome	  
of	   the	   transaction.	  While	  Williamson’s	   transaction	   costs	   economics	  has	   lessened	   the	  main	  
assumptions	  of	   transaction	  costs	  economics,	  his	  approach	  remains	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  
rational	  actor	  models	  that	  much	  of	  economics	  draws	  upon.	  	  
A	  related	  approach,	  within	  what	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  new	  institutionalism	  in	  
economics,	  is	  the	  one	  developed	  by	  economic	  historian	  and	  Nobel	  Laureate	  Douglas	  North.	  
His	  approach	  also	  breaks	   further	  with	  neoclassical	  economics.	  “A	  neoclassical	  world	  would	  
be	  a	   jungle	  and	  no	  society	  would	  be	  viable”	   (North,	  1981:	  11;	  cited	   in	  Godard,	  2002:	  249).	  
Where	   Williamson	   is	   primarily	   concerned	   with	   understanding	   how	   different	   forms	   of	  
governance	   structures	   economize	   on	   transactions	   costs	   at	   the	   organisational	   level.	   North	  
(1990)	  focuses	  on	  how	  institutions	  drive	  economic	  development	  and	  change	  in	  societies.	  His	  
conception	   of	   institutions	   as	   both	   formal	   and	   informal	   rules	   that	   constrain	   individual	  
behaviour	   and	   shape	   human	   interaction	   (North,	   1990)	   is	   also	   more	   akin	   to	   the	  
conceptualisation	   of	   institutions	   by	   earlier	   institutional	   economists.	   While	   North	   (1990)	  
shares	  with	  Williamson	  an	   interest	   in	   transaction	  costs,	  he	   tends	   to	   focus	  on	  how	  broader	  
institutional	   frameworks	   drive	   transaction	   costs.	   Williamson	   instead	   tends	   to	   focus	   on	  
transaction	  costs	  as	  determining	  the	  choice	  for	  a	  particular	  governance	  structure	  (Hirsch	  and	  
Lounsbury,	  1996;	  Scott,	  2001).	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2.1.5	   New	  Institutionalism	  in	  Political	  Science	  	  
Within	  the	  new	  institutionalism	  in	  political	  science,	  two	  rival	  camps	  have	  emerged:	  historical	  
institutionalists	  and	  rational	  choice	  institutionalists.	  Both	  point	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  political	  
institutions,	  but	  hold	  different	  opinions	  on	  a	  number	  of	  issues.	  	  
Historical	   institutionalists	   emphasize	   that	   political	   institutions	   are	   not	   simply	  
determined	   by	   society,	   but	   exert	   themselves	   independent	   effects	   upon	   society.	   They	   also	  
note	   that	   preferences	   are	   not	   exogenous	   to	   policy	   processes,	   but	   are	   at	   least	   partially	  
shaped	  in	  political	  processes.	  Furthermore,	  they	  tend	  to	  reject	  that	  history	   is	  efficient,	  and	  
that	  many	  outcomes	  are	  not	  necessarily	  the	  result	  of	  purposive	  behaviour,	  but	  rather	  from	  
unintended	  consequences	  and	  constrained	  choice	  (March	  and	  Olsen,	  1984).	  Similar	  to	  North	  
(1990),	   they	   also	   draw	   on	   a	   general	   definition	   of	   the	   institutions	   as	   “both	   formal	  
organizations	   and	   informal	   rules	   and	   procedures	   that	   structure	   conduct”	   (Thelen	   and	  
Steinmo,	  1992:	  2).	  	  
This	  is	  also	  seen	  in	  the	  distinction	  that	  March	  and	  Olsen	  (1989)	  have	  drawn	  between	  
human	  action	  based	  on	  a	  “logic	  of	  instrumentality”	  or	  expected	  consequences	  and	  a	  “logic	  of	  
appropriateness“.	   In	   the	   former,	   the	   basic	   question	  with	  which	   an	   actor	   is	   confronted	   is:	  
“What	  is	  in	  it	  for	  me?”,	  while	  in	  the	  latter	  the	  question	  that	  needs	  an	  answer	  is	  “What	  does	  a	  
person	  like	  me	  do	  in	  these	  kinds	  of	  situations?”	  Most	  rational	  choice	  theorists	  tend	  to	  focus	  
on	  the	  former.	  Neo-­‐institutionalists	  tend	  to	  be	  equally	  interested	  in	  the	  latter.	  	  
In	   rational	   choice	   institutionalism,	   institutions	   tend	   to	   enter	   the	   political	   arena	   as	  
constraints	  on	  self-­‐interested	  behaviour,	  providing	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  structuring	  actors’	  
preferences	   and	   interests.	   Rational	   choice	   institutionalists	   are	   unified	   by	   assuming	   that	  
individuals	   will	   maximize	   their	   interests	   and	   that	   this	   maximisation	   will	   produce	  
dysfunctional	  behaviour	  at	  the	  collective	  level,	  such	  as	  free-­‐riding	  and	  shirking	  (Peters,	  2005:	  
49-­‐50).	  Given	  this	  assumption	  they	  are	  inclined	  to	  focus	  on	  questions	  of	  institutional	  design	  
(Peters,	   2005).	   This	   for	   example,	   is	   visible	   in	   the	   Institutional	   Analysis	   and	   Development	  
Framework,	  which	  focuses	  on	  how	  the	  interaction	  the	  context,	  action	  arena	  and	  patterns	  of	  
interaction	  dictate	  the	  outcomes	  of	  a	  policy	  reform	  (Ostrom,	  Gardner,	  and	  Walker,	  1994).	  	  	  
Elinor	   Ostrom	   who	   together	   with	   Oliver	   Williamson	   received	   the	   Nobel	   Prize	   in	  
Economics	  for	  their	  research	  on	  the	  working	  of	  institutions	  in	  economic	  life,	  emphasized	  the	  
rule-­‐based	   nature	   of	   institutions.	   Ostrom	   (1990:	   51)	   defined	   institutions	   as,	   “the	   sets	   of	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working	   rules	   that	  are	  used	   to	  determine	  who	   is	  eligible	   to	  make	  decisions	   in	   some	  arena,	  
what	   actions	   are	   allowed	   or	   constrained,	   what	   aggregation	   rules	   will	   be	   used,	   what	  
information	  must	  or	  must	  not	  be	  provided,	  and	  what	  payoffs	  will	  be	  assigned	  to	  individuals	  
dependent	   on	   their	   actions”.	   All	   rules	   contain	   prescriptions	   that	   forbid,	   permit,	   or	   require	  
some	   action	   or	   outcome.	   Her	   work	   focussing	   upon	   the	   formation	   and	   perpetuation	   of	  
institutions	   in	   so-­‐called	   ‘common	   pool	   resources’	   extended	   the	   economic	   analysis	   of	  
institutions	  into	  sectors	  that	  were	  traditionally	  regarded	  as	  ‘less’	  economic,	  belonging	  more	  
or	  less	  to	  the	  public,	  non-­‐profit	  sector.	  	  	  	  
Historical	   institutionalists,	   tend	  to	  go	  beyond	  this,	   trying	  to	  explain	  how	  institutions	  
themselves	   shape	   the	   interests	   and	   preferences	   of	   actors	   (Thelen	   and	   Steinmo,	   1992).	  
Although	   differences	   between	   these	   approaches	   continue	   to	   persist	   some	   authors	   have	  
recently	  noted	  that	  the	  differences	  may	  have	  been	  exaggerated	  (e.g.	  Campbell,	  2004).	  	  	  	  
  
2.2	   Origins	  of	  Neo-­‐Institutional	  Theory	  in	  Organisational	  Sociology	  	  
 
The	  foundations	  for	  neo-­‐institutional	  theory	  in	  organisational	  sociology	  were	  laid	  out	  in	  two	  
articles,	   one	  written	  by	  Meyer	   and	  Rowan	   (1977)	   and	   the	  other	  written	  by	  DiMaggio	   and	  
Powell	   (1983).	   They	   were	   in	   part	   a	   reaction	   and	   in	   part	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   earlier	   “old	  
institutionalist”	   work	   authored	   by	   Philip	   Selznick	   (1949)	   and	   associates,	   who	   in	   their	  
scepticism	   towards	   rational	   actor	   models	   had	   highlighted	   the	   “shadowlands	   of	   informal	  
interaction”	  in	  organisations	  (Selznick,	  1949:	  260;	  see	  also:	  Powell	  and	  DiMaggio,	  1991).	  	  	  
 
2.2.1	   Meyer	  and	  Rowan	  on	  Rationalized	  Myths	  	  
Meyer	   and	   Rowan	   (1977:	   341)	   argued	   that	   the	   formal	   structure	   of	  many	   organisations	   in	  
complex	   modern	   societies	   reflected	   rationalized	   myths	   prevalent	   in	   their	   institutional	  
environments.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Berger	  and	  Luckmann	  (1967)	  they	  asserted	  that:	  	  
“Institutionalized	   rules	   are	   classifications	   built	   into	   society	   as	   reciprocated	  
typifications	  or	   interpretations	   (Berger	  and	  Luckmann,	  1967:	  54).	  Such	  rules	  may	  be	  simply	  
taken	  for	  granted	  or	  may	  be	  supported	  by	  public	  opinion	  or	  the	  force	  of	  law	  (Starbuck,	  1976).	  
Institutions	  inevitably	  involve	  normative	  obligations	  but	  often	  enter	  into	  social	   life	  primarily	  
 27 
as	   facts,	   which	   must	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   by	   actors.	   Institutionalization	   involves	   the	  
processes	   by	  which	   social	   processes,	   obligations,	   or	   actualities	   come	   to	   take	   on	   a	   rulelike	  
status	  in	  social	  thought	  and	  action.”	  	  
Organisations	  in	  a	  sector	  tend	  to	  become	  isomorphic,	  i.e.	  they	  tend	  to	  take	  the	  same	  
shape	   and	   develop	   the	   same	   content,	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   these	   rationalized	   myths,	  
incorporating	  them	  into	  their	   formal	  structures,	   to	  gain	  social	  support	  and	   legitimacy	  from	  
their	   wider	   environment,	   thereby	   ensuring	   their	   chances	   of	   survival.	   Legitimacy	   –	   “...	   a	  
generalized	  perception	  or	  assumption	  that	   the	  actions	  of	  an	  entity	  are	  desirable,	  proper	  or	  
appropriate	  within	  some	  socially	  constructed	  system	  of	  norms,	  values,	  beliefs	  and	  definition”	  
(Suchman,	  1995:	  574)	  –	  was	  awarded	  primacy	  over	  efficiency.	  Organisations	  survive	  not	  so	  
much	  because	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  efficiently	  coordinating	  and	  controlling	  their	  activities,	  but	  
because	  they	  are	  able	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  rules,	  norms,	  values	  and	  mores	  prevalent	   in	  their	  
institutional	  environment	  (Meyer	  and	  Rowan,	  1977).	  	  
However,	  Meyer	   and	   Rowan	   (1977)	   also	   noted	   that	   conformity	   to	   institutionalized	  
rules	  and	  typifications	  often	  conflict	  with	  efficiency	  criteria.	  As	  a	  result	  organisations	  tend	  to	  
buffer	  their	  formal	  structure	  from	  their	  technical	  core	  and	  there	  is	  only	  a	  loose	  coupling	  of	  
formal	   organisational	   structure	   and	   actual	   technical	   activities	   performed	   within	   the	  
organisation.	  Thus,	  organisations’	  conformity	  to	  institutional	  pressures	  is	  largely	  ceremonial.	  
They	  derived	  their	  insights	  from	  their	  research	  of	  public	  schools,	  in	  which	  new	  programmes	  
aimed	   to	   improve	   education	   of	   students.	   Meyer	   and	   Rowan	   (1977)	   observed	   that	   while	  
many	  of	  the	  schools	  had	  formally	  implemented	  these	  programmes,	  actual	  teaching	  practices	  
in	  the	  class-­‐	  room	  basically	  remained	  the	  same.   
 
2.2.2	   DiMaggio	  and	  Powell’s	  revisiting	  of	  Weber’s	  Iron	  Cage	  
DiMaggio	  and	  Powell	   (1983)	  extended	  the	   institutional	   isomorphism	  argument	  a	  few	  years	  
later.	   They	   distinguished	   three	   types	   of	   institutional	   isomorphism,	   i.e.	   the	   tendency	   that	  
organisations	  –	  predominantly	  within	  one	  sector	  -­‐	  tend	  to	  take	  the	  same	  shape	  and	  develop	  
the	   same	   policies	   and	   procedures.	   Coercive	   isomorphism,	   which	   is	   dependent	   on	   force,	  
concerns	  the	  ability	  to	  set	  rules	  and	  apply	  sanctions	  by	  powerful	  actors	  (e.g.	  the	  state)	  in	  the	  
institutional	  environment	  of	  organisations.	  Normative	  isomorphism	  is	  based	  on	  the	  pressure	  
for	  conformity	  to	  norms	  and	  values,	  and	  has	  been	  associated	  primarily	  with	  professional	  and	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trade	   associations.	   Mimetic	   isomorphism,	   finally,	   involves	   the	   mimicking	   of	   other	  
organisations	   under	   conditions	   of	   environmental	   uncertainty.	  DiMaggio	   and	  Powell	   (1983:	  
148)	  suggested	  that	  these	   institutional	  mechanisms	  would	  exert	  their	  greatest	   influence	  at	  
the	   level	   of	   the	   organisational	   field	   or	   sector,	   which	   they	   intended	   to	   mean:	   “those	  
organizations	   that	   in	   the	   aggregate	   constitute	   a	   recognized	   area	   of	   institutional	   life:	   key	  
suppliers,	   resource	   and	   product	   consumers,	   regulatory	   agencies,	   and	   other	   organizations	  
that	  produce	  similar	  services	  or	  products.”	  	  
Their	   arguments	   generated	   a	   spin-­‐off	   of	   empirical	   research.	   Studies	   typically	  
examined	   how	   a	  wide	   range	   of	   different	   types	   innovations,	   including	   civil	   service	   reforms	  
(Tolbert	  and	  Zucker,	  1983),	  total	  quality	  management	  (Westphal,	  Gulati	  and	  Shortell,	  1997),	  
the	  adoption	  of	  the	  multidivisional	  form	  (Fligstein,	  1985;	  Palmer,	  Jennings	  and	  Zhou,	  1993),	  
modern	  personnel	  administration	  (Baron,	  Dobbin	  and	  Jennings,	  1986),	  and	  human	  resource	  
management	   (Dobbin	   and	   Sutton,	   1998)	   diffused	   within	   in	   an	   organisational	   field	   (see	  
Mizruchi	  and	  Fein,	  1999	  for	  a	  review	  and	  critique).	  However,	  as	  Mizruchi	  and	  Fein	  (1999)	  in	  
their	  analysis	  revealed,	  a	  disproportionally	  large	  number	  of	  empirical	  studies	  focused	  solely	  
on	   the	   mimetic	   isomorphism	   hypothesis.	   	   This	   seems	   consistent	   with	   the	   emphasis	   then	  
placed	   by	   sociological	   neo-­‐institutional	   theorists	   on	   the	   cultural-­‐cognitive	   dimension	   of	  
institutions	  (Scott,	  2001).	  	  
 
2.2.3	   Unintended	  Consequences	  of	  the	  Original	  Statements	  
The	   early	   theoretical	   statements	   of	   Rowan	   and	   Meyer	   (1977)	   and	   DiMaggio	   and	   Powell	  
(1983)	  and	  the	  subsequent	  empirical	  work	  produced	  some	  unintended	  consequences.	  First,	  
an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  macro-­‐side	  of	  institutions	  had	  seemed	  to	  develop.	  Although	  institutional	  
arguments	   apply	   at	   all	   levels,	   from	   interpersonal	   systems	   to	   world	   systems	   (Scott,	   2008;	  
Zucker,	   1977),	   the	   early	   accounts	   paved	   the	  way	   for	   neo-­‐institutionalists	   to	   analyse	   those	  
social	   systems	   in	   which	   institutional	   effects	   would	   expectedly	   exert	   their	   most	   profound	  
influence.	   Thus	   following	   the	   propositions	   of	  DiMaggio	   and	   Powell	   (1983)	   a	   large	   body	   of	  
studies	  focused	  on	  organisational	  fields	  (i.e.	  sectors	  such	  as	  health	  care	  or	  schools).	  Others	  
have	  attempted	  analyses	  at	  the	  level	  of	  societal	  sectors	  (Scott	  and	  Meyer,	  1991)	  and	  at	  the	  
world	  systems	  level	  (Meyer,	  Boli,	  Thomas	  and	  Ramirez,	  1997).	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   The	   emphasis	   on	   macro-­‐level	   institutional	   phenomena	   had	   another	   consequence.	  
Studies	   did	   not	   address	   the	   institutions	   per	   se,	   but	   rather	   their	   consequences	   (i.e.	   their	  
effects).	  Relatively	  little	  attention	  was	  placed	  on	  how	  institutions	  emerged	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
The	  emphasis	  that	  was	  placed	  on	  the	  shared	  conceptions	  and	  meanings	  that	  constitute	  the	  
nature	   of	   social	   reality	   (Weber	   and	   Glynn:	   2006:1643;	   Scott,	   2001)	   -­‐	   in	   the	   sociological	  
variant	   of	   neo-­‐institutional	   theory	   -­‐	   reinforced	   the	   theory’s	   emphasis	   on	   the	   stabilizing	  
effects	  of	   institutions.	   Institutional	   change	  became	  primarily	  viewed	  as	  convergent	  change	  
(Scott	  2001;	  Greenwood	  and	  Hinings,	  1996),	  in	  which	  institutions	  drive	  organisations	  within	  
a	  sector	  or	  field	  towards	  increased	  similarity.	  	  
Third,	   many	   studies	   tended	   to	   focus	   predominantly	   on	   public	   sector	   organisations	  
and	  fields,	  where	  efficiency	  considerations	  were	  generally	  considered	  to	  be	  of	  less	  concern	  
than	   in	   organisations	   subjected	   to	   competitive	   market	   circumstances;	   there	   was	   even	  
mention	  of	  “permanently	  failing	  organisations”	  (Meyer	  and	  Zucker,	  1989).	  Meyer	  and	  Rowan	  
(1977)	   clearly	   distinguished	   institutional	   from	   technical	   considerations	   in	   the	   formal	  
structure	   of	   organisations.	   DiMaggio	   and	   Powell	   (1983)	   also	   made	   a	   clear	   distinction	  
between	   institutional	   and	   competitive	  pressures	  both	  of	  which	  drove	  organisations	  within	  
an	  organisational	  field	  towards	  similarity.	  Scott	  (2008:	  436)	  noted	  how	  institutional	  theorists	  
almost	   made	   a	   wrong	   turn	   in	   1980s	   and	   early	   1990s,	   “[g]iven	   the	   stance	   taken	   by	   these	  
foundational	   essays,	   institutional	   theory	   stood	   in	   danger	   of	   becoming	   a	   theory	   of	   socially	  
legitimate	   albeit	   inefficient	   organizations.	   A	   focus	   on	   the	   explanation	   of	   non-­‐rational	  
features	   of	   organizations	   threatened	   to	   condemn	   institutional	   theorists	   to	   play	   the	   role	   of	  
subordinate	  hand-­‐maiden	   to	   rational	  analysts	   (in	   their	  numerous	  guises),	  who	   could	   safely	  
devote	  themselves	  to	  the	  adult	  concerns	  of	  constructing	  accounts	  of	  efficient	  organizations,	  
leaving	  to	   institutionalists	  the	  scraps	  (error,	  subterfuge,	  ritualism)	  accounting	  for	  the	  error-­‐
term	   in	   their	   equations.	   Not	   a	   good	   division	   of	   labour,	   I	   think,	   particularly	   for	  
institutionalists.”	  	  
Later	  on,	  some	  of	  these	  earlier	  statements	  by	  Meyer	  and	  Rowan	  (1977)	  and	  DiMaggio	  
and	   Powell	   (1983)	   became	   revised.	   Scott	   and	   Meyer	   (1991)	   suggested	   that	   there	   are	  
organisations	  that	  work	   in	  both	  highly	   institutional	  and	  highly	  technical	  environments	   (e.g.	  
banks	  and	  hospitals).	  Likewise,	  some	  organisations	  operate	  in	  both	  low	  competitive	  and	  low	  
institutional	   environments	   (e.g.	   country	   clubs,	   day-­‐care	   centres),	   with	   low	   institutional	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environments	   characterised	   by	   limited	   interference	   of	   regulations	   and	   the	   professsiona-­‐
lization.	  	  
 
2.2.4	   Interests	  and	  Agency	  in	  Neo-­‐institutionalism	  in	  Organisational	  Sociology	  
DiMaggio	  (1988)	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  to	  argue	  that	  without	  politics	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  explain	  
either	   the	   sources	   of	   institutionalisation	   and	   deinstitutionalisation.	   Instead	   of	   analysing	  
institutions,	  scholars	  should	  be	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  process	  of	  institutionalisation.	  A	  focus	  
on	   the	   latter	   would	   reveal	   “…	   that	   institutionalization	   is	   a	   product	   of	   the	   political	   efforts	  
actors	  to	  accomplish	  their	  ends	  and	  that	  the	  success	  of	  an	  institutionalization	  project	  and	  the	  
form	   that	   the	   resulting	   institutions	   takes	   depend	   on	   the	   relative	   power	   of	   the	   actors	  who	  
support,	  oppose,	  or	  otherwise	  strive	  to	  influence	  it.”	  	  (1988:	  13)	  
He	  proposed	  to	  incorporate	  interests	  and	  agency	  more	  fully	  in	  institutional	  theory	  by	  
the	   notion	   of	   “institutional	   entrepreneurs,”	   which	   he	   borrowed	   from	   Eisenstadt	   (1980).	  
Institutional	   entrepreneurs	   are	  actors	  who	  are	   capable	  of	   institutionalizing	  new	   logics	   and	  
practices,	   in	   which	   they	   see	   “an	   opportunity	   to	   realize	   interest	   that	   they	   value	   highly”	  
(DiMaggio	  1988:	  14).	  The	  literature	  on	  institutional	  entrepreneurship	  grew	  rapidly	  after	  his	  
publication	   (see	   Leca,	   Battilana	   and	   Boxenbaum,	   2008	   for	   a	   review).	   	   Leca,	   Battilana	   and	  
Boxenbaum	  (2008)	   identified	  more	   than	  60	  articles	   in	  academic	   journals	   in	  North	  America	  
and	  Europe	  in	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  institutional	  entrepreneurship	  stood	  central.	  	  
However,	  the	  concept	  is	  not	  without	  its	  controversies.	  Some	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  
whole	   idea	  of	   institutional	   entrepreneurship	   is	   particularly	   uninstitutional	   (Seo	   and	  Creed,	  
2002).	  The	  problems	  surrounding	   this	   idea	   relate	   to	   the	  classic	  agency-­‐structure	  debate	   in	  
sociology	   (Giddens,	   1984).	   Generally,	   this	   problem	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   “paradox	   of	  
embedded	   agency”	   (Garud,	   Hardy	   and	  McGuire;	   2007;	   Holm,	   1995;	   Seo	   and	   Creed,	   2002;	  
Sewell,	   1992).	   In	   essence,	   the	   issue	   is	   how	   can	   actors,	   whose	   identities	   and	   interests	   are	  
shaped	   by	   the	   regulative,	   normative	   and	   cognitive	   elements	   within	   a	   field,	   escape	   these	  
elements	  by	   introducing	  new	  models	  and	  practices	  within	  a	   field?	  The	  general	  assertion	   is	  
that	   the	   dominant	   actors	   within	   an	   organisational	   field	   have	   the	   resources	   to	   affect	  
institutional	  change,	  but	  lack	  the	  incentives	  to	  do	  so.	  While	  peripheral	  actors	  often	  have	  the	  
incentives	   to	   affect	   institutional	   change	  given	   their	  underprivileged	   status,	   they	  often	   lack	  
the	  necessary	  resources	  to	  achieve	  it.	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In	  a	  similar	  attempt	  to	  incorporate	  agency	  and	  interests	  in	  institutional	  theory	  Oliver	  
(1991)	  proposed	  to	  combine	   institutional	  theory	  with	  resource	  dependence	  theory	  (Pfeffer	  
and	   Salancik,	   1978).	   She	   posited	   that	   compliance	   to	   institutional	   pressures	   from	  
organisations’	   wider	   social	   contexts,	   although	   perhaps	   the	   most	   common,	   is	   only	   one	  
response	   that	   organisations	   could	   adopt.	   Other	   responses	   to	   institutional	   pressures	   that	  
organisations	   could	   adopt	   include	   compromise,	   avoidance,	   defiance,	   and	   manipulation.	  	  
Hence,	   organisations	   on	   their	   turn	  may	   be	   able	   to	   defend	   their	   interests	   and	   sometimes	  
effect	  institutional	  changes	  in	  the	  environment	  surrounding	  them.	  	  
 
2.3	   The	  Concept	  of	  Logics	  	  	  
 
2.3.1	   Conceptualizing	  Institutional	  Logics	  
The	  concept	  of	  institutional	  logics	  has	  provided	  neo-­‐institutional	  theorists	  with	  a	  way	  out	  of	  
viewing	  actors	  as	  “cultural	  dopes”	   (Garfinkel,	  1967;	  Swidler,	  1986),	  with	  a	   focus	  on	  almost	  
mindless	   conformity	   of	   individuals	   and	   organisations	   to	   institutional	   pressures	   from	   their	  
wider	   environment,	   characteristic	   of	   early	   neo-­‐institutionalist	   theorizing	   (e.g.	   Meyer	   and	  
Rowan,	   1977;	   DiMaggio	   and	   Powell,	   1983).	   Instead,	   culture	   is	   now	   considered	   to	   be	   a	  
“repertoire	  or	  toolkit”	  (Swidler,	  1986:	  273),	  which	  socially	  skilled	  actors	  (Fligstein,	  2001)	  may	  
use	   to	   solve	   whatever	   problems	   they	   encounter.	   Cultural	   conflict	   and	   institutional	  
contradictions	   are	   viewed	   as	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   encounter	   of	   incompatible	   logics	  
(DiMaggio,	  1997;	  Friedland	  and	  Alford,	  1991:	  Seo	  and	  Creed,	  2002).	  This	  debate	  once	  again	  
underlines	  how	  much	  cultural	  and	  institutional	  theories	  are	  interwoven.	  	  	  
One	  of	  the	  first	  pioneers	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  logics	  of	  action	  was	  the	  French	  sociologist	  
Lucien	   Karpik	   (1978),	   who	   noted	   that	   the	   classical	   Weberian	   notion	   of	   rationality	   –	   the	  
adequacy	   of	   means	   to	   ends	   –	   was	   insufficient	   to	   describe	   the	   firm.	   He	   argued:	   “what	  
characterises	  the	  firm	  is	  a	  chain	  of	  ends	  and	  means	  or	  a	  series	  of	  primary	  objectives	  and	  of	  
subsidiary	  objectives	  …	   [emphasis	   in	  original]”.	   They	  are	  both	  principals	  of	   regrouping	  and	  
dispersal	  as	  well	  as	  principles	  of	  action	  around	  which	   individuals	  and	  groups	  organize	  their	  
attitudes	   and	   behaviour	   (1978:	   47).	   He	   suggested	   that	   the	   orientations	   and	   practices	   of	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individuals	   and	   organisations	   cannot	   be	   isolated	   from	   the	   societal	   wholes	   to	   which	   they	  
belong.	  	  
His	  work	  focused	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  two	  forms	  of	  capitalism.	  The	  first	  form,	  
“classical	   capitalism”	   (e.g.,	   energy,	   semi-­‐finished	   goods,	   automobile	   industries),	   is	  
characterized	   by	   industrial	   concentration	   and	   preference	   for	   oligopolistic	   situations,	   and	  
which	   operates	   through	   a	   ‘growth‘	   principle.	   The	   second,	   “technological	   capitalism”	   (e.g.,	  
chemical,	  pharmaceutical	  and	  electronics	  industries),	  is	  primarily	  based	  on	  the	  concentration	  
of	  material	  and	  symbolic	   resources	  and	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   its	   functioning	   is	  governed	  by	   the	  
rule	  of	  ‘puissance’	  (power).	  All	  this	  following	  Lucien	  Karpik	  (1978).	  	  
Friendland	   and	   Alford	   (1991)	   raised	   a	   similar	   concern	  with	   the	   organisation	   of	   the	  
societal	   order	   and	   how	   it	   enables	   and	   constrains	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   organisations	   and	  
individuals.	  They	  emphasized	   that	  “an	  adequate	  social	   theory	  must	  work	  at	   three	   levels	  of	  
analysis	  –	  individuals	  competing	  and	  negotiating,	  organizations	  in	  conflict	  and	  coordination,	  
and	   institutions	   in	   contradiction	  and	   interdependency.	   Institutions	  must	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  
simultaneously	  material	   and	   symbolic.	   However,	   no	   institutional	   order	   should	   be	   accorded	  
primacy	  a	  priori.	  To	  restore	  meaning	  into	  social	  analysis	  in	  a	  way	  which	  is	  neither	  subjectivist,	  
functionalist,	  nor	   teleological,	   the	  notion	  of	   institutional	   contradiction	   is	   vital”	   (1991:	  241).	  
These	   levels	   should	   be	   seen	   as	   ‘nested,’	  where	   organisation	   and	   institution	   specify	   higher	  
levels	  of	  constraint	  and	  opportunity	  for	  individual	  action	  (Rao	  and	  Kenney,	  2008:	  354).	  
Friedland	   and	   Alford	   have	   taken	   the	   notion	   of	   logics	   of	   action	   to	   the	   institutional	  
level.	   For	   them	   most	   Western	   countries	   have	   developed	   a	   complex	   society,	   in	   which	  
different	   institutional	   sectors,	   each	  with	   a	   distinct	   institutional	   logic,	   are	   operative.	   These	  
institutional	  sectors	  often	  contradict	  with	  one	  another.	  These	  authors	  emphasize	  the	  way	  in	  
which	   interests,	   norms	   and	   values	   are	   institutionally	   shaped	   and	   constrained.	   Institutions	  
not	  only	  constrain	  the	  ends	  to	  which	  behaviour	  should	  be	  directed,	  but	  the	  means	  by	  which	  
those	  ends	  are	  achieved.	  “Institutions	  provide	   individuals	  with	  vocabularies	  of	  motives	  and	  
with	  a	  sense	  of	  self.	  They	  generate	  not	  only	  that	  which	  is	  valued,	  but	  the	  rules	  by	  which	  it	  is	  
calibrated	   and	   distributed….	  Nonetheless,	   individuals,	   groups,	   and	   organizations	   try	   to	   use	  
institutional	  logics	  to	  their	  own	  advantage”	  (Friedland	  and	  Alford,	  1991:	  251).	  
Earlier	   work	   in	   sociological	   institutionalism,	   emphasizing	   the	   way	   in	   which	  
organisations	   were	   subjected	   by	   pressures	   to	   conform	   to	   rules,	   norms,	   and	   values	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predominant	   in	   their	   wider	   environment,	   tended	   to	   be	   contrasted	   with	   economic	  
approaches,	   assuming	   rational	   utility	   maximizing	   individuals	   and	   organisations	   (DiMaggio	  
and	  Powell,	  1983;	  Scott	  and	  Meyer,	  1991).	  So	  for	  example,	  Scott	  and	  Meyer	  (1991)	  argued	  
that	  technical	  efficiency	  was	  the	  primary	  basis	  for	  evaluation	  of	  organisational	  effectiveness	  
in	  the	  private	  sector,	  while	  conformity	  to	  institutional	  pressures	  would	  be	  more	  of	  a	  concern	  
for	  organisations	  operating	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  However,	  the	  work	  of	  Friedland	  and	  Alford	  
(1991)	  and	  Boltanski	   and	  Thévenot	   (2004)	  opened	  a	  way	  of	   viewing	   the	  utility	  maximizing	  
individual	  as	  belonging	  to	  a	  particular	  institutional	  order,	  made	  possible	  by	  certain	  historical	  
conditions	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  Enlightenment.	  “For	  whatever	  reason,	  some	  societies	  do	  
not	   conceptualize,	   let	   alone	   value,	   an	   abstract	   individual.	   Clearly	   the	   achievement	   of	  
individuality	  was	   as	  much	   a	   cultural	   transformation	   as	   it	   was	   the	   natural	   outcome	   of	   the	  
division	  of	  labor”	  (Friedland	  and	  Alford,	  1991:	  239).	  	  
Early	  empirical	   studies	  on	   institutional	   logics	   tended	   to	   focus	  on	   shifts	   in	  dominant	  
logics	   over	   time.	   For	   example,	   Fligstein,	   (1985)	   developed	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   conception	   of	  
control,	  which	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  logics	  and	  found	  in	  a	  longitudinal	  study	  of	  
top	  100	  Fortune	  companies	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  multidivisional	  form	  greatly	  depended	  
on	  whether	  the	  firm’s	  corporate	  executive	  officer	  had	  a	  background	  in	  marketing,	  finance,	  or	  
engineering.	   Moreover,	   he	   observed	   that	   corporate	   executive	   officers	   of	   each	   of	   these	  
occupational	  communities	  came	  to	  power	  during	  specific	  time	  periods.	  	  
In	   their	   historical	   analysis	   of	   institutional	   change	   in	   the	   health	   care	   sector	   in	   the	  
California	   Bay	   area	   Scott	   et	   al.	   (2000)	   observed	   the	   shift	   from	   an	   institutional	   logic	   of	  
professional	  care	  emphasizing	  quality	  of	  medical	  care,	  followed	  by	  one	  based	  on	  the	  logic	  of	  
equity	   of	   access	   to	   service,	   to	   one	   relying	   on	   the	   operation	   of	   market	   forces	   and	   the	  
intermingling	  of	  large	  corporate	  groups,	  which	  became	  based	  on	  principles	  of	  efficiency.	  	  	  
Currie	   and	  Guah	   (2007)	   examined	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   conflicting	   institutional	   logics	  
threatened	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   National	   Programme	   for	   IT	   in	   the	   UK	   health	   care	  
sector.	  Unlike	  traditional	  studies	  in	  institutional	  theory	  that	  tend	  to	  provide	  linear	  models	  of	  
institutional	  change,	  they	  showed	  how	  conflicting	  logics	  in	  the	  organisational	  field,	  triggered	  
a	   non-­‐linear	   process	   of	   institutional	   change.	   Their	   interview	   data	   pointed	   “to	   conflicting	  
forces	   in	   the	   interpretation,	   legitimation	  and	  mobilization,	  were	   threatening	  the	  survival	  of	  
the	  NPfIT,	  as	  the	  innovation	  was	  failing	  to	  become	  institutionalized	  in	  a	  political	  battlefield.”	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Dobbin	   and	   Sutton	   (1998)	   have	   examined	   the	   way	   in	   which	   government	   induced	  
personnel	   legislation	   led	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   professional	   personnel	   departments.	  
Initially,	   this	   legislation	   was	   viewed	   as	   a	   burden.	   The	   logic	   followed	   was	   one	   of	   legal	  
compliance.	  Later,	  under	  the	  Human	  Resource	  Management	  paradigm	  personnel	  managers	  
were	  able	  to	  redefine	  workers	  as	  strategic	  assets	  to	  organisations	  and	  their	  work	  as	  integral	  
to	   organisations’	   strategies	   and	   performance.	   In	   essence,	   the	   institutional	   logic	   of	   legal	  
compliance	  shifted	  to	  one	  based	  on	  a	  strategic	  resource	   logic	  (see	  Weber	  and	  Glynn,	  2006	  
for	  this	  point).	  	  	  
Zajac	  and	  Westphal	  (2004)	  drew	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  institutional	  logics	  to	  account	  for	  
changes	   over	   time	   in	   stock	  market	   reactions	   and	   found	   support	   for	   their	   contention	   that	  
changes	   in	   prevailing	   belief	   systems	  were	   responsible	   for	   these	   changes.	   They	   found	   that	  
stock	   market	   reactions	   to	   stock	   repurchasing	   plan	   announcements	   changed	   significantly	  
from	  negative	  during	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s	  to	  positive	  from	  the	  mid	  1980s	  onward.	  
They	   provided	   evidence	   that	   this	   shift	   in	   stock	   market	   reactions	   came	   about	   as	   a	  
consequence	   of	   a	   shift	   from	   a	   corporate	   governance	   logic	   toward	   an	   agency	   logic.	   Their	  
study	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  since	  they	  provided	  evidence	  for	  a	  sociological	  explanation	  in	  
a	  sector,	  which	   is	  generally	  considered	   to	  be	  subjected	  most	   to	   the	  market	   imperatives	  of	  
economic	  theory	  emphasizing	  utility	  maximizing	  individuals.	  	  
Green,	   Babb	   and	   Alpaslan	   (2008)	   point	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   rhetoric	   in	   the	  
construction	   and	   competition	   of	   institutional	   logics.	   They	   examined	   the	   competition	  
between	  a	  Managerial	  Capital	  logic	  versus	  an	  Investor	  Capital	  logic.	  The	  former	  specifies	  that	  
managers	  should	  be	   in	  control	  of	   the	   firm	  because	  of	   their	  superior	  knowledge.	  The	   latter	  
emphasises	  shareholder	  value	  maximisation	  and	  points	  out	  that	  managers	  are	  nothing	  more	  
than	   the	   agents	   of	   their	   firm’s	   shareholders	   and	  must	   be	   encouraged	   to	  work	   in	   the	  best	  
interests	  of	  shareholders	  (Green,	  Babb	  and	  Alpaslan,	  2008:	  44).	  
Chung	  and	  Luo	  (2008)	  examined	  the	  key	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  family,	  market,	  and	  
government	   in	  emerging	  economies	  and	   showed	  how	   they	   supplied	   competing	   logics	   that	  
influence	  restructuring	  strategies.	  They	  presented	  an	   instance	   in	  which	  the	   logics	  of	   family	  
control,	   shareholder	   value,	   and	   stakeholder	   balance	   clashed,	   and	   examined	   the	  
consequences	  of	  contemporaneously	  conflicting	  institutional	  logics.	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Owen-­‐Smith	   and	   Powell	   (2008:	   611)	   in	   their	   research	   in	   the	   biotech	   field	   revealed	  
how	  the	  organisational	  form	  of	  the	  dominant	  players	   in	  a	  network	  shapes	  the	  character	  of	  
social	   capital	   in	   a	   community.	   They	   noted	   that	   where	   universities	   dominate,	   a	   logic	   of	  
discovery	   that	   favours	  openness	  and	   information	  diffusion	  prevails	  and	  membership	  alone	  
suffices	   to	   increase	   rates	   of	   innovation.	   In	   contrast,	  when	   for-­‐profit	   organisations	   are	   key	  
players	   in	   the	   network	   and	   more	   ‘closed,’	   proprietary	   logics	   are	   at	   the	   fore,	   a	   central	  
network	  position	  is	  essential	  (Owen-­‐Smith	  and	  Powell,	  2008).	  In	  addition	  to	  shifting	  the	  ways	  
that	  organisations	  extract	  benefits	  from	  their	  networks,	  the	  different	  logics	  associated	  with	  
partners	   of	   disparate	   form	   shape	   strategies	   for	   innovation,	   the	   kinds	   of	   connections	   firm	  
forge,	   and	   the	   markets	   they	   seek	   to	   serve.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   relational	   and	   structural	  
embeddedness	   of	   economic	   action	   depends	   not	   just	   on	   the	   networks	   but	   also	   on	   the	  
orientations	   of	   participants	   to	   the	   fields	   and	   logics	   that	   render	   ties	   sensible	   and	   help	  
determine	  the	  shape	  and	  effects	  of	  structures	  (Owen-­‐Smith	  and	  Powell,	  2008:618).	  	  	  
More	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  work	  of	  Ulrika	  Mörth	  (2003).	  In	  
an	   historical	   analysis	   of	   the	   European	   armaments	   field,	   she	   traces	   the	   construction	   of	   a	  
European	   armaments	   field	   around	   the	   competition	   between	   two	   competing	   frames	   (cf.	  
Goffman,	  1974:	  21)	  each	  embodied	  in	  a	  different	  set	  of	  European	  institutions	  (also	  referred	  
to	  as	  pillars1).	  The	  ‘defence	  frame’,	  emphasizing	  military	  capacity	  problems	  and	  the	  need	  for	  
a	  common	  defence	  policy,	  is	  primarily	  tied	  to	  institutions	  and	  networks	  and	  organisations	  in	  
the	  second	  pillar	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (Mörth,	  2003:	  52).	  The	  ‘market	  frame’,	  emphasising	  
the	   creation	   of	   a	   European	  market	   for	   armaments	   and	   the	   reduction	   of	   national	   defence	  
industry	  protectionism	  of	  European	  governments,	  is	  strongly	  associated	  with	  actors	  attached	  
to	   the	   first	   pillar	   of	   the	   European	  Union.	  Over	   time,	   the	   two	  organisational	   fields	  became	  
more	  closely	  interconnected,	  and	  frame	  competition	  became	  more	  intense	  when	  the	  actors	  
in	   both	   organisational	   fields	   engaged	   in	   a	   political	   struggle	   over	   the	   definition	   of	   the	  
armaments	  issues.	  Eventually,	  the	  European	  Commission	  was	  able	  to	  reframe	  the	  issue	  into	  
a	   modified	   market	   perspective,	   “…	   by	   reframing	   the	   armaments	   and	   industry	   issue	   the	  
                                                
1	   The	   European	   Union	   is	   made	   up	   of	   three	   different	   ‘pillars’.	   The	   first	   one,	   the	   European	  
Communities,	   is	  the	  oldest	  and	  deals	  with	  economic,	  environmental	  and	  social	  policies.	  The	  second	  
pillar,	  handles	  security	  and	   foreign	  policy	   issues.	  The	   third	  pillar	  deals	  with	  crime	   fighting.	  The	   first	  
pillar	  was	  until	  2009	   the	  only	  one	  with	  a	   legal	   status.	  Within	  each	  of	   these	  pillars	  different	   sets	  of	  
actors	  were	   involved	  with	   little	  overlap	  of	  actors	  between	  the	  pillars.	   In	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  of	  2009,	  
the	  idea	  of	  the	  pillars	  was	  formally	  abandoned.	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Commission	   manages	   the	   conflict	   between	   the	   market	   and	   defense	   frames.	   Thus,	   frame	  
competition	  will	   persist,	   but	   in	   a	   less	   obvious	  way.	   …	   The	   sense-­‐making	   process,	   in	  which	  
various	  frames	  are	  presented,	  functions	  as	  an	  important	  component	  in	  generating	  cohesion	  
within	  the	  Commission	  (Mörth,	  2003:	  104-­‐105).	  
Others	  (Hyvönen,	  Järvinen,	  Pellinen	  and	  Rahko,	  2009)	  have	  presented	  a	  comparative	  
case	  study	  of	  differences	  in	  institutional	  logics	  of	  two	  units	  within	  the	  Finish	  Defence	  Forces.	  
These	  two	  units	   triggered	  different	  responses	  to	  pressures	   from	  State	  Audit	  Office	  to	  alter	  
their	   management	   accounting	   systems.	   In	   one	   of	   the	   units,	   management	   accounting	   had	  
become	   deeply	   institutionalised	   as	   part	   of	   a	   military	   officer’s	   competencies.	   In	   the	   other	  
unit,	   this	   institutionalisation	   had	   not	   taken	   place.	   Hyvönen,	   Järvinen,	   Pellinen	   and	   Rahko	  
(2009)	   examined	   the	   way	   in	   which	   this	   difference	   institutional	   logic	   influenced	   the	   units’	  
strategies	   in	   dealing	   with	   pressure	   exerted	   by	   the	   State	   Audit	   Office	   to	   change	   their	  
management	   accounting	   systems	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   implementation	   of	   a	   new	  
enterprise	  resource	  planning	  system.	  They	  showed	  how	  different	  logics	  led	  to	  an	  adoption	  of	  
different	   institutional	   responses:	   a	   resistance	   strategy	   in	   the	   unit	   where	   management	  
accounting	   had	   become	   deeply	   ingrained	   in	   military	   officer’s	   competencies,	   and	   a	  
ceremonial	  acquiescence	  strategy	  where	  management	  accounting	  was	  less	  considered	  to	  be	  
part	  of	  an	  officer’s	  core	  skills.	  	  
 
2.3.2	   National	  Institutional	  Logics	  
Our	  intent	  to	  use	  the	  notion	  of	  institutional	  logics	  at	  the	  national	  level	  may	  sound	  somewhat	  
counterintuitive	  given	  our	  summary	  of	  the	  literature	  presented	  in	  the	  foregoing	  paragraphs.	  
Neo-­‐institutionalists	  have	  persuasively	  associated	  institutional	  logics	  with	  the	  organization	  of	  
societal	  orders	  such	  as	  the	  family,	  the	  state,	  religion,	  science	  etc.	  and	  tend	  to	  view	  societal	  
changes	  and	  conflict	  as	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  contradictions	  of	  institutional	  orders	  (Friedland	  
and	  Alford,	  1991;	  Thorton,	  2004).	  	  Although	  analysing	  institutional	  logics	  at	  the	  national	  level	  
would	  not	  necessarily	  be	  the	  most	  obvious	  choice	  for	  empirical	  research	  of	  (American)	  neo-­‐
institutional	   scholars,	   we	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   not	   inconsistent	   with	   the	   original	   ideas.	   The	  
organisation	   of	   nations’	   institutional	   orders,	   the	   dominance	   of	   certain	   institutional	   orders	  
over	  others,	   the	  degrees	  of	   integration	  and	  differentiation	  between	   the	  orders,	   as	  well	   as	  
the	  norms	  and	  values	  associated	  with	  a	  particular	  institutional	  order	  are	  likely	  to	  vary	  across	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nations.	  As	   such,	   they	  are	   likely	   to	  give	   rise	   to	  different	   institutional	   logics	  at	   the	  national	  
level.	   Indeed,	  much	  American	   institutional	   scholars	   appear	   to	  have	  neglected	   the	  national	  
dimension,	  since	  in	  the	  American	  context	  this	  issue	  is	  not	  readily	  apparent.	  In	  the	  European	  
context,	   the	  national	  dimension	  has	  a	  deeper	   impact,	  simply	  because	  what	  constitutes	  the	  
European	  Union	  are	  its	  European	  member	  states.	  This	  can	  definitely	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  current	  
discussion	   surrounding	   the	   debt	   problems	   of	   Greece,	   which	   are	   fought	   out	   between	  
different	  member	  	  states.	  	  	  
	   A	   number	   of	   earlier	   studies	   have	   suggested	   that	   the	   organisation	   of	   a	   nation’s	  
institutional	   orders	   can	   produce	   a	   particular	   national	   institutional	   logic	   (Chung	   and	   Luo,	  
2008;	   Luo	   2007.	  Maurice,	   Sorge	   and	  Warner,	   1980).	   Close	   to	   the	   empirical	   setting	   of	   our	  
study	  that	  has	  examined	  institutional	  logics	  at	  the	  national	  level	  is	  the	  work	  of	  Bremberg	  and	  
Britz	  (2009).	  These	  authors	  examined	  how	  diverging	  institutional	  logics	  of	  European	  member	  
states	  affects	  the	  degree	  of	  cooperation	  among	  member	  states	  on	  EU	  civil	  protection	  policy.	  
They	   compared	   the	   institutional	   logics	   of	   Spain	   and	   Sweden	   to	   understand	   the	   diverging	  
positions	  on	  the	  future	  of	  European	  Union	  civil	  protection.	  Their	  analysis	  of	  the	  belief	  system	  
and	   accompanied	   practices	   of	   Spain	   revealed	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   formal	   definition	   of	   civil	  
protection,	  which	  makes	  clear	  that	  the	  concept	  refers	  to	  the	  physical	  protection	  of	  people	  
and	  goods	  during	  war	  and	  in	  peacetime,	  and	  that	  civil	  protection	  organisationally	  belongs	  to	  
the	   Ministry	   of	   Interior	   in	   a	   generally	   decentralized	   structure,	   but	   with	   centralisation	  
possibility	   in	   cases	   of	   emergence	   (Bremberg	   and	   Britz,	   2009:	   301).	   In	   Sweden	   a	   different	  
picture	  of	  the	  dominant	  institutional	  logic	  emerged.	  Unlike	  the	  situation	  in	  Spain	  the	  concept	  
of	  civil	  protection	  is	  not	  classified	  into	  the	  Swedish	  belief	  system.	  Civil	  defence	  in	  Sweden	  is	  a	  
wartime	   concept.	   Under	   peacetime	   circumstances	   protection	   and	   preparedness	   are	  
considered	  more	   important	   concepts.	  Moreover,	   in	   the	   Swedish	   context	   it	   is	   unclear	   how	  
those	   concepts	   are	   related	   to	   national	   security	   issues.	   Associated	   practices	   in	   Sweden	  
pointed	  to	  a	  decentralized	  system	  coordinated	  largely	  by	  local	  authorities,	  with	  virtually	  no	  
possibilities	  for	  national	  authorities	  to	  conduct	  practical	  disaster	  relief	  (Bremberg	  and	  Britz,	  
2009:301).	  	  	  
They	  revealed	  that	  the	  divergent	  institutional	  logics	  within	  the	  national	  security	  fields	  
of	   both	  nations	  hamper	   cooperation	   in	   the	  development	  of	   the	   EU	   civil	   protection	  policy.	  
The	  different	  positions	  adopted	  by	  these	  nations	   in	   the	  development	  European	  Union	  civil	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protection	  policy	  reflect	   their	  underlying	   institutional	   logics.	  Spain	  together	  with	  a	  number	  
of	   Southern	   European	   states	   advocates	   a	   centralized	   role	   for	   the	   European	   Commission,	  
while	  Sweden	  prefers	  a	  predominantly	   intergovernmental	  approach,	   reflecting	   its	   lack	  of	  a	  
centralized	   civil	   protection	   system	   in	   its	  own	  national	   context	   (Bremberg	  and	  Britz,	   2009).	  
Eventually	  an	  agreement	  was	   reached	  on	  a	  very	  broad	  definition	  of	  civil	  protection,	  which	  
allowed	  the	  persistence	  of	  diverging	   institutional	   logics.	  Consequently,	   further	  cooperation	  
in	  this	  matter,	  despite	  the	  agreement,	  proved	  difficult	  (Bremberg	  and	  Britz,	  2009).	  This	  is	  a	  
first	   example	   of	   institutional	   logics	   at	   the	   national	   level,	   to	  which	  we	  will	   turn	   later	  more	  
explicitly.	  	  
Work	   in	   comparative	   political	   economics	   has	   noted	   considerable	   variety	   in	   the	  
operation	  of	  national	  economies,	  even	  in	  the	  capitalist	  economies	  of	  the	  western	  world	  (Hall	  
and	  Soskice	  2001;	  Jepperson,	  2002;	  Prasad,	  2005;	  Whitley,	  1994).	  A	  number	  of	  theories	  have	  
gained	  prominence	  within	  the	  field.	  We	  will	  briefly	  review	  those	  that	  seem	  relevant	  to	  this	  
study.	  	  
The	   Varieties-­‐of-­‐Capitalism-­‐approach	   developed	   by	   Hall	   and	   Soskice	   (2001)	  
emphasises	   the	   manners	   in	   which	   firms	   in	   national	   economies	   resolve	   coordination	  
problems,	  which	  are	  central	  to	  their	  core	  competencies	  (Hall	  and	  Soskice,	  2001:	  6-­‐7).	  They	  
note	  five	  spheres	  in	  which	  they	  must	  develop	  relationships	  with	  other	  economic	  actors.	  The	  
first	  one	  involves	  industrial	  relations,	  in	  which	  the	  main	  challenge	  is	  how	  to	  coordinate	  with	  
other	   economic	   actors,	   i.e.	   employees,	   labour	   unions	   and	   other	   employers,	   over	   wage	  
bargaining	   and	   other	   work	   conditions.	   The	   second	   sphere	   of	   vocational	   training	   and	  
education	   refers	   to	   the	   problem	   that	   firms	   face	   is	   how	   to	   ensure	   sufficient	   skill	   levels	   of	  
potential	   employees.	  Within	   the	   sphere	   of	   corporate	   governance,	   the	   question	   is	   how	   to	  
secure	   capital	   and	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   investors	   keep	   track	   of	   the	   return	   on	   their	  
investments.	  Within	  the	  fourth	  sphere	  of	  inter-­‐firm	  relations,	  the	  main	  coordination	  problem	  
is	  the	  sharing	  of	  proprietary	  knowledge	  and	  appropriation	  concerns	  in	  alliances.	  Fifth,	  within	  
the	   sphere	   of	   employees	   firms	   have	   to	   ensure	   their	   workers	   possess	   the	   appropriate	  
competencies	  to	  further	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  firm.	  	  
The	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  five	  spheres	  of	  coordination	  problems	  are	  solved	  among	  the	  
economic	  actors	  in	  national	  economies	  present	  the	  basis	  for	  comparison	  within	  the	  varieties	  
of	  capitalism	  approach.	  Hall	  and	  Soskice	  draw	  a	  primary	  distinction	  between	  two	  ideal	  types	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of	  political	  economies	  constituting	  a	  continuum	  on	  which	  many	  countries	  can	  be	  ranked.	  In	  
liberal	  market	  economies	  (LMEs),	  the	  primary	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  firms	  coordinate	  
their	   activities	  are	  hierarchies	  and	  competitive	  market	  arrangements.	  Coordination	  among	  
firms	  is	  facilitated	  through	  the	  ‘the	  invisible	  hand’	  in	  deregulated	  markets	  and	  with	  minimal	  
state	   intervention.	   In	   coordinated	  market	   economies	   (CMEs),	   firms	   depend	  more	   on	   non-­‐
market	  relationships	  to	  coordinate	  with	  other	  actors	  and	  to	  develop	  and	  maintain	  their	  core	  
competencies	   (Hall	   and	   Soskice,	   2001:	   9).	   These	   relationships	   are	   often	   based	   on	  
cooperative	   relations,	   relational	  or	   incomplete	  contracting,	  and	  monitoring	  of	  exchange	  of	  
private	  information	  through	  networks.	  In	  liberal	  market	  economies	  coordination	  takes	  place	  
through	   the	   price	   mechanism	   in	   competitive	   markets,	   in	   coordinated	   market	   economies	  
coordination	  involves	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  strategic	  interaction	  among	  economic	  actors.	  	  
Whereas	   the	   aforementioned	   studies	   did	   not	   formally	   employ	   the	   concept	   of	  
institutional	   logics,	   they	  do	  provide	  ample	  evidence	   that	  national	   institutional	   frameworks	  
shape	   the	   interests,	   practices	   and	   values	   of	   individuals	   and	   organisations.	   To	   give	   an	  
example:	   in	   an	   early	   examination	   of	   the	   processes	   of	   integration	   and	   differentiation	   in	  
manufacturing	   units	   of	   firms	   in	   France,	   Germany	   and	   Great-­‐Britain,	   Maurice,	   Sorge,	   and	  
Warner	   (1980	   found	   considerable	   variation	   among	   these	   countries	   stemming	   from	   the	  
manner	   in	   which	   education,	   training,	   recruiting,	   and	   promotion	   of	   workers	   is	   organized	  
within	  these	  countries.	  	  
Whitley	  (1992)	  developed	  the	  notion	  of	  “business	  recipes”	  which	  take	  their	  form	  from	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  national	  business	  systems	  are	  organized.	  Business	  recipes,	  he	  argues:	  
“are	   particular	   ways	   of	   organizing,	   controlling,	   and	   directing	   business	   enterprises	   that	  
become	   established	   as	   the	   dominant	   forms	   of	   business	   organization	   in	   different	   societies.	  
They	  reflect	  successful	  patterns	  of	  business	  behaviour	  and	  understandings	  of	  how	  to	  achieve	  
economic	  success	  that	  are	  reproduced	  and	  reinforced	  by	  crucial	  institutions”	  (Whitley,	  1992:	  
125).	  He	  suggests	  that	  distinct	  business	  recipes	  find	  their	  origin	  in	  the	  specific	  configuration	  
of	   the	   key	   dimensions	   of	   business	   systems:	   the	   nature	   of	   firms	   as	   economic	   agents,	   the	  
interconnections	  between	   the	   firms,	   and	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   coordination	  and	   control	   is	  
organized	  and	  distributed	  (Whitley,	  1992).	  	  
Similarly,	   cross-­‐cultural	   scholars	   have	   noted	   considerable	   variety	   in	   the	   norms	   and	  
values	  of	  national	  cultures	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  the	  management	  of	  organisations	  working	  in	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an	  international	  context,	  such	  as	  multinational	  companies	  and	  international	   joint	  ventures,	  
mergers	   and	   acquisitions	   (e.g.,	   Barkema	   and	   Vermeulen,	   1997;	   Hofstede,	   2001;	   Morris,	  
Podolny,	  and	  Sullivan,	  2008;	  Smith,	  Peterson	  and	  Thomas,	  2008).	   	  This	  research	  strand	  has	  
even	   led	   to	   the	  development	  of	  a	  new	  educational	   field	   in	   international	  management	  and	  
international	  business	  studies.	  	  
The	  earlier	  mentioned	  Varieties-­‐of-­‐Capitalism-­‐approach	  is	  particularly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  
institutional	  framework	  of	  national	  economies	  that	  provide	  support	  for	  the	  role	  and	  degree	  
of	   strategic	   interaction	   in	   coordination.	  Moreover,	   it	   adopts	   a	   view	   of	   institutions,	   which	  
comes	   close	   to	   neo-­‐institutional	   theory	   in	   organisational	   sociology.	   Alike	   neo-­‐institutional	  
theorists,	   Hall	   and	   Soskice	   (2001)	   emphasize	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   informal	   rules	   and	  
shared	  understandings	  that	  underlie	  coordination	  through	  strategic	  interaction.	  They	  argued	  
that	   these:	  “…	  shared	  understandings	  are	   important	  elements	  of	   the	   ‘common	  knowledge’	  
that	   lead	   participants	   to	   coordinate	   on	   one	   outcome,	   rather	   than	   another,	  when	  both	   are	  
feasible	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  formal	  institutions”	  (2001:	  13).	  
	   Luo	   (2007)	   examined	   the	  way	   in	  which	   national	   institutional	   logics	   as	   embodied	   in	  
country	   specific	   political	   institutions	   influence	   the	   way	   in	   which	   individuals	   perceive	   and	  
interpret	   a	   widespread	   Human	   Resource	   Management	   model,	   the	   continuous	   learning	  
model.	   In	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  Luo	  (2007)	  used	  the	  degree	  of	  statism	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  
corporateness	   to	   assess	   individuals’	   preferences	   for	   continuous	   learning	   and	   for	   broad	  
versus	   narrow	   employee	   training.	   His	   findings	   confirm	   that	   national	   institutional	   logics	  
structure	  the	  perceptions	  and	  interpretations	  of	  individuals	  in	  a	  country.	  Specifically,	  people	  
from	  statist	  and	  corporatist	  countries	  have	  less	  preference	  to	  be	  trained	  continuously	  than	  
those	   from	   nonstatist	   and	   noncorporatist	   countries,	   and	   people	   from	   noncorporatist	  
countries	  prefer	  broad	  training	  over	  narrow	  training.	  	  
	   Together,	  these	  studies	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  theoretical	  support	  for	  our	  treatment	  of	  
institutional	  logics	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  In	  chapter	  3,	  we	  will	  describe	  the	  national	  logics	  in	  
defence	  industry	  matters	  of	  the	  actors	  involved	  in	  this	  study	  more	  thorough.	  For	  that	  we	  will	  
draw	  upon	  cross-­‐cultural	  and	  comparative	  studies	  examining	  the	  defence	  industrial	  policies	  
and	  general	  business	  climates	  of	  the	  countries	  involved	  in	  this	  study.	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2.4	   Alignment	  of	  Logics	  	  
 
Most	  studies	  present	  an	  unusually	  consensual	  picture	  of	   institutional	  change,	   in	  which	  one	  
dominant	   set	   of	   institutional	   logics	   is	   gradually	   replaced	   by	   a	   successor.	  Most	   writers	   do	  
underscore	   the	   politics	   involved,	   but	   the	   research	   designs	   used	   often	   do	   not	   allow	   the	  
capturing	  of	   the	  micro-­‐dynamics	   involved	   (Bacharach,	  Bamberger,	   and	   Sonnenstuhl,	   1996;	  
DiMaggio,	   1997;	   Lounsbury	   2007).	   More	   recently	   scholars	   have	   come	   to	   recognize	   that	  
environments	   often	   consist	   of	  multiple	   competing	   logics	   (Clemens	   and	   Cook,	   1999;	   Djelic	  
and	   Quack,	   2003;	  Washington	   and	   Ventresca,	   2004;	   Lounsbury,	   2007).	   Similar	   ideas	   have	  
recently	   been	   developed	   in	   the	   “economics	   of	   conventions”	   school	   in	   French	   sociology	  
(Boltanski	  and	  Thévenot,	  2004).	  Much	  of	  an	  actors’	  social	  capability	  may	  actually	  consist	  of	  
his	  or	  her	  capability	  of	  activating	  the	  appropriate	  logic	  in	  a	  particular	  social	  context.	  	  
One	   should	  not	   easily	   think	   that	   all	   individuals	   belong	   to	  one	  of	   these	   institutional	  
orders.	  In	  complex	  societies	  most	  individuals	  do	  not	  limit	  themselves	  to	  one	  particular	  set	  of	  
institutional	  logics	  in	  order	  to	  render	  their	  lives	  meaningful.	  Many	  theorists	  have	  pointed	  at	  
the	  contextual	  dependence	  of	  meanings	  (Bechky,	  2003;	  Weick,	  1969).	  	  This	  also	  holds	  for	  the	  
activation	  of	  logics.	  For	  example,	  that	  one	  is	  a	  scientist	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  that	  one	  
cannot	   be	   religious	   as	   well.	   Similarly	   we	   should	   also	   be	   careful	   to	   analyse	   particular	  
behaviours	  or	  actions	  as	  belonging	  to	  a	  particular	  institutional	  order,	  because	  some	  type	  of	  
action	  or	  activity	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  different	   sets	  of	   values,	  meanings	  and	  practices.	  
For	  example,	  the	  act	  of	  sexual	  intercourse	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  love,	  domination,	  fulfilling	  
one’s	  religious	  duties,	  and	  even	  a	  market	  exchange	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  prostitute).	  	  
Boltanski	   and	   Thévenot	   (1999)	  managed	   to	   construct	   different	   institutional	   orders	  
(‘worlds’)	  each	  possessing	  a	  different	  “mode	  of	   justification”.	  For	  the	  construction	  of	  these	  
modes	   the	   authors	   drew	   on	   text	   from	   political	   philosophers,	   who	   provided	   systematic	  
accounts	   of	   the	   principles	   of	   equivalence	   underlying	   the	   ‘modes	   of	   justification.’	   These	  
modes	  of	  justification	  are	  often	  incompatible.	  These	  authors	  maintain	  that	  most	  individuals	  
unproblematically	  know	  how	  to	  perform	  in	  each	  of	  these	  worlds	  and	  are	  generally	  capable	  
of	   recognizing	   to	   which	   world	   a	   particular	   social	   situation	   belongs.	   Of	   most	   interest	   are	  
‘ambiguous	   situations’	   (Boltanski	   and	   Thévenot,	   1999),	   in	   which	   different	   logics	   apply.	   In	  
these	   situations	   ‘institutional	   exceptions’	   may	   emerge	   in	   which	   “framings	   of	   situations”	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conflict,	  basic	  values	  are	  challenged,	  and	  participants	  find	  themselves	  “on	  a	  different	  page”	  
or	  “wavelength”	  (Orr	  and	  Scott,	  2008:	  566).	  
Social	  life	  is	  full	  of	  situations	  that	  are	  more	  transient	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  different	  logics	  
could	   be	   applied.	   Is	   the	   ‘market’	   capable	   of	   ensuring	   the	   proper	   protection	   of	   the	  
environment?	  Or	  should	  the	  government	  intervene	  to	  establish	  a	  minimal	  level	  playing	  field	  
for	  businesses	  by	  providing	  legislation?	  And	  socially	  skilled	  actors	  are	  often	  capable	  of	  tying	  
their	  particular	  grievances	  to	  established	  institutional	   logics	  to	  advance	  their	  own	  interests	  
(Friedland	  and	  Alford,	  1991).	  Many	  of	  the	  contemporary	  marketing	  efforts	  of	  companies	  are	  
aimed	  to	  associate	  their	  products,	  services	  and	  brand	  names	  to	  existing	  institutional	  logics	  to	  
elicit	  demand	  for	  their	  products.	  	  
Although	   institutional	   logics	   generally	   remain	   in	   a	   state	   of	   contradiction	   (Friedland	  
and	  Alford,	  1991;	  Seo	  and	  Creed,	  2002),	  occasionally	   they	  may	  promote	  the	  pursuit	  of	   the	  
same	  interest.	  	  This	  is	  seen	  in	  a	  recent	  political	  debate	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  working	  at	  home	  in	  
The	  Netherlands.	  The	  Dutch	  Green	  Left	  party	  proposes	  a	  new	  law	  that	  will	  spur	  employers	  to	  
allow	  employees	  to	  work	  more	  from	  their	  homes.	  Their	  justification	  is	  primarily	  grounded	  in	  
a	   discourse	   promoting	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   environment.	   The	   Christian	   party	   supports	  
Green	  Left	  party’s	   initiative,	  but	  their	  rhetoric	  draws	  from	  a	   logic	  valuing	  the	  family	  as	  the	  
basic	   cornerstone	   of	   society	   because	   parents	   being	   more	   at	   home	   are	   believed	   to	   be	  
conducive	  to	  the	  children’s	  wellbeing.	  	  
 
2.5	   Micro-­‐Politics	  of	  (Hierarchical)	  Alignment	  of	  Logics	  
 
One	   study	   examining	   how	   logics	   of	   action	   are	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   politics	   of	   micro-­‐
institutional	  
processes	   is	   the	  work	  by	  Bacharach,	  Bamberger	  and	  Sonnenstuhl	   (1996).	  They	  applied	   the	  
concept	  of	   logics	  to	  account	  for	  the	  organisational	  transformation	  process	  that	  takes	  place	  
when	   institutional	   level	   logics	   change	   and	   trigger	   adjustments	   in	   lower	   level	   logics.	   Their	  
case	   revolves	   around	   major	   deregulation	   in	   the	   airline	   industry.	   Until	   1978,	   the	   airline	  
industry	   had	  been	  operating	   in	   an	   environment	   heavily	   regulated	  by	   the	  Civil	   Aeronautics	  
Board	  (CAB).	  Competition	  had	  long	  been	  regulated	  by	  the	  CAB	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  
uniform	   prices,	   the	   allocation	   of	   routes	   based	   on	   system	   rationality,	   the	   arrangements	   of	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mergers,	   and	   cooperation	   between	   labour	   and	   management	   (Bacharach,	   Bamberger	   and	  
Sonnenstuhl,	  1996:	  485).	  	  
This	   institutional	   environment	   shaped	   the	   development	   of	   a	   quality-­‐oriented	   logic	  
among	   airline	   managers	   in	   which	   they	   tried	   to	   gain	   competitive	   advantage	   by	   providing	  
quality	  services	  to	  customers.	  The	  logic	  of	  middle	  and	  lower	  management	  at	  that	  time	  were	  
aligned.	   These	   pursued	   a	   ‘communalistic	   logic’	   closely	   working	   together	   with	   the	   flight	  
attendants	   to	   ensure	   they	   had	   loyal	   and	   skilled	   workforce	   providing	   quality	   services	   to	  
customers.	  At	  the	  technical	  level,	  the	  flight	  attendants	  had	  adopted	  an	  “acquiescence	  logic”,	  
which	  was	  aligned	  with	  the	  logic	  of	  middle	  and	  lower	  management.	  In	  a	  struggle	  for	  greater	  
control	   of	   the	   work	   processes	   and	   a	   stronger	   recognition	   of	   their	   occupation,	   flight	  
attendants	   tended	   to	   closely	   work	   together	   with	   middle	   and	   lower	   level.	   This	   situation	  
drastically	   changed	   when	   the	   1978	   Airline	   Deregulation	   Act	   became	   in	   effect.	   As	   a	  
consequence	  of	  this	  change	  the	  quality	  logic	  became	  replaced	  by	  a	  cost-­‐oriented	  logic.	  Top	  
management	   of	   airliners	   responded	   through	   the	   optimisation	   of	   their	   existing	   routes,	   by	  
negotiating	  a	   two-­‐tier	  wage	   system	   for	   their	  employees	   (to	  be	  able	   to	   compete	  with	  non-­‐
union	  carriers)	  and	  by	  rationalising	  the	  work	  of	  flight	  attendants	  and	  through	  a	  reduction	  in	  
staffing	  levels	  on	  flights	  (Bacharach,	  Bamberger	  and	  Sonnenstuhl,	  1996).	  	  
These	  rationalisation	  attempts	  of	  managers	  had	  a	  detrimental	  effect	  on	  the	  wellbeing	  
of	   flight	  attendants.	   In	  particular	   the	  new	  work	  schedules	  and	  the	  closing	  of	  smaller	  bases	  
and	  the	  creation	  of	  ‘mega-­‐hubs’,	  which	  effectively	  created	  a	  commuters	  community	  of	  flight	  
attendants	  who	   lived	  hundreds	  of	  miles	   from	  their	  work	  place,	  seriously	  eroded	  employee	  
well-­‐being	   (Bacharach,	   Bamberger	   and	   Sonnenstuhl,	   1996).	   The	   situation	   in	   which	   flight	  
attendants	   were	   forced	   made	   them	   more	   susceptible	   to	   drug	   and	   alcohol	   abuse.	   This	  
problem	   was	   widely	   acknowledged	   in	   the	   industry.	   In	   the	   late	   1970s	   a	   group	   of	   flight	  
attendants	  started	   lobbying	  the	  Association	  of	  Flight	  Attendants	  (AFA)	  to	  press	  for	  a	  union	  
employee	  assistance	  programme.	  The	  idea	  behind	  the	  programme	  was	  that	  union	  members	  
would	  help	  other	  union	  members	   to	  cope	  with	  their	  problems	  without	   the	   intervention	  of	  
management.	  	  
Initially,	   the	   AFA	   had	   wanted	   to	   develop	   a	   joint	   programme	   together	   with	   airline	  
management.	   Considering	   its	   pre-­‐deregulated	   quality	   logic	   the	   AFA	   thought	  management	  
would	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  programme.	  It	  expected	  management	  of	  airliners	  to	  fund	  the	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programme	   and	   middle	   and	   lower	   management	   to	   take	   much	   of	   the	   responsibility	   for	  
carrying	  out	  the	  programme	  to	  help	  troubled	  flight	  attendants.	  This	  expectation	  was	  based	  
on	  the	  resources	  invested	  by	  management	  in	  maintaining	  a	  dedicated	  and	  skilled	  work	  force,	  
when	   top	  management	  was	   still	   acting	  upon	   the	  quality-­‐oriented	   logic.	  However,	  with	   the	  
adoption	   of	   the	   new	   cost-­‐oriented	   logic	   by	   top	   management	   the	   union	   completely	  
misjudged	   the	  new	   situation.	   The	   joint	  programme	  would	  not	  materialize,	   certainly	  not	   in	  
the	   way	   the	   AFA	   advocated.	   Management	   was	   at	   best	   willing	   to	   establish	   a	   company	  
financed	  and	  administered	  programme	  in	  which	  the	  sole	  role	  of	  the	  AFA	  would	  be	  to	  inform	  
a	  supervisor	  or	  company	  employee	  assistance	  officer	  about	  a	  trouble	  flight	  attendants	  The	  
AFA	  and	  labour	  still	  had	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  shift	  in	  management’s	  logic.	  	  
Bacharach,	   Bamberger	   and	   Sonnenstuhl	   (1996)	   note	   that	   the	   subsequent	   action	   of	  
the	  AFA	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  logic	  of	  action	  emphasizing	  employee	  well-­‐
being	   among	   flight	   attendants.	   The	   AFA,	   unwilling	   to	   sacrifice	   its	   autonomy,	   decided	   to	  
implement	  the	  programme	  on	  its	  own.	  The	  change	  in	  logics	  at	  the	  institutional	  level	  among	  
top	  management	  and	  the	  shift	  in	  logics	  among	  flight	  attendants	  also	  triggered	  changes	  in	  the	  
logics	   of	   action	   of	   the	   managerial	   level.	   Under	   the	   new	   cost-­‐oriented	   logic	   of	   top	  
management	  and	  the	   ‘employee	  well-­‐being	   logic’	  adopted	  by	  the	  flight	  attendants,	  middle	  
and	   lower	  managers	   were	   prevented	   from	   further	   pursuing	   their	   communalistic	   logics	   of	  
developing	  and	  maintaining	  a	  dedicated	  and	  skilled	  work	  force	  providing	  quality	  services.	  On	  
the	   one	   hand,	   their	   traditional	   goal	   of	   creating	   and	  maintaining	   a	  workforce	   of	   dedicated	  
and	   skilled	   service	   providers	   was	   inconsistent	   with	   top	   managers’	   concern	   with	   cost	  
reduction.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  their	  communalistic	  means	  and	  paternalistic	  cooperation,	  was	  
inconsistent	  with	  labour’s	  new	  end	  of	  safeguarding	  member’s	  well	  being.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	   order	   to	   reduce	   the	   cognitive	   dissonance	   experienced	   by	   middle	   and	   lower	  
managers	   in	   the	   new	   situation	   two	   important	   steps	   were	   taken.	   	   First,	   they	  managed	   to	  
theorize	   their	   logic	   as	   not	   being	   inconsistent	   with	   top	   managements’	   new	   cost-­‐oriented	  
logic.	  They	  rationalized	  that	  developing	  and	  maintaining	  a	  skilled	  and	  dedicated	  work	  force	  
was	  actually	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  top	  management’s	  cost	  reduction	  programmes.	  Towards	  
the	   flight	   attendants,	   middle	   and	   lower	   managers	   adopted	   a	   more	   balanced,	   collegial	  
approach	  of	  cooperation,	  instead	  of	  the	  paternalistic	  style	  that	  had	  dominated	  previously.	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The	  labour	  union	  was	  willing	  to	  accept	  this	  new	  approach	  as	  it	  discovered	  the	  limits	  
of	  its	  confrontative	  logic	  it	  had	  developed.	  Because	  the	  employee	  assistance	  programme	  was	  
now	   completely	   run	   within	   the	   AFA,	   peer	   counsellors	   noted	   they	   lacked	   the	   appropriate	  
means	   to	   motivate	   severely	   troubled	   flight	   attendants	   to	   seek	   help.	   Management	   could	  
more	   easily	   induce	   troubled	   flight	   attendants	   to	   seek	   professional	   help,	   because	   such	  
individual	   problems	   could	   eventually	   result	   in	   disciplinary	   actions	   (Bacharach,	   Bamberger	  
and	  Sonnenstuhl,	  1996).	  	  
Although	  labour	  and	  management	  initially	  remained	  cautious	  in	  their	  cooperation	  in	  
the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  Employee	  Assistance	  Programme	  (EAP),	  they	  increasingly	  noticed	  the	  
benefits	  of	  their	  cooperation.	  This	  revealed	  itself	   in	  supervisors	  becoming	  more	  proactively	  
involved	  in	  referring	  troubled	  flight	  attendants	  to	  the	  EAP;	  supervisors	  and	  peer	  counsellors	  
began	  to	  view	  themselves	  as	  a	  team	  (Bacharach,	  Bamberger	  and	  Sonnenstuhl,	  1996).	  What	  
had	   happened,	   the	   authors	   argue,	   is	   that	   middle	   and	   lower	   management,	   unlike	   top	  
management	   and	   the	   flight	   attendants,	   did	   not	   abandon	   its	   old	   ‘communalistic	   logic’	   but	  
simply	  rationalized	  it	  as	  being	  consistent	  with	  the	  newly	  adopted	  ‘cost-­‐oriented	  logic’	  of	  top	  
management	   and	   the	   newly	   ‘confrontative	   logic’	   of	   the	   flight	   attendants.	   Bacharach,	  
Bamberger	  and	  Sonnenstuhl	   (1996)	  noted	  that	   the	  rationalisation	  of	   the	  middle	  and	   lower	  
managers’	   logic	   as	   being	   consistent	   with	   the	   new	   logic	   adopted	   at	   the	   top	   management	  
level,	  and	  the	  new	  style	  of	  cooperation	  with	  the	  flight	  attendants	  was	  in	  fact	  an	  extension	  of	  
its	   communalistic	   logic.	   Thus,	   the	  middle	   and	   lower	  managers	  were	   not	   readily	  willing	   to	  
disband	  their	  old	  logic	  and	  associated	  behavioural	  patterns.	  	  
This	  took	  place	  in	  a	  period	  of	  intense	  political	  conflict	  between	  top	  management	  and	  
flight	  attendants	  and	  other	  operational	  personnel	  during	  the	  early	  1980s.	  The	  cost-­‐oriented	  
logic	   of	   top	   management	   and	   the	   concomitant	   deteriorating	   working	   conditions	   of	   flight	  
attendants	   had	   mounted	   to	   a	   clash	   of	   logics	   eventually	   culminating	   in	   strikes.	   This	  
heightened	  conflict	  between	   labour	  and	  top	  management	  would	   increasingly	  put	  strain	  on	  
the	   cooperative	   relations	   between	   the	   operational	   work	   force	   and	   middle	   and	   lower	  
management.	  At	   the	   level	  of	  middle	   and	   lower	  managers	   the	  awareness	  emerged	   that	   its	  
continued	   rationalisation	   of	   its	   logic	   as	   being	   consistent	   with	   the	   new	   logics	   at	   the	   top	  
management	   level	   and	   operational	   level	   became	   untenable.	   	   This	   was	   reinforced	   by	  
accusations	   of	   top	   management	   that	   middle	   and	   lower	   level	   “were	   overstepping	   their	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bounds”,	   not	   enforcing	   the	   new	  work	   rules	   and	   increasing	   the	   carrier’s	   health	   care	   costs	  
(Bacharach,	  Bamberger	  and	  Sonnenstuhl,	  1996:	  500).	  Eventually,	  this	   led	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  
the	   cooperation	   between	   the	   operational	   work	   force	   and	   middle	   and	   lower	   level	  
management.	   Middle	   and	   lower	   level	   management	   at	   this	   point	   abandoned	   their	   old	  
‘communalistic	   logic’	   and	   adopted	   a	   Tayloristic	   logic	   of	   action,	   which	   implied	   rule	  
accountability	  by	  means	  of	  routinisation	  and	  standardisation.	  This	  new	  logic	  aligned	  with	  the	  
logic	   of	   action	   adopted	   at	   the	   top	  managerial	   level.	   “Rule	   accountability	   served	   the	   cost-­‐
reduction	   and	   control-­‐oriented	   means	   of	   the	   institutional	   level,	   while	   routinisation	   and	  
standardisation	  were	  not	   inconsistent	  with	  the	  defence-­‐oriented	  ends	  of	   labor”,	  (Bacharach	  
and	  Bamberger	  and	  Sonnenstuhl,	  1996:	  501).	  
Bacharach,	   Bamberger	   and	   Sonnenstuhl	   (1996:	   502-­‐503)	   summarized	   their	   findings	  
as	   follows:	   “When,	   in	   response	   to	   environmental	   changes,	   actors	   at	   the	   institutional	   (top	  
management,	  author)	  level	  adopt	  a	  new	  logic	  of	  action,	  this	  logic	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  inconsistent	  
with	   those	   logics	  held	  by	  actors	  at	   the	  core	   (operational,	  author)	   level	  of	   the	  organization.	  
Reacting	   to	   the	   dissonance	   created	   by	   such	   inconsistency,	   actors	   at	   the	   core	   level	   will	  
attempt	  either	  to	  rationalize	  or	  adapt	  their	  old	  logics	  to	  the	  institutional	  level’s	  new	  logic.	  As	  
we	   have	   seen	   in	   this	   paper,	   after	   a	   period	   of	   time,	   the	   core-­‐level	   actors’	   effort	   to	   reduce	  
dissonance	  by	  rationalizing	  and	  adapting	  their	  existing	   logic	  to	  the	   logic	  of	  the	   institutional	  
level	  may	  result	  not	  in	  the	  reduction	  of	  dissonance	  but	  in	  the	  accentuation	  of	  inconsistencies	  
and	   increased	   dissonance.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   core-­‐level	   actors	   may	   abandon	   their	   old	  
rationalizing	   and	   adapting	   strategies	   and	   adopt	   new	   logics	   aligned	   with	   the	   institutional	  
level’s	  new	  logic,	  thus	  bringing	  the	  hierarchical	  levels	  of	  the	  organization	  into	  alignment.”	  	  
We	  have	  paid	  so	  much	  attention	  to	  this	  analysis,	  because	  Bacharach,	  Bamberger	  and	  
Sonnenstuhl	   (1996)	   developed	   the	   approach	  we	   are	   pursuing	   in	   this	   study.	   However,	   our	  
approach	  differs	  in	  one	  fundamental	  aspect.	  Bacharach,	  Bamberger	  and	  Sonnenstuhl	  (1996)	  
focused	  on	  hierarchical	   relations	  between	   top	  managers,	  middle	   and	   lower	  managers	   and	  
operational	   employees	   in	   an	   intraorganisational	   setting.	   Arguably,	   this	   makes	   it	   easier	   to	  
facilitate	   alignment,	   because	   of	   the	   coercive	   capacities	   of	   top	  management	   toward	   lower	  
level	  management	  and	  the	  operational	  level.	  In	  interorganisational	  relations	  between	  two	  or	  
more	   autonomous	  organisational	   entities,	   coercion	   is	   often	   considered	   to	  be	   less	   likely	   to	  
occur,	   unless	   there	   is	   a	   substantial	   degree	   of	   resource	   dependence	   between	   two	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organisations	   (Pfeffer	   and	   Salancik,	   1978).	   Nonetheless,	   despite	   absent	   coercive	   power,	   a	  
certain	  alignment	  of	   interests	  and	  preferences	  needs	  to	  be	  assured	  in	  interfirm	  or	  multiple	  
agent	   cooperation;	   it	   cannot	   survive	  without	   (Grandori,	   1997;	   Child	   and	  Rodrigues,	   2003).	  
Before	  we	   continue	   to	   develop	   our	   conceptual	  model,	   we	  will	   first	   draw	   on	   some	   of	   the	  
relevant	  literature	  on	  interorganisational	  relationships.	  Although,	  it	  has	  been	  at	  least	  implicit	  
in	   our	   argument	   thus	   far,	   we	   will	   elaborate	   in	   the	   following	   paragraph	   on	   our	  
conceptualisation	  of	  interorganisational	  relations	  as	  occasions	  of	  structural	  overlap	  (Thorton	  
and	  Ocasio,	  2008).	  	  
The	   last	  couple	  of	  decades	  witnessed	  a	  significant	   increase	   in	   the	  various	  modes	   in	  
which	   Western	   economies	   are	   being	   managed.	   The	   dichotomy	   between	   hierarchical	   and	  
market	   governance	   diminished,	   and	   an	   increase	   in	   hybrids	   could	   be	   observed	   (Bradach,	  
1997;	   Bradach	   and	   Eccles,	   1989).	   Powell	   (1990)	   even	   went	   as	   far	   to	   suggest	   that	  
conceptualizing	   alliances	   and	   networks	   as	   hybrids,	   is	   misleading,	   and	   that	   they	   actually	  
constitute	  a	  distinct	  organisational	  form.	  Increasingly,	  different	  types	  of	  organisations,	  public	  
and	   private,	   profit	   and	   non-­‐profit,	   turned	   to	   cooperative	   interorganisational	   relationships	  
(IOR)	  for	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  motivations,	  such	  as	  risk	  sharing,	  securing	  resources,	  in	  particular,	  
skills,	   and	   knowledge	   (Powell,	   1987).	   Simultaneously,	   scholarly	   work	   on	   and	   interest	   in	  
alliances	   and	   networks	   has	   increased	   considerably	   (Smith,	   Carroll,	   and	   Ashford,	   1995).	  
Khanna	  (1998)	  suggests	  that	  probably	  there	  is	  no	  other	  research	  topic	  that	  has	  received	  so	  
much	  attention	  in	  the	  organisational	  literature.	  	  
Research	  so	  far	  has	  commonly	  adopted	  a	  resource	  dependence	  (Pfeffer	  and	  Salancik,	  
1978),	   a	   transaction	   cost	   economics	   (Williamson,	   1981),	   or	   a	   resource-­‐based	   perspective	  
(Rumelt,	   1978).	   It	   was	   primarily	   focused	   on	   the	   conditions	   leading	   to	   the	   initiation	   of	  
cooperative	  interorganisational	  relationships.	  It	  is	  not	  our	  intention	  to	  review	  the	  complete	  
literature	   on	   interorganisational	   relations	   here.	   Such	   an	   endeavour	  would	   be	  way	   beyond	  
the	  scope	  of	  this	  study.	  We	  will	  draw,	  however,	  on	  some	  perspectives	  relevant	  to	  our	  own	  
research.	  In	  particular,	  we	  will	  draw	  on	  perspectives	  that	  emphasize	  the	  process	  dynamics	  of	  
interorganisational	   relations,	   which	   takes	   institutional	   and	   cultural	   factors	   into	   account.	  
Scholars	   examining	   cooperative	   interorganisational	   relationships	   suggested	   that	   problems	  
and	  tensions	  emerge	  because	  the	  actors	  may	  have	  dissimilar	  backgrounds	  and	  belief	  systems	  
(Sutcliffe	   and	   Huber,	   1998),	   and	   are	   accustomed	   to	   different	   structures,	   varying	   cultures	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(Barkema	  and	  Vermeulen,	  1997	  and	  diverging	  management	  styles	  (Lane	  and	  Lubatkin,	  1998).	  
In	  international	  public-­‐private	  projects	  this	  is	  even	  more	  likely	  as	  actors	  stem	  from	  different	  
institutional	  sectors	  and	  national	  cultures.	  
	   Students	   of	   international	   business	   have	   explored	   the	   effects	   of	   institutional	   and	  
cultural	  differences	  on	  the	  choice	  of	  entry	  mode	  for	  foreign	  direct	  investments.	  Drawing	  on	  
the	  work	  of	  Hofstede	  on	  national	  cultures,	  researchers	  have	  used	  concepts	  such	  as	  ‘psychic	  
distance’	  (e.g.	  O’Grady	  and	  Lane,	  1996)	  and	  ‘cultural	  distance’	  (e.g.	  Kogut	  and	  Singh,	  1988).	  
Others	  have	  suggested	  that	  this	  approach	  may	  be	  too	  abstract	  to	  capture	  the	  complexity	  of	  
cross-­‐country	   societal	   differences	   and	   have	   offered	   concepts	   such	   as	   ‘institutional	  
differences’	  (Xu	  and	  Shenkar,	  2002)	  and	  ‘institutional	  idiosyncrasies’	  (Henisz,	  2003).	  	  
These	  studies	  suggest	  that	  cultural	  and	  institutional	  differences	  between	  parties	  in	  an	  
interorganisational	  relationship	  significantly	  increase	  transaction	  costs.	  Orr	  and	  Scott	  (2008)	  
have	   provided	   empirical	   evidence	   for	   this	   observation.	   They	   studied	   23	   cases	   in	   which	   a	  
foreign	   entrant	   teamed	  up	  with	   host	   country-­‐company	   and	   noted	   that	   in	   all	   23	   cases	   the	  
entrant	   displayed	   ‘institutional	   ignorance’	   as	   result	   of	   unfamiliarity	   with	   host	   countries’	  
institutions.	   In	   all	   cases	   they	   noted	   a	   sequence	   in	   which	   an	   entrant	   entered	   a	   project	  
institutionally	   ignorant,	   acts	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   deviant	   from	   local	   institutions,	   which	   then	  
results	   in	   disapproval	   and	   additional	   costs	   originating	   from	   the	  host	   (Orr	   and	   Scott,	   2008:	  
571).	  	  	  	  
Ham	   and	   Mowery	   (1998)	   provided	   evidence	   that	   cross-­‐sector	   interorganisational	  
relationships	   are	   often	   subjected	   to	   similar	   experiences.	   They	   (1998)	   conducted	   a	  
comparative	   case	   study	   into	   five	   Cooperative	   Research	   and	   Development	   Agreements	  
(CRADAs)	   between	   private	   firms	   and	   a	   large	   public	   research	   laboratory,	   the	   Lawrence	  
Livermore	  National	  Laboratory.	  They	  noted	  how	  different	  logics	  between	  public	  and	  private	  
actors	  in	  all	  of	  their	  cases	  led	  to	  tensions	  in	  the	  projects.	  Many	  of	  the	  public	  project	  officers	  
from	   the	   Lawrence	   Livermore	  National	   Laboratory	  had	   years	  of	   experience	   in	   research	  on	  
weapons	  systems.	  These	  public	  project	  officer	  generally	  favoured	  performance	  over	  project	  
costs	  and	  schedule,	  and	  emphasized	  the	  answering	  of	  the	  underling	  research	  questions.	  The	  
private	  firms	  involved	  in	  the	  CRADAs,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  tended	  to	  favour	  fast	  completion	  of	  
important	   project	   milestones.	   In	   depth	   understanding	   of	   the	   underlying	   science	   of	  
technologies	  was	  of	  minor	   concern	   to	   the	  private	   firms.	  Rather	   they	   tended	   to	   favour	   the	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marketing	  of	  the	  technology	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  started	  to	  show	  promise	  (Ham	  and	  Mowery	  1998:	  
667).	  
We	  suggest	  that	  international	  public-­‐private	  networks	  present	  occasions	  conditioned	  
by	  structural	  overlap	  (Thorton	  and	  Ocasio,	  2008),	  in	  which	  different	  interests,	  logics,	  values	  
and	   beliefs	   intermingle	   and	   are	   contested	   (Kraatz	   and	   Moore,	   2008;	   Schneiberg	   and	  
Clemens,	  2006;	  Stryker	  2002;	  Thorton	  and	  Ocasio	  2008).	  Meyer	  and	  Rowan	  (1977)	  already	  
acknowledged	   that	   many	   organisations	   and	   networks	   face	   institutionally	   pluralistic	  
environments.	  “Because	  the	  ceremonial	  rules	  are	  transmitted	  by	  myths	  that	  may	  arise	  from	  
different	   parts	   of	   the	   environment,	   the	   rules	   may	   conflict	   with	   one	   another”	   (p.355).	  
Schneiberg	   and	   Clemens	   (2006)	   urged	   theorists	   to	   examine	   organisations	   and	   networks	  
operating	  at	   the	  boundaries	  and	   interstices	  of	  organisational	   fields	  where	  actors	  are	  often	  
exposed	   to	   institutional	   contradictions	   and	   exposure	   to	   multiple	   logics.	   In	   the	   following	  
section	  we	  will	  present	  a	  model	  of	   the	  alignment	  of	   logics	   in	   interorganisational	   relations.	  
We	  will	  do	  this	  by	  drawing	  on	  the	  sense-­‐making	  perspective	  proposed	  by	  Karl	  Weick	  (1969;	  
1995).	  	  
 
2.6	   Alignment	  of	  Logics	  in	  Networks	  through	  Sense-­‐Making	  
 
Currently,	   neo-­‐institutional	   theory	   lacks	   an	   adequate	   understanding	   of	   micro-­‐institutional	  
dynamics.	   It	  has	  tended	  to	  emphasize	  stability	  over	  change	  and	  the	  constraining	  effects	  of	  
institutions	  over	   their	  enabling	  potential.	  Powell	  and	  Colyvas	   (2008)	  have	  also	  emphasized	  
this	  arguing,	  “…	  macro-­‐lines	  of	  analysis	  could	  also	  profit	  from	  a	  micro-­‐motor.	  Such	  a	  motor	  
would	   involve	   theories	   that	   attend	   to	   enaction,	   interpretation,	   translation	   and	   meaning.	  
Institutions	   are	   sustained,	   altered	   and	   extinguished	   as	   they	   are	   enacted	   by	   individuals	   in	  
concrete	  social	  situations”	  (Powell	  and	  Colyvas,	  2008:	  276).	  	  
These	  words	   indeed	   point	   to	   a	   closer	   connection	   between	   neo-­‐institutional	   theory	  
and	  another	  influential	  line	  of	  organisational	  analysis	  that	  particularly	  focuses	  on	  the	  micro-­‐
processes	  of	  meaning	  construction.	  The	  sense-­‐making	  perspective	  developed	  by	  Karl	  Weick	  
(1969)	  seems	  particularly	  relevant	  for	  further	  theorizing.	  While	  both	  Weick’s	  work	  and	  neo-­‐
institutional	   theorizing	   developed	   at	   about	   the	   same	   time,	   both	   streams	   of	   research	  
developed	   relatively	   independently	   of	   one	   another	   (Weber	   and	  Glynn,	   2006).	   This	   is	   even	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more	  remarkable	  given	  that	  both	  perspectives	  share	  a	  similar	  heritage	  through	  the	  work	  of	  
George	  Herbert	  Mead,	  Erving	  Goffman	  and	  Berger	  and	  Luckmann.	   Interestingly,	   they	  have	  
also	   received	   remarkably	   similar	   criticisms,	   albeit	   in	   an	   opposite	   direction.	   Where	   neo-­‐
institutional	   theory	   is	   often	   criticized	   for	   assuming	   the	   existence	   of	   too	   much	   order	   and	  
stability	   in	  everyday	   life,	   the	  work	  of	  Karl	  Weick	   is	  often	  criticised	   for	   the	  opposite,	   that	   it	  
neglects	   how	   the	   wider	   social	   context	   affects	   sense-­‐making	   processes	   in	   organisations	  
(Weber	   and	   Glynn,	   2006).	   The	   manner	   in	   which	   the	   larger	   social	   context	   affects	   sense-­‐
making	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Pfeffer	  and	  Salancik	  (1978:	  63).	  They	  argued	  that	  in	  order	  to	  
understand	   how	   the	   environment	   affects	   an	   organisation	   attention	   should	   be	   directed	  
towards	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  an	  organisation	  perceives	  and	  represents	  its	  environment.	  	  
Louis	   (1980)	   who	   studied	   the	   socialisation	   of	   newcomers	   in	   entering	   unfamiliar	  
organisation	  defined	  sense-­‐making	  as	  “…	  a	  recurring	  cycle	  comprised	  of	  a	  sequence	  of	  events	  
occurring	   over	   time.	   The	   cycle	   begins	   as	   individuals	   form	   unconscious	   and	   conscious	  
anticipations	  and	  assumptions,	  which	  serve	  as	  predictions	  about	  future	  events.	  Subsequently,	  
individuals	  experience	  events	  that	  may	  be	  discrepant	  from	  predictions.	  Discrepant	  events,	  or	  
surprises,	  trigger	  a	  need	  for	  explanation,	  or	  post-­‐diction,	  and	  correspondingly,	  for	  a	  process	  
through	  which	  interpretations	  of	  discrepancies	  are	  developed.	  Interpretation,	  or	  meaning,	  is	  
attributed	  to	  surprises”	  (Louis,	  1980:	  241).	  	  
Hence,	  sense-­‐making	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  meaning	  
(Gioia	  and	  Chittpetti,	  1991;	  Weick,	  1995).	  Thomas,	  Clark	  and	  Gioia,	   (1993:	  240)	  argue	   that	  
sense-­‐making	   involves	   “the	   reciprocal	   interaction	   of	   information	   seeking,	   meaning	  
ascription,	  and	  action”.	  Note	  that	  these	  descriptions	  of	  sense-­‐making	  primarily	  occur	  at	  the	  
individual	   level.	   For	   organisational	   level	   phenomena	   the	   story	   becomes	   more	   complex.	  
Cultural	   sense-­‐making	   activities	   present	   a	   somewhat	  more	   complicated	   story.	   Only	   when	  
individuals	   in	  organisations	  share	  basic	  assumptions,	  values	  and	  norms	  one	  can	  talk	  of	   the	  
existence	  of	  a	  culture.	  Nevertheless	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  little	  consensus	  on	  what	  this	  sharing	  
actually	  implies	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  assumptions	  and	  beliefs	  are	  shared	  (Harris,	  1994).	  	  
Recently,	   Jeong	   and	   Brower	   (2008)	   developed	   a	   model	   of	   sense-­‐making	   that	   is	  
particularly	  well	  suited	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  study.	  They	  developed	  a	  three	  stage-­‐process	  
model	  of	  sense-­‐making	  consisting	  of	  noticing,	  interpretation	  and	  action.	  Noticing	  involves	  a	  
“process	   in	   which	   individuals	   in	   organizations	   indicate	   to	   themselves	   some	   things	   in	   the	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outward	   situations,	   and	   in	   doing	   so	  mentally	   project	   their	   problematic	   plans	   of	   action	   for	  
those	   things”	   (Jeong	   and	   Brower,	   2008:	   228).	   Interpretation	   they	   note	   “is	   a	   kind	   of	  
combining	  process	   in	  which	   the	  cue	   is	   connected	   to	  a	   frame	  of	   reference,	   through	  which	  a	  
state	   of	   affairs	   (meaning)	   of	   the	   cue	   is	   constructed.”	   Jeong	   and	   Brower,	   2008:	   230).	   In	  
addition,	   they	  argue	   that	   three	  aspects	  of	  action	  are	  critical.	  First,	   they	  note	   that	  action	   is	  
directed	   toward	   the	   attainment	   of	   future	   goals	   (Jeong	   and	   Brower,	   2008:	   232).	   Second,	  
action	  is	  a	  controlled	  operation	  that	  translates	  thought	  into	  deed	  (Jeong	  and	  Brower,	  2008:	  
232).	   Third,	   that	   action	   often	   triggers	   subsequent	   noticing	   and	   interpretation	   (Jeong	   and	  
Brower,	  2008:	  232).	  Figure	  2.1	  contains	  a	  schematic	  representation	  of	  our	  conceptual	  model.	  
	   Literature	   often	   tends	   to	   portray	   alignment	   as	   a	   dichotomy;	   either,	   interests	   and	  
preferences	  are	  aligned	  and	   relationships	   flourish,	  or	   they	  are	  not	  and	   relationships	  break	  
down.	  The	  model	  we	  have	  presented	  here	  may	  also	  suggest	  this.	  It	  seems	  also	  implicit	  in	  the	  
study	  of	  Bacharach,	  Bamberger	  and	  Sonnenstuhl	  (1996),	  which	  we	  have	  discussed	  at	  some	  
length	   earlier.	   Maybe	   such	   an	   assumption	   is	   justified	   in	   the	   context	   of	   hierarchical	  
relationships,	   where	   management	   often	   exerts	   a	   controlling	   influence	   upon	   the	   logics	   of	  
their	  subordinates	  (Thorton,	  2004).	  However,	  many	  social	  structures	  do	  not	  share	  the	  stable	  
properties	   of	   hierarchies.	   Powell	   and	   Colyvas	   (2008:	   605)	   argue	   that	   actors	   in	   social	  
structures	   that	   engage	   multiple	   logics	   “can	   use	   their	   circumstances	   to	   forge	   new	  
opportunities	  or	  craft	  multivocal	  identities.”	  
	   In	   settings	   where	   numerous	   logics	   reflect	   conflicting	   or	   incompatible	   demands,	  
ambiguous	   identities	   and	   multiple	   networks	   offer	   room	   to	   manoeuvre.	   In	   many	   social	  
situations	  complete	  alignment	  is	  unlikely	  to	  occur.	  
 A	  recent	  study	  by	  Lok	  (2010)	  is	  particularly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  a	  societal	  
shift	  in	  logics	  activate	  micro-­‐level	  sense-­‐making	  activities	  of	  firm	  managers	  and	  how	  these	  
sense-­‐making	  processes	  in	  effect	  challenged	  broadly	  legitimised	  logics.	  “…	  even	  highly	  
legitimated	  logics	  advocated	  by	  powerful	  change	  agents	  are	  subject	  to	  subtle	  challenges	  
based	  on	  the	  mutability	  of	  the	  identities	  and	  practices	  that	  underpin	  them”	  (Lok,	  2010:	  
1330).	  He	  studied	  how	  managers	  and	  institutional	  investors	  reacted	  to	  the	  diffusion	  of	  the	  




Figure	  2.1	   Conceptual	  framework	  of	  the	  alignment	  of	  institutional	  logics	  in	  	   	  





He	   noted	   that:	   “Both	   management	   and	   institutional	   shareholders	   responded	   to	   strong	  
societal	   pressures	   for	   identity	   and	   practice	   transformation	   based	   on	   the	   new	   enlightened	  
shareholder	   value	   logic	   by	   subtly	   reworking	   the	   identities	   and	   practices	   prescribed	   at	   the	  
societal	   level	   in	   their	   everyday	   talk	   and	   activities	   in	   ways	   that	   preserved	   a	   sense	   of	  
autonomy,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   degree	   of	   coherence	   with	   pre-­‐existing	   self-­‐identifications	   and	  
practices”	   (Lok,	   2010:	   1330).	   In	   this	   way	   they	   managed	   to	   both	   accommodate	   the	   new	  
shareholder	  value	  logic	  as	  well	  as	  resist	  it.	  	  
The	  sense-­‐making	  perspective	  is	  particular	  sensitive	  to	  this	  (Maitlis,	  2005).	  Donnellon,	  
Gray	   and	  Bougon	   (1986)	  noticed	   that	   some	  ambiguity	   remains	   in	   the	   literature	   as	   to	  how	  
much	  shared	  meaning	  is	  required	  for	  organized	  action.	  Donnellon,	  Gray,	  and	  Bougon	  (1986:	  
44)	   argue	   that	   what	   is	   required	   for	   organized	   action	   to	   unfold	   is	   equifinal	  meaning.	   	   For	  
them,	   this	   means	   that	   although	   interpretations	   differ	   between	   individuals,	   they	   may	   still	  
have	   the	   same	   behavioural	   implications.	   “…	   organization	   members	   may	   have	   different	  
reasons	   for	   undertaking	   the	   action	   and	   different	   interpretations	   of	   the	   action’s	   potential	  
outcomes,	  but	  they	  may	  nonetheless	  act	  in	  an	  organized	  manner.	  	  
Similarly,	  Maitlis	   (2005)	   developed	   a	   typology	   of	   sense-­‐making	   processes	   based	   on	  
her	  study	  of	  sense	  making	  processes	  between	  orchestra	   leaders	  and	  stakeholders	   in	  which	  
she	  differentiates	  between	  guided,	  fragmented,	  restricted,	  and	  minimal	  sense	  making.	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Much	   prior	   research	   on	   sense-­‐making	   has	   been	   directed	   towards	   high	   uncertainty	  
environments,	  where	  there	  is	  a	  tight	  coupling	  between	  behaviours	  and	  outcomes,	  the	  latter	  
with	   potentially	   disastrous	   results	   such	   as	   coordination	   on	   aircraft	   carriers	   (Weick	   and	  
Roberts,	   1993),	   fire	   fighters	   (Weick,	   1993)	   and	  military	   expeditionary	   operations	   (Kramer,	  
2007).	  But	  ordinary	   life	   and	   certainly	  organisational	   life	  presents	  many	  occasions	   in	  which	  
both	  individuals	  and	  organisations	  have	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  unexpected	  circumstances.	  	  
Note	  that	  much	  research	  on	  organisational	  sense-­‐making	  deals	  with	  how	  individuals	  
make	  sense	  of	  organizational	  phenomena.	  Which	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  same	  as	  how	  two	  or	  
more	   individuals	  try	  to	  achieve	  a	  congruent	  understanding	  of	  events	  and	  their	  behavioural	  
implications.	   Indeed	   the	   model	   of	   Jeorg	   and	   Brower	   (2008)	   presents	   an	   instance	   of	   an	  
individual	   sense-­‐making	   process	   in	   an	   organisational	   context.	   Relying	   completely	   on	   this	  
model	  may	  present	   a	   risk	   that	   certain	  elements	  of	  multiparty	   sense-­‐making	  processes	   are	  
neglected.	  	  
A	   number	   of	   studies	   have	   suggested	   concepts	   that	   are	   useful	   to	   study	   multiparty	  
sense-­‐making	  processes.	  Gioia	  and	  Chittipetti	  (1992)	  distinguished	  sense-­‐making	  and	  sense-­‐
giving.	   Vlaar,	   van	   Fenema	   and	   Tiwari	   (2008)	   in	   a	   study	   of	   sense-­‐making	   processes	   of	  
members	   of	   distributed	   work	   teams	   suggested	   that	   multiparty	   sense-­‐making	   processes	  
consist	  of	  communicative	  acts	  of	  sense-­‐giving,	  sense-­‐demanding	  and	  sense-­‐breaking.	  Sense-­‐
giving	  consists	  of	  acts	   to	   influence	  the	  way	  others	   think	  and	  act	  and	  concerns	  activities	  by	  
which	   stakeholders	   frame	   and	   disseminate	   their	   visions	   and	   beliefs	   to	   others	   (Vlaar,	   Van	  
Fenema	   and	   Tiwari,	   2008:	   242).	   Sense-­‐demanding	   is	   a	   communicative	   act	   in	   which	  
individuals	  ask	  for	  clarification	  of	  their	  situation	  (Vlaar,	  Van	  Fenema	  and	  Tiwari,	  2008:	  242).	  
Sense-­‐breaking	   involves	   the	   questioning	   of	   others	   reasoning	   and	   understandings	   causing	  
them	   to	   experience	   their	   views	   of	   reality	   as	   incoherent,	   insensible,	   and	   untenable	   (Vlaar,	  
Van	  Fenema	  and	  Tiwari,	  2008:	  243).	  	  
A	  more	  political	  view	  of	  sense-­‐making	  has	  been	  pursued	  recently	  by	  scholars	  studying	  
post-­‐merger	   integration	   processes	   (Kroon,	   2010,	   Vaara,	   2003,	   Vaara	   and	   Monin,	   2010).	  
Vaara	  (2003)	  conceives	  of	  sense-­‐making	  as	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  through	  which	  one	  can	  
view	   decision-­‐making	   as	   contextual	   processes	  which	   are	   characterised	   by	   uncertainty	   and	  
ambiguity,	  and	  involve	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  political	  tensions	  (Vaara,	  2003:862).	  Sense-­‐making	  is	  
viewed	  as	  a	  dialectical	  process	   in	  which	  tensions	  emerge	  out	  of	   the	  discursive	  practices	  of	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participants,	   which	   can	   be	   motivated	   by	   the	   desire	   to	   achieve	   congruent	   actionable	  
understandings	  (e.g.	  sense-­‐giving	  or	  sense-­‐demanding),	  but	  also	  the	  opposite	  suggested	  by	  
the	  notion	  of	  sense-­‐hiding.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  sense-­‐making	  and	  its	  dialogical	  underpinnings	  can	  
be	  seen	  as	  what	  Lindblom	  (1959)	  has	  called	  the	  ‘science	  of	  muddling	  through’.	  With	  this	  he	  
tried	   to	   outline	   a	   different	   form	   of	   decision-­‐making	   that	   does	   not	   follow	   the	   patterns	  
outlined	  by	  formal-­‐rational	  decision-­‐making	  models.	  	  	  	  
The	  conceptual	  model	  we	  propose	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  our	  analysis	  is	  predicated	  
on	  the	  idea	  that	  interorganisational	  sense-­‐making	  efforts	  contain	  a	  process	  in	  which	  actors	  
recognise	   some	   problematic	   situation	   in	   dealing	   with	   one	   or	   more	   of	   their	   partners	  
(noticing).	   Interpreting	  this	  problematic	  situation	   involves	  elaborating	  upon	  the	  specifics	  of	  
this	  situation.	  Yet,	  as	  Jeorg	  and	  Brower	  (2008)	  suggest	  this	  interpretation	  is	  formed	  in	  light	  of	  
pre-­‐existing	   cognitive	   frameworks.	   Institutional	   logics	   provide	   for	   these	   pre-­‐established	  
cognitive	   frameworks.	   Institutional	   logics	   comprise	   the	   means-­‐end	   frames	   through	   which	  
problematic	   situations	   are	   analysed	   and	   responded	   to.	   Given	   that	   human	   beings	   are	   only	  
boundedly	  rational	   (Simon,	  1978)	  and	  often	  time	  for	  elaborate	  search	  processes	   is	   lacking,	  
logics	   serve	   as	   heuristic	   devices	   that	   filter	   cues	   from	   the	   environment.	   They	   structure	  
decision	  makers’	  attention	  (Thornton	  and	  Ocasio,	  1999	  Thornton,	  2004).	  	  	  
In	   this	   sense,	   logics	   structure	   the	   noticing	   and	   interpretation	   processes	   of	   the	  
organisational	  actors.	  It	  refers	  to	  the	  cultural	  dimension	  of	  misalignment	  denoted	  by	  Stokes	  
and	  Hewitt	   (1976:	   843),	  which	   ‘revolves	   around	   the	   fact	   that	   problematic	   situations	   often	  
involve	  misalignment	  between	  the	  actual	  or	  intended	  acts	  of	  participants	  and	  cultural	  ideals,	  
expectations,	   beliefs,	   knowledge	   and	   the	   like.	   “Alignment”	   in	   this	   sense	   has	   to	   do	   with	  
perceived	  discrepancies	  between	  what	  is	  actually	  taking	  place	  in	  a	  given	  situation	  and	  what	  
is	  thought	  to	  be	  typical,	  normatively	  expected,	  probable,	  desirable	  or,	  in	  other	  respects,	  more	  
in	  accord	  with	  what	  is	  culturally	  normal.	  In	  our	  context,	  there	  is	  an	  additional	  difficulty.	  That	  
is	  that	  partners	  will	  assess	  other	  actor’s	  action	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  own	  cultural	  repertoire.	  But	  
from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  another	  participant	  that	  same	  action	  may	  entirely	  be	  consistent	  
with	   the	   cultural	   repertoire	   of	   that	   participant.	   Nevertheless,	   sustained	   interaction	   and	  
hence	   the	   concomitant	   sense-­‐making	   processes	   are	   likely	   to	   reduce	   these	   ‘biased’	  
perspectives	  as	  actors	  will	  become	  more	  aware	  of	  their	  cultural	  differences,	  and	  how	  they	  
affect	  perceptions	  and	  judgments.	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This	  concludes	  our	  theoretical	  journey.	  It	  started	  with	  the	  origins	  of	  institutional	  thinking	  in	  
various	   disciplines.	   Via	   the	   emergence	   of	   neo-­‐institutional	   theorizing	   in	   the	   sociology	   of	  
organisations	   and	   the	   discussion	   of	   institutional	   logics,	   particularly	   national	   institutional	  
logics,	   the	   journey	   went	   on	   to	   study	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   aligning	   institutional	   logics	   in	  
hierarchies	  as	  well	  as	  in	  interorganisational	  relations.	  We	  have	  conceptualised	  alignment	  as	  
a	  sense-­‐making	  process	  involving	  noticing,	  interpretation	  and	  action.	  
	   Our	   basic	   theoretical	   position	   is	   that	   institutional	   logics	   provide	   for	   the	   underlying	  
cognitive	  and	  symbolic	  structures	  through	  which	  events	  are	  rendered	  meaningful.	   In	  other	  
words,	  institutional	  logics	  inform	  the	  noticing,	  interpretation	  and	  action	  processes	  of	  agents.	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   in	   pluralistic	   cultural	   and	   institutional	   settings	   these	   noticing,	  
interpretation	   and	   action	   processes	   may	   also	   reveal	   a	   form	   of	   ignorance	   in	   which	   actors	  
become	  aware	  of	  differences	  in	  their	  institutional	  logic.	  This	  in	  turn	  may	  trigger	  activities	  to	  

























































This	   chapter	   is	   dedicated	   to	   a	   description	   of	   the	   four	   founding	   nations	   of	   the	   NH	   90	  
programme	  (i.e.	  France,	  Germany,	  Italy	  and	  the	  Netherlands)	  based	  on	  literature	  about	  their	  
history,	   institutions,	   politics	   and	   economics.	   This	   description	   aims	   to	   provide	   important	  
background	   information	  as	   this	   thesis	   revolves	  around	  differences	   in	   institutional	   logics	  of	  
these	   countries	  and	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  programme	  actors	   from	   these	   countries	   seek	   to	  
align	   their	  national	   institutional	   logics.	   For	  each	   country	  we	  will	   briefly	   sketch	   its	  business	  
climate,	  managerial	  practices,	  and	  industrial	  policies,	  after	  which	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  
the	  defence	  industry	  therein.	  	  
 
3.1	   France	  
 
For	  many	  centuries	  France	  has	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  European	  and	  world	  politics.	  Its	  
history	   and	   traditions	   seem	   reflected	   in	   a	   strong	   national,	   state-­‐based	   orientation	   that	  
seems	   be	   a	   primary	   trait	   of	   the	   French	   nation.	   Although	   many	   authors	   have	   traced	   the	  
French	  concept	  of	  ‘grandeur’	  back	  to	  the	  seventeenth	  century,	  under	  the	  reign	  of	  Louis	  XIV	  
(e.g.	   Cerny,	   1980),	   or	   the	   nineteenth	   century	   in	   the	   Napoleontic	   era,	   it	   would	   show	   its	  
twentieth	  century	  qualities	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  General	  de	  Gaulle.	  But	  French	  –	  as	  well	  
as	  other	  nations’	  -­‐	  idiosyncrasies	  may	  go	  a	  bit	  deeper	  than	  the	  listing	  of	  historical	  events	  and	  
developments	  can	  clarify.	  
Anthropologist	  Mary	  Douglas	  (1986)	  argued	  that	  both	  France	  and	  the	  United	  States	  
developed	   logics	   based	   on	   natural	   analogies.	   She	  maintained	   that	   in	   the	  U.S.	   the	   analogy	  
referred	  to	  natural	  selection	  processes	  spurring	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  fittest.	  The	  adopted	  logic	  
of	  progress	  was	  that	  market	  selection	  effects	  economic	  rationality,	  which	   in	   the	  aggregate	  
results	  in	  growth.	  In	  France,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  the	  analogy	  was	  made	  to	  a	  biological	  system,	  
only	   functioning	   properly	   when	   all	   parts	   are	   coordinated	   by	   a	   central	   entity	   (the	   brain),	  
hence	  ensuring	  survival	  and	  growth.	  These	  different	  logics	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  evaluation	  and	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policy	  making.	   In	   the	   U.S.	   scheme	   economic	   irrationalities	   are	   viewed	   as	   the	   outcome	   of	  
market	   failures.	   In	   France,	   failures	   in	   central	   coordination	   would	   be	   viewed	   largely	  
responsible	  for	  this	  outcome.	  	  
Burt,	   Hogarth	   and	   Michaud	   (2000)	   offer	   further	   evidence	   of	   differences	   between	  
American	  and	  French	  business	  systems.	  Using	  network	  measures	   they	  examined	  the	  social	  
capital	   of	  U.S	  managers	   and	   French	  managers.	  Although	   they	   found	  evidence	   that	  bridge-­‐
relationships	  offer	  advantages	   in	  both	  the	  U.S	  and	  France,	   they	  also	  revealed	  a	  number	  of	  
interesting	   differences	   that	   seem	   to	   pertain	   to	   the	   analogy	   described	   by	   Douglas	   (1986).	  
These	  differences	   include	  the	  wider	  range	  of	  American	  contacts	  and	  the	  positive	  emotions	  
that	   American	   managers	   associate	   with	   bridge	   relationships.	   French	   managers	   appear	   to	  
form	   less	   porous	   cliques	   and	   tend	   to	   have	   negative	   emotions	   with	   fulfilling	   bridge	  
relationships	  (Burt,	  Hogarth	  and	  Michaud,	  2000).	  These	  authors	  note	  that	  these	  differences	  
could	   at	   least	   partially	   be	   explained	   by	   differences	   in	   the	   educational	   and	   professional	  
systems	   of	   both	   countries.	   In	   France,	   top	   managers	   generally	   stem	   from	   the	   elite	  
educational	   systems,	   where	   cliques	   are	   formed	   that	   are	   maintained	   and	   nurtured	  
throughout	  managers’	  professional	  careers.	  This	  is	  different	  for	  top	  managers	  in	  the	  United	  
States,	  who	  lack	  this	  kind	  of	  educational	  background	  (Burt,	  Hogarth	  and	  Michaud,	  2000).	  	  
Dobbin	   (1992)	   pursuits	   Douglas’	   ideas	   further	   in	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   American	   and	  
French	   electronics	   policies.	   After	   WWII	   semiconductor	   chips	   became	   viewed	   in	   both	  
countries	   as	   having	   important	   industrial	   and	  military	   applications.	   But	   consistent	  with	   the	  
different	  natural	  analogies	  adopted,	  policy	  mechanisms	  and	  outcomes	  were	  very	  different.	  
As	   Dobbin	   (1992:	   197)	   phrased	   it:	   “Where	   the	   Americans	   outlawed	   mergers,	   the	   French	  
brokered	  them.	  Where	  the	  Americans	  refused	  to	  favor	  particular	  firms	  in	  their	  procurement	  
procedures,	   the	   French	   designated	   “national	   champions”.	  Where	   the	   Americans	   sought	   to	  
stimulate	   competition	   and	  market	   entry,	   the	   French	   sought	   to	   eliminate	   both.	  Where	   the	  
Americans	  made	  agreements	  to	  make	  product	  competition	  illegal,	  the	  French	  encouraged	  it.”	  	  
After	   the	   Second	  World	  War	   the	   French	   state	  assumed	  a	   strong	   centralized	   role	   in	  
governing	   the	   economy	   (Dormois,	   1999).	   Its	   primary	   aim	  was	   to	   transform	   France	   from	  a	  
largely	   agricultural	   society	   to	   an	   industrialized	   one	   (Prasad,	   2005).	   Its	   industrial	   policy	  
throughout	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  has	  particularly	  been	  favourable	  to	  business	  (Prasad,	  2005).	  
After	   the	   war	   it	   nationalized	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   its	   key	   industries	   (table	   3.1)	   and	   a	   Planning	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Commission	  was	  established	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  directing	  economic	  growth	  (Prasad,	  2005:	  388).	  
De	   Gaulle’s	   strategy	   involved	   creating	   ‘national	   champions’	   capable	   of	   surviving	   in	   an	  
international	   competitive	  arena	   (Prasad,	  2005).	   Table	  3.1	   shows	   that	   the	   large	  majority	  of	  
industrial	  production	  in	  France	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  belonged	  to	  the	  state.	  	  
But,	  like	  elsewhere,	  times	  are	  changing,	  at	  least	  to	  a	  certain	  degree,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  later. 
  
 
Table	  3.1	   Share	  of	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  in	  French	  industrial	  output,	  1962	   	  
Natural	  Gas	   100%	  
Electricity	   100%	  
Tobacco,	  matches	   100%	  
Miscellaneous	  minerals	   65%	  
Military	  goods	   62%	  
Aircraft	   47%	  
Vehicles	   40%	  
Health	  services	   37%	  
Source:	  Dormois	  (1999:	  78)	  
 
	  
Defence	  Industrial	  Policies	  	  
Jean-­‐Baptiste	   Colbert,	   who	  was	   a	   finance	  minister	   under	   Louis	   XIV,	   laid	   down	   the	   French	  
approach	  to	  defence	  procurement	  that	  inspired	  French	  defence	  industrial	  policies	  for	  much	  
of	  the	  19th	  and	  20th	  century	  and	  which	  again	  was	  revived	  under	  the	  presidency	  of	  General	  de	  
Gaulle	   (Cobble,	  2004).	  Colbert	  was	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  under	  Louis	  XIV	  from	  1670	  to	  1680.	  
His	   defence	   economic	   policies	   set	   the	   intellectual	   foundation	   of	  what	   is	   now	   regarded	   as	  
Colbertism:	  a	  mercantilist	  defence	  procurement	  strategy	  intended	  to	  create	  a	  strong	  home-­‐	  
based	   production	   structure.	   While	   this	   policy	   could	   establish	   an	   ostensibly	   self-­‐sufficient	  
arms	   industry,	   its	   principal	   objective	   was	   economic:	   import	   substitution	   and	   export	  
promotion.	   In	   this	  model,	  military	   needs,	   such	   as	   security	   of	   supply,	   were	   less	   important	  
than	   the	   larger	   economic	   effort	   of	   expanding	   domestic	   industrial	   production	   and	   the	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creation	   of	   favourable	   trade	   balances.	   This	   was	   done	   within	   a	   closed	   defence	   market	  
composed	  of	  state	  arsenals	  and	  state-­‐subsidized	  private-­‐owned	  monopolies.	  
General	  De	  Gaulle,	  who	  became	  the	  first	  president	  of	  the	  Fifth	  Republic	  in	  1958,	  left	  a	  
deep	  imprint	  on	  French	  defence	  industrial	  policy	  in	  the	  decades	  to	  follow.	  Key	  elements	  of	  
his	   policy	   included	   diplomatic	   and	   military	   independence	   through	   national	   nuclear	  
deterrence	  means,	  a	  special	  status	  in	  NATO,	  and	  an	  exceptionally	  high	  level	  of	  national	  self-­‐
reliance	   in	   the	   development	   and	   acquisition	   of	   weapons	   and	   other	   types	   of	   military	  
equipment	   (Yost,	   1994:	   237).	   	   Under	   the	   Fifth	   Plan	   (1966-­‐1970)	   a	   number	   of	   industrial	  
sectors	   were	   defined	   as	   being	   important	   to	   French	   industrial	   development.	  Within	   these	  
sectors	   the	   government	   tried	   to	   create	   national	   champions	   capable	   of	   competing	  
internationally.	   Initially	   the	   selected	   sectors	   would	   receive	   public	   orders,	   huge	   operating	  
subsidies,	   preferential	   tariffs,	   and	   public	   R&D	   financing,	   before	   being	   allowed	   to	   compete	  
internationally	   (Dormois,	   1999:	   85).	   Especially,	   the	   nuclear	   and	   aeronautics	   industries	  
received	  enormous	  amounts	  of	  governmental	  support	  (Dormois,	  1999).	  	  	  
	   The	   legacy	   of	   De	   Gaulle’s	   policy	   is	   reflected	   in	   a	   strong	   preference	   to	   conduct	  
national	  defence	  equipment	  programmes	  (table	  3.2).	  In	  the	  period	  1995-­‐1997	  approximately	  
80%	  of	  its	  defence	  equipment	  programmes	  were	  national	  programmes.	  In	  Europe,	  this	  level	  
of	   conducting	   national	   programmes	   has	   only	   been	   equalled	   by	   the	   United	   Kingdom	  
(Heuninckx,	  2008).	   In	   contrast,	  of	  Germany’s	  procurement	  programmes	  during	  1995-­‐1997,	  
only	   an	   estimated	   10%	   were	   exclusively	   national.	   For	   Italy,	   the	   proportion	   of	   national	  
programmes	  is	  approximately	  30%.	  As	  an	  example,	  the	  desire	  to	  maintain	  domestic	  design	  
and	  development	  capabilities	  has	  also	  been	  an	  argument	  in	  France’s	  decision	  to	  develop	  its	  
own	   fighter	   aircraft	   (the	   Dassault	   Rafale)	   instead	   of	   participating	   in	   the	   multinational	  
Eurofighter	   Typhoon	  programme.	   Currently,	   France	   is	   the	   only	   European	   country	   that	   has	  
embarked	   upon	   such	   an	   endeavour.	   Germany,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   collaborates	   with	   Italy,	  
Spain,	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  in	  the	  Eurofighter	  Typhoon	  programme.	  Italy	  and	  the	  United	  
Kingdom	   also	   cooperate	   together	   with	   the	   United	   States	   on	   the	   Joint	   Strike	   Fighter	  







Table	  3.2	   Proportion	  of	  type	  of	  defence	  procurement,	  1995-­‐1997	  





France	   81%	   15%	   4%	  
Germany	   10%	   75%	   15%	  
Italy	   30%	   50%	   20%	  
Netherlands	   N.A.	   N.A.	   N.A.	  
Source:	  EU	  Institute	  for	  Security	  Studies	  (in	  Heunickx,	  2008:	  128).	  	  
 
Under	   the	   leadership	   and	   policy	   of	   General	   De	   Gaulle,	   the	   French	   Délégation	  
Générale	  pour	  l’Armenent	  (DGA)	  emerged	  as	  the	  most	  important	  instrument	  of	  intervention	  
by	  the	  government	  in	  the	  French	  industry	  (Mampauy,	  2001).	   In	  1961,	  the	  DGA	  received	  its	  
mission,	   which	   it	   has	   retained	   ever	   since	   (Mampauy,	   2001).	   This	   mission	   contains	   the	  
following	  goals:	  	  	  
• to	  develop	  and	  implement	  programs	  for	  the	  research,	  design	  and	  production	  of	  arms	  
(and	  later	  maintenance,	  repairs	  of	  an	  industrial	  nature	  and	  modernisations);	  
• to	  exercise	  supervision	  of	  the	  state-­‐run	  establishments	  and	  national	  companies	  and	  
to	  regulate	  the	  private	  companies	  involved	  in	  armament	  programmes;	  
• to	  ensure	  the	  organisation	  and	  monitoring	  of	  the	  arms	  programmes	  implemented	  in	  
collaboration	  with	  foreign	  countries;	  and	  
• to	  promote	  arms	  exports	  and	  ensure	  their	  regulation,	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  policy	  
defined	  by	  the	  government.	  
In	   1975,	   65%	  of	   public	   research	   and	  development	  went	   to	   aerospace,	   24%	   to	   electronics,	  
and	  6%	   to	  office	  equipment	   (Dormois,	  1999:	  89).	  The	   importance	  of	  military	   research	  and	  
development	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  research	  and	  development	  grants	  awarded	  
by	  public	  agencies.	  Two	  thirds	  of	   the	  grants	  were	  under	   the	  supervision	  of	   the	  Ministry	  of	  
Defence,	  twenty-­‐five	  percent	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Industry,	  and	  7%	  by	  the	  telecom	  agency	  PTT.	  
In	   the	   1980s,	   the	   resources	  made	   available	   to	   the	   French	  Ministry	   of	   Defence	   for	  
research	  and	  development	  and	  the	  procurement	  of	  weapons	  combined	  with	  the	  persistent	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weakness	   of	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Industry	   gave	   a	   prominent	   role	   to	   the	   French	  DGA	   in	   French	  
industrial	  policy	  (Chesnais,	  1993).	  
Compared	  to	  other	  European	  defence	  materiel	  organisations	  and	  the	  United	  States	  
Pentagon,	   the	  DGA	  has	  more	  power	   to	  manage	  and	  control	   the	  national	  defence	   industry	  
(Mampauy,	   2001;	   Serfati,	   2000).	   Aside	   from	   weapons	   procurement	   the	   DGA	   operates	   a	  
substantial	   research	   and	   development	   budget	   and	   runs	   a	   network	   of	   public	   arsenals	  
(Mampauy,	  2001).	  	  
In	  order	  to	  sustain	  a	  relatively	  large	  and	  self-­‐sufficient	  defence	  industrial	  base	  France	  
has	  relied	  extensively	  on	  the	  export	  of	  military	  equipment.	  As	  the	  mission	  statement	  of	  the	  
DGA	   suggests,	   the	   promotion	   of	   exports	   is	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   the	  mission	   of	   the	   DGA	   to	  
promote	  and	  assist	   the	  export	  of	  defence	  equipment.	   In	  France,	  exports	  have	  traditionally	  
been	   viewed	   as	   an	   important	   tool	   in	   sustaining	   independent	   domestic	   defence	   industrial	  
capabilities.	  In	  the	  mid	  1980s,	  for	  example,	  export	  sales	  accounted	  for	  approximately	  40%	  of	  
total	  sales	   in	  France	  (Flamm,	  2000).	  Yet,	  French	   industrial	  ambitions	  reached	  their	   limits	   in	  
the	  1980s	  as	  government	  budget	  deficits	  skyrocketed.	  Between	  1980	  and	  1985	  the	  budget	  
deficit	  jumped	  from	  30	  to	  153	  billion	  FF	  to	  reach	  350	  billion	  in	  1992	  (Dormois,	  1999:	  91).	  	  
In	  the	  early	  1990s,	  almost	  80%	  of	  the	  French	  defence	  industry	  was	  either	  directly	  or	  
indirectly	   owned	   by	   the	   state	   in	   the	   form	   of	   government-­‐owned	   and	   operated	   arsenals,	  
nationalized	  companies	  or	  firms	  in	  which	  the	  government	  owned	  a	  large	  share	  of	  the	  stock	  
(U.S.	  Congress,	  Office	  of	  Technology	  Assessment,	  1992:	  7).	  Similar	  to	  developments	  in	  other	  
western	   countries	   in	   the	   1980s,	   the	   French	   government	   pressed	   for	   the	   formation	   of	  
‘national	  champions’	   in	   the	  defence	   industry	  and	  related	  strategic	  civilian	  sectors	   (aircraft,	  
electronics,	   satellites	   etc.).	   For	   example,	   Dassault	   became	   the	  main	   contractor	   for	   fighter	  
aircraft,	   Aerospatiale	   for	   helicopters	   and	   ballistic	   missiles	   and	   Thomson	   CSF	   (currently	  
Thales)	   for	   electronics.	   The	   desire	   to	   maintain	   domestic	   capabilities	   in	   the	   full	   range	   of	  
military	  capabilities,	  and	  the	  reliance	  on	  national	  champions	  for	  its	  major	  weapons	  systems	  
has	   led	  the	  DGA	  to	  adopt	  administrative	  controls	  on	  price	  and	  quality.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  it	  
cooperates	   with	   industry	   to	   maintain	   profits,	   employment,	   and	   investment	   in	   new	  
technologies	  to	  maintain	  the	  international	  competitiveness	  of	  France	  (U.S.	  Congress,	  Office	  
of	  Technology	  Assessment,	  1992:	  7).	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According	  to	  Fourcade-­‐Gourinchas	  and	  Babb	  (2002)	  France	  underwent	  a	  number	  of	  
neo-­‐liberal	  changes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  privatisation	  of	  public	  owned	  companies,	  liberalisation	  of	  
the	  banking	  sector	  and	  the	  establishing	  central	  bank	   independence	  during	  1986	  and	  1993.	  
Yet,	   unlike	   other	   countries	   in	   which	   neo-­‐liberalism	   was	   embraced	   domestically	   (e.g.	   the	  
United	  Kingdom),	  France	  liberalisation	  policies	  were	  mainly	  a	  response	  to	  external	  pressures	  
in	   particular	   from	   European	   integration	   (Fourcade-­‐Gourinchas	   and	   Babb,	   2002).	   The	   neo-­‐
liberal	  reforms	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  France	  were	  less	  ideologically	  driven	  and	  were	  less	  
radical	  than	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (Fourcade-­‐Gourinchas	  and	  Babb,	  
2002;	  Prasad,	  2005).	   In	  France	  a	   ‘pragmatic	  neo-­‐liberalism’	  emerged	  (Fourcade-­‐Gourinchas	  
and	  Babb,	  2002).	  	  
Although	   the	   French	   industrial	   system	   has	   undergone	   import	   changes	   in	   the	   last	  
couple	  of	  decades	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  privatisation	  of	  some	  of	  its	  major	  companies,	  including	  
Eurocopter	  France,	  the	  central	  wheel	  in	  the	  French	  defence	  industrial	  system	  has	  remained	  
the	   DGA	   (Délégation	   Générale	   pour	   l’Armement).	   Serfati	   (2000)	   has	   described	   the	   French	  
defence	   industrial	   system	   as	   a	   central	   element	   –	   a	   mesosystem	   -­‐	   in	   the	   French	   overall	  
national	  system	  of	  innovation.	  Although,	  the	  French	  government	  has	  been	  actively	  pursuing	  
a	  policy	  of	  privatisation,	  the	  basic	  features	  of	  this	  mesosystem	  have	  been	  highly	  resilient	  and	  
have	   not	   changed	  much.	   The	   tight	   relations	   between	   French	   defence	   companies	   and	   the	  
DGA	   remain.	   Some	   authors	   have	   suggested	   that	   the	   ‘pantouflage’	   phenomenon	   is	   also	  
partially	  responsible	  for	  the	  reluctance	  in	  French	  government	  to	  expose	  French	  industry	  to	  
full	   market	   forces	   and	   international	   competition	   (Dormois,	   1999;	   Serfati	   2000).	   	   This	  
phenomenon	   refers	   to	   high-­‐level	   civil	   servants	   obtaining	  work	   in	   private	   enterprises	   (and	  
vice	   versa),	   which	   is	   a	   sort	   of	   ‘revolving	   door’-­‐principle	   that	   not	  many	  Western	   countries	  
know.	  It	  underlines	  the	  strong	  interconnections	  in	  France	  –	  a	  sort	  of	  osmosis	  -­‐	  between	  the	  
state	  and	  large	  industries,	  particularly	  the	  defence	  industry.	  
Of	   the	   nations	   in	   the	   NH	   90	   programme,	   France	   is	   highly	   committed	   to	   European	  
collaboration.	   Yet,	   its	   European	   commitment	   is	   also	   partially	   a	   consequence	   of	   its	   uneasy	  
relationship	   with	   the	   United	   States	   concerning	   defence	   industrial	   collaboration	   (James,	  
2002).	   Since,	   the	   1970s	   it	   has	   cooperated	   on	   a	   number	   of	   programmes	   in	   particular	  with	  
Germany.	  For	  France,	   these	  early	  cooperative	  efforts	  with	  Germany	  were	  an	  effort	   to	  gain	  
some	  control	  after	  Germany	  was	  allowed	  to	  rearmament	  itself	  (Lorell,	  1980).	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In	   France,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   parliament	   in	   defence	   procurement	   is	   limited.	   Its	  
involvement	   has	   been	   restricted	   to	   approving	   the	  military	   programme-­‐laws,	  which	   define	  
goals	  for	  procurement	  during	  a	  multi-­‐year	  period	  offering	  general	  estimates	  of	  the	  probable	  
costs	   (Yost,	   1994:	   252).	   Hence,	   the	   DGA	   exercises	   considerable	   latitude	   in	   individual	  
programme	  management.	  	  
	  
3.2	   Germany	  
 
Germany	   is	   a	   fairly	   young	   nation:	   it	   was	   founded	   as	   late	   as	   1871.	   Since	   then,	   it	   has	  
undergone	  turbulent	  times	  that	  lasted	  until	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  previous	  century.	  Economically	  
and	   socially	   Germany	   has	   faired	   remarkably	   well	   after	   its	   destruction	   during	   the	   Second	  
World	   War.	   Brodbeck	   and	   Frese,	   (2007:	   166)	   suggested	   that	   this	   may	   be	   attributed	   to	  
German	   cultural	   values,	   in	   particular	   a	   high	   level	   of	   performance	   orientation	   and	  
assertiveness	   combined	   with	   low	   interpersonal	   compassion	   at	   work,	   which	   combination	  
contributes	   to	   a	   work	   environment,	   in	   which	   task	   conflict	   plays	   an	   important	   role.	   Task	  
conflict,	  unlike	  relational	  or	  interpersonal	  conflict,	  is	  often	  suggested	  to	  be	  beneficial	  to	  high	  
performance	  and	  quality	  (Brodbeck	  and	  Frese,	  2007).	  	  	  
	   Consistent	  with	  these	  cultural	  values	  is	  the	  tendency	  towards	  what	  Gannon	  and	  Pillai	  
(2009)	   indicate	  as	  compartmentalisation	  in	  the	  German	  society:	  the	  importance	  of	  keeping	  
distance	   between	   people	   as	   well	   as	   between	   and	   in	   organisations.	   This	  
compartmentalisation	   is	   clearly	   reflected	   in	   a	   ‘penchant	   for	   formality’	   (Gannon	   and	   Pillai,	  
2009:	  187).	  This	  compartmentalisation	   is	  also	  visible	   in	  German	  business,	   in	  which	   respect	  
for	   status	   and	   power	   is	   highly	   valued.	   It	   is	   also	   evident	   in	   information	   exchange	   between	  
departments	  in	  German	  organisations,	  which	  is	  more	  difficult	  than	  in	  the	  United	  Stated	  for	  
example	  (Gannon	  and	  Pillai,	  2009).	  	  
In	   Germany	   a	   preference	   for	   a	  markedly	   different	   leadership	   culture	   has	   emerged	  
after	   the	   war.	   This	   leadership	   culture	   comprises	   the	   attributes	   of	   integrity,	   performance	  
orientation,	   vision,	   administrative	   competence	   and	   team	   integration	   (Brodbeck	   and	   Frese,	  
2007:	  177).	  This	  leadership	  style	  tends	  to	  downplay	  the	  role	  of	  leader’s	  impact.	  Although	  a	  
number	   of	   alternative	   explanations	   exist,	   its	   Nazi	   history	   appears	   to	   play	   a	   role	   here.	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Brodbeck	   and	   Frese	   (2007)	   note	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   wariness	   of	   visionary	   leadership	   in	  
German	   contemporary	   culture,	   which	   they	   attribute	   to	   a	   “…	   deep	   fear	   and	   constant	  
suspicion	  in	  Germany	  that	  a	  visionary	  leader	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  a	  dark	  charismatic”	  	  (2007:	  
177).	  
Within	   NATO	   Germany	   is	   often	   criticised	   for	   a	   lack	   of	   interest	   in	   military	  
preparedness	  and	  a	  low	  level	  of	  involvement	  in	  European	  military	  matters	  (Gannon	  and	  Pillai	  
(2009:	  181).	  Because	  of	  its	  Nazi	  history,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  opposition	  to	  participation	  in	  military	  
operations	   exists	   among	   the	   German	   population	   (Gannon	   and	   Pillai,	   2009).	   How	   its	  
precarious	   and	   sensitive	   past	   still	   affects	   current	   political	   affairs	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	  
resignation	   of	   the	   German	   President	   Horst	   Köhler	   on	   May	   31st,	   2010.	   During	   a	   visit	   to	  
German	  troops	   in	  Afghanistan	  on	  May	  22nd	  Köhler	   told	  a	  radio	  reporter	  who	  accompanied	  
him	  on	  his	  trip:	  “A	  country	  of	  our	  size,	  with	  its	  focus	  on	  exports	  and	  thus	  reliance	  on	  foreign	  
trade,	  must	  be	  aware	  that	  ...	  military	  deployments	  are	  necessary	  in	  an	  emergency	  to	  protect	  
our	   interests	   -­‐-­‐	   for	   example	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   trade	   routes,	   for	   example	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  
preventing	  regional	  instabilities	  that	  could	  negatively	  influence	  our	  trade,	  jobs	  and	  incomes."	  
Apparently	  justifying	  German	  involvement	  in	  armed	  conflicts	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  protection	  
of	   German	   economic	   interests,	   he	   was	   intensely	   criticised	   for	   his	   remarks	   (Der	   Spiegel,	  
2010).	  A	  weak	  later	  he	  resigned.	  
	  
Defence	  industrial	  policy	  
Industrial	  policy	  has	  been	  a	  much-­‐debated	  issue	  in	  Germany.	  Feldenkirchen	  (1999)	  suggests	  
that	  the	  debate	  on	  concepts	  and	  effects	  of	  industrial	  policy	  were	  even	  more	  important	  than	  
its	  actual	  implementation.	  The	  basic	  question	  that	  begged	  an	  answer	  in	  German	  politics	  has	  
been	  whether	   the	   state	   should	   control	   structural	   changes	   in	   the	   economy,	   or	   whether	   it	  
should	  try	  to	  eliminate	  barriers	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  market	  forces	  (Feldenkirchen,	  1999:	  101).	  
Feldenkirchen	   (1999:	   102)	   suggests	   that	   between	   1871	   and	   1990	   industrial	   policies	  
fluctuated	   between	   these	   poles.	   	   Yet,	   both	   have	   never	   been	   implemented	   to	   their	   full	  
ramifications.	  	  
	   In	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s,	   government	   policy	   was	   aimed	   at	   diminishing	   the	  
technological	  gap	  between	  Germany	  and	  other	  countries	  and	  stimulating	  innovation.	  In	  the	  
early	  1990s	  the	  microelectronics	  and	  aerospace	  industries	  became	  a	  focal	  recipient	  of	  direct	  
and	  indirect	  support	  (Feldenkirchen,	  1999).	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   After	   the	  Second	  World	  War	   the	  Federal	  Government	  of	  Germany	  was	   subdued	   to	  
strong	   restrictions	   on	   the	   development	   and	   production	   of	   defence	   equipment.	   Until	   the	  
1970s,	  when	   these	   restrictions	  were	   lessened	   it	   relied	  extensively	  on	   foreign	   suppliers	   for	  
the	   equipment	   of	   its	   armed	   forces	   (Kelleher	   and	   Fisher,	   1994).	   With	   the	   abolishment	   of	  
these	   restrictions	   it	   continued	   to	   rely	   heavily	   on	   foreign	   contractors	   for	   its	   defence	  
equipment,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   it	   would	   utilize	   national	   civilian	   companies	   with	  
comparable	   civilian	   technological	   capabilities	   (Kausal	   et	   al.	   1999).	   Consequently,	   German	  
firms	   operating	   in	   the	   defence	   sector	   have	   a	   substantial	   amount	   of	   commercial	   activities,	  
lessening	  their	  dependence	  upon	  defence	  orders	  (Kausal	  et	  al.	  1999;	  Hanel,	  2003).	  	  
Most	  of	  the	  German	  Aerospace	  companies	  were	  integrated	  into	  DASA	  (DaimlerBenz	  
Aerospace	  AG),	  which	  became	  Germany’s	  national	  aerospace	  champion.	   	  Since	  2000	  when	  
DASA	  merged	  with	  Aerospatiale-­‐Matra	  from	  France	  and	  CASA	  from	  Spain	  to	  form	  the	  EADS	  
(European	   Aerospace,	   Defence	   and	   Space	   Company),	   most	   of	   its	   aerospace	   and	   defence	  
industry	  was	  integrated	  into	  European	  structures.	  Daimler	  continues	  to	  control	  22.5	  %	  of	  the	  
shares	  of	  EADS.	  	  
	   The	  integration	  of	  its	  aerospace	  industry	  into	  wider	  European	  structures	  was	  partially	  
a	  means	   to	   secure	   basic	   national	   defence	   industrial	   capabilities	   deemed	   necessary	   for	   its	  
security.	   This	   had	   become	   unavoidable	   as	   military	   procurement	   funds	   dropped	   by	   21.2%	  
between	   1990	   and	   2003.	   The	   total	   number	   of	   employees	   in	   the	   defence	   sector	   declined	  
from	  280.000	  in	  1990	  to	  50.000	  in	  2003	  (Hanel,	  2003).	  Aerospace	  related	  defence	  industry	  
employment	  accounted	   for	   approximately	  half	  of	   these	  50.000	   jobs.	   EADS	   is	   currently	   the	  
sole	   industrial	   prime	   contractor	   responsible	   for	   most	   of	   the	   aerospace	   equipment	  
programmes	  of	  the	  German	  armed	  forces.	  Next	  to	  the	  NH	  90	  programme,	  it	  carries	  out	  the	  
industrial	  work	  related	  to	  the	  Eurofighter	  Typhoon	  programme,	  the	  Tiger	  Attack	  helicopter	  
and	   the	   A400M	   transport	   aircraft.	   These	   programmes	   play	   a	   major	   role	   in	   maintaining	  
industrial	   capabilities	   and	   technological	   competitiveness	   of	   the	   aerospace	   industry	   (Hanel,	  
2003).	  	  	  
	   Germany	  has	  a	  relatively	  restricted	  export	  policy	  with	  respect	  to	  military	  equipment,	  
which	  underlines	  once	  again	  Germany’s	  restrained	  military	  orientation	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
Second	   World	   War.	   This	   policy	   has	   been	   codified	   in	   the	   Politische	   Grundsätze	   der	  
Bundesregierung	   für	   den	   Export	   von	   Kriegswaffen	   und	   sonstigen	   Rüstungsgütern	   (Political	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Principles	   of	   the	   Federal	   Government	   of	   Germany	   for	   the	   Export	   of	   War	   Weapons	   and	  
Defence	   Equipment,	   Bundesregierung,	   2000).	   These	   principles	   apply	   to	   countries	   that	   are	  
not	  members	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  NATO.	  Export	  to	  European	  and	  NATO	  countries	  is	  in	  principle	  not	  
restricted.	  	  
Given	   that	   its	   defence	   industry	   is	   privately	   owned	   and	   less	   dependent	   upon	  
government	  support	  because	  of	  the	  companies’	  substantial	  amount	  of	  commercial	  business,	  
it	  has	  adopted	  a	  more	  arm’s-­‐length	  relationship	  with	  its	  main	  suppliers.	  In	  Germany,	  defence	  
procurement	   is	   subdued	   to	   stricter	  parliamentary	  oversight	   compared	   to	  France	  and	   Italy.	  
Besides	   the	   general	   evaluation	   of	   the	   equipment	   requirements	   and	   budget,	   it	   also	   must	  
approve	   of	   all	   large	   contracts	   worth	   over	   25M	   Euro	   (Kausal	   et	   al.	   1999).	   In	   Germany,	  
programmes	  are	  managed	  by	  the	  Bundesambt	   für	  Wehrtechnik	  und	  Beschaffung	   (BWB).	   It	  
was	  established	  over	  50	  years	  ago	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  central	  interface	  between	  the	  armed	  forces	  
and	  industry	  (Kausal	  et	  al.	  1999).	  Unlike	  most	  other	  procurement	  agencies	  (including	  its	  NH	  
90	   programme	   counterparts),	   the	   BWB	   is	   a	   civilian	   organisation.	   Although	   it	   is	   under	   the	  
control	  of	  the	  German	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  the	  BWB	  operates	  independently,	  which	  again	  is	  
a	  response	  to	  Germany’s	  dramatic	  military	  past	  (Kausal	  et	  al.	  1999).	  
 
3.3	   Italy	   	   	  
 
Like	  Germany,	  Italy	  has	  emerged	  as	  a	  nation	  state	  relatively	  late,	  in	  1861.	  After	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  
Roman	  Empire	  Italy	  has	  been	  conquered	  by	  many	  foreign	  invaders,	  such	  as	  Germanic	  tribes,	  
Normans,	  and	  Byzantines.	  Until	  1861,	  the	  area	  of	  what	   is	  now	  Italy	  consisted	  of	  numerous	  
small	   kingdoms	   and	   city-­‐states.	   This	   decentralized	   past	   has	   probably	   led	   to	   Italy’s	   current	  
socio-­‐economic	   structure,	   particularly	   in	   the	   North,	   in	   which	   there	   is	   strong	   dynamic	  
interaction	   and	   collaboration	   at	   the	   regional	   level	   among	   firms	   (producers,	   suppliers,	  
subcontractors),	  as	  well	  as	  with	  political	  and	  labour	  market	  institutions	  (Brusco,	  1982).	  This	  
undoubtedly	   reflects	   an	   entrepreneurial	   decentralized,	   collaborative	   way	   of	   working	   and	  
negotiating.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  a	  central	  firm	  with	  a	  leadership	  function	  (e.g.,	  Benetton)	  often	  
coordinates	  the	  many	  economic	  activities	  in	  a	  sector	  or	  region	  (e.g.,	  Grandori,	  1997).	  	  
	   Inside	  Italian	  organisations,	  the	  large	  power	  distance	  found	  in	  Italian	  culture	  seems	  to	  
have	  its	  effect	  on	  Italian	  management	  style.	  Gannon	  and	  Pillai	  (2009)	  note	  that	  there	  is	  little	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delegation	   of	   authority	   or	   effective	   communication	   between	   the	   different	   levels	   of	  
management	   in	  most	   Italian	  firms.	  Employees	  are	  rarely	   involved	  in	  decisions	  affecting	  the	  
company	  or	  their	  own	  work.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   Italians	  generally	  want	  to	  make	  a	  nice	  and	  
good	   impression	  when	   interacting	  with	  others	   (Gannon	  and	  Pillai,	  2009:	  351-­‐372;	   see	  also	  
Hofstede,	  2001).	  
	  
Defence	  industrial	  policy	  
In	   Italy	   public	   enterprises	   have	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   scale-­‐intensive	   and	   high	   tech	  
industries.	  During	   the	   1960s	   and	  1970s	   they	   served	   to	  maintain	   an	   industrial	   capability	   in	  
sectors	   such	   as	   electronics	   and	   aerospace	   (Malerba,	   1993).	   Italian	  military	   demand	   -­‐	  with	  
few	   relevant	   exceptions	   -­‐	   has	   been	   generally	   less	   technological	   progressive,	   smaller,	   and	  
more	   open	   to	   imports	   than	  military	   demand	   in	   other	   European	   countries.	   In	   1986,	   Italian	  
expenditures	  on	  military	  equipment	  amounted	  to	  $2500	  million,	  versus	  $7100	  million	  in	  the	  
United	  Kingdom,	  and	  $4400	  million	   in	   the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany.	   It	  must	  be	  noted	  
that	   21.5%	   of	   the	   Italian	   military	   demand	   was	   satisfied	   by	   imports	   (Nones,	   1988).	   Some	  
cases	   of	   successful	   development	   exist,	   however.	   They	   are	   in	   most	   cases	   linked	   to	  
participation	   in	   international	   programs	   such	   as	   Alenia	   in	   the	   Tornado	   fighter	   plane	   and	  
Agusta	  in	  helicopters	  (Malerba,	  1993:	  247).	  
In	   the	   1930s,	   the	   state	   had	   nationalized	   a	   number	   of	   important	   Italian	   banks	  
including	   their	   industrial	  participations	  preventing	   them	   from	  bankruptcy	   (Malerba,	  1993).	  
These	  came	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  IRI	  (Istituto	  per	   la	  Ricostruzione	  Industriale).	  This	  was	  
remarkable	   since	   IRI	   had	   originally	   been	   intended	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   temporary	   organisation	  
(Federico	   and	   Giannetti,	   1999).	   During	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s	   the	   success	   of	   these	   public	  
sector	  organisations	  –	  the	  IRI	  and	  ENI	  (Ente	  Nazionale	  Idrocarburi)	  -­‐	  led	  to	  the	  development	  
of	   a	   strong	   conviction	   that	   public	   organisations	   would	   spur	   modernisation	   and	   balanced	  
growth	  in	  Italy	  (Martinelli,	  1981).	  
It	  would	   last	  until	   the	  mid	  1990s	  when	   IRI	  was	  partially	  privatized	   in	  Finmecanicca.	  
Finmeccanica	   was	   established	   in	   1948	   as	   a	   sub	   holding	   of	   IRI.	   Following	   an	   internal	   IRI	  
restructuring	   in	  1989,	  STET	  electronic	  enterprises	  came	  under	  the	  control	  of	  Finmeccanica.	  
Its	  aerospace	  activities	  consolidated	   in	  Alenia,	  after	   the	  merger	  of	  Aeritalia	  and	  Selenia.	   In	  
1992,	  it	  also	  received	  control	  over	  a	  number	  of	  other	  aerospace	  and	  defence	  companies	  that	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were	   previously	   under	   control	   of	   EFIM	   (Ente	   Finanziamento	   Industrie	  Meccaniche).	   EFIM,	  
another	   state	   holding	   organisation,	   which	   had	   been	   set	   up	   in	   1962,	   had	   ran	   into	   serious	  
financial	  difficulties	   in	  the	  1980s	  and	  was	  forced	  to	  wound	  up	   in	  1992.	   In	  1993,	   the	   Italian	  
government	  partially	  privatised	  Finmeccanica.	  Currently,	  Finmeccanica	  is	  the	  second	  largest	  
industrial	   group	   in	   Italy,	   after	   Fiat.	   Finmeccanica	   develops	   and	   manufactures	   helicopters,	  
military	  aircraft,	  defence	  systems,	  satellites,	  power	  plants,	  automation	  equipment,	  and	  rail	  
systems.	  65	  per	  cent	  of	  its	  revenues	  come	  from	  aeronautics,	  helicopters,	  defence	  and	  space,	  
and	  the	  company	  is	  in	  the	  top	  20	  defence	  contractors	  worldwide	  by	  sales	  revenue.	  (James,	  
2002:	   142).	   The	   Italian	   government	   has	   encouraged	   Finmeccanica	   to	   enter	   into	   joint	  
ventures	  as	  a	  way	  of	  ensuring	  that	  capabilities	  and	  ownership	  are	  retained	   in	   Italy	   (James,	  
2002:	  126).	  	  
Like	  in	  France,	  the	  Italian	  government	  has	  pursued	  a	  policy	  of	  privatisation	  including	  
Finmeccanica	   (the	   mother	   company	   of	   NH	   90	   programme	   partner	   AgustaWestland).	  
However,	  it	  continues	  to	  retain	  at	  least	  30%	  of	  the	  shares	  of	  Finmeccanica.	  
 
3.4	   The	  Netherlands	  
 
Van	   Iterson	   (2000)	   has	   examined	   the	   development	   of	   the	   ‘rules	   of	   action’	   in	   Dutch	  work	  
organisations.	  He	  describes	   the	  Dutch	  national	  business	   system	  as	  a	  mixture	  of	   the	  Anglo-­‐
Saxon	   and	   Germanic	   systems	   (Van	   Iterson,	   2000:	   176-­‐177).	   Seemingly	   paradoxical	   it	  
combines	   short-­‐termism	   and	   long-­‐termism,	   shareholder	   value	   and	   stakeholder	   value,	   and	  
social	  isolation	  and	  social	  embeddedness	  (Van	  Iterson,	  2000:	  177).	  The	  Dutch	  rules	  of	  action	  
emphasize	  the	  three	  C’s	  of	  consultation,	  consensus,	  and	  compromise.	  These	  rules	  of	  actions	  
have	  developed	   from	   the	   thirteenth	   to	   the	   seventeenth	   century	  and	   still	   have	   currency	   in	  
the	  present.	  	  
They	   have	   their	   roots	   in	   the	   specific	   way,	   in	   which	   the	   government	   of	   the	  
Netherlands	   has	   been	   established	   and	   the	   strong	   presence	   of	   The	   Netherlands	   in	  
international	  trade	  since	  the	  seventeenth	  century.	  The	  roots	  of	  these	  rules	  of	  actions	  have	  
been	   traced	   back	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   ‘Waterschappen’	   (local	   polder	   boards)	   in	   the	  
thirteenth	   century.	   In	   principal,	   volunteering	   farmers	   sat	   on	   the	   boards	   of	   the	   polders	   to	  
protect	   them	   from	   flooding.	   They	  were	  private	   initiatives	  without	  any	   central	   government	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involvement.	  These	  polder	  boards	  are	  regarded	  as	  one	  of	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  Dutch	  rules	  
of	  action	  of	  seeking	  consensus	  and	  building	  coalitions	  (Van	  Iterson,	  2000:	  178).	  	  
French	  sociologist	  Philippe	  D’Iribarne	  (1998)	  captured	  the	  Dutch	  principle	  underlying	  
Dutch	  social	  interrelationships	  as	  a	  ‘logic	  of	  consensus’.	  This	  preoccupation	  with	  consensus	  –	  
and	  avoidance	  of	  conflicts	  -­‐	  has	  a	  number	  of	  characteristics.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  a	  strong	  concern	  
for	   facts	   and	   objectivity.	   People	   in	   the	   Netherlands	   display	   a	   genuine	   willingness	   to	   be	  
persuaded	   by	   arguments	   that	   are	   based	   on	   objective	   facts.	   This	   also	   extends	   towards	  
working	   relations.	  A	   second	  characteristic	   concerns	   the	  egalitarian	  nature	  of	   interpersonal	  
relations	  both	  between	   individuals	   in	  society	  as	  well	  as	   in	  organisations.	  Status	  differences	  
between	   individuals	   tend	   to	   be	   downplayed.	   The	   use	   of	   sanctions	   and	   repression	   when	  
mistakes	   have	   been	   made	   tends	   to	   be	   fiercely	   resisted.	   Rather	   individuals	   demand	   an	  
explanation	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  their	  mistakes	  (D’Iribarne,	  1998).	  	  
D’Iribarne	  (1998:	  248)	  summarized	  it	  as	  follows:	  “Everything	  that	  tends	  towards	  the	  
use	   of	   repression,	   formal	   or	   informal,	   even	   when	   someone	   given	   his	   position	   would	   be	  
entitled	  to	  it,	  will	  receive	  a	  lot	  or	  resistance.	  There	  is	  little	  room	  for	  sanctions…	  To	  approach	  
one	  another,	   either	   as	   equals	   or	   superior	   and	   subordinate,	   people	  will	   talk	   and	  argument,	  
factual	  data	  will	  be	  collected	  and	  thoroughly	  and	  objectively	  assessed,	  people	  persuade	  each	  
other.	  It	  is	  everyone’s	  duty	  to	  strive	  for	  an	  agreement	  and	  realize	  earlier	  made	  agreements.	  
When	  new	  factual	  data	  turns	  up,	  everyone	  is	  free	  to	  open	  up	  new	  discussions	  that	  lead	  to	  a	  
new	   agreement.	   And	   when	   the	   with	   power	   of	   argumentation	   reached	   situation	   does	   not	  
satisfy	  one	  of	  the	  parties,	  it	  would	  be	  very	  inappropriate	  to	  either	  alone	  or	  in	  a	  group	  play	  out	  
once	  jokers	  to	  exert	  some	  kind	  of	  repression.”	  	  	  
Egalitarianism	   is	   an	   important	   feature	   of	   Dutch	   culture	   (Thierry,	   Den	   Hartog,	  
Koopman	   and	   Wilderom,	   2007).	   Thus,	   although	   leaders	   are	   expected	   to	   satisfy	   high	  
requirements	   to	   qualify	   for	   their	   jobs,	   they	   are	   still	   expected	   to	   behave	   as	   a	   next-­‐door	  
neighbour.	   They	   should	   not	   behave	   distinctively	   and	   their	   style	   of	   living	   should	   be	   kept	   a	  
private	  issue	  (Thierry,	  Den	  Hartog,	  Koopman	  and	  Wilderom	  (2007:	  240).	  This	  is	  also	  reflected	  
in	   the	   attitude	   of	   the	   Dutch	   press	   towards	   the	   royal	   family,	   whose	   private	   lives	   are	  
respected.	   The	  egalitarian	  nature	  of	  Dutch	   culture	   is	   also	   reflected	   in	   a	   general	   sensitivity	  
towards	   those	   in	  more	  or	   less	  deprived	  circumstances,	   the	  mediocre	  and	  poor	  performers	  
(Thierry,	  Den	  Hartog,	  Koopman	  and	  Wilderom,	  2007).	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The	   focus	   on	   consensus	   in	   the	   Netherlands	   is	   also	   visible	   in	   the	   structure	   and	  
composition	   of	   corporate	   executive	   and	   supervisory	   boards,	   the	   role	   and	   accompanied	  
responsibilities	  of	  work	  councils	  in	  organisations,	  the	  centralized	  wage	  and	  work	  conditions	  
bargaining	   that	   takes	   place	   between	   labour	   unions	   and	   employer	   associations,	   and	   the	  
political	   system	   in	  which	  governments	  are	  always	   formed	  by	  a	  coalition	  of	  political	  parties	  
(Van	  Iterson	  and	  Olie,	  1994).	  
	  
Defence	  industrial	  policy	  
Notwithstanding	   a	   considerable	   number	   of	   large	   Dutch	   companies	   (Philips,	   Akzo	   Nobel,	  
Unilever,	   Shell	   for	   example)	   that	   have	   been	   around	   for	   some	   time,	   the	   Netherlands	   is	  
generally	   characterized	  as	   a	   late	   industrialiser.	   Since	   its	   establishment	  as	   a	  nation	   state	   in	  
the	  16th	  century	  (following	  its	  independence	  war	  from	  Spain)	  it	  emerged	  as	  a	  strong	  trading	  
nation.	  In	  the	  17th	  century	  it	  experienced	  its	  Golden	  Era,	  with	  footholds	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  
world	  and	  trade	  flourishing.	  Some	  authors	  have	  suggested	  that	  in	  many	  ways	  a	  ‘laissez	  faire’-­‐
capitalism	   emerged	   that	   the	   world	   has	   never	   seen	   since	   (Van	   Zanden,	   1998).	   Companies	  
were	   founded,	   in	  which	   individual	  participants	  could	  buy	  shares	  and	  the	  Amsterdam	  Stock	  
Exchange	  was	  created.	  	  
Even	   after	   its	   decline	   in	   the	   18th	   century	   international	   trade	   remained	   its	   primary	  
domain	   of	   business.	   It	   was	   only	   after	   the	   Second	  World	  War	   that	   the	   Dutch	   government	  
assumed	  a	  stronger	  centralized	  role	  in	  the	  economy.	  This	  was	  primarily	  driven	  by	  a	  need	  to	  
rebuild	  the	  country	  that	  had	  suffered	  from	  five	  years	  of	  Nazi	  occupation.	  The	  main	  features	  
of	   its	  economic	  policy	  were:	  a	  mixed	  economy	  (in	  which	  governmental	  control	  and	  market	  
forces	   are	   the	   main	   factors),	   a	   consultation	   economy	   (which	   means	   that	   major	   interest	  
groups	  are	  frequently	  consulted	  about	  their	  views),	  and	  a	  substantial	  welfare	  state	  (Thierry,	  
Den	  Hartog,	  Koopman	  and	  Wilderom,	  2007:	  223-­‐224).	  
	   The	  Netherlands,	  relying	  on	  an	  open	  economy,	  has	  traditionally	  been	  committed	  to	  a	  
relatively	   liberal	   industrial	   policy.	   This	   tradition	  dates	  back	   to	   the	   sixteenth	   century,	  when	  
the	   Netherlands	   was	   created	   (Van	   Zanden,	   1999).	   Yet,	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s	   it	   has	  
experimented	  with	  a	  more	  interventionist	  industrial	  policy	  (Van	  Zanden,	  1999).	  A	  number	  of	  
economic	  shocks	  in	  the	  1970s	  were	  mitigated	  by	  generous	  industrial	  policies,	  which	  gave	  an	  
impulse	  to	  declining	  industries,	  among	  which	  industries	  operating	  in	  the	  defence	  sector	  (Van	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Zanden,	   1998).	   However,	   in	   the	   early	   1980s	   the	   financial	   situation	   of	   the	   state	   had	  
deteriorated	   to	   such	  an	  extent	   that	  drastic	  budget	   cuts	  were	   inevitable.	   	   The	  government	  
ended	   all	   kinds	   of	   subsides	   to	   ailing	   industries	   and	   shifted	   to	   a	   more	   ‘offensive’	   policy	  
towards	   the	  promotion	  of	   technological	   change	  and	   stimulation	  of	   growth	   industries	   (Van	  
Zanden,	  1998:	  172).	  This	  change	  was	  speeded	  by	  the	  discovery	  that	  RSV	  (a	  huge	  combination	  
of	  ship	  building	  and	  metalworking	  firms),	  which	  had	  received	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  subsidies	  for	  
industrial	  policy	  was	  virtually	  bankrupt.	  Subsequently,	   this	   led	  a	   large	  public	  scandal	  and	  a	  
parliamentary	  inquiry	  into	  the	  allocation	  of	  subsidies	  (Van	  Zanden,	  1998:	  172).	  	  
	   Another	  part	  of	  its	  new	  policy	  orientation	  was	  aimed	  at	  privatisation.	  Yet,	  this	  policy	  
change	  was	  not	   radically	  different	   from	  earlier	  own.	  Already	   in	   the	  1960s	   the	  government	  
had	  sold	  large	  parts	  of	   its	  shares	  in	  well	  performing	  industries.	   In	  the	  1980s	  it	  transformed	  
state	  enterprises	  (the	  postal	  service	  and	  bank	  for	  example)	  into	  state	  controlled	  firms,	  and	  in	  
subsequent	  years	   it	  sold	   its	  shares	   in	  tranches	  to	  achieve	  complete	  privatisation.	  But	  given	  
the	  small	  share	  of	  the	  government	  owned	  sector	  in	  the	  economy,	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  policy	  
remained	  relatively	  small	  (Van	  Zanden,	  1998:	  172).	  	  
	   The	   Netherlands	   never	   really	   developed	   a	   large	   defence	   industry.	   A	   number	   of	  
companies	  such	  as	  Fokker,	  DAF,	  Volvo,	  Philips,	  Hollandse	  Signaal	  and	  a	  few	  shipyards	  were	  
active	   in	   the	   defence	   sector	   and	   received	   large	   orders.	   Yet,	   for	   the	   most	   part	   these	  
companies	  were	  active	  in	  the	  civil	  market.	  In	  the	  aerospace	  sector	  the	  bulk	  of	  defence	  orders	  
went	   to	   Fokker.	   Yet,	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s	   Fokker	   ran	   into	   serious	   financial	   troubles.	   In	  
1987,	  the	  Dutch	  government	  saved	  the	  company	  from	  bankruptcy	  by	  providing	  a	  loan,	  under	  
the	  condition	  that	  it	  sought	  a	  strong	  partner.	  Initially,	  a	  deal	  with	  DASA	  saved	  the	  company.	  
But	   a	   few	   years	   later	   when	   a	   disagreement	   between	   the	   Dutch	   government	   and	   DASA	  
emerged	  over	  the	  financing	  of	  Fokker,	  the	  deal	  collapsed.	  Van	  Zanden	  (1999:	  189-­‐190)	  noted	  
that	   “before	   1995	   new	   subsidies	   were	   given	   again	   and	   again	   because	   the	   ‘national	  
champion’	   Fokker	   was	   regarded	   a	   ‘leading	   edge	   company’,	   in	   which	   new	   products	   and	  
technologies	  were	  developed	  for	  rapidly	  growing	  markets.	  But	  this	  myth	  has	  faded,	  as	  losses	  
have	  piled	  up	  and	  detailed	  studies	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  Fokker	  on	  the	  rest	  of	  Dutch	  industry	  have	  
shown	  that	  these	  were	  and	  are	  quite	  modest.	  It	  was	  finally	  closed	  down	  in	  1996.”	   	  After	  its	  
bankruptcy	  in	  1996	  the	  economically	  viable	  parts	  of	  Fokker,	  including	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  
were	  transferred	  to	  Stork	  and	  became	  Stork-­‐Fokker	  Aerospace.	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This	   concludes	   the	   sketches	   of	   the	   four	   countries’	   industrial	   practices	   and	   defence	  
industrial	  policies	  –	  their	  national	  institutional	  logics	  so	  to	  speak.	  Clearly,	  the	  four	  nations	  –	  
even	  though	  they	  are	  all	  European	  and	  more	  or	  less	  neighbouring	  each	  other	  –	  differ	  a	  lot	  in	  
their	  manners,	  approaches	  and	  policies.	  The	  question	  now	  is	  how	  these	  national	  institutional	  
logics	  have	  influenced	  the	  evolvement	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  To	  this	  we	  will	  turn	  in	  the	  





























































CHAPTER	  4 	  	  	  	  RESEARCH	  METHODOLOGY	  
 
4.1	   Case	  Study	  Research	  
 
For	  this	  study	  we	  have	  adopted	  a	  retrospective	  qualitative	  case	  study	  design.	  Any	  decision	  
for	  a	  particular	  research	  design	  involves	  trade	  offs	  in	  accuracy,	  simplicity	  and	  generalizability	  
(Weick,	   1969).	   We	   have	   chosen	   to	   lay	   the	   focus	   on	   accuracy	   studying	   one	   international	  
programme	   in-­‐depth.	  The	  motivation	   for	  doing	   so	   is	   that	   the	  academic	   literature	  provides	  
only	  limited	  knowledge	  of	  the	  management	  of	  international	  arms	  collaboration.	  Qualitative	  
research	   is	  especially	  suited	  for	  examining	  poorly	  understood	  phenomena	  and	  dynamics	   in	  
single	  settings	  (Golden-­‐Biddle	  and	  Locke,	  2007;	  Eisenhardt,	  1989)	  and	  highly	  appropriate	  for	  
understanding	   the	   context	   and	  micro-­‐dynamics	  of	   institutional	  processes	   (Greenwood	  and	  
Hinings,	   1996:	   1022).	   Our	   case	   study	   approach	   draws	   heavily	   upon	   process	   research	  
methods.	   Process	   methods,	   unlike	   variance	   methods,	   are	   primarily	   concerned	   with	  
understanding	  how	  and	  why	  things	  evolve	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  over	  time	  (George	  and	  Bennet,	  
2004;	  Langley,	  1999).	  	   	  
 
4.2	   Data	  Collection	  
 
We	   relied	   primarily	   on	   two	   types	   of	   data:	   documents	   at	   the	   network	   and	   organisational	  
level,	   and	   interviews.	   First,	   documents	  we	  gathered	   came	   from	  a	  wide	   variety	  of	   sources.	  
Some	  were	  provided	  by	  our	  interview	  respondents,	  others	  came	  from	  databases	  and	  library	  
searches	   and	   included	   the	   General	   Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   (GMOU),	   production	  
contracts,	  articles	  in	  Flight	  International	  and	  Aviation	  Week	  and	  Space	  Technology,	  research	  
papers,	  market	  reports	  and	  Dutch	  parliamentary	  documents	  etc.	  	  
Second,	   we	   have	   conducted	   35	   interviews	   with	   individuals	   affiliated	   to	   the	   NH	   90	  
programme	   these	   interviews	   were	   conducted	   between	   May	   2007	   and	   June	   2009.	   The	  
interviews	   were	   conducted	   in	   three	   rounds	   of	   data	   collection.	   In	   the	   first	   data	   collection	  
round	  we	  covered	  the	  Dutch	  public	  side	  of	  the	  NH-­‐90	  project.	   In	  the	  second	  round	  of	  data	  
collection,	   we	   interviewed	   staff	   members	   from	   NAHEMA,	   located	   in	   Aix-­‐en-­‐Provence	   in	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France.	   Respondents	   include	   the	   Vice-­‐President,	   Division	   Managers,	   and	   Work	   Group	  
Members.	  During	  the	  third	  round	  of	  data	  collection	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  with	  French,	  
German	  and	  Italian	  NH90	  programme	  officials	  and	  with	  officials	  from	  Fokker	  (see	  table	  4.1	  
for	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   respondents).	   The	   selection	   of	   respondents	   basically	   involved	   a	  
snowball	  technique	  in	  which	  we	  asked	  respondents	  near	  the	  end	  of	  the	  interview	  to	  provide	  
us	  with	  names	  of	  other	  persons	  whom	  they	  thought	  of	  as	  being	  potentially	  interesting	  for	  us	  
to	  talk	  to.	  	  
We	  set	  out	  to	  have	  a	  representative	  sample	  of	  the	  individuals	  working	  in	  the	  different	  
defence	  ministries	  and	  industrial	  partners.	  However,	  we	  soon	  discovered	  that	  gaining	  access	  
to	  a	  number	  of	  organisations	  in	  or	  study	  proved	  difficult.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  private	  side	  of	  
the	  programme,	   the	   timing	  of	  our	  data	   collection	  was	  unfortunate.	  At	   that	   time,	  NHI	  was	  
undergoing	   a	  major	   restructuring	   process	  which	   had	   been	   demanded	   by	   the	   participating	  
defence	  departments	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  control	  over	  the	  delays	  that	  plagued	  the	  programme.	  
This	   involved	  a	  number	  of	  personnel	  changes	  and	  contractual	   renegotiations	  that	  required	  
the	  firms’	  full	  attention.	  Hence,	  key	  personnel	  at	  NHI,	  Eurocopter	  and	  Agusta	  were	  reluctant	  
to	  talk	  to	  us	  during	  this	  restructuring	  process.	  
Gaining	  access	  to	  the	  public	  organisations	   in	  the	  programme	  was	  somewhat	  easier.	  
Nevertheless,	   here	   too	  we	   encountered	   some	   difficulties,	   particularly	   in	   gaining	   access	   to	  
individuals	  working	  for	  the	  programme	  offices	  of	  France	  and	  Italy.	  First,	  rather	  unexpectedly,	  
there	   was	   a	   language	   barrier.	   Many	   of	   potential	   respondents	   from	   these	   countries	   had	  
difficulties	  expressing	  themselves	  clearly	  in	  English	  (as	  did	  we	  in	  their	  native	  languages).	  	  
Moreover,	   for	  many	   of	   the	   programme	   representatives	   travelling	   constitutes	   a	   fair	  
share	  of	   their	  working	   time.	  Hence,	  at	  any	  point	   in	   time	  a	  number	  of	  programme	  officials	  
were	  not	  available	  at	  the	  programme	  offices.	   	   In	  other	   instances,	  we	  got	  a	  consent	  from	  a	  
programme	   office,	   but	   after	   calling	   several	   times	   we	   eventually	   failed	   to	   make	   an	  
appointment	  with	  potential	  respondents.	  	  
	   The	   interviews	  were	  conducted	  by	  at	   least	  two	  and	  occasionally	  three	   interviewers.	  
The	  interviews	  were	  semi-­‐structured.	  For	  each	  interview	  we	  relied	  on	  an	  interview	  protocol	  
containing	  the	  main	   issues	  and	  questions	  to	  be	  addressed.	  We	  started	  the	   interviews	  with	  
general	  questions	  related	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  organisation	  of	  which	  the	  respondent	  was	  a	  
member,	  and	  his	  main	  tasks	  and	  responsibilities.	  From	  there	  we	  went	  to	  the	  core	  topics	  in	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which	  we	  were	  primarily	   interested.	  These	  included	  the	  interests,	  goals	  and	  motivations	  to	  
participate	   in	   the	  NH	  90	  programme,	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  decisions	  were	  made,	   conflicts	  
that	  may	  have	  occurred	  between	  programme	  members	  and	  how	  these	  were	  resolved,	  and	  
the	  overall	  assessment	  of	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  programme.	  The	  interviews	  ended	  with	  us	  
asking	  whether	   there	  were	   issues	   related	   to	   the	  NH	  90	  of	  which	   the	   respondent	   felt	   they	  
were	  	  
important,	  but	  that	  weren’t	  covered	  by	  our	  earlier	  questions.	  We	  also	  asked	  respondents	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  interview	  for	  additional	  contacts	  that	  could	  prove	  valuable	  for	  our	  study.	  
 
 
Table	  4.1	   List	  of	  respondents	  
Respondent	   Organisation	  	   Number	   Number	  of	  quotes	  
used	  in	  text	  
The	  Netherlands	   	   	   	  
Minister	  of	  Defence	   Dutch	  Ministry	  of	  Defence	   1	   1	  
State	  Secretary	  of	  
Defence	  
Dutch	  Ministry	  of	  Defence	   2	   2	  
National	  Armaments	  
Director	  	  
Dutch	  Defence	  Material	  
Organisation	  
1	   5	  
Director	  Acquisition	  	   Dutch	  Defence	  Material	  
Organisation	  
1	   1	  
Director	  Weapons	  
Systems	  	  
Dutch	  Defence	  Material	  
Organisation	  
1	   	  
Director	  Projects	  and	  
Procurement	  /NH	  90	  
Steering	  Committee	  
Member	  	  
Dutch	  Defence	  Material	  
Organisation	  
1	   2	  
Project	  Officer	  Public	  
Private	  Cooperation	  
Dutch	  Defence	  Material	  
Organisation	  
1	   	  
NH	  90	  programme	  
officials	  
Dutch	  Defence	  Material	  
Organisation	  
5	   Official	  1:	  10	  
Official	  2:	  1	  
Official	  3:	  1	  
NAHEMA	  Officials	   NAHEMA	   2	   Official	  1:	  5	  
Official	  2:	  4	  
Executive	  Vice-­‐
President	  STORK	  




STORK	  	   1	   4	  
NH	  90	  Programme	  
Manager	  
STORK	   1	   2	  
	   	   	   	  
France	   	   	   	  
NH	  90	  programme	   French	  Defence	  Material	   1	   3	  
 78 
officials	   Organisation	  
NAHEMA	  Officials	   NAHEMA	   3	   Official	  1:	  5	  
Official	  2:	  4	  
Official	  3:	  2	  	  
	   	   	   	  
Germany	   	   	   	  
State	  Secretary	  of	  
Defence	  
German	  Defence	  Material	  
Organisation	  
1	   1	  
Member	  of	  Parliament	   German	  Parliament	  
(Bundestag)	  
1	   	  
Director	  Division	  Air/	  
NH	  90	  Steering	  
Committee	  Member	  
German	  Defence	  Material	  
Organisation	  
1	   3	  
NH	  90	  programme	  
officials	  
German	  Defence	  Material	  
Organisation	  
5	   Official	  1:	  3	  
Official	  2:	  4	  
Official	  3:	  3	  
NAHEMA	  Officials	   NAHEMA	   2	   Official	  1:	  2	  
	   	   	   	  
Italy	   	   	   	  
NH	  90	  Programme	  
Officials	  
Italian	  Defence	  Material	  
Organisation	  
3	   Official	  1:	  3	  
Official	  2:	  1	  
	  
4.3	   Data	  Analysis	  
 
The	  aforementioned	  problems	   in	   collecting	  our	  data	  obviously	  have	   some	   implications	   for	  
the	   subsequent	   analysis	   of	   our	   interview	   data.	   Probably	   the	   single	   most	   important	  
implication	  is	  that	  it	  forced	  us	  to	  rely	  more	  heavily	  on	  the	  descriptions	  provided	  by	  the	  Dutch	  
respondents.	   One	   could	   argue	   that	   the	   illumination	   of	   a	   nation’s	   logic	   should	   be	   based	  
foremost	   on	   accounts	   provided	   by	   native	   respondents.	   Nevertheless,	  we	   still	   believe	   that	  
our	  adopted	  strategy	  has	  its	  merits.	  Many	  of	  our	  respondents	  had	  some	  years	  of	  experience	  
in	  working	   in	   international	   environments.	  Moreover,	   a	   number	   of	  Dutch	   respondents	   and	  
their	   families	   had	   lived	   in	   France	   for	   a	   couple	   of	   years	   and	   as	   such	   they	   were	   relatively	  
familiar	  with	  its	  culture.	  	  
	   We	  now	   turn	   to	   the	  procedures	  used	   to	  analyse	  our	  data,	  which	  basically	   involved	  
three	  different	  steps.	  The	  first	  step	  in	  data	  analysis	  involved	  constructing	  a	  narrative	  of	  the	  
NH	   90	   programme.	   Here	   the	   documentary	   material	   was	   particularly	   helpful	   because	   it	  
allowed	  us	  to	  describe	  the	  main	  developments	   from	   its	   inception	  to	   its	  current	  stage.	  This	  
allowed	  us	   to	   identify	   the	  different	  programme	  phases	  and	   the	  main	  problems	  and	   issues	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encountered	  by	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  programme.	  The	  main	  data	  sources	  for	  this	  account	  of	  the	  
NH	   90	   programme	   are	   industry	   news	   sources	   Flight	   International	   and	   Aviation	  Week	   and	  
Space	  Technology	  and	  Dutch	  parliamentary	  documents	  on	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  (see	  table	  	  
4.2	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  documents	  that	  were	  used).	  We	  used	  ‘NH	  90’	  as	  primary	  search	  in	  
the	  databases	  of	   these	  data	  sources.	  For	  each	  of	   the	  documents	  we	   listed	  the	  main	   issues	  
raised,	  being	  particularly	  sensitive	  to	  political	  issues	  raised	  in	  the	  programme.	  	  In	  chapter	  5,	  
we	  will	  describe	  the	  results	  of	  this	  analysis	  in	  detail.	  	  
	   The	  second	  step	  in	  data	  analysis	  involved	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  different	  logics	  of	  
the	  four	  programme	  partners.	  For	  this	  we	  relied	  on	  common	  procedures	  for	  qualitative	  data	  
analysis	  (cf.	  Strauss	  and	  Corbin,	  1990;	  Miles	  and	  Huberman,	  1994).	  We	  engaged	  in	  a	  coding	  
procedure	  in	  which	  labels	  were	  assigned	  to	  text	  units	  (sentences	  or	  paragraphs).	  
	   In	  chapter	  3,	  we	  sketched	  some	  general	  features	  of	  the	  defence	  industrial	  production	  
features	  and	  general	  business	  climate	  conditions	  of	  each	  of	  the	  nations	  under	  study.	  These	  
provided	  us	  with	  a	  number	  of	  categories	  potentially	   relevant	   for	  our	  subsequent	  empirical	  
analysis.	   Yet,	   through	   out	   the	   coding	   procedure	   we	   remained	   sensitive	   to	   other	   issues,	  
conceptions,	   and	   events	  mentioned	   by	   respondents	   that	   did	   not	   fit	   a	   code	   on	   our	   initial	  
coding	  list.	  Primarily	  descriptive	  codes	  were	  applied	  to	  chunks	  of	  text	  (from	  sub-­‐sentences,	  
to	   paragraphs).	   Examples	   of	   codes	   that	   we	   used	   included:	   government-­‐industry	   relations,	  
industrial	   interests,	   evaluation	   of	   cooperation,	   programme	   management,	   responsibilities,	  
and	  authority	  relations.	  
	  
Table	  4.2	   Documents	  studied	  	  	  
Documents	  studied	   Type	   Year(s)	   Number	  of	  
Articles	  
Dutch	  parliamentary	  documents	   Publicly	  available	   1985-­‐2011	   82	  
Flight	  International	   Industry	  News	   1985-­‐2005	   121	  
Aviation	  Week	  and	  Space	  Technology	  
	  
Industry	  News	   1999-­‐2009	   48	  
Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	   NATO	  Classified	   1991	   1	  plus	  
amendments	  
Development	  and	  Production	  Contract	   Commercially	  
Confidential	  





We	   then	   sought	   to	   compare	   these	   codes	   across	   respondents	   to	   see	   whether	   we	   could	  
discern	  differences	  between	  the	  nations	  on	  these	  codes.	  Careful	  comparison	  of	  the	  quotes	  
and	  iteration	  between	  data	  and	  theory	  allowed	  us	  to	  identify	  two	  main	  dimensions	  (defence	  
industrial	  orientation	  and	  programme	  management	  control)	  on	  which	  we	  observed	  variation	  
between	  the	  four	  different	  nations.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  analysis	  are	  presented	  in	  chapter	  6.	  	  
In	   the	   third	   data	   analysis	   step	  we	   tried	   to	   understand	   how	   the	   process	   of	   aligning	  
between	  the	  different	  actors	  unfolded.	  Again	  we	  engaged	  in	  a	  coding	  procedure	  in	  which	  we	  
assigned	  labels	  to	  text	  units.	  Based	  on	  our	  theoretical	  framework	  we	  applied	  codes	  in	  which	  
actors	   expressed	   concern	   with	   individual	   sense-­‐making	   activities	   noticing,	   interpretation,	  
and	  action,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  communicative	  acts	  of	  sense	  making	  (cf.	  Vlaar,	  Van	  Fenema,	  and	  
Tiwari,	   2008	   and	   Vaara	   and	  Monin	   (2010),	   sense-­‐giving,	   sense-­‐demanding,	   sense-­‐breaking	  
and	   sense-­‐hiding	   necessary	   for	   multiparty	   negotiations.	   Additional	   codes	   that	   emerged	  
centred	  around	  more	  structural	   features	  of	   the	  programme	  organisation.	  Codes	   that	  were	  
applied	   were	   negotiation	   process,	   decision-­‐making	   structure,	   information	   exchange	   and	  
lobbying.	  During	  the	  coding	  process,	  we	  became	  aware	  that	  that	  these	  codes	  referred	  to	  two	  
different	  processes,	  one	   lateral	  between	   the	  nations	  with	  NAHEMA	  as	   the	  centre	  and	  one	  
vertical	   where	   representatives	   of	   the	   nations	   communicated	   with	   superiors	   in	   their	  
respective	  procurement	  agencies.	  This	   informed	  the	  subsequent	  development	  of	  two	  main	  
themes	  (Coalition	  formation	  describing	  the	  lateral	  one	  and	  escalation	  describing	  the	  vertical	  
one)	  upon	  which	  we	  built	  our	  analysis	   further.	  Proceeding	  our	  analysis	  with	   these	   themes	  
made	   us	   sensitive	   to	   two	   other	   themes	   (the	   structuring	   role	   of	   the	   Memoranda	   of	  
Understanding	  and	  the	  role	  of	  NAHEMA	  or	  more	  specifically	  the	  role	  of	  the	  representatives	  
of	  NAHEMA)	  that	  did	  not	  readily	  fall	  within	  the	  coalition	  formation	  and	  escalation	  themes.	   
 
4.4	   Research	  Quality	  
 
We	  have	  to	  admit	  that	  the	  number	  of	  respondents	  from	  Italy	  and	  France	  is	  relatively	  small.	  
So	   small,	   that	   we	   have	   even	   considered	   to	   dismiss	   these	   nations	   from	   our	   study.	  
Nonetheless,	  we	  also	   felt	   that	   skipping	   these	  nations	   from	  our	   study	  would	   seriously	   limit	  
our	   study’s	   theoretical	   and	   empirical	   value.	  We	   also	   believed	   it	  would	   do	   injustice	   to	   the	  
interviews	   we	   did	   conduct	   with	   officials	   from	   the	   programme	   offices	   of	   France	   and	   Italy	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which	   provided	   us	   with	   important	   insights	   about	   the	   programme	   and	   the	   cooperation	  
among	  the	  partners.	  	  	  
In	   order	   to	   increase	   the	   validity	   and	   reliability	   of	   this	   study	   we	   have	   relied	   on	   a	  
number	   of	   procedures.	  We	   have	   sought	   to	   triangulate	   our	   data	   using	   both	   documentary	  
sources	   and	   interviews	   with	   individuals	   affiliated	   with	   the	   NH	   90	   programme.	   For	   the	  
interviews	  we	  have	  used	  a	   structured	   interview	  protocol.	   This	  protocol	  was	  used	   for	  each	  
interview	  we	  conducted.	  
Moreover,	   the	   interviews	  were	  conducted	  by	  either	   two	  or	   three	   interviewers	  with	  
one	  interviewer	  heaving	  the	  primary	  lead,	  while	  the	  other(s)	  took	  notes	  and	  ensured	  that	  all	  
the	  basic	  questions	   in	  the	   interview	  protocol	  were	  covered.	  The	  first	  set	  of	   interviews	  was	  
also	   coded	   separately	   by	   two	   researchers	   based	   on	   the	   initial	   coding	   list	   that	   was	  
constructed.	  After	   having	   coded	  a	   transcript	   the	   researchers	   got	   together	   to	   compare	   the	  
codes	  that	  they	  applied	  and	  discuss	  the	  codes	  they	  applied	  to	  chunks	  of	  text	  in	  cases	  where	  





















































CHAPTER	  5 	  	  	  	  NH90	  CASE	  DESCRIPTION	  
 
This	   chapter	   is	   dedicated	   to	   a	   historical	   description	   of	   the	   NH	   90	   programme	   from	   its	  
inception	   in	   the	   early	   1980s	   up	   to	   the	   present.	   The	  main	   data	   sources	   for	   this	   historical	  
description	  are	   industry	  news	  sources	   (primarily	  Aviation	  Week	  and	  Space	  Technology	  and	  
Flight	  International)	  and	  Dutch	  parliamentary	  documents	  on	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  
After	   the	   Second	   World	   War,	   the	   build	   up	   of	   the	   European	   defence	   industrial	  
capabilities	  relied	  heavily	  upon	  support	   from	  the	  United	  States.	  From	  the	  13	  billion	  dollars	  
provided	  under	  the	  European	  Recovery	  Programme	  by	  the	  United	  States	  a	  large	  proportion	  
was	   spent	   on	   industries	   with	   military	   importance	   (Lovering,	   2001:	   33).	   Within	   NATO,	  
armaments	   collaboration	   also	   became	   an	   important	   subject,	   in	   particular	   to	   achieve	  
interoperability	  among	  alliance	  members,	  and	  convergence	  of	  doctrines	  and	  training.	  During	  
the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  most	  of	  these	  collaborative	  programmes	  involved	  the	  production	  under	  
license	   of	   United	   States	   military	   equipment	   (Lorell,	   1980).	   Notable	   examples	   are	   the	  
Lockheed	  F104	  Starfighter	  and	  its	  successor,	  the	  General	  Dynamics	  F16	  Fighting	  Falcon.	  
France,	   in	   particular,	   has	  been	   a	   strong	  early	   advocate	  of	   European	   cooperation	   in	  
the	   development	   and	   production	   of	   weapons	   systems,	   somewhat	   paradoxically	   with	   its	  
policy	   of	   maintaining	   a	   strong	   and	   independent	   military	   power.	   French	   independence	   in	  
procurement	  matters	   dates	   back	   to	   the	   17th	   century	   (U.S.	   Congress,	   Office	   of	   Technology	  
Assessment,	   1992:	   3).	   But	   in	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	   the	   war	   it	   relied	   heavily	   on	  
American	  developed	  military	  equipment.	  When	  Charles	  de	  Gaulle	  became	  president	  in	  1958	  
this	  would	  soon	  change.	  He	  formulated	  a	  new	  defence	  and	  security	  policy	  for	  France	  based	  
on	  diplomatic	  and	  military	  independence	  through	  nuclear	  deterrence,	  a	  special	  status	  within	  
NATO	  and	  national	  self-­‐sufficiency	   in	  military	  equipment	  (Yost,	  1994:	  237).	   In	  practice,	  this	  
has	   resulted	   in	   the	   national	   development	   and	   production	   of	   its	  most	   important	  weapons	  
systems	   even	   when	   better	   or	   cheaper	   alternatives	   were	   available	   from	   other	   countries	  
(including	  nuclear	  capabilities).	  In	  order	  to	  control	  the	  unit	  costs	  of	  weapons	  systems	  it	  has	  
tended	   to	   rely	   heavily	   on	   exports	   (U.S	   Congress,	   Office	   of	   Technology	   Assessment,	   1992;	  
Yost,	  1994).	  The	  first	  collaborative	  development	  and	  production	  programmes	  were	  based	  on	  
Franco-­‐West	   German	   bilateral	   arrangements,	   and	   were	   primarily	   attempts	   by	   the	   French	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government	   to	   gain	   some	   control	   over	   post-­‐war	   rearmament	   of	   the	   Federal	   Republic	   of	  
Germany	  (Lorell,	  1980).	  	  
In	   the	   following	   decades,	   when	   European	   nations	   had	  managed	   to	   build	   up	   there	  
defence	   industrial	   capabilities,	   they	   increasingly	   became	   concerned	   with	   the	   “one	   way	  
street”	   in	   which	   European	   countries	   procured	   American	   developed	   military	   systems	  
(Lovering,	  2001).	  At	  the	  same	  time	  the	  United	  States,	  despite	  frequent	  rhetoric	  of	  opening	  
up	  of	   a	   “two	  way	   street”,	   remained	   reluctant	   to	  buy	  equipment	   from	  European	   suppliers.	  
Increasingly,	   even	   the	   larger	   countries	   became	   unsatisfied	   with	   this	   division	   of	   labour.	  
European	  countries	  struggled	  to	  keep	  their	  defence	  industrial	  capabilities	  in	  shape	  given	  the	  
rising	  costs	  of	  developing	  and	  producing	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  military	  equipment.	  To	  this	  end,	  a	  
number	   of	   European	   nations	   collaborated	   in	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Independent	  
European	  Programme	  Group	  (IEPG),	  which	  was	  founded	  in	  1976	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  achieving	  a	  
more	  balanced	  relationship	  in	  the	  procurement	  of	  defence	  equipment	  between	  the	  United	  
States	  and	  Western	  Europe	  (Tweede	  Kamer,	  1984:	  7).	  	  
 
5.1	   Changing	  Nature	  of	  the	  European	  Defence	  Industry	  
 
One	   should	   be	   sensitive	   to	   the	   changes	   that	   have	   taken	   place	   in	   the	   European	   defence	  
industry.	  These	  changes	  are	  still	  continuing	   in	  the	  present.	   Initially,	  European	  governments	  
have	   tried	   and	   at	   least	   to	   some	   extent	   succeeded	   in	   the	   consolidation	   of	   the	   European	  
defence	  industry.	  European	  governments	  basically	  have	  pursued	  a	  mixture	  of	  three	  different	  
strategies	   for	   the	  consolidation	  of	   the	  defence	  and	  aerospace	   industry2	   in	   the	  past.	  A	  very	  
clear	  preference	  for	  either	  of	  them	  has	  yet	  to	  emerge.	  	  
The	  first	  strategy	  that	  was	  pursued	  by	  more	  or	  less	  all	  governments	  was	  the	  creation	  
of	  “national	  champions”.	   In	  Germany,	  this	  consolidation	  took	  place	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  
DASA.	   In	   France,	   Aerospatiale	   emerged	   as	   a	   national	   aerospace	   champion.	   A	   further	  
consolidation	   in	   France	   to	  date	  has	  not	   yet	  occurred,	  primarily	  because	   the	  private	   sector	  
company	   Dassault	   Aviation	   has	   been	   able	   to	   withstand	   pressure	   from	   the	   French	  
                                                
2	  We	  would	   like	  to	  emphasize	  that	  we	  are	  here	  primarily	  talking	  about	  the	  aerospace	  sector	  of	  the	  
defence	   industry.	   For	   naval	   and	   land	   systems	   the	   current	   situation	   differs	   dramatically.	   Although	  
governments	   there	   have	   also	   sought	   further	   consolidation	   and	   rationalisation,	   companies	   thus	   far	  
have	  been	  able	  to	  withstand	  these	  attempts	  of	  governments.	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government	   to	  merge	  with	   Aerospatiale.	   In	   Italy,	   Finmeccanica	   emerged	   as	   the	   dominant	  
defence	   and	   aerospace	   industrial	   group.	   In	   the	   Netherlands	   the	   government	   has	   tried	   to	  
integrate	  the	  Fokker	  into	  DASA,	  but	  eventually	  this	  attempt	  failed	  and	  Fokker	  went	  bankrupt	  
(Van	   Zanden,	   1999).	   The	   economically	   viable	   parts	   of	   Fokker	   were	   taken	   over	   by	   Stork.	  
Alongside	   the	   creation	   of	   these	   national	   champions	   governments	   the	   second	   strategy	  
pursued	   consisted	   of	   negotiation	   among	   governments	   over	   the	   specialisation	   in	   different	  
defence	  sectors.	  	  
Yet	  this	  proved	  extremely	  difficult	  given	  the	  divergent	   interests	  of	  the	  governments	  
involved.	   Moreover,	   even	   if	   the	   governments	   had	   been	   able	   to	   reconcile	   their	   divergent	  
interests	  as	  to	  what	  capabilities	  they	  would	   like	  to	  retain	  and	  what	  capabilities	  they	  would	  
allow	   to	   be	   handled	   by	   other	   nations,	   a	   second	   problem	   would	   have	   to	   be	   solved.	   This	  
problem	  would	  be	  to	  convince	  their	  national	  companies	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  wishes	  of	  their	  
governments	  (Fligstein,	  2006).	  Especially	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  in	  Germany	  this	  would	  
have	   proved	   difficult	   given	   that	   their	   defence	   companies	   were	   privately	   owned.	   In	   the	  
previous	   chapter,	   we	   already	   noted	   that	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Defence	   was	   not	   capable	   of	  
preventing	  Westland	  to	  seek	  closer	  cooperation	  with	  the	  American	  helicopter	  manufacturer	  
Sikorsky.	  	  
A	  final	  possible	  strategy	  for	  governments	  would	  have	  been	  a	  primarily	  market	  driven	  
solution	   (Fligstein,	   2006).	   Here	   companies	   would	   have	   been	   allowed	   to	   decide	   in	   which	  
sectors	   to	  specialize	  and	  which	  companies	   to	  buy.	  Yet,	  a	  problem	  here	  was	  that	  especially	  
the	  private	  sector	  firms	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Germany	  were	  reluctant	  to	  seek	  closer	  
integration	   with	   French	   state-­‐owned	   companies	   –	   despite	   the	   efforts	   of	   the	   French	  
government	  to	  privatize	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  its	  defence	  companies	  during	  the	  1990s.	  
	   What	   has	   characterized	   much	   of	   the	   efforts	   of	   both	   European	   governments	   and	  
defence	  companies	  has	  been	  a	  mixture	  of	  these	  three	  approaches.	  Governments	  have	  been	  
reluctant	   to	   completely	   abandon	   full	   control	   of	   their	   defence	   companies.	   Defence	   firms,	  
uncertain	  about	  what	  their	  governments	  said	  they	  wanted	  them	  to	  do	  and	  what	  they	  would	  
actually	  allow	  them	  to	  do,	  have	  sought	  greater	  cooperation	  and	  integration.	  So,	  what	  have	  
emerged	   in	   the	   meantime	   are	   primarily	   four	   large	   European	   groups,	   EADS,	   Thales,	   BAe	  
Systems	  and	  Finmeccanica.	  Yet,	  each	  of	  these	  groups	  has	  still	  managed	  to	  preserve	  much	  of	  
their	  original	  national	  identities	  (Serfati,	  2001;	  Fligstein,	  2006).	  	  And	  all	  of	  these	  groups	  have	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developed	   ties	   to	   one	   another	   through	   a	   variety	   of	   shareholdings	   in	   a	   number	   of	   cross-­‐
national	   joint	   ventures,	   which	   has	   been	   described	   as	   the	   ‘European	   spaghetti	   bowl’	   of	  
European	  defence	  cooperation	  (Keohane,	  2002:	  7).	  	  
	   These	   cross-­‐national	   joint	   ventures	   were	   formed	   among	   a	   number	   of	   different	  
programmes	   (see	   table	   5.1	   for	   an	   overview	   of	   types	   and	   numbers	   of	   collaborative	  
programmes).	  In	  the	  civil	  market,	  French	  Aerospatiale	  and	  Deutsche	  Aerospace	  founded	  the	  
Airbus	  programme.	  Subsequently,	  Spanish	  Contrucciones	  Aeronáuticas	  SA	  (CASA)	  joined	  the	  
programme	  in	  1971,	  followed	  by	  British	  Aerospace	  (BAe)	  in	  19793.	  A	  couple	  of	  years	  later,	  in	  
1985	   the	   Future	   European	   Fighter	   Aircraft	   programme	   (FEFA)	   was	   founded	   by	   the	  
governments	  of	  Germany,	   Italy,	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  France,	  originally	  participated	  as	  
well,	  but	  eventually	  decided	  to	  nationally	  develop	  and	  produce	  the	  Dassault	  Rafale.	  Similar	  
developments	  occurred	  in	  the	  helicopter	  industry	  with	  three	  collaborative	  programmes	  (i.e.	  
the	  NH	  90,	  EH	  101,	  PAH	  2	  and	  A	  129)	  launched	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	  	  
  
 
Table	  5.1	   Collaboration	  in	  arms	  production	  among	  western	  European	  producers	  
	   1971-­‐75	   1976-­‐80	   1981-­‐85	   1986-­‐90	   1991-­‐94	  
Consortia	   8	   5	   20	   22	   38	  
Joint	  Ventures	  	   1	   0	   2	   8	   20	  
Merger	  &	  Acquisitions	  	   0	   0	   2	   36	   12	  
Strategic	  Alliances	   0	   0	   0	   6	   10	  
Source:	  Brzoska	  1998:	  87	  
 
 
5.2	   The	  NH	  90	  Programme	  
 
In	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  the	  military	  helicopter	   industry	  (and	  the	  aerospace	  industry	  
as	   a	   whole)	   faced	   difficult	   times.	   A	   large	   overcapacity	   existed,	   especially	   in	   Europe,	   and	  
increasingly	  both	  governments	  and	  companies	  were	  seeking	  international	  cooperation	  as	  a	  
                                                
3	  Since	  2006,	  Airbus	  is	  completely	  owned	  by	  the	  European	  Aerospace	  Defence	  and	  Space	  Company.	  
(EADS)	  after	  BAe	  sold	  its	  20%	  share	  in	  the	  Airbus	  programme	  to	  EADS.	  	  
 87 
possible	   remedy.	   For	   most	   European	   countries	   (even	   the	   larger	   ones),	   the	   domestic	  
development	  and	  production	  of	  advanced	  aircraft	  was	  viewed	  as	  undesirable	  given	  the	  cost	  
trend	  in	  developing	  and	  producing	  aircraft.	  	  
In	   1979,	   Agusta	   (Italy)	   and	   Westland	   (UK)	   formed	   European	   Helicopter	   Industries	  
(EHI)	   to	   develop	   the	   EH	   101	   (since	   2007,	   AW	   101)	   anti-­‐submarine	   warfare	   helicopter.	  
Initially,	  France	  and	  Germany	  were	  also	  involved,	  but	  they	  later	  discovered	  that	  they	  did	  not	  
have	  a	  requirement	  for	  such	  a	  helicopter	  (Flight	  International,	  1985:	  84).	  
In	   1985,	   Westland	   (United	   Kingdom)	   and	   Agusta	   (Italy)	   agreed	   to	   extend	   their	  
cooperation	   to	   build	   a	   naval	   anti-­‐submarine	   warfare	   helicopter,	   a	   utility	   battlefield	  
helicopter	  and	  a	  civilian	  transport	  helicopter	  based	  on	  the	  EH	  101	  design.	  They	  also	  agreed	  
to	   develop	   an	   upgraded	   version	   of	   the	   Agusta	   A	   129	   Mangusta	   anti-­‐tank/anti-­‐helicopter	  
aircraft	   (Flight	   International,	   1985:	   83).4	   In	   May	   1985,	   France	   and	   Germany	   agreed	   on	   a	  
Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  to	  form	  the	  Eurocopter	  company	  comprised	  of	  Aerospatiale	  
of	  France	  and	  MBB	  (Messerschmitt-­‐Bölkow-­‐Blohm)	  of	  Germany.	  These	  governments	  agreed	  
to	  build	  a	  two-­‐seat	  attack	  helicopter	  (currently	  known	  as	  the	  Tiger	  attack	  helicopter)	  (Flight	  
International	  1985:	  83).	  
In	   the	   late	   1970s,	   a	   number	   of	   NATO	   defence	   departments	   identified	   the	   need	   of	  
developing	   a	   new	   maritime	   helicopter	   for	   the	   NATO	   frigate	   of	   the	   1990s.	   In	   1985,	   the	  
Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   (MoU)	   was	   signed,	   declaring	   the	   intention	   of	   the	  
governments	   of	   France,	   Germany,	   Italy,	   the	   Netherlands	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   to	  
cooperate	   on	   the	   development	   and	   production	   of	   new	   helicopters.	   The	   attention	   soon	  
became	   focused	   on	   a	   standard	   helicopter,	   that	   foresaw	   in	   the	   development	   of	   both	   a	  
transport	  (TTH,	  Tactical	  Transport	  Helicopter)	  and	  a	  tactical	  (NFH,	  NATO	  Frigate	  Helicopter)	  
version.	  Standardisation	  between	  the	  two	  versions	  was	  believed	  to	  reduce	  production	  and	  
exploitation	  costs.	  In	  1986,	  the	  feasibility	  study	  and	  the	  pre-­‐definition	  phase	  came	  to	  an	  end.	  
The	   following	   year,	   the	   UK	   withdrew	   from	   the	   programme	   for	   industrial	   and	   operational	  
considerations.	   The	   other	   participating	   countries	   were	   convinced	   the	   projected	   demands	  
                                                
4	   In	   1986,	   a	   Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   was	   signed	   between	   the	   governments	   of	   Italy,	   the	  
Netherlands,	   Spain	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   to	   investigate	   an	   improved	   version	   of	   the	   A129	  
Mangusta.	   The	   study	   progressed	   under	   the	   name	   Joint	   European	   Helicopter	   Tonal.	   However,	   the	  
program	  collapsed	  in	  1990	  when	  both	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  decided	  to	  procure	  
the	   American	   AH-­‐64	   Apache.	   Spain	   subsequently	   decided	   to	   join	   the	   Franco-­‐German	   Eurocopter	  
Tiger	  Programme	  (Tweede	  Kamer,	  1985a).	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could	  be	  satisfied.	  The	  multi-­‐role	  helicopter	  should	  be	  able	  to	  fulfil	  three	  primary	  purposes:	  
combating	  submarines	  as	  well	  as	  surface	  ships,	  and	  serve	  as	  an	  early	  warning	  system	  for	  an	  
air	  strike.	  	  
Despite	   the	   emergence	   of	   two	   different	   camps,	   (i.e.	   Eurocopter	   and	   European	  
Helicopter	   Industries),	   the	   efforts	   did	   reveal	   the	   willingness	   of	   European	   countries	   to	   do	  
something	  about	  the	  overcapacity	  in	  the	  industry.	  Sustaining	  four	  helicopter	  manufacturers	  
was	  deemed	  to	  be	  economically	  unviable.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  the	  aforementioned	  countries	  
together	  with	  the	  Netherlands	  signed	  a	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  to	   jointly	  develop	  
the	  NH90	  (NATO	  Helicopter	  for	  the	  1990s).	  MBB	  and	  Aerospatiale	  agreed	  to	  work	  together	  
under	   the	  banner	  of	   Eurocopter	   in	   the	  programme.	  However,	   at	   the	   start	   of	   the	  program	  
there	  was	  already	  some	  scepticism	  over	  the	  programme.	  Westland’s	  representative	  on	  the	  
NH	   90	   industrial	   management	   committee	   noted	   that,	   “[t]he	   history	   of	   collaborative	  
programmes	  suggests	  that	  the	  NH90	  in-­‐service	  date	  –	  1994	  –	  is	  extremely	  optimistic…	  It	  will	  
take	  an	  awful	  long	  time	  to	  set	  up	  (cited	  in	  Flight	  International,	  1985:	  85).”	  Similar	  views	  were	  
expressed	  by	  the	  then	  managing	  director	  of	  Eurocopter,	  “It	  is	  a	  good	  idea	  to	  go	  ahead	  with	  
the	  programme,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  very	  difficult	  way	  to	  go	  with	  five	  nations.	  I	  don’t	  see	  it	  succeeding	  
but	  if	  you	  want	  it	  to,	  you	  can	  do	  it.	  It	  depends	  on	  how	  strong	  the	  determination	  is…”	  (cited	  in	  
Flight	  International,	  1985:	  86).	  	  
The	  NH	  90	  programme	   (see	   figure	  5.3	   for	  a	   graphical	   representation)	   includes	   four	  
nations:	   France,	  Germany,	   Italy,	   and	   The	  Netherlands.	   These	   nations	   together	   formed	   the	  
NATO	  Helicopter	  Management	   Agency	   (NAHEMA).	   	   In	   2001,	   Portugal	   became	  member	   of	  
NAHEMA,	  followed	  by	  Belgium	  in	  2004.	  The	  industrial	  partners,	  responsible	  for	  the	  design,	  
development,	  and	  production	  of	  the	  NH90,	  were	  drawn	  from	  the	  participating	  nations	  and	  
involved	  Aerospatiale	  from	  France	  (currently	  Eurocopter	  France),	  Messcherschmitt-­‐Bölkow-­‐
Blohm	   (currently	   Eurocopter	  Germany),	  Agusta	   from	   Italy,	   (currently	  AgustaWestland)	   and	  
Fokker	   from	  the	  Netherlands.	  Eurocopter	  France	  and	  Eurocopter	  Germany	  are	  now	  wholly	  
owned	  subsidiaries	  of	  the	  European	  Aeronautic,	  Defence,	  and	  Space	  Company	  (EADS).	  These	  
four	  industrial	  partners	  have	  organized	  themselves	  in	  NHIndustries	  (NHI).	  NHI	  serves	  as	  the	  
contract	  partner	  for	  the	  respective	  industrial	  partners	  (see	  table	  5.2	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  




Figure	  5.1	   The	  NH	  90	  Programme	  
 
 
We	  have	  already	  discussed	  some	  of	  the	  basic	  features	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  We	  
will	  detail	  the	  programme	  set	  up	  further	  here.	  We	  deem	  it	  necessary	  to	  provide	  some	  more	  
details	  here,	  as	  some	  additional	  background	  information	  will	  be	  useful	  for	  the	  presentation	  
of	  the	  research	  findings.	  The	  founding	  nations	  –	  France,	  Germany,	  Italy,	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  
together	  form	  the	  NATO	  Helicopter	  Management	  Organisation	  NAHEMO.	  The	  objective	  was	  
to	   define,	   develop,	   produce	   and	   support	   the	  NH	   90	   in	   order	   to	   have	   the	   first	   production	  
helicopters	  with	  maximum	  commonality	  in	  operational	  service	  with	  armed	  forces	  in	  1997.	  	  
 The	  overall	  responsibility	  for	  programme	  matters	  lies	  with	  the	  NH	  90	  Steering	  
Committee.	  The	  Steering	  Committee	  (SC)	  consists	  of	  the	  Heads	  of	  Delegation	  (HoDs).	  Under	  
normal	   circumstances	   the	   Steering	   Committee	   convenes	   twice	   a	   year.	   The	   Steering	  
Committee	   is	   assisted	   by	   a	   Joint	   Executive	   Committee	   (JEC).	   Within	   the	   JEC,	   the	   NH	   90	  
programme	  managers	  from	  the	  participating	  nations	  take	  seat.	  Under	  normal	  conditions	  the	  
JEC	  convenes	  about	  six	  times	  a	  year.	  The	  tasks	  of	  the	  JEC	  include	  the	  timely	  execution	  of	  the	  
programme	   by	   the	   NATO	   Helicopter	   Management	   Agency	   (NAHEMA),	   the	   national	  
coordination	   of	   the	   requirements	   with	   the	   armed	   forces,	   and	   the	   preparation	   of	   the	  
decisions	   of	   the	   Steering	   Committee.	   Within	   each	   of	   the	   participating	   nations	   there	   is	   a	  
dedicated	  NH	  90	  programme	  office	  within	  the	  different	  defence	  materiel	  organisations.	  The	  
different	   national	   programme	   offices	   consist	   of	   programme	   officials	  who	   take	   part	   in	   the	  
different	   functional	  working	  groups	   (e.g.	  engineering,	   logistics	  support,	   training	  equipment	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etc.).	  Decision	  making	  is	  based	  on	  unanimity.	  The	  chairmanship	  of	  both	  the	  JEC	  and	  the	  SC	  
rotates	  annually	  among	  the	  nations.	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
Table	  5.2	   Company	  Profiles	  
Company	   Profile	  	  




Aerospatiale	  emerged	  as	  the	  French	  aerospace	  champion	  in	  1970	  out	  of	  a	  
merger	   of	   a	   number	   of	   state-­‐owned	   companies.	   In	   1992	   its	   helicopter	  
division	  had	  been	  merged	  with	  the	  helicopter	  division	  of	  German	  DASA.	  In	  
1999,	   the	   company	   merged	   with	   Matra	   Haute	   Technologies	   to	   form	  
Aerospatiale-­‐Matra.	   Under	   the	   government	   of	   Lionel	   Jospin	   the	  
privatisation	   of	   Aerospatiale-­‐Matra	   was	   initiated	   pending	   a	   further	  
European	   integration	   when	   Aerospatiale-­‐Matra	   and	   Contrucciones	  
Aeronáuticas	   SA	   (CASA)	   from	   Spain	   merged	   to	   form	   the	   European	  
Aeronautic	   Defence	   and	   Space	   Company	   (EADS).	   Currently,	   the	   French	  






Messerschmitt-­‐Bölkow-­‐Blohm	   was	   a	   German	   aerospace	   company,	   which	  
resulted	   from	   the	   merger	   of	   a	   number	   of	   aerospace	   companies	   in	   the	  
1960s.	   In	  1989,	  Daimler-­‐Benz	  Aerospace	  AG	  acquired	  MBB.	  (Following	  the	  
merger	   of	   Daimler-­‐Benz	   and	   Chrysler	   in	   1995	   the	   company	   name	   was	  
changed	   into	   Daimler-­‐Chrysler	   Aerospace	   AG.	   The	   helicopter	   division	   of	  
DASA	  had	  already	  been	  merged	  with	  the	  helicopter	  division	  of	  Aerospatiale	  
from	   France	   in	   1992	   to	   form	   Eurocopter.	   Later	   in	   2000,	   DASA	   and	  
Aerospatiale-­‐Matra	  and	  Contrucciones	  Aeronáuticas	  SA	  (CASA)	  from	  Spain	  
merged	   to	   form	   the	   European	   Aeronautic	   Defence	   and	   Space	   Company	  




Agusta	   started	  helicopter	  manufacturing	   in	  1952.	   Initially	   this	  was	   limited	  
to	   production	   under	   licence	   of	   U.S.	   helicopters.	   But	   later	   it	   started	   to	  
develop	  and	  build	  its	  own	  designs.	  The	  company	  is	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  the	  large	  
Italian	   industrial	   group	   Finmeccanica	   of	   which	   the	   Italian	   government	  
controls	   about	   30%	   of	   the	   shares.	   In	   the	   early	   1990s	   it	   teamed	   up	   with	  
Westland	   from	   the	   UK	   to	   form	   the	   European	   Helicopter	   Industries.	   At	  
about	  the	  same	  time	  it	  also	  became	  involved	  in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  In	  
July	   2000,	   Finmeccanica	   and	   GKN	   from	   the	   UK	   agreed	   to	   merge	   their	  
helicopter	   divisions	   to	   form	   AgustaWestland.	   In	   2004,	   AgustaWestland	  




Fokker	   was	   a	   Dutch	   aircraft	   manufacturer.	   In	   the	   1980s	   it	   had	   run	   into	  
financial	  difficulties	  almost	  leading	  up	  to	  its	  bankruptcy	  after	  an	  ambitious,	  
yet	  unsuccessful	  project	  of	  developing	  two	  new	  aircraft	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  
In	   1987,	   the	   Dutch	   government	   prevented	   the	   company	   from	   going	  
bankrupt	  by	  providing	  it	  with	  a	  loan,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  urged	  Fokker	  to	  
find	   a	   strong	   partner.	   In	   1992,	   the	   company	   was	   acquired	   by	   DASA.	  
However,	  DASA	  was	  unable	  to	  solve	  the	  financial	  problems	  at	  Fokker	  and	  in	  
1996	   Fokker	   went	   bankrupt.	   Many	   of	   its	   activities	   (including	   the	   NH	   90	  
programme)	  were	   transferred	   to	   Stork	  and	   continued	  under	   Stork-­‐Fokker	  




The	   NATO	   Helicopter	   Management	   Agency	   (NAHEMA)	   is	   the	   international	  
programme	  office	  to	  which	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  management	  and	  the	  negotiation	  and	  execution	  
of	   the	   contracts	   with	   industry	   have	   been	   delegated.	   It	   is	   a	   NATO	   (North	   Atlantic	   Treaty	  
Organisation)	   agency	   located	   in	   Aix-­‐en-­‐Provence	   (France).	   The	   representation	   within	  
NAHEMA	  is	  based	  upon	  the	  total	  number	  of	  helicopters	  intended	  to	  be	  procured	  by	  a	  nation	  
in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  The	  General	  Manager	  (GM)	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  
programme.	   Within	   NAHEMA	   there	   are	   three	   divisions,	   engineering,	   logistics	   and	  
administration	  headed	  by	  a	  division	  leader.	  The	  people	  working	  within	  these	  divisions	  take	  
part	  in	  the	  different	  functional	  working	  groups	  in	  which	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  national	  
programme	  offices	  also	  take	  seat.	  In	  total	  there	  are	  51	  people	  working	  for	  NAHEMA.	  	  
	  
	  
Table	  5.3	   Division	  of	  work	  share	  
Company	   Responsibility	  
	  
Eurocopter	  France	   Cockpit	   development,	   rotors	   and	   blades,	   core	   avionics	   and	   control	  
systems,	  power	  plants	  and	  flight	  testing	  of	  basic	  prototypes.	  
Eurocopter	  Germany	  	   Centre	   section,	   fuel	   systems,	   avionics,	   tactical	   transport	   mission	  
equipment	  package	  and	  flight	  tests	  of	  army	  prototype.	  
Agusta	   Main	   gearbox,	   iron	   bird	   test	   rig,	   hydraulic	   system,	   naval	   mission	  
equipment	  package	  and	  flight	  tests	  of	  naval	  prototype.	  
Fokker	   Tail	  section,	  landing	  gear	  design,	  sliding	  doors,	  intermediate	  gearbox,	  
and	  wind	  tunnel	  testing.	  	  
Source:	  Flight	  International	  (1998).	  
	  
	  
	   We	   find	   a	   similar	   set	   up	   on	   the	   industrial	   side.	   The	   four	   partner	   companies,	  
AgustaWestland,	  Eurocopter	  France,	  Eurocopter	  Germany,	  and	  Fokker	  have	  established	  NHI	  
(NATO	   Helicopter	   Industries),	   a	   joint	   venture	   located	   at	   the	   Eurocopter	   France	   facility	   in	  
Marseille	  (France),	  approximately	  7	  kilometres	  from	  NAHEMA.	  The	  structure	  resembles	  that	  
of	  NAHEMA.	  The	  actual	  work	  gets	  done	  at	  the	  different	  plants	  of	  the	  parent	  companies	  of	  
NHI.	  Table	  5.3	  presents	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  general	  division	  of	  work	  share	  over	  the	  four	  
partner	  companies.	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The	  total	  programme	  covers	  a	  number	  of	  phases.	  Each	  phase	  is	  covered	  by	  a	  separate	  
Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   (MoU)	   between	   the	   nations	   and	   a	   separate	   contract	  
between	  NAHEMA	  and	  NHI.	  The	  programme	  is	  divided	  over	  the	  following	  phases:	  	  
1. Feasibility	  and	  Predefinition	  Phase;	  	  
2. Project	  Definition	  Phase;	  
3. Design	  and	  Development	  Phase;	  	  
4. production	  Investment/Production	  Phase;	  
5. In-­‐service	  Support	  Phase.	  	  
The	   first	   two	   phases	   have	   been	   completed.	   In	   1992,	   the	   design	   and	   development	  
phase	  began.	   In	   2000,	   the	  production	   investment/production	  phase	  began,	  which	  marked	  
the	   start	   the	   series	   production	   of	   the	   NH	   90.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   2006	   the	   first	   three	   series	  
produced	   helicopters	  were	   delivered	   to	   the	  German	   army.	   The	   first	   helicopters	   that	   have	  
entered	   service	   with	   armed	   forces	   of	   the	   nations	   have	   been	   delivered	   in	   a	   Meaningful	  
Operational	  Capability	   (MOC)	   configuration.	  Basically,	   this	  means	   that	   the	  helicopters	   that	  
have	  been	  delivered	  do	  not	  yet	  meet	  the	  contractual	  specified	  operational	  requirements.	  It	  
can	  be	  used,	  however,	   for	   certain	   tasks	   such	  as	   initial	   training.	  Currently,	   the	  partners	  are	  
discussing	   the	   set	   up	   for	   the	   in-­‐service	   support	   phase.	   The	   production	   of	   the	   helicopters	  
currently	  under	  contract	  for	  the	  founding	  nations	  will	  extend	  at	  least	  till	  2018.	  	  
 
5.3	   Historical	  Background	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  Programme	  
 
Here,	  we	  will	  present	  a	  detailed	  overview	  of	  the	  NH	  programme.	  Table	  5.4	  contains	  a	  time	  
line	  of	   the	  main	  events	   relating	   to	   the	  NH	  90	  programme	  to	  be	  discussed	   in	   the	   following	  
sections.	  	  
 
5.3.1	   Programme	  Definition	  Phase	  1985-­‐1992	  
On	   September	   19th	   1985,	   the	   NH	   90	   programme	   Feasibility	   and	   Pre-­‐definition	   Study	   was	  
given	  a	  go	  ahead	  with	  the	  signing	  of	  a	  MoU	  between	  the	  governments	  of	  France,	  Germany,	  
Italy,	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (Tweede	  Kamer,	  1985a).	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Table	  5.4	   NH	  90	  programme	  chronology	  
Date	  	   Event	  	  
1979	   Agusta	  (Italy)	  and	  Westland	  (UK)	  formed	  European	  Helicopter	  Industries	  to	  
develop	   the	  15	   tonne	  EH	  101.	   France	  and	  Germany	   refused	  participation	  
noting	  they	  did	  not	  have	  a	  requirement	  for	  such	  a	  helicopter.	  	  	  
1984	   Germany	   and	   France	   announced	   their	   cooperation	   on	   the	   PAH	   2	   Tigre	  
attack	   helicopter.	   This	   came	   hard	   on	   the	   heels	   of	   Agusta,	   who	   together	  
with	   Westland	   from	   the	   UK	   under	   earlier	   agreements	   were	   to	   join	   the	  
programme	   to	   study	   a	   combined	   A	   129	   upgrade	   and	   PAH	   2	   attack	  
helicopter	  programme.	  	  	  
	   	  
1985	   Start	  NH	  90	  Feasibility	  and	  Pre-­‐definition	  Phase	  	  
1985	  –	  1986	  	   The	   governments	   of	   France,	   Germany,	   Italy,	   the	   Netherlands	   and	   the	  
United	   Kingdom	   gave	   their	   go	   ahead	   for	   the	   NH	   90	   feasibility	   and	   pre-­‐
definition	   study	   with	   the	   signature	   of	   the	   NH	   90	   feasibility	   and	   pre-­‐
definition	  phase	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding.	  	  
1985	  –	  1986	  	   “Westland	   affair”,	   despite	   pressure	   from	   the	   UK	   defence	   ministry	   for	  
teaming	  with	  a	  European	  consortium	  existing	  of	  Aerospatiale,	  MBB,	  Agusta	  
and	   British	  Aerospace,	  Westland	   decides	   for	   the	   Sikorsky	   (from	   the	  U.S.)	  
deal.	  	  
1986	  	   The	  governments	  of	  Italy,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Spain	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  
announce	   their	   collaboration	   in	   the	   Joint	   European	   Helicopter	   Tonal	  
Programme	  regarding	  the	  development	  of	  an	  upgrade	  of	  the	  Agusta	  A	  129.	  
In	   1990,	   the	   programme	   collapsed	   when	   the	   Netherlands	   and	   the	   UK	  
opted	  for	  the	  U.S.	  AH	  64	  Apache	  (produced	  by	  McDonnel-­‐Douglas)	  instead.	  
Spain	  joined	  the	  Tigre	  attack	  helicopter	  programme.	  	  
1987	  	   The	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Westland	  abandoned	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  after	  
the	  UK	  MoD	  decided	  it	  did	  not	  have	  a	  requirement	  for	  such	  a	  helicopter.	  	  
1987	  –	  1989	   NH	  90	  programme	  project	  definition	  and	  evaluation	  phase	  took	  place.	  	  
1990	  –	  1991	  	   Difficult	  negotiations	  between	  the	  governments	  after	  the	  work	  share	  had	  
to	  be	  divided	  following	  UK’s	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  With	  
Germany	  and	  Italy	  facing	  budgetary	  pressures,	  France	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  
each	  raised	  their	  share	  in	  the	  development	  costs	  of	  the	  NH	  90.	  	  
1991	   The	  governments	  of	  France,	  Germany,	  Italy	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  signed	  the	  
General	   Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   for	   the	   development	   and	  
production	  of	  the	  NH	  90.	  	  
1991	  -­‐	  1992	   Concerns	  arose	  that	  France	  might	  abandon	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  	  	  
January	  1992	   DASA	   (formerly	   MBB)	   from	   Germany	   and	   Aerospatiale	   merged	   their	  
helicopter	  subsidiaries	  in	  Eurocopter.	  	  
	   	  
1992	   Start	  NH	  90	  design	  and	  development	  phase	  	  
August	  1992	   Signing	   of	   the	   design	   and	   development	   contract	   between	   NAHEMA	   and	  
NHI.	  	  
1993	   Industrial	  political	  conflict	  between	  France	  and	  Italy	  over	  the	  motor	  to	  be	  
used	  to	  power	  the	  NH	  90.	  Initially,	  it	  had	  been	  decided	  that	  the	  Rolls-­‐Royce	  
Turbomeca	   RRTM	   322	   would	   be	   used.	   Italy,	   however	   insisted	   that	   the	  
General	  Electric-­‐Alfa	  Romeo	  (CT-­‐7E)	  would	  receive	  a	  chance.	   In	  1994,	   the	  
issue	  was	  resolved	  by	  allowing	  the	  Alfa-­‐Romeo	  CT-­‐7E	  with	  Italy	  bearing	  the	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non-­‐recurring	  costs.	  	  
1993	  -­‐	  	  1996	   Governments	  start	  reassessing	  their	  procurement	  plans	  after	  the	  collapse	  
of	  the	  Warschau	  Pact	  in	  1991.	  France	  unilaterally	  cut	  its	  procurement	  plans	  
for	   both	   the	   Tiger	   and	  NH	   90	   helicopter	   programmes.	   In	   1996,	  Germany	  
delayed	   its	   in-­‐service	   date	   for	   the	   NH	   90	   to	   2007	   (originally	   2004)	   and	  
France	  to	  2011	  (originally	  2007).	  	  
1997	   Difficult	   negotiations	   among	   the	   participating	   nations	   over	   work	   share	  
division	   and	   investment	   return	   for	   the	   production	   investment	   and	  
production	  contract.	  Eventually,	  the	  problem	  was	  escalated	  to	  the	  level	  of	  
the	  NADs.	  The	  negotiations	  between	  NAHEMA	  and	  NHI	  also	  were	  though.	  
The	  initial	  price	  offer	  from	  NHI	  was	  considered	  to	  high	  and	  the	  offer	  lacked	  
a	  specification	  of	  the	  costs	  for	  initial	  supply	  and	  training.	  	  
	   	  
2000	   Signing	   of	   the	   production	   investment	   and	   production	  Memorandum	   of	  
Understanding.	  	  	  
June	  2000	   Order	   placed	   by	   the	   NAHEMO	   countries	   with	   NHI	   for	   a	   first	   batch	  
production	  of	  NH	  90s.	  	  
2001	   Portugal	  joins	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  	  
2006	   NAHEMO	   nations	   became	   worried	   about	   the	   progress	   made	   by	   the	  
industrial	   partners.	   Several	   programme	   delays	   had	   been	   announced	   by	  
NHI.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  number	  of	  non-­‐NAHEMO	  countries	  procuring	  the	  NH	  
90	  was	   significantly	   increasing.	   The	   NAHEMO	   governments	   express	   their	  
concern	   that	   the	   active	   marketing	   of	   the	   NH	   90	   by	   NHI	   comes	   at	   the	  
expense	  of	  ensuring	  a	  timely	  delivery	  of	  their	  NH	  90s.	  	  
2007	   After	  the	  delays	  in	  the	  programme	  had	  been	  escalated	  to	  the	  level	  of	  the	  
National	   Armaments	   Directors	   it	   was	   eventually	   decided	   by	   the	  
governments	   that	   NHI	   required	   a	   new	   managerial	   structure.	   Under	   this	  
new	  structure	  AgustaWestland	  became	  responsible	  for	  the	  naval	  variant	  of	  
the	  NH	  90	  (NFH)	  and	  Eurocopter	  for	  the	  transport	  variant	  (TTH).	  	  
	   Belgium	  joins	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  	  
2008	   During	   a	   public	   demonstration	   on	   June	   1	   2008	   am	   Italian	   NH	   90	   TTH	  
crashed	   into	   a	   lake	   after	   performing	   a	   rolling	   turn.	   The	   three	   crew	  
members	  were	  rescued,	  and	  taken	  to	  the	  hospital	  where	  one	  of	  them	  died	  
of	  his	  injuries	  a	  couple	  of	  hours	  later.	  (Defense	  News,	  2008)	  	  
	   In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  2008	  NHI	  and	  NAHEMA	  reached	  an	  agreement	  on	  the	  
conditions	   for	   the	   delivery	   of	   NH	   90	   in	   MOC	   (Meaningful	   Operational	  
Capability)	   configuration.	   This	   means	   that	   NH	   90	   helicopters	   will	   be	  
delivered	   to	   nations	   that	   do	   not	   match	   the	   full	   requirements.	   These	  
helicopters	  can	  be	  used	   for	  a	  number	  of	  purposes	  such	  as	  education	  and	  
training	   and	   coast	   guard	   duties.	   This	   interim	   qualification	   process	   was	  
agreed	  upon	  because	  of	  the	  delays	  in	  the	  programme	  which	  caused	  a	  gap	  
in	  the	  helicopter	  capabilities	  of	  some	  nations.	  	  
2010	   In	  April	  2010	  the	  Dutch	  armed	  forces	  received	  their	  first	  NH	  90	  helicopter	  
in	  MOC	  configuration	  from	  NHI.	  In	  May	  this	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  delivery	  of	  




In	   1985,	   the	   “Westland	   Affair”	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   unfolded,	   one	   of	   the	  major	  
political	  embarrassments	  of	  Thatcher	  government.	  Westland	  had	   run	   into	  serious	   financial	  
troubles	  and	  was	  actively	  looking	  for	  a	  strong	  partner.	  United	  States	  Sikorsky,	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  
United	  Technologies	  Corporation	  together	  with	  Fiat	  from	  Italy,	  offered	  to	  take	  a	  29.9%	  stake	  
in	   the	  company	  and	  the	   insurance	  that	  Westland	  would	  gain	  a	  substantial	  work	  share	  and	  
the	  right	  to	  manufacture	  under	  licence	  and	  sell	  the	  Sikorsky	  UH-­‐60	  Black	  Hawk	  (Freedman,	  
1987).	   This	   deal	  was	  much	   favoured	   by	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Trade	   and	   Industry	   of	   the	   United	  
Kingdom.	   The	   UK’s	   Defence	   Department	   and	   Westland’s	   largest	   customer,	   on	   the	   other	  
hand,	   feared	   the	   deal	  with	   Sikorsky	   could	   ultimately	   result	   in	   the	   loss	   of	   an	   independent	  
helicopter	  design	  capability	  (Freedman,	  1987).	  	  	  
The	  then	  State	  Secretary	  of	  Defence	  Mr	  Heseltine	  asked	  the	  Thatcher	  government	  to	  
give	   him	   some	   time	   to	   look	   for	   a	   potential	   European	   solution.	   He	   hastily	   assembled	   a	  
consortium	   of	   Agusta	   from	   Italy,	   Aerospatiale	   from	   France,	   and	  Messcherschmitt-­‐Bölkow-­‐
Blohm	   from	  Germany	   (Freedman,	   1987),	   later	   joined	   by	   British	   Aerospace.	  With	   Sikorsky,	  
Westland	   had	   long	   tradition	   of	   collaboration.	   However,	   with	   bidders	   of	   the	   European	  
consortium	   Westland	   was	   involved	   in	   two	   collaborative	   efforts	   (i.e.	   European	   Helicopter	  
Industries	   with	   Agusta	   from	   Italy	   on	   the	   EH	   101	   and	   in	   Nato	   Helicopter	   Industries	   with	  
Agusta,	  Aerospatiale	  from	  France	  and	  Messcherschmitt-­‐Bölkow-­‐Blohm	  on	  the	  NH90).	  	  
	   While	  the	  European	  consortium	  and	  State	  Secretary	  of	  Defence	  Mr.	  Heseltine	  were	  
negotiating	   a	   deal,	   the	   National	   Armaments	   Directors	   of	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   France,	  
Germany,	   and	   Italy	   jointly	   recommended	   that	   future	  military	   aircraft	   requirements	   should	  
only	   be	   met	   by	   aircrafts	   designed	   in	   Europe.	   Westland	   considered	   this	   to	   be	   a	   great	  
impediment	   to	   the	   Sikorsky/Fiat	   deal.	   The	   Thatcher	   government	   then	   intervened	   by	  
overruling	   the	   National	   Armaments	   Directors’	   recommendation,	   stating	   that	   by	   13	  
December	  1985	  it	  would	  not	  be	  bound	  by	  it	  anymore	  unless	  by	  then	  Westland	  had	  received	  
an	   offer	   from	   a	   European	   consortium	   that	   it	   could	   accept	   and	   defend	   towards	   its	  
shareholders.	  	  
	   The	   offer	   of	   the	   European	   consortium	   was	   declined	   despite	   the	   prospects	   of	  
substantial	  work	  share	  on	   three	  European	  programmes,	   the	  EH101	  with	  Agusta,	   the	  NH90	  
with	   Agusta,	   Aerospatiale,	   MBB	   and	   Fokker,	   and	   an	   attack	   helicopter.	   Nonetheless,	   the	  
Board	   at	   Westland	   favoured	   the	   Sikorsky/Fiat	   solution	   and	   announced	   on	   the	   day	   the	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ultimatum	   of	   the	   National	   Armaments	   Director	   expired	   that	   it	   had	   reached	   a	   deal	   with	  
Sikorsky/Fiat.	  This	  news	  came	  hard	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  members	  of	   the	  European	  consortium.	  
Aerospatiale	  immediately	  indicated	  that	  under	  the	  NADs’	  recommendation,	  the	  Sikorsky/Fiat	  
deal	  would	   imply	  an	  end	   to	  Westland’s	  participation	   in	   the	  European	  programmes.	  This	   is	  
indicated	  in	  the	  letter	  that	  Prime	  Minister	  Thatcher	  wrote	  to	  Sir	  John	  Cuckney,	  Chairman	  of	  
the	   Board	   of	  Directors	   at	  Westland:	   “…	  you	   should	   be	   aware	   of	   indication	   from	  European	  
governments	  and	  companies	  that	  they	  currently	  take	  the	  view	  that	  a	  number	  of	  projects	   in	  
which	  Westland	  are	  expecting	  to	  participate	  in	  cooperation	  with	  other	  European	  companies	  
may	  be	  lost	  to	  Westland	  if	  the	  United	  Technologies/Fiat	  proposals	  are	  accepted”	  (Thatcher,	  
January	   2,	   1986).	   	   Especially,	   Westland’s	   work	   share	   on	   the	   NH	   90	   programme	   was	   in	  
jeopardy,	  because	  the	  Black	  Hawk	  was	  a	  direct	  competitor	  to	  the	  NH	  90	  (Freedman,	  1987).	  	  
Although	   the	   State	   Secretary	   for	   Trade	   and	   Industry	   Brittan	   and	   Prime	   Minister	  
Thatcher	   not	   only	   took	   the	   stance	   that	  Westland	   as	   a	   private	   sector	   company	   should	   be	  
allowed	  to	  decide	  for	  itself	  but	  also	  favoured	  the	  Sikorsky	  option,	  State	  Secretary	  of	  Defence	  
Heseltine	  continued	  to	  press	  for	  more	  time	  allowing	  the	  European	  consortium	  to	  prepare	  a	  
new	  bid.	  Subsequent	  events	  within	  the	  Thatcher	  government	  resulted	  in	  the	  resignation	  of	  
Mr	   Heseltine	   in	   January	   who	   felt	   his	   views	  were	   suppressed	   by	   the	   Cabinet	   of	   UK	   Prime	  
Minister	  Thatcher.	  	  
Eventually,	   the	   Sikorksy/Fiat	   deal	   went	   through	   despite	   the	   pressure	   from	   the	  
Defence	   Department	   and	   the	   European	   consortium.	   Nonetheless,	   Westland	   and	   Agusta	  
continued	  to	  collaborate	  on	  the	  EH	  101	  helicopter.	  In	  1987,	  Westland	  and	  the	  UK	  abandoned	  
the	  NH	  90	  programme	  after	  the	  UK	  army	  had	  dropped	  its	  requirement	  for	  the	  9	  ton	  NH	  90	  in	  
favour	  of	  the	  15	  tonne	  EH	  101	  (Flight	  International,	  1986:	  37).	  
In	   November	   1986,	   the	   feasibility	   and	   pre-­‐definition	   phase	   was	   completed.	   From	  
1987	  till	  1989	  the	  project	  definition	  and	  evaluation	  phase	  took	  place,	  which	  was	  evaluated	  
satisfactorily	   by	   the	   partners	   in	   the	   programme	   (Tweede	   Kamer,	   1990).	   After	   the	   Project	  
Definition	  and	  Evaluation	  phase	   the	   first	  difficulties	  emerged.	   Following	   the	  withdrawal	  of	  
the	  United	  Kingdom	  the	  work	  share	  among	  the	  nations	  had	  to	  be	  redefined.	  France	  and	  Italy	  
would	  have	  to	  take	  35%	  each,	  Germany,	  25%	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  5%.	  However,	  Germany	  
and	   Italy	   faced	   budgetary	   pressures	   and	   were	   eager	   to	   reduce	   their	   work	   shares	   in	   the	  
development	  phase.	  Germany	  even	  threatened	  to	  abandon	  the	  programme	  altogether	  if	  its	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work	   share	   was	   not	   reduced	   to	   21%,	   and	   Italy	   was	   hard	   pressed	   because	   of	   financial	  
problems	  in	  its	  other	  helicopter	  programme	  (Flight	  International,	  1991:	  5).	  	  
During	  1990,	  negotiations	  between	  France	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  kept	  the	  programme	  
going	   after	   each	   agreed	   to	   increase	   its	   work	   share.	   France	   took	   a	   43.4%	   stake	   in	   the	  
programme,	   the	  Netherlands	  6.6%,	  Germany	  23.6%,	  and	   Italy,	  26.4%.	   (Flight	   International,	  
1991:	   5).	   	   In	   1991,	   the	   General	   Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   was	   signed	   by	   the	  
participating	   nations,	   followed	   by	   the	   establishment	   of	   NAHEMA,	   the	   intergovernmental	  
agency	  responsible	  for	  NH	  90	  contract	  management	  (Tweede	  Kamer,	  1991).	  	  The	  first	  flight	  
of	  the	  NH	  90	  was	  scheduled	  for	  1993	  and	  the	  first	  deliveries	  to	  the	  nations	  were	  scheduled	  
for	  1998.	  Nonetheless,	   a	   year	   later,	   in	  1991,	   the	  programme	  would	  again	   linger.	  With	   the	  
decline	  of	  the	  Soviet	  threat	  many	  western	  countries	  started	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  their	  equipment	  
plans.	  From	  the	  French	  side	  there	  were	  some	  contradictory	  signals	  as	  to	  their	  position	  in	  the	  
NH	   90	   programme.	   Concerns	   arose	   that	   the	   French	   would	   abandon	   the	   programme	  
altogether	   (Flight	   International,	   May	   1992:	   23;	   Tweede	   Kamer,	   1991).	   But	   by	   the	   end	   of	  
1992,	  the	  programme	  was	  back	  on	  track	  with	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  design	  and	  development	  
contract	  by	  the	  participating	  nations	  in	  August	  1992	  and	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  contract	  between	  
NAHEMA	  and	  NHI	  one	  month	   later	  (Tweede	  Kamer,	  1992b).	  By	  that	  time	  the	  flights	  of	  the	  
first	  3	  prototypes	  were	  scheduled	  for	  1995	  and	  the	  first	  deliveries	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  to	  the	  armed	  
forces	  of	  the	  nations	  were	  expected	  to	  take	  place	  in	  2000	  (Tweede	  Kamer,	  1993a).	  	  
 
5.3.2	   Programme	  Design	  and	  Development	  Phase	  1993	  –	  1999	  
The	   decision	   to	   go-­‐ahead	   with	   the	   design	   and	   development	   phase	   coincided	   with	   some	  
important	  developments.	  In	  Germany,	  a	  large	  restructuring	  of	  its	  aerospace	  companies	  had	  
been	   underway,	   which	   culminated	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   “national	   champion”	   Deutsche	  
Aerospace	  AG	   (DASA)	   (the	  aerospace	  subsidiary	  of	  Daimler	  Benz)	   in	  May	  1989.5	   Later	   that	  
year,	   DASA	   acquired	   MBB.	   	   On	   January,	   31st	   1992,	   DASA	   and	   Aerospatiale	   merged	   their	  
helicopter	   divisions	   into	   Eurocopter	   (McGowen,	   2005).	   Already	   in	   1987,	   the	   Dutch	  
                                                
5	   In	  1995,	   the	   company	  was	   renamed	   into	  Daimler-­‐Benz	  Aerospace	  AG.	  After	   the	  merger	  between	  
Daimler-­‐Benz	  and	  Chrysler	   in	  1998	   the	   company	  name	  was	   changed	   to	  DaimlerChrysler	  Aerospace	  
AG.	   	  July	  18th,,	  2000	  the	  company	  merged	  with	  Aerospatiale-­‐Matra	  and	  Construcciones	  Aeronáutics	  
SA	   (CASA)	   from	   Spain	   to	   form	   the	   European	   defense	   conglomerate	   EADS	   (European	   Aerospace,	  
Defence	  and	  Space	  company),	  of	  which	  Eurocopter	  became	  a	  fully	  owned	  subsidiary.	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government	   had	   urged	   Fokker	   to	   find	   a	   strong	   financial	   partner	   (Tweede	   Kamer,	   1992a).	  
Fokker	  had	  run	  into	  serious	  trouble	  because	  of	  setbacks	   in	   its	  civilian	  aircraft	  programmes.	  
The	   Dutch	   government	   already	   had	   to	   financially	   support	   the	   company	   to	   prevent	  
bankruptcy.	   Discussions	   concerning	   a	   potential	   integration	  were	   opened	  with	  DASA.	   After	  
years	   of	   tough	   negotiations	   an	   agreement	   was	   finally	   reached	   in	   1992	   (Tweede	   Kamer,	  
1993b).	  	  
	   At	  the	  same	  time	  though,	  the	  ramifications	  of	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  in	  1989	  and	  
the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Warschau	  Pact	  became	  visible.	  Many	  countries	  were	  reconsidering	  their	  
equipment	   plans	   and	   even	   major	   collaborative	   programmes	   were	   being	   re-­‐evaluated.	   In	  
France	  alone,	  there	  were	  talks	  of	  cutting	  the	  equipment	  budget	  by	  as	  much	  as	  8.5%	  (Flight	  
International,	  1993:	  4).	  French	  parliamentary	  finance	  committees	  were	  particularly	  keen	  on	  
the	  NH	  90	  programme	  as	   a	   candidate	   for	   cancellation	   (Flight	   International,	   1993:	   4).	   	   The	  
new	  procurement	  plan	  of	   the	  French	  government	  demanded	  a	  30%	  cost	   reduction	  on	   the	  
NH	  90.	  Within	  this	  context	  a	  debate	  between	  the	  French	  army	  and	  navy	  emerged	  over	  the	  
continuation	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  While	  the	  navy	  still	  wanted	  to	  procure	  the	  NFH	  90,	  
the	   army	  was	   considering	   procuring	   the	   cheaper	   Cougar	   helicopter	   instead	   of	   the	  NH	   90.	  
(Flight	   International,	   1994a:	   19).	   In	   Germany,	   similar	   developments	  were	   under	  way.	   The	  
German	   navy	   also	   became	   concerned	   with	   the	   costs	   of	   the	   programme	   and	   reduced	   its	  
requirement	  from	  50	  to	  38	  aircraft.	  Moreover,	  it	  also	  considered	  the	  possibility	  of	  procuring	  
a	  cheaper	  version	  of	  the	  basic	  NH	  90	  equipped	  for	  maritime	  use	  instead	  of	  the	  NFH	  90	  (Flight	  
International,	   1994b:	   14).	   At	   a	   political	  meeting	   in	   Paris	   in	  October	   1994,	   all	   the	   partners	  
expressed	  their	  continuing	  commitment	  to	  the	  programme	  (Tweede	  Kamer,	  1994)	  	  	  	  
	   The	   signing	   of	   the	   production	   investment	  was	   delayed	   from	  1996	   to	   1997	   and	   the	  
schedule	   for	   the	   in-­‐service	   date	   of	   the	   TTH	   90	   was	   delayed	   from	   2000	   to	   2002	   (Flight	  
International	  1995a:	  16).	  Germany	  pushed	  back	  its	  NFH	  90	  in-­‐service	  schedule	  to	  2004	  and	  
spread	  its	  schedule	  of	  its	  38	  naval	  NH	  90	  to	  2010.	  The	  German	  Navy	  was	  forced	  to	  update	  its	  
fleet	   of	   Sea	   Lynx	  Mk88s,	  which	  were	   originally	   intended	   to	   be	   replaced	   by	   the	  NFH	  90	   in	  
2003.	  On	  top	  of	  this,	   it	  had	  to	  procure	  an	  additional	  7	  Sea	  Lynx	  helicopters	  for	  the	  frigates	  
that	   entered	   service.	   Despite	   press	   rumours,	   the	  German	  Ministry	   of	   Defence	   announced	  
that	  they	  would	  continue	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  (Flight	  International,	  1995a:	  16).	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The	  real	  first	  industrial	  political	  conflict	  that	  emerged	  in	  1993	  concerned	  the	  decision	  
on	  which	  motor	  would	  be	  used	  to	  power	  the	  NH	  90.	  Earlier	  on,	  a	  decision	  had	  been	  reached	  
to	  use	  the	  Rolls	  Royce-­‐Turbomeca	  (RRTM322).	  Italy,	  however,	  started	  to	  press	  for	  the	  use	  of	  
the	  General	  Electric-­‐Alfa	  Romeo	  (CT-­‐7E).	  Germany	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  were	  not	  necessarily	  
against	   the	   use	   of	   the	  GE-­‐Alfa	   CT-­‐7E,	   but	   pressed	   France	   and	   Italy	   to	   come	   to	   a	   decision	  
soon.	  The	  great	  industrial	  interests	  for	  both	  France	  and	  Italy	  led	  to	  postponement	  of	  a	  final	  
decision	  until	  1994	  when	  the	  General	  Electric-­‐Alfa	  motor	  was	  allowed,	  with	  Italy	  bearing	  the	  
non-­‐recurring	  costs6	  (Tweede	  Kamer,	  1994).	  	  
Meanwhile,	  the	  French	  government	  had	  agreed	  on	  the	  new	  procurement	  outline.	  For	  
1996,	  the	  procurement	  budget	  was	  reduced	  by	  10%	  compared	  to	  earlier	  plans.	  At	  the	  same	  
time,	  though,	   it	  was	  decided	  that	  France	  would	  continue	   its	  participation	   in	  both	  the	  Tiger	  
and	  NH	  90	  programmes.	  However,	  it	  would	  delay	  its	  delivery	  schedule	  of	  the	  aircrafts	  (Flight	  
International,	  1995b:	  5).	  But	  in	  1996,	  a	  unilateral	  French	  decision	  to	  cut	  both	  Tiger	  and	  NH	  
90	  procurement	  numbers	  created	  political	  upheaval	  in	  Germany	  (Flight	  International,	  1996:	  
14).	  The	  French	  army	  was	  to	  acquire	  only	  120	  Tiger	  attack	  helicopters	  instead	  of	  the	  earlier	  
planned	  215,	  and	  the	  number	  of	  NH	  90s	  that	  would	  be	  procured	  was	  cut	  to	  68	  instead	  of	  the	  
expected	   160.	   The	   French	   navy,	  which	   had	   planned	   to	   procure	   60	  NH	   90s,	  would	   receive	  
only	  27	  helicopters	  (Flight	  International,	  1996:	  14).	  	  
	   At	   the	   Steering	   Committee	   meeting,	   November	   3rd	   through	   5th	   1996,	   Germany	  
postponed	  its	  delivery	  date	  of	  its	  NFHs	  to	  2007	  (four	  years	  later	  than	  initially	  planned)	  and	  
France	  postponed	  its	  delivery	  date	  of	  its	  TTHs	  to	  2011	  (Tweede	  Kamer,	  1996).	  
The	  negotiations	  concerning	  the	  pre-­‐production	  investment/production	  during	  1997	  
contract	  were	  tough.	  The	  partners	  could	  not	  agree	  on	  issues	  of	  work	  offset	  and	  investment	  
return	  (Flight	  International,	  1997:	  17).	  This	  was	  the	  result	  of	  different	  interpretations	  of	  the	  
relevant	   articles	   of	   the	   Memorandum	   of	   Understanding.	   To	   get	   out	   of	   the	   deadlock	   the	  
Steering	   Committee	   convened	   in	   December	   1997	   to	   discuss	   a	   German	   proposal.	   The	  
proposal	  was	  supported	  by	   Italy	  and	  The	  Netherlands,	  but	  proved	  unacceptable	  to	  France.	  
Subsequently,	  the	  problem	  was	  escalated	  to	  the	  level	  of	  the	  National	  Armaments	  Directors	  
(NADs)	  (Tweede	  Kamer,	  1998a).	  	  
                                                
6	  Non-­‐recurring	  costs	  refer	  to	  the	  costs	  only	  once	  occurring	  associated	  with	  the	  use	  of	  an	  alternative	  
engine	  (or	  other	  systems).	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Not	   only	   did	   the	   negotiations	   between	   the	   governments	   prove	   to	   be	   hard	   fought,	  
also	   the	   negotiations	  with	   industry	   for	   the	   pre-­‐production/production	   investment	   did	   not	  
progress	   very	   smoothly.	   In	   October	   1997,	   the	   nations	   received	   the	   offer	   of	   NHI.	   The	  
governments	  were	  not	  pleased	  with	  the	  price	  offered	  and	  its	  argumentation.	  The	  offer	  also	  
lacked	   a	   specification	   of	   the	   costs	   of	   initial	   supply	   and	   training.	   The	   Steering	   Committee,	  
subsequently,	   admonished	   NHI	   to	   significantly	   reduce	   the	   costs	   of	   pre-­‐production	   and	   to	  
reduce	   the	  unit	   costs	   to	   a	   level	   in	   line	  with	   the	  market	   (Tweede	  Kamer,	   1998a:	   2).	  During	  
these	  contract	  negotiations	  the	  Dutch	  government	  postponed	  its	  delivery	  schedule	  to	  2007.	  
Following	   the	   postponement	   of	   the	   delivery	   schedules	   of	   the	   other	   countries	   the	  
Netherlands	  had	  become	  lead	  customer	  and	  was	  unwilling	  to	  bear	  the	  extra	  risks	  associated	  
with	  this	  position	  (Tweede	  Kamer,	  1998b:	  4).	  	  
It	  took	  until	  the	  middle	  of	  1998	  before	  a	  final	  agreement	  over	  the	  work	  share	  division	  
was	  reached	  among	  the	  governments	  (table	  5.5	  shows	  the	  final	  division	  of	  the	  work	  share).	  
In	  July	  that	  year,	  NAHEMA	  received	  the	  new	  offer	  by	  NHI.	  The	  NAHEMO	  countries	  accepted	  
the	  new	  offer	  of	  NHI,	  which	  included	  a	  price	  reduction	  of	  12.9%,	  compared	  with	  the	  offer	  of	  
the	  year	  before	  under	  the	  condition	  that	  the	  contract	  was	  signed	  that	  year.	  Meanwhile,	   in	  
the	   Netherlands	   Fokker	   had	   filed	   for	   bankruptcy	   in	  March,	   1996.	   The	   activities	   of	   Fokker	  
were	   transferred	   to	  Fokker	  Aerostructure	  B.V.	  and	   in	  1996	  acquired	  by	  Stork	   to	  which	   the	  
Dutch	  NH	  90	  work	  package	  was	  transferred	  (Tweede	  Kamer,	  1997).	  
	  
 
Table	  5.5	   Number	  of	  intended	  orders	  and	  division	  of	  work	  share	  	  








Work	  share	  in	  









France	   41.6%	   24%	   Fr.	  and	  Ger.	  together	  
61.5%	  
133	   27	  
Germany	   28.2%	   36.5%	   	   205	   38	  
Italy	   23.7%	   33%	   33%	   155	   64	  
Netherlands	   6.5%	   5.5%	   5.5%	   -­‐	   20	  
Source:	  Tweede	  Kamer	  (1999:	  7)	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5.3.3	   Programme	  Production	  Phase	  2000	  –	  2011	  	  	  
Although	  the	  programme	  encountered	  a	  number	  of	  problems	  and	  at	  times	  had	  been	  on	  the	  
verge	  of	  being	  completely	  abandoned,	  on	  June	  30th	  2000	  the	  production	  contract	  was	  signed	  
and	  an	  order	  for	  a	  first	  batch	  of	  helicopters	  was	  placed	  at	  NHI.	  The	  contract	  was	  worth	  6.6	  
billion	  euro.	  The	  first	  production	  batch	  consisted	  of	  298	  helicopters	  (of	  a	  total	  requirement	  
of	   595	   helicopters).	   The	   founding	   nations	   agreed	   to	   contribute	   25%	   of	   the	   production	  
investment	  costs	  (Flight	  International,	  2000c:	  5).	  	  
NHI	  was	  keen	  on	  closing	  the	  deal	  soon.	  A	  firm	  order	  from	  the	  founding	  nations	  was	  
likely	  to	  increase	  confidence	  of	  potential	  export	  countries	  in	  the	  programme	  and	  product.	  By	  
that	   time	  a	  number	  of	  countries	  had	  shown	   interest	   in	   the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  The	  NH	  90	  
was	   offered	   in	   the	   competition	   for	   the	   Nordic	   Standard	   Helicopter	   Programme	   (NSHP)	   of	  
Norway,	  Sweden	  and	  Finland	   (Flight	   International,	  2000a:	  18).	  Portugal	  had	  also	  placed	  an	  
interest	   in	   the	   NH	   90	   programme	   (Flight	   International,	   2000b:	   8).	   	   Belgium	   became	   the	  
fourteenth	  buyer	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  and	  the	  sixth	  member	  of	  NAHEMA	  in	  2005	  (see	  table	  5.6	  for	  
the	  NH	  90	  order	  book	  of	  NHIndustries).	  
 
 
Table	  5.6	   NH	  90	  order	  book	  
	   TTH	   NFH	   Total	  
France	   34	   27	   61	  
Germany	   122	   	   122	  
Italy	   70	   46	   116	  
The	  Netherlands	   	   20	   20	  
Portugal	   10	   	   10	  
Belgium	   4	   4	   8	  
Subtotal	  NAHEMO	   240	   97	   337	  
Norway	   	   14	   	  
Finland	   20	   	   	  
Sweden	   18	   	   	  
Spain	   45	   	   	  
Greece	   20	   	   	  
Oman	   20	   	   	  
Australia	   	   46	   	   	  
New	  Zealand	   9	   	   	  
Subtotal	  Non-­‐NAHEMO	   178	   14	   192	  
	   418	   111	   529	  
Sources:	  www.nhindustries.com	  (accessed	  November	  11,	  2009).	  NHIndustries	  (2010)	  press	  
release	  of	  December	  16,	  2010	  confirms	  firm	  orders	  for	  529	  NH	  90	  helicopters	  for	  14	  





While	  the	  NH	  90	  order	  book	  would	  grow	  during	  these	  years,	  the	  programme	  also	  suffered	  
from	  delays.	   The	   industrial	  partners	   struggled	  with	   the	  qualification	  of	   the	  helicopter.	   The	  
qualification	   process	   entails	   the	   testing	   and	   subsequent	   documentation	   of	   a	   helicopter	   to	  
see	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  performs	  according	  to	  the	  original	  requirements	  of	  a	  nation.	  The	  
qualification	   of	   the	   first	   German	   army	   TTH	  was	   expected	   to	   be	   completed	   in	  March/April	  
2006	  and	  the	  first	  Italian	  NFH	  was	  due	  for	  qualification	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2007,	  almost	  two	  
years	  behind	  schedule	  (Taverna	  and	  Nativi,	  2006).	  
The	  countries	  became	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  progress	  being	  made	  on	  the	  programme.	  
The	   French	   Defence	   Minister	   Michele	   Alliot-­‐Marie	   called	   the	   delays	   “unacceptable”	  	  
(Taverna	  and	  Nativi,	  2006).	  Francois	  Lurea,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  French	  DGA	  noted	  that	  an	  audit	  
of	   the	  NH	  90	  programme	   found	  development	   failures	  at	   Eurocopter	  and	  difficult	   relations	  
between	   Eurocopter	   and	   AgustaWestland,	   and	   management	   problems	   at	   NAHEMA.	   In	  
particular,	   the	   latter	   issue	   prompted	   French	   officials	   to	   propose	   to	   transfer	   programme	  
responsibility	   from	   NAHEMA	   to	   OCCAR	   (Organisation	   Conjointe	   de	   Cooperation	  
d’Armements)	   (Taverna	   and	   Nativi,	   2006).	   	   And	   a	   year	   later,	   the	   Dutch	   and	   German	  
governments	   publicly	   announced	   their	   concerns	   with	   the	   delivery	   schedules	   of	   their	  
helicopters.	  Dutch	  state	  secretary	  for	  defence,	  Mr	  Van	  der	  Knaap	  expressed	  his	  concerns	  on	  
behalf	   of	   the	   Netherlands	   and	   Germany	   to	   NHI	   management.	   NHI	   acknowledged	   the	  
problems,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  meeting	  informed	  the	  Dutch	  state	  secretary	  of	  a	  further	  delay	  of	  
4	   to	   6	   months	   with	   respect	   to	   delivery	   of	   its	   first	   NH	   90.	   Following	   a	   proposal	   by	   the	  
Netherlands,	   the	   NH	   90	   Steering	   Committee	   demanded	   a	   monthly	   report	   on	   production	  
planning	   from	  NHI	   (Lok,	   2007a:	   39).	   Other	  measures	   such	   as	   a	   reduction	   in	   procurement	  
numbers	  by	  France	  were	  taken	  as	  well.	  	  
	   Despite	   the	   concerns	   raised	   by	   the	   founding	   nations	   in	   February	   2007,	   NHI	  
announced	  another	  delay	  with	  the	  delivery	  of	  the	  NFH.	  According	  to	  the	  new	  planning	  the	  
armed	   forces	  would	   not	   receive	   their	   first	   NFH90s	   until	  well	   into	   2009.	   A	   letter	   from	   the	  
Dutch	  state	  secretary	  of	  defence	  to	  the	  Dutch	  parliament	  notes:	  “This	  is	  an	  additional	  delay	  
of	  15	  months	  compared	  to	  the	  previously	  planned	  delivery	  date	  of	  April	  2008	  that	  was	  taken	  
into	  account	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Defence	  we	  were	  using	  only	  a	  few	  months	  ago.	  It	  means	  nine	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to	  eleven	  months	  additional	  delay	  compared	  to	  the	  four	  to	  six	  months	  delays	  that	  was	  told	  to	  
me	  during	  a	  meeting	  with	  NHI	  on	  February	  2,	  1997.”	  (Tweede	  Kamer,	  2007).	  
	   At	   this	   time	   the	   founding	   nations	   started	   to	   express	   their	   concern	  with	   the	   active	  
marketing	  of	  the	  helicopter	  to	  export	  countries	  by	  the	  industrial	  partners	  instead	  of	  ensuring	  
the	  timely	  delivery	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  to	  the	  launching	  customers	  (Lok,	  2007b).	  	  
Moreover,	   the	   Steering	   Committee	   demanded	   a	   restructuring	   of	   NHI.	   In	   the	   new	  
structure	  AgustaWestland	  assumed	  programme	  responsibility	  for	  the	  naval	  variant	  of	  the	  NH	  
90,	  while	  Eurocopter	  gained	  programme	  responsibility	   for	   the	   transport	  version	  of	   the	  NH	  
90.	   This	   division	   of	   labour	   between	   the	   two	   companies	   put	   Fokker	   in	   an	   odd	   position.	   It	  
implied	  that	  Fokker	  became	  a	  subcontractor	   for	  AgustaWestland	  and	  Eurocopter,	  but	  with	  
prime	  contractor	  responsibilities.	  	  Finally,	  it	  was	  agreed	  that	  Fokker	  would	  no	  longer	  have	  a	  
seat	   in	   the	   Board	   of	   Directors	   of	   NHI,	   but	   Agusta	   and	   Eurocopter	  would	   guarantee	   a	   fair	  
share	  of	  the	  work.	   It	  would	  also	  keep	   its	  position	  on	  the	  supervisory	  board	  overseeing	  the	  
activities	  of	  the	  board	  of	  directors	  of	  NHI	  (Tweede	  Kamer,	  2008:	  2).	  	  
In	  May	  2008,	  NHI	  announced	  another	  delay	  in	  delivering	  the	  NH90.	  In	  the	  production	  
planning	  the	  delivery	  of	  the	  first	  fully	  operational	  Dutch	  NFH	  has	  been	  postponed	  from	  July	  
2009	  to	  April	  2011.	  It	  did	  announce	  that	  it	  could	  temporarily	  offer	  NH	  90s	  in	  a	  “Meaningful	  
Operational	  Capability”,	  which	  meant	  that	  although	  the	  helicopter	  was	  not	  fully	  operational,	  
it	  could	  be	  used	  for	  tasks	  such	  as	  training	  and	  education	  (Tweede	  Kamer,	  2008:	  7).	  Table	  5.7	  
contains	  the	  most	  recent	  available	  data	  on	  current	  deliveries	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  by	  NHindustries.	   
In	  the	  meantime,	  some	  nations	  also	  started	  to	  express	  concerns	  over	  the	  division	  of	  
work	  share.	  The	  Netherlands,	  Germany	  and	  Italy	  were	  all	  behind	  in	  receiving	  the	  work	  share	  
they	  were	  entitled	  to	  (see	  table	  5.8	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  the	   initially	  agreed	  division	  of	  work	  
share	  and	  the	  current	  work	  share	  division).	  Most	  of	  the	  contract	  value	  has	  been	  awarded	  to	  
French	   companies.	   Although	   France,	   at	   least	   for	   the	   time	   being,	   has	   procured	   less	  
helicopters	   than	   it	   originally	   intended	   to,	   it	   has	   received	   the	   largest	   share	   of	   the	   total	  
contract	  value	  in	  terms	  of	  work	  share.	  At	  this	  moment	  it	  has	  received	  approximately	  37%	  of	  
the	  work	  share,	  while	  based	  on	  the	  original	  agreements	  it	  is	  entitled	  to	  30.85	  %	  of	  the	  work	  
share.	   In	   this	   sense,	   French	   businesses	   profit	  more	   from	   the	   programme	   than	   companies	  




Table	  5.7	   Number	  of	  delivered	  NH	  90s	  
	   TTH	   NFH	   Total	  
France	   	   3	   	  
Germany	   18	   	   	  
Italy	   12	   	   	  
The	  
Netherlands	  
	   3	   	  
Portugal	   	   	   	  
Belgium	   	   	   	  
Subtotal	  
NAHEMO	  
30	   6	   36	  
Norway	   	   	   	  
Finland	   9	   	   	  
Sweden	   6	   	   	  
Spain	   	   	   	  
Greece	   	   	   	  
Oman	   4	   	   	  
Australia	   	   13	   	   	  




32	   	   32	  
Total	   62	   	   68	  
Source:	  Tweede	  Kamer	  2011:	  4.	  
	  
	  
	   Indeed	  these	  latter	  nations	  seem	  to	  be	  pressing	  France	  to	  get	  the	  work	  share	  in	  line	  
with	  the	  original	  agreements.	  For	  the	  Netherlands	  there	  is	  an	  additional	  problem.	  The	  most	  
dominant	   companies	   AgustaWestland	   and	   Eurocopter	   appear	   to	   be	   reluctant	   to	   include	  
Dutch	  companies	  in	  their	  supply	  chain.	  The	  division	  of	  the	  work	  share	  had	  been	  carried	  out	  
at	  an	  early	  stage	  by	  these	  companies	  preferring	  companies	  from	  their	  own	  countries.	  Now	  
they	   indicate	   that	   it	   is	   very	   difficult	   to	   include	   other	   companies	   in	   the	   production	   phase	  









Table	  5.8	   Initially	  agreed	  division	  of	  work	  share	  and	  current	  division	  of	  work	  share	  
Country	  and	  intended	  
number	  of	  orders	  
Intended	  















France	   26.45	   30.85	   37.05	   3822	  
Germany	   36.20	   30.85	   28.12	   2900	  
Italy	   32.40	   31.60	   29.22	   3014	  
The	  Netherlands	   3.31	   5.5	   4.4	   454	  
Portugal	   1.65	   1.2	   1.2	   124	  
Total	   100%	   100%	   100%	   103.14	  
Source:	  Tweede	  Kamer	  2011:	  6.	  
 
 
5.4	   Concluding	  Comment	  	  
 
In	   this	   chapter	  we	   set	   out	   to	   give	   a	   description	   of	   the	  NH	   90	   programme.	  We	   started	   by	  
detailing	  the	  political	  and	  historical	  context	  in	  which	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  was	  established.	  
European	   governments	   in	   the	   1970s	   sought	   closer	   cooperation	   with	   each	   other	   in	   the	  
development	   and	   production	   of	   military	   equipment.	   A	   number	   of	   development	   and	  
production	   programmes	   were	   underway	   to	   give	   a	   boost	   to	   European	   helicopter	  
manufacturers.	  Originally,	  it	  was	  intended	  to	  combine	  these	  programmes	  and	  to	  produce	  a	  
family	   of	   helicopters	   to	   serve	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   participating	   governments.	   Yet	  
subsequent	  events	  (the	  withdrawal	  of	  France	  and	  Germany	  from	  the	  EH	  101	  with	  Italy,	  and	  
the	  abandonment	  of	  the	  UK	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  after	  the	  “Westland	  affair”	   in	  1986)	  
resulted	  in	  quite	  a	  different	  situation	  for	  the	  European	  helicopter	  industry.	  Later	  the	  German	  
and	   French	   agreement	   on	   the	   PAH	   2	   attack	   helicopter	   at	   the	   exclusion	   of	   Italy	   and	   the	  
United	   Kingdom	  would	   again	   put	   strain	   on	   the	   relationships	   between	   the	   companies	   and	  
governments	   involved.	   Especially,	   for	  Agusta	   this	  proved	  a	  bitter	  pill	  with	   the	  PAH	  2	  Tigre	  
attack	  helicopter	  being	  a	  direct	   competitor	   to	   its	  own	  A	  129	  Mangusta.	   In	  1986,	   Italy,	   the	  
Netherlands,	  Spain	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  agreed	  to	  cooperate	  on	  the	  development	  of	  an	  
upgrade	  of	  Agusta’s	  A	  129	  attack	  helicopter	   in	  the	  European	  Helicopter	  Tonal	  Programme.	  
Yet,	   this	   programme	   collapsed	   in	   1990	   when	   the	   Netherlands	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom	  
 106
decided	   to	   procure	   the	   American	   AH	   64	   Apache	   developed	   and	   produced	   by	  Hughes	   and	  
McDonnel	  Douglas	  (currently	  produced	  by	  Boeing).	  	  
	   Amidst	  this	  industrial-­‐political	  turmoil,	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  faired	  relatively	  well	  for	  
a	   four-­‐nation	   programme,	   until	   the	   1990s.	   The	   programme	   was	   upheld	   when	   after	   the	  
withdrawal	   of	   the	   UK	   the	   work	   share	   had	   to	   be	   re-­‐divided	   between	   the	   remaining	  
programme	   partners.	   This	   was	   particularly	   difficult	   in	   a	   climate	   in	   which	   Italy’s	   and	  
Germany’s	   budgets	   were	   pressured,	   with	   the	   latter	   even	   threatening	   to	   abandon	   the	  
program	   altogether.	   In	   1991,	   the	   governments	   of	   France,	   Germany	   and	   the	   Netherlands	  
signed	   the	   General	   Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   and	   formally	   established	   the	   NATO	  
Helicopter	  Management	  Agency	  (NAHEMA)	  as	  the	  executive	  agency	  working	  on	  their	  behalf.	  
Not	  much	   later,	   the	  programme	  became	  endangered	  when	   it	  was	   subjected	   to	   scrutiny	   in	  
France.	  Eventually,	  the	  programme	  survived	  the	  political	  instabilities	  of	  the	  early	  1990s	  and	  
in	  August	  1992	  the	  governments	  gave	  their	  consent	  for	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  contract	  between	  
NAHEMA	  and	  the	  industrial	  consortium	  NATO	  Helicopter	  Industries	  (NHI).	  	  	  	  
	   From	  mid	   1990s	   to	   the	   end	   of	   the	  millennium,	   again	   political	   difficulties	   emerged	  
when	  some	  nations	  indicated	  they	  might	  buy	  fewer	  helicopters	  than	  originally	  foreseen	  and	  
some	   nations	   delayed	   their	   in-­‐service	   dates	   for	   the	   helicopter.	   The	   production	   contract	  
negotiations	   were	   particularly	   tough,	   but	   in	   2000	   the	   Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	  
covering	  the	  production	  contract	  was	  signed	  between	  NHI	  and	  NAHEMA.	  	  
	   During	  the	  production	  phase,	  technical	  and	  managerial	  problems	  plagued	  the	  NH	  90	  
programme	   leading	   to	   substantial	   delays.	   Nonetheless,	   on	   the	   export	   market	   the	   NH	   90	  
became	  successful	  with	  more	   than	  10	  countries	  outside	  of	   the	   founding	  nations	  procuring	  
the	  aircraft.	  Yet,	  this	  also	  fuelled	  frustration	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  governments	  of	  the	  founding	  
nations,	   worrying	   that	   NHI	   spends	   too	  much	   effort	   in	   the	  marketing	   of	   the	   helicopter	   to	  









CHAPTER	  6 	  	   UNRAVELLING	  THE	  LOGICS	  OF	  THE	  NH90	  NATIONS	  	  
 
Our	  first	  research	  question	  involved	  answering	  the	  question	  if	  and	  in	  what	  manner	  the	  logics	  
of	  the	  NH	  90	  nations	  differ.	  This	  chapter	  is	  dedicated	  to	  answering	  this	  question.	  Based	  on	  
our	  literature	  review	  of	  research	  on	  institutional	  logics	  presented	  in	  paragraph	  2.3	  and	  of	  the	  
defence	   industrial	   policies	   and	   the	   features	   of	   the	   general	   business	   climate	   of	   the	  NH	   90	  
nations	  described	  in	  chapter	  3	  we	  developed	  an	  initial	  coding	  protocol	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  
interview	   material.	   We	   were	   particularly	   sensitive	   to	   differences	   in	   defence	   industrial	  
policies,	   and	   differences	   in	   organisational	   structures	   and	   roles,	   nevertheless	  we	   remained	  
open-­‐minded	   with	   respect	   to	   other	   categories	   that	   might	   prove	   relevant	   in	   our	   research	  
context	   (see	  Chapter	  4	   for	  a	   further	  description	  of	   the	  procedures	  used	  for	   the	  analysis	  of	  
the	  data.)	  	  	  	  
Further	  analysis	  of	  the	  interview	  data	  allowed	  us	  to	  identify	  two	  main	  dimensions	  on	  
which	   the	   logics	   of	   the	   founding	   NH	   90	   nations	   varied.	   These	   two	   main	   dimensions	  
themselves	   are	  made	  up	  of	   a	   number	   of	   constitutive	   elements.	   The	   first	  main	   dimension,	  
Defence	   industrial	   orientation	   describes	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   a	   nation	   is	   concerned	   with	  
defence	   industrial	   matters,	   like	   sustaining	   an	   independent	   domestic	   source	   of	   supply	   of	  
military	  equipment.	  Subsumed	  under	  this	  dimension	  are	  the	  nature	  of	  government	  company	  
relationships,	   the	  degree	   to	  which	  exports	  are	  deemed	   important	   to	   sustain	   this	  domestic	  
source	  of	  defence	  production	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  nation	  supports	  the	  establishment	  
of	  a	  European	  defence	   industry.	  The	  second	  main	  dimension	  concerns	  programme	  control	  
and	   describes	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   governments	   exert	   control	   over	   a	   programme.	   The	  
constitutive	  elements	  comprising	   this	  dimension	  are	  programme	  management	  control	  and	  
parliamentary	   control.	   The	   former	   describes	   the	   degree	   of	   autonomy	   in	   decision-­‐making	  
delegated	   to	   programme	   management.	   The	   latter	   describes	   the	   degree	   of	   oversight	   by	  
members	  of	  parliament	  on	  programme	  matters.	   In	   the	   following	  paragraphs	  we	  will	  detail	  




6.1	   Defence	  Industrial	  Orientation	  
 
Historically,	   many,	   if	   not	   all	   western	   countries	   have	   had	   a	   strong	   interest	   in	   maintaining	  
domestic	   defence	   technological	   capabilities	   as	   a	   prerequisite	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   their	  
national	   sovereignty	   (James,	   2002).	   The	   protection	   of	   its	   territorial	   sovereignty	   has	   for	  
centuries	   been	   one	   of	   the	   primary	   reasons	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state.	   This	   is	  
clearly	  seen	  in	  the	  relatively	  slow	  progress	  made	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  European	  Security	  and	  
Defence	  Policy	  (ESDP).	  Governments	  are	  reluctant	  to	  give	  up	  their	   freedom	  in	  determining	  
their	  defence	  and	  foreign	  policies.	  
This	   is	  also	  why	  the	  defence	  industry	  is	  exempted	  from	  the	  European	  Communities’	  
internal	  market	  rules.	  Although	  economic	  growth	  over	  the	  past	  few	  decades	  has	  reduced	  the	  
importance	   of	   defence	   procurement	   as	   a	   driver	   for	   industrial	   progress,	   it	   used	   to	   be	   an	  
important	   instrument	   for	   industrial	  development	   in	  many	  nations.	  Aerospace	  and	  defence	  
industries	   have	   been	   generally	   regarded	   as	   a	   leading,	   high	   tech	   sector	   central	   to	   the	  
international	  competitive	  posture	  of	  nations	  (Hartley,	  1993).	  Howard	  (cited	  in	  Suchman	  and	  
Eyre,	  1992:	  154)	  once	  wrote	   the	   following	  about	   the	  material	  and	  symbolic	   significance	  of	  
the	  battle	  ship	  late	  19th	  century:	  “The	  battle	  ship	  was	  indeed	  a	  symbol	  of	  national	  pride	  and	  
power	   of	   a	   unique	   kind;	   one	   even	  more	   appropriate	   to	   the	   industrial	   age	   than	   armies.	   It	  
embodied	   at	   once	   the	   technological	   achievement	   of	   [the]	   nation	   as	  whole,	   its	   world-­‐wide	  
reach	   and,	   with	   its	   huge	   guns,	   immense	   destructive	   power.	   It	   was	   a	   status	   symbol	   of	  
universal	  validity,	  one	  which	  no	  nation	  conscious	  of	   its	  destiny	  could	  afford	  to	  do	  without.”	  	  
These	  words	   could	   easily	   apply	   to	   the	   indigenous	   aerospace	   capabilities	   of	   nations	   during	  
much	   of	   the	   latter	   half	   of	   the	   20th	   century.	  Many	   European	   governments,	   in	   the	   decades	  
following	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  have	  invested	  tremendous	  resources	  to	  secure	  indigenous	  
aerospace	  and	  defence	  capabilities.	  	  	  	  
This	  desire	   to	  maintain	   at	   least	   some	   independent	  domestic	   capabilities	   is	   also	   the	  
main	  reason	  behind	  the	  slow	  pace	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  European	  defence	  industry.	  Although	  
some	   efforts	   have	   been	  made,	   not	   in	   the	   least	   place	   by	   the	   formation	   of	   numerous	   joint	  
ventures	  between	  the	  main	  defence	  companies	  with	  or	  without	  governmental	  support.	  Yet,	  
further	  consolidation	  and	   integration	  has	  proven	  difficult.	  Although	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  few	  
companies	  (e.g.	  EADS,	  Finmeccanica,	  BAE	  Systems,	  Thales)	  with	  a	  strong	  trans-­‐European	  and	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in	   some	   instances	   even	   a	   strong	   transatlantic	   orientation	   has	   occurred.	   Their	   complete	  
integration	   has	   been	   hampered	   by	   governments’	   concern	   with	   security	   of	   supply	   of	  
equipment	   and	   spare	  parts.	  Moreover,	   those	   governments	  with	   a	   large	  defence	   industrial	  
base	  have	  also	  been	  wary	  of	  further	  integration	  out	  of	  fear	  that	  it	  might	  lead	  to	  loss	  of	  jobs	  
in	  their	  domestic	  defence	  industries.	  	  
These	  examples	  indeed	  indicate	  that	  institutional	  logics	  in	  defence	  industrial	  politics	  
are	  largely	  nationally	  circumscribed.	  This	  is	  clearly	  seen	  in	  the	  division	  of	  work	  share	  among	  
the	  nations	  and	  the	  division	  of	  responsibilities	  within	  NAHEMA	  (as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  
chapter).	   The	   importance	   of	   the	   national	   dimension	   was	   also	   frequently	   stressed	   by	  
respondents	   during	   interviews.	   For	   example,	   a	   German	   BWB	   official	   commenting	   on	   the	  
work	  share	  division	  made	  the	  following	  remark:	  	  
	  
“If	  you	  wanted	  Italy	  to	  participate,	  Italian	  industry	  had	  to	  be	  in.	  If	  you	  want	  Germany	  
	   to	   participate,	   then	   German	   industry	   needed	   to	   be	   in.	   If	   you	   want	   to	   have	   the	  
	   Netherlands	   involved,	   Dutch	   industry	   had	   to	   be	   in.	   It’s	   simple	   as	   that.”	   (Interview	  
	   German	  Director	  Division	  Air)	  
	  
The	   importance	  of	  the	  national	  boundaries	   in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  was	  also	  clear	  
from	  the	  language	  used	  in	  official	  documents	  and	  by	  respondents.	  Documents	  are	  signed	  by	  
the	  governments	  of	  the	  respective	  nations.	  Respondents	  most	  generally	  referred	  to	  nations	  
as	   the	   primary	   actors.	   Moreover	   basic	   regulations	   pertaining	   to	   auditing	   of	   the	   private	  
companies,	   final	   qualification	   of	   the	   helicopter	   and	   airworthiness	   regulations	   are	   also	  
nationally	   circumscribed.	   For	   example,	   the	   national	   auditing	   agencies	   responsible	   for	  
auditing	  the	  NHindustries	  partners	  are	  only	  allowed	  to	  examine	  the	  company	  that	   is	  based	  
within	   their	  national	   territory.	   Similarly,	   all	  nations	  have	   their	  own	  qualification	  process	   in	  
which	   the	   final	   performance	   of	   the	   helicopter	   is	   being	   assessed	   against	   the	   contractually	  
specified	  requirements.	    
	  
France	  
In	   chapter	   three,	   we	   have	   described	   the	   basic	   institutional	   features	   of	   the	   French	  
procurement	   system	   and	   the	   primary	   efforts	   by	   the	   French	   government	   to	   change	   the	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system.	  We	  have	  noted	  that	  although	  a	  wave	  of	  privatisations	  and	  European	  cross	  mergers	  
have	  occurred,	  the	  main	  characteristics	  have	  been	  relatively	  persistent.	  The	  main	  features,	  
described	  earlier,	  were	  relatively	  stable	  and	  frequent	  interactions	  between	  the	  French	  DGA	  
and	   national	   defence	   firms,	   mediated	   by	   a	   system	   of	   ‘pantouflage’	   in	   which	   higher-­‐level	  
government	   officials	   and	   directors	   of	   defence	   firms	   often	   switch	   between	   the	   public	   and	  
private	  sectors	  (Mampauy	  2001;	  Dormois,	  1999).	  The	  interviews	  we	  conducted	  are	  largely	  in	  
line	  with	  this	  earlier	  description.	  	  
	   With	   respect	   to	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   national	   procurement	   agencies	   and	   the	  
national	   defence	   firms	   we	   noted	   some	   differences.	   All	   the	   procurement	   agencies	   in	   our	  
study	  maintained	  closer	  relations	  to	  their	  own	  defence	  firms.	  This	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  given	  
that	  the	  different	  nations	  have	  more	  (past,	  present	  and	  future)	  programmes	  (either	  national	  
or	  international),	  in	  which	  their	  main	  defence	  firms	  are	  involved.	  Nevertheless,	  there	  seems	  
to	   exist	   a	   difference	   in	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   governments	   and	   their	   defence	   firms	   give	  
meaning	  to	  their	  relationship.	  In	  France,	  relationships	  between	  the	  government	  and	  industry	  
have	  tended	  to	  remain	  relatively	  tight	  and	  cooperative.	  This	  is	  reflected	  in	  a	  comment	  from	  a	  
French	  NAHEMA	  official	  who	  was	  very	  surprised	  when	  he	  arrived	  at	  NAHEMA.	  He	  noted	  that	  
the	  relationship	  between	  NAHEMA	  and	  NHI	  was	  highly	  uncooperative,	  	  
	  
“But	  I	  was	  really	  surprised	  when	  I	  arrived	  here	  and	  saw	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  
the	  official	  nations	  in	  the	  agency	  and	  the	  industry	  was	  not	  in	  a	  cooperative	  mode.	  I	  was	  
surprised	   by	   it.	   It’s	   really	   not	   cooperative,	   it’s	   more	   contractually,	   not	   my	   ideal	  
relationship…	   Because	   I	   don’t	   know	   if	   you’re	   aware	   of	   this	   contract,	   this	   contract	  
protects	  the	  customer	  as	  it	  is	  a	  fixed	  	   price	   contract	   for	   development	   and	   production.	  
Really	   it’s	  difficult	   for	   industry	   to	  escape,	   they	  have	  an	  obligation,	  and	   if	   they	  cannot	  
really	  meet	  all	  the	  obligations,	  they	  will	  be	  penalised…	  The	  contract	  is	  very,	  very	  tough.	  
I’m	  not	  so	  fond	  of	  this	  contract,	  because	  I	  believe	  it	  was	  not	  really	  the	  right	  way	  to	  have	  
a	  full	  contract	  covering	  the	  production	  of	  more	  than	  500	  helicopters	  for	  more	  than	  15	  
years.	  For	  me	  it’s	  nonsense.”	  (Interview	  French	  NAHEMA	  official	  1)	  
	  
This	  French	  NAHEMA	  official	  describes	  the	  relationship	  between	  NAHEMA	  and	  NHI.	  He	  
criticises	  the	  contractual	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  contract	  between	  the	  NAHEMA	  and	  NHI	  and	  
seems	   to	   be	   on	   the	   defence	   of	   the	   industrial	   consortium.	   It	   is	   easier	   to	   understand	   this	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criticism	  on	  the	  contractual	  set	  up	  of	  the	  programme	  when	  we	  look	  at	  how	  French	  national	  
programmes	   normally	   proceed.	   French	   national	   procurement	   policy	   stipulates	   an	  
incremental	   approach	   in	   which	   the	   DGA	   and	   its	   suppliers	   cooperate	   closely	   together	   on	  
development	  and	  production.	  Batch	  contracts	  typically	  do	  not	  exceed	  3	  or	  4	  years	  in	  France.	  
This	  means	  that	  there	  is	  much	  more	  room	  for	  cooperative	  behaviour	  between	  the	  DGA	  and	  
French	   suppliers	   between	   contracts.	   The	   same	   French	   NAHEMA	   official	   suggests	   that	  
whenever	   there	   is	   a	   contract	   between	   the	   government	   and	   industry	   the	   relationship	   will	  
become	  adversarial,	  	  
	  
“Cooperation	   is	   important	   with	   industry	   between	   phases	   sometimes.	   You	   have	  
development	  phases,	  and	  before	  ordering	  the	  production	  of	  the	  helicopters	  (you	  have	  
phases,	  author).	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  should	  be	  important	  to	  discuss	  about	  the	  best	  way	  to	  
contract	   for	   the	   production…	   it	   should	   be	   important	   for	  me,	   to	   really	   have	   this	   in	   a	  
cooperative	  way,	   because	  we	   know	   that,	  when	  we	   have	   a	   contract	   signed	   it’s	  more	  
difficult	  to	  be	  in	  a	  cooperative	  	  mode.”	  (Interview	  French	  NAHEMA	  official	  1)	  
	  
Having	  batch	  contracts	  for	  3	  or	  4	  years	  allows	  a	  cooperative	  mode	  between	  contracts.	  One	  
of	  the	  difficulties	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  is	  the	  continuation	  of	  these	  practices	  even	  inside	  
the	  programme.	  A	  French	  NH	  90	  programme	  official	  notes	  that	  the	  French	  government	  often	  
has	  contacts	  with	  Eurocopter	  France,	  	  
	  
“One	  difficulty	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  international	  program	  is	  the	  direct	  link	  between	  nation	  
and	  partner	  company	  without	  transparency.	  Really	  this	  is	  a	  problem…	  We	  know	  that	  
the	   French	   programme	   manager	   and	   HOD	   (Head	   of	   Delegation)	   have	   regular	  
meetings	  with	  their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  company…	  And	  with	  the	  programme	  manager	  
at	  Eurocopter.	  It	  could	  be	  useful,	  but	  with	  more	  transparency.	  The	  problem	  for	  us	  now	  
is	   that	  we	  don’t	  know	  what’s	  discussed.	   (…)	  And	  sometimes	   it’s	  discussed	  more	   in	  a	  
cooperative	  way,	  than	  inside	  NAHEMA.	  We	  have	  to	  stick	  to	  the	  contract.	  So	  we	  have	  
the	   contractual	   partners	   and	   it’s	   absolutely	   not	   cooperative.”	   (Interview	   French	  
NAHEMA	  official	  1)	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Although	  these	  ‘unofficial’	  relationships	  between	  the	  procurement	  agencies	  and	  their	  
national	   industrial	   programme	   partner	   occurred	   in	   all	   the	   nations,	   there	   seemed	   to	   be	   a	  
general	  perception	  that	  in	  some	  nations	  mutual	  support	  was	  higher	  than	  in	  other	  nations.	  	  A	  
Dutch	  Fokker	  official:	  
	   	  
“I	  mean	  there	   is	  a	  customer-­‐supplier	   relationship.	  But	  you	  can	  give	   that	  meaning	   in	  
different	  ways.	  I	  have	  the	  perception	  that	  in	  France	  they	  cooperate	  very	  consciously.	  
There	   is	   also	   a	   very	   strong	   intermingling	   between	   the	   private	   sector	   and	   the	  
government,	   and	   people	   who	   switch,	   who	   go	   from	   industry	   to	   the	   DGA	   and	   back	  
again.	  A	  real	  exchange	  takes	  place	  there.	  And	  here	  [in	  the	  Netherlands,	  author.]	  it	  is	  
more	  like	  we	  versus	  them”.	  	  (Interview	  Fokker	  NH	  90	  Programme	  Manager)	  
	   	   	  
This	   more	   or	   less	   cooperative	   relationship	   between	   Eurocopter	   and	   the	   DGA	   is	  
difficult	  to	  follow.	  It	  often	  remains	  unclear	  what	  is	  being	  discussed	  there	  even	  for	  the	  French	  
NAHEMA	  official.	   The	   interweaving	   of	   the	   economy	   and	   politics	   in	   France	   is	   for	   outsiders	  
difficult	  to	  understand.	  Some	  respondents	  pointed	  to	  the	  ‘revolving	  door’	  (or	  pantouflage	  in	  
France)	  phenomenon	  in	  France,	  where	  top	  officials	  of	  defence	  companies	  are	  appointed	  to	  
high	   level	   government	   positions	   and	   vice	   versa.	   As	   a	   former	   Dutch	   State	   Secretary	   for	  
Defence	  observed	  when	  he	  was	  in	  office,	  	  
	  
“In	   France,	   defence	   companies	   are	   basically	   state-­‐owned	   companies.	   They	   are	   so-­‐
called	   partly	   privatised,	   but	   they	   are	   actually	   state-­‐owned	   companies.	   The	   DGA	  
(Director	   General	   of	   Armaments),	  when	   I	  was	   in	   office,	  was	   the	   former	   Director	   of	  
Peugeot,	  and	  that	  person	  is	  simply	  being	  replaced	  there.	  The	  state	  has	  an	  enormous	  
‘voice’	  in	  this.	  So	  it	  can	  do	  a	  lot	  with	  	  that.	   It	   allocates	   money	   for	   it	   and	   subsidises	   it	  
one	  way	  or	  another.”	  (Interview	  Dutch	  State	  Secretary	  of	  Defence	  1)	  
	  
Some	   authors	   have	   suggested	   that	   the	   ‘pantouflage’	   phenomenon	   is	   also	   partially	  
responsible	   for	   the	   reluctance	   in	   French	   government	   to	   expose	   French	   industry	   to	   full	  
market	  forces	  and	  international	  competition	  (Dormois,	  1999;	  Serfati	  2000).	  	  Although,	  there	  
seems	   to	   be	   indeed	   mutual	   support	   between	   the	   DGA	   and	   French	   Eurocopter,	   the	  
cooperative	   nature	   of	   the	   relationship	   has	   its	   limitations.	   A	   respondent	   from	   Fokker,	   for	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example	  describes	  it	  as	  ‘love-­‐hatred	  relationship’	  (Interview	  Executive	  Vice-­‐President	  STORK)	  
The	  precarious	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  industry	  and	  government	  and	  difficulty	  of	  
balancing	   different	   public	   and	   private	   interests	   is	   illustrated	   by	   a	   quote	   from	   a	   French	  
NAHEMA	  official,	  	  	  
	   	  
“We	  cannot	  wait,	  wait,	  and	  wait.	  And	  say	  to	  politicians	  and	  the	  parliament:	  “Oh,	  its	  
okay,	   “And	   you	   know,	   the	   reaction	   of	   the	   partner	   companies,	   if	   a	   nation	   is	  
terminating	  a	  contract,	  would	  be	  to	  threat:	  “If	  you	  terminate	  the	  contract,	   I	  will	   fire	  
2000	  people”.	  …Yes,	  we	  find	  	  ourselves	  in	  a	  very	  odd	  position.	  In	  the	  rear	  side,	  we	  are	  
working	  for	  our	  own	  country,	  and	  our	  employment	  in	  this	  country.	  So,	  there	  is	  a	  point	  
of	  no	  return.”	  (Interview	  French	  NAHEMA	  official	  2)	  
	  
	   Among	  the	  nations	  in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme,	  France	  is	  highly	  committed	  to	  European	  
collaboration.	   Yet,	   its	   European	   commitment	   is	   also	   partially	   a	   consequence	   of	   its	   uneasy	  
relationship	   with	   the	   United	   States	   concerning	   defence	   industrial	   collaboration	   (James,	  
2002).	   Since,	   the	   1970s	   it	   has	   cooperated	   on	   a	   number	   of	   programmes	   in	   particular	  with	  
Germany.	  For	  France,	   these	  early	  cooperative	  efforts	  with	  Germany	  were	  an	  effort	   to	  gain	  
some	  control	  after	  Germany	  was	  allowed	  to	  rearmament	  itself	  (Lorell,	  1980).	  	  
 
Germany	  
In	   chapter	   three	  we	   described	   that	   the	   German	   defence	   industry	   was	   virtually	   destroyed	  
during	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Restrictions	  on	  German	  rearmaments	  imposed	  by	  the	  Allied	  
occupying	  nations	   immediately	  after	  the	  war	  ensured	  that	  a	  German	  defence	   industry	  was	  
almost	  non-­‐existent	  until	  the	  1970s	  when	  Germany	  was	  allowed	  to	  rearm	  itself	  again.	  Since	  
then,	  German	  defence	  industrial	  capabilities	  have	  gradually	  improved.	  Given	  that	  its	  defence	  
industry	   is	   privately	  owned	  and	   less	  dependent	  upon	  government	   support	   because	  of	   the	  
companies’	  substantial	  amount	  of	  commercial	  business,	  it	  has	  adopted	  a	  more	  arm’s-­‐length	  




“In	  France	  the	  interlocation	  if	  I	  may	  say	  so	  between	  industry	  and	  state	  is	  much,	  much	  
	   stronger	   than	   with	   us.	   To	   a	   certain	   extent	   it	   was	   a	   state-­‐run	   industry	   …	   So,	   the	  
	   cooperation,	   the	   distance	   is	   very	   close,	   much	   more	   than	   in	   Germany.	   Very	   close.”	  
	   (Interview	  Former	  German	  State	  Secretary	  of	  Defence)	  
	  
He	   added	   that	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   German	   government	   and	   its	   main	  
defence	   suppliers	   takes	   on	   a	   relationship,	   which	   is	  more	   “business-­‐like.”	   A	   respondent	   at	  
Fokker	   also	   noted	   this	   difference	   in	   the	   relation	   between	   the	   German	   government	   and	  
Eurocopter,	  	  
	  
“The	  Germans	  also	  liked	  to	  please	  [their	  government,	  author],	  yet	  they	  did	  so	  out	  of	  
	   commercial	   considerations.	   They	   were	   able	   to	  make	   very	   good	   arrangements	   with	  
	   their	  government	  through	  customisations,	  national	  customisations.	  And	  for	  that	  they	  
	   would	   get	   the	   first	   prize.	   They	   were	   also	   separately	   funded	   by	   the	   Germans.”	  	  
	   (Interview	  Executive	  Vice-­‐President	  STORK).	  
	  
Germany	   participated	   by	   means	   of	   the	   Bundesambt	   für	   Wehrtechnik	   und	  
Beschaffung	  (BWB)	  in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  It	  was	  established	  over	  50	  years	  ago	  to	  serve	  
as	   a	   central	   interface	   between	   the	   armed	   forces	   and	   industry	   (Kausal	   et	   al.	   1999).	   Unlike	  
most	  other	  procurement	  agencies	  (including	  its	  NH	  90	  programme	  counterparts),	  the	  BWB	  is	  
a	  civilian	  organisation.	  Although	   it	   is	  under	   the	  control	  of	   the	  German	  Ministry	  of	  Defence	  
the	  BWB	  operates	   independently	   (Kausal	  et	  al.	  1999).	   	   In	  the	  NH	  90	  programme,	  Germany	  
often	  places	  additional	  contracts	  with	  their	  industry.	  Mostly,	  these	  additional	  contracts,	  as	  a	  
German	  BWB	  official	  explained	  generally	   serve	   to	  bridge	  a	  gap	  between	   the	   requirements	  
demanded	  by	  the	  German	  armed	  forces	  and	  the	  requirements	  that	  were	  decided	  within	  the	  
NAHEMO	  with	  the	  other	  nations.	  Yet,	  a	  feeling	  exists	  that	  the	  German	  government	  tends	  to	  
pay	  more	  for	  products	  and	  services	  they	  order	  for	  their	  own	  national	  purposes.	  	  A	  German	  
BWB	  official	  provided	  us	  with	  an	  example.	  This	  example	  concerns	  the	  contract	  negotiations	  
for	  the	  IOC	  (Initial	  Operational	  Capability)	  TTH	  contract.	  	  
	  
“And	  here	  the	  industry	  tried	  to	  separate	  us	  from	  the	  Italians.	  They	  said	  your	  contract	  
	   is	  much	  earlier,	  let's	  talk	  to	  you	  and	  they	  talked	  to	  them	  [the	  Italians]	  separately.	  And	  
 115 
	   at	  the	  end	  we	  	  figured	  out,	  because	  both	  contracts	  are	  surveyed	  by	  NAHEMA,	  that	  the	  
	   Italians	  had	  much	  better	  conditions	  than	  the	  Germans.	  So	  at	  the	  end	  we	  merged	  it	  of	  
	   course.	  But	  this	  was	  an	  example	  where	  they	  tried	  to	  separate	  us.	  It	  looks	  like	  when	  we	  
	   try	   to	   negotiate	   alone,	   this	   is	   at	   least	   my	   experience,	   not	   with	   other	   countries	  
	   together,	  we	  (as	  the	  German	  government,	  author)	  –	   	  are	  in	  worse	  position,	   in	  a	   less	  
	   good	  position.	  …	  Normally	  you	  think	  if	  you	  talk	  to	  Fokker,	  because	  you	  are	  Dutch,	  it	  is	  
	   better.	   (For	   the	  German	  government,	   author)	   it	   is	   the	   opposite.	   At	   least	   that	   is	  my	  
	   experience.”	  (Interview	  German	  NH	  90	  Official	  1)	  
	  
The	   German	   government	   is	   highly	   committed	   to	   European	   cooperation	   in	  
development	  and	  production	  of	  military	  equipment.	  Much	  of	  its	  more	  advanced	  and	  costly	  
equipment	   has	   been	  produced	   in	   collaboration	  with	   other	   European	  nations	   (for	   example	  
Tornado,	  Eurofighter	  Typhoon,	  A400M,	  Tiger,	  and	  NH	  90).	  Politically,	  the	  primary	  motivation	  
for	   entering	   European	   cooperation	   is	   the	   possibility	   to	   save	   costs.	   Moreover,	   there	   is	   a	  
strong	   ‘intention	   from	   the	   German	   political	   level	   to	   form	   European	   companies	   which	   are	  
capable	   to	   survive	   on	   the	   world	   market’	   (BWB	   official).	   Yet	   from	   a	   MoD	   perspective	  
international	  cooperation	  has	  an	  additional	  advantage.	  As	  a	  German	  MoD	  official	  explained,	  	  
	  
	   “If	   you	   have	   a	   common	   project	   with	   some	   partner	   nation	   it	   is	   better	   for	   yourself,	  
	   because	   your	   political	   agreement	   is	  much	   easier	   for	   a	   project	  with	   other	   countries,	  
	   then	   for	   a	   project	   that	   is	   nationally.	   In	   Germany,	   it	   is	   that	  way.	   In	   other	   countries
	   may	  be	  it	  is	  a	  little	  bit	  different.	  I	  know	  that	  France	  is	  very	  proud	  of	  national	  projects.	  
	   In	  Germany	   that	   is	   not	   the	   same	   case.	  Our	   political	   understanding	   is	   to	   get	   it	   very	  
	   cheap	  and	  to	  have	   it	  with	  partners.	  And	  therefore	   in	  Germany	  cooperation	   is	  easier	  
	   than	  in	  some	  other	  countries.”	  (Interview	  German	  NH	  90	  Programme	  Official	  2)	   	  
	  
In	  Germany	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  easier	  to	  get	  political	  commitment	  for	  programmes	  that	  
involve	   other	   nations.	   In	   that	   sense,	   international	   cooperation	   increases	   stability	   of	  
equipment	  programmes.	  National	  programmes	  have	  a	  higher	   risk	  of	   termination	  or	  down-­‐
scaling.	  The	  respondent	  also	  notes	  that	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case	  in	  other	  countries.	  He	  
indicated	   that	   in	   France	   national	   programmes	   are	   considered	   more	   legitimate	   given	   the	  
sense	  of	   national	   prestige	   that	   surrounds	   some	  programmes.	  Although,	   the	  primary	   focus	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seems	   to	   be	   on	   keeping	   costs	   manageable,	   the	   German	   government	   does	   keep	   track	   of	  
industrial	  interests.	  According	  to	  a	  German	  MoD	  official,	  	  
	  
“…	  our	   industry	   is	  split	   into	  some	  national	  projects	   to	  get	  additional	  money	  for	   that
	   project	  which	  will	  make	  them	  more	  flexible,	  than	  when	  they	  have	  only	   international	  
	   projects	  and	  are	  not	  in	  a	  situation	  to	  develop	  some	  elements	  and	  therefore	  it	  is	  a	  very	  
	   complicated	   situation.	   The	  whole	   story	   is	   very	   complicated.”	   (Interview	  German	  NH	  
	   90	  Programme	  Official	  2)	  
	  
International	  programmes	  have	  the	  downside	  of	  elaborate	  work	  share	  arrangements,	  
which	  make	  it	  difficult	  for	  national	   industries	  participating	  in	  a	  programme	  to	  maintain	  the	  
capabilities	  to	  manufacture	  a	  complete	  weapons	  system.	  In	  Germany,	  this	  problem	  is	  solved	  
by	  awarding	  some	  national	  projects	  to	  its	  industry	  allowing	  certain	  design	  and	  development	  
capabilities	  to	  be	  maintained	  in	  German	  industry.	  	  
  
Italy	  
Like	   in	   France,	   the	   Italian	   government	   has	   pursued	   a	   policy	   of	   privatisation	   including	  
Finmeccanica	   (the	   mother	   company	   of	   NH	   90	   programme	   partner	   AgustaWestland).	   It	  
continues	   to	   retain	   at	   least	   30%	   of	   the	   shares	   of	   Finmeccanica.	   The	   Italian	   MoD	   also	  
maintains	   relatively	   close	   ties	   to	   its	   main	   defence	   equipment	   suppliers.	   An	   Italian	   NH	   90	  
programme	  official	   describes	   the	   relations	  between	  MoD	  and	   industry.	   This	   respondent	   is	  
from	  the	  army	  engineers	  corps.	  He	  belongs	  to	  a	  special	  branch	  of	  officers	  who	  specialize	  in	  
procurement.	  As	  part	  of	  their	  education	  and	  profession	  they	  work	  very	  closely	  with	  industry	  
to	  gain	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  industrial	  dynamics.	  
	  	  
“I	   am	   a	   technical	   officer,	   an	   engineer,	   and	   in	   the	   army	   we	   have	   this	   branche	   of	  
officers,	  we	  are	  not	  with	  a	  lot,	  and	  since	  the	  very	  beginning,	  when	  I	  was	  a	  Lieutenant,	  
just	  after	  receiving	  my	  degree	  of	  university,	  I	  started	  working	  with	  industry.	  So,	  in	  my	  
job	  it	  is	  quite	  useful	  to	  relate	  with	  industry,	  because	  I	  did	  it	  since	  the	  very	  beginning.	  
So,	   industry	   is	   aware	   that	   the	   counterpart	   has	   this	   kind	   of	   background	   and	   so	   the	  
discussion	  is	  very	  easy.”	  (Interview	  Italian	  NH	  90	  Official	  1)	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These	  tight	  relations	  between	  Agusta	  and	  the	  Italian	  MoD	  relations	  are	  also	  
described	  by	  a	  Dutch	  NAHEMA	  official,	  	  
	   	  
	  “Italy	   is	   always	   dealing	   with	   Agusta…	   because	   Agusta	   is	   the	   home	   supplier	   of	  
	   helicopters	  for	  Italy.	  Moreover,	  the	  member	  of	  the	  BOR	  (Board	  of	  Representatives	  of	  
	   NHI)	  of	  Agusta	  worked	  together	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Defence	  in	  Rome	  with	  the	  current	  
	   JEC-­‐member,	  Joint	  Executive	  	  Committee	   …	   They	   know	   each	   other.	   So,	   they	   are	  
	   continuously	  talking	  to	  one	  another,	  and	  for	  us	  it	  is	  occasionally	  very	  difficult	  to	  follow	  
	   that.”	  	  (Interview	  Dutch	  NAHEMA	  Official	  1)	  	  	  	  
	  
Unlike	  the	  arms-­‐length	  of	  the	  procurement	  agencies	  of	  Germany	  and	  the	  
Netherlands	  this	  MoD	  official	  portrays	  a	  very	  open	  and	  trusting	  relationship	  between	  Agusta	  
and	  his	  own	  organisation.	  
	  
“...we	   know	   the	   people,	   because	   we	   have	   many	   side	   meetings,	   they	   come	   here,
	   sometimes	   we	   go	   to	   them...so	   we	   speak	   really	   frankly	   with	   them	   and	   they	   do	   the	  
	   same.	   Every	   kind	   of	   topic,	   from	   the	   development	   costs,	   the	   programme	   itself,	   how	  
	   long	  it	  	  lasts	   or	   about	   the	   delays	   or	   what	   the	   problems	   are,	   how	  we	   solve	   them,	   a	  
	   common	  approach,	  the	  solution	  which	  could	  be	  useful	  for	  the	  users,	  the	  armed	  forces	  
	   and	   how	   not	   to	   penalize	   industry	   too	   much	   or...	   they	   have	   to	   work,	   they	   have	   to	  
	   guarantee	  a	  cash-­‐flow...knowing	  their	  problem	  you	  know	  exactly	  	  how	   to	   work.”	  
	   (Interview	  Italian	  NH	  90	  Official	  1)	  
	  
A	  respondent,	  an	  employee	  of	  Fokker,	  noticed	  another	   tendency	   in	   the	   relations	  between	  
Agusta	  and	  the	  Italian	  MoD.	  He	  noted	  a	  strong	  tendency	  at	  NAHEMA	  to	  strictly	  adhere	  to	  the	  
letter	  of	  the	  contract	  even	  when	  circumstances	  have	  changed.	  	  
	  
“But	  the	  meaning	  of	  such	  an	  understanding	  is	  different.	  The	  manner	   in	  which	  we	  as	  
Dutch	  	   people	  want	  it	  is	  more	  like,	  ‘Well,	  discuss	  what	  you	  can	  and	  what	  you	  can’t	  do	  
on	  both	  sides	  	   [industry	   and	   government]	   and	   then	   agree	   on	   something	   new	  which	  
you	  can	  fulfil.’	   	  While	  the	  attitude	  of	  Italians	  is	  more	  like,	   ‘continue	  to	  promise	  what	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was	  agreed	  upon	  in	  the	  original	  contract.	  We	  know	  it	  will	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  different,	  but	  
that	   is	   something	  we	  will	   deal	  with	  when	   that	  moment	   comes,’	   because	   that’s	   not	  
something	   you	   can	   communicate	   upfront.	   So,	   these	   are	   different	  worlds.	   An	   Italian	  
will	  achieve	  a	  solution	  with	  his	  government,	  but	   through	  a	  different	  process	   than	   in	  
the	  Netherlands.”	  (Interview	  Executive	  Vice-­‐President	  STORK)	  	  
	  
In	  Italy,	  general	  practice	  is	  to	  hold	  on	  the	  contract	  as	  long	  as	  possible,	  expecting	  that	  
when	  problems	  compile	  the	  government	  will	  help.	  In	  the	  Netherlands,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	  
open,	  to	  address	  the	  problems,	  and	  certainly	  not	  to	  conceal	  them.	  A	  respondent	  from	  Fokker	  
suggested	  that	  this	  may	  be	  related	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  government-­‐industry	  relationship,	  in	  
the	  Netherlands,	  which	  is	  more	  commercial.	  	  
 
The	  Netherlands	  
As	  mentioned	  previously,	  the	  Dutch	  government	  had	  adopted	  a	  stronger	  market-­‐orientation	  
in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  adopted	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  by	  the	  Thatcher	  
government.	  This	  logic	  is	  still	  very	  dominant	  in	  the	  Netherlands.	  A	  former	  Dutch	  Minister	  of	  
Defence	   noted	   how	   the	   Dutch	   government	   initially	   practiced	   a	   defence	   industrial	  
orientation,	  but	  that	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  using	  the	  defence	  budget	  for	  industrial	  political	  ends	  
often	  led	  to	  troubles.	  	  
	  
“We	   had	   these	   kind	   of	   processes	   while	   trying	   to	   save	   Fokker,	   and	   we	   had	   these	  
	  process	   with	   a	   number	   of	   shipyards,	   we	   had	   it	   with	   DAF	   (a	   Dutch	   car	   and	   truck	  
manufacturer),	  and	  in	  general	   it	  ended	  badly	  for	  the	  economic-­‐political	  argument	  to	  
use	  security	  money	  for	  that.”	  (Interview	  Former	  Dutch	  Minister	  of	  Defence)	  
	  
	  	   A	   former	  Dutch	  Secretary	  of	  Defence	  also	  described	   this	  hands-­‐off	  approach	  of	   the	  
Dutch	  government	  towards	  defence	  companies:	  	  
	  
	   “As	  the	  Dutch	  government,	  we	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  Stork.	  Absolutely	  nothing.	  We	  
	   all	  have	  to	  keep	  our	  heads	  above	  the	  water	  ourselves.	  In	  the	  Netherlands	  people	  want	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   to	  distance	   themselves	   from	   the	  defence	   industry.	   It	   is	   dangerous,	   it	   hurts,	   you	  will	  
	   always	  get	  in	  trouble	  	  with	  it.”	  	  (Interview	  Former	  Dutch	  State	  Secretary	  of	  Defence	  1)	  
	  
In	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s,	   a	   number	   of	   defence-­‐related	   companies	   had	   run	   into	  
financial	  difficulties.	  The	  government	   intervened	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions	   to	  prevent	   the	  
bankruptcy	   of	   these	   companies.	   Nonetheless,	   many	   of	   these	   efforts	   eventually	   failed	  
(examples	   beside	   Fokker	   include	   DAF	   trucks,	   Volvo	   Cars,	   RDM	   shipyards).	   The	   Dutch	  
government	   later	   returned	   to	   its	   more	   traditional	   laissez-­‐faire	   defence	   industrial	   policy,	  
limiting	   its	   intervention	   in	   the	   management	   of	   the	   defence-­‐related	   industry.	   This	   is	  
illustrated	  in	  the	  following	  quote	  from	  a	  former	  Dutch	  National	  Armaments	  Director:	  	  
	  
“When	  you	  talk	  about	  1990s,	   that	  France,	  but	   Italy	  as	  well,	  a	   little	   in	  Germany,	  but	  
	   the	   Netherlands	   certainly	   did	   not	   have	   a	   defence	   industrial	   policy…	   Culturally,	  
	   historically	   and	   industrially	   the	   Netherlands	   are	   positioned	   very	   differently	   in	   these	  
	   relations.”	  (Interview	  	  Former	  Dutch	  National	  Armaments	  Director)	  
	  
A	  Dutch	  NH	   90	   programme	   official	   explained	   the	   difference	   further.	   He	   also	   notes	  
that	   the	  Netherlands	  has	   lost	   its	   defence	   industrial	   orientation.	  He	   also:	   notes	   that	   this	   is	  
very	  difficult	  to	  understand	  for	  the	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme:	  
	  
“You	  have	  to	  see	  that	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  other	  nations	  still	  practice	  politics.	  
	   France	  is	  very	  clear.	  Italy	  and	  Agusta,	  that	  goes	  through,	  I	  call	  it,	  Economic	  and	  Social	  
	   Affairs,	   In	   Germany	   still	  many	   people	   are	   employed	   in	   the	   defence	   industry.	   In	   the	  
	   Netherlands,	  we	  let	  that	  loose.	  These	  countries	  absolutely	  don’t	  understand	  why	  the	  
	   Netherlands	   has	   done	   that.	  We	   don’t	   get	   that	   explained.”	   (Interview	   Dutch	   NH	   90	  
	   Programme	  Official	  1)	  
	  
The	  failed	  attempts	  in	  supporting	  troubled	  companies	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  worsening	  of	  
the	   financial	   situation	   of	   the	   government,	   led	   to	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	  more	  market-­‐oriented	  
rationality.	  As,	  a	  Dutch	  NH	  90	  programme	  official	  explained	  to	  us,	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“From	  the	  other	  perspective,	  when	  you	  look	  at	  the	  shipping	  industry,	  the	  fact	  that	  you	  
	   let	   go	   also	  means	   that	   a	   core	   is	   being	  motivated	   to	   operate	   autonomously	   on	   the	  
	   market,	  from	  	  which	   they	   also	   can	   gain	   all	   sorts	   of	   benefits.	   Simply,	   by	   not	   being	  
	   pampered	  you	  get	  strong.”	  (Dutch	  NH	  90	  Programme	  Official	  1)	  
	  
This	   logic	   is	   also	   reflected	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   Dutch	   government	   and	  
Fokker,	   the	  Dutch	   industrial	  partner	   in	   the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  This	   relationship,	   similar	   to	  
Germany,	  takes	  on	  a	  more	  business-­‐like	  nature,	  as	  this	  quote	  from	  this	  Fokker	  respondent	  
illustrates.	  
	  
	   “In	   the	   Netherlands,	   we	   tend	   to	   view	   government	   and	   industry	   as	   two	   separate	  
	   entities.	   I	   do	   not	   want	   to	   imply	   that	   there	   is	   no	   mutual	   support,	   but	   the	   business	  
	   nature	  	  is	   higher	   than	   in	   France	   and	   Italy.”	   	   (Interview	   Executive	   Vice-­‐President	  
	   Fokker)	  
	  
As	   an	   example,	   of	   how	   the	   liberal	   market	   logic	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   relationship	  
between	  the	  Dutch	  government	  with	  Fokker,	  a	  Dutch	  NH	  90	  programme	  official	  provided	  us	  
with	  an	  example.	  All	  the	  nations	  have	  their	  own	  audit	  agency,	  which	  monitor	  and	  control	  the	  
prices	  of	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  helicopter.	  These	  audit	  agencies	  are	  only	  allowed	  to	  monitor	  and	  
control	  the	  prices	  of	  their	  domestic	   industry	  in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  So,	  for	  example	  the	  
Dutch	  audit	  agency	  is	  only	  allowed	  to	  monitor	  and	  control	  the	  prices	  of	  Fokker.	  	  
	  
“These	  audit	  agencies	  control	  the	  prices.	  Is	  this	  realistic,	  what	  raises	  are	  in	  there?	  We	  
know	  that	  the	  French,	  the	  Italians,	  and	  the	  Germans	  look	  at	  this	  through	  a	  different	  
lens	  towards	  their	  industries	  than	  we	  look	  at	  Fokker.	  And	  that	  means	  that	  compared	  
to	   the	   other	   industries	   that	   Fokker	   is	   often	   disadvantaged.	   Because,	   we	   say,	   ‘you	  
count	  these	  spare	  parts	  and	  these	  raises	  but	  that	  is	  not	  what	  we	  have	  agreed.	  That	  is	  
too	   expensive.’	   So,	   Fokker	   from	   its	   position	   rightly	   complains,	   ‘they	   are	   allowed	   to	  
have	  those	  raises.	  So	  why	  can’t	   I?’	  Well,	  that	   is	  Fokker’s	  problem.”	  (Interview	  Dutch	  
NH	  90	  Programme	  Official	  1)	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In	  the	  other	  countries,	  the	  audit	  agencies	  occasionally	  allow	  their	  suppliers	  to	   increase	  the	  
price	  of	  certain	  spare	  parts.	  For	  example,	  an	  Italian	  NH	  90	  official	  noted	  that	  they	  tend	  to	  use	  
a	  quota	  of	  approximately	  10%	  above	  the	  costs.	  	  
 
6.2	   Programme	  Control	  	  
 
The	  second	  main	  dimension	  that	  has	  emerged	  from	  our	  interviews	  concerns	  the	  manner	  in	  
which	  individual	  programmes	  are	  being	  managed.	  Variation	  exists	  among	  the	  nations	  in	  the	  
degree	   of	   parliamentary	   oversight	   of	   programmes	   and	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   authority	   is	  
delegated	  to	  the	  programme	  manager	  and	  his	  staff.	  	  	  
 
France	  
In	  France,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  parliament	  in	  defence	  procurement	  is	  limited.	  Its	  involvement	  has	  
been	   restricted	   to	   approving	   the	   military	   programme-­‐laws,	   which	   define	   goals	   for	  
procurement	   during	   a	   multi-­‐year	   period	   offering	   general	   estimates	   of	   the	   probable	   costs	  
(Yost,	  1994:	  252).	  Hence,	   the	  DGA	  exercises	  considerable	   latitude	   in	   individual	  programme	  
management.	  	  
	   As	  in	  Germany	  and	  The	  Netherlands,	  the	  French	  programme	  manager	  has	  an	  integral	  
responsibility	  for	  programme	  related	  matters.	  This	  integral	  programme	  responsibility	  implies	  
that	   a	   programme	   manager	   is	   capable	   of	   making	   autonomous	   decisions	   within	   the	  
performance,	  time,	  budgetary	  framework	  provided	  by	  his	  superiors.	  Yet,	  some	  respondents	  
noted	  more	  subtle	  differences	  in	  how	  programme	  managers	  fulfil	  their	  role.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  
French	  NH	  90	  programme	  official	  described	  his	  role	  as	  follows	  “making	  decisions,	  proposing	  
choices,	  making	   innovative	  solutions	  to	  turn	  around	  the	  difficulties	  and	  so	  on.”	  Yet,	  he	  also	  
noted	   that	   some	  other	  programme	  managers	  displayed	  different	  attitudes	  and	  behaviours	  
towards	  their	  role,	  	  
	  
“For	  me,	   the	  major	  difficulty	   is	   that	  programme	  managers,	  not	  all	  of	   them,	  but	   too	  
many,	  are	  not	  in	  a	  mind-­‐set	  of	  making	  proposals	  to	  improve	  the	  process	  or	  to	  enable	  
earlier	  deliveries	  or	   to	  overcome	  problems,	  make	  compromises.	  They’re	  more	   in	   the	  
mind-­‐set	  of,	   it’s	  written	   in	  the	  contract,	  that’s	  the	  way	   it	  should	  happen,	  sometimes	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even	   though	   they	   acknowledge	   that	   which	   was	   written	   in	   the	   contract	   was	   either	  
stupid	   or	   not	   in	   the	   best	   interests	   of	   the	   customers.”	   	   (Interview	   French	   NH	   90	  
Programme	  Official)	  
	   	  	  
Germany	  
In	  Germany,	  defence	  procurement	  is	  subdued	  to	  stricter	  parliamentary	  oversight	  compared	  
to	   France	   and	   Italy.	   Besides	   the	   general	   evaluation	   of	   the	   equipment	   requirements	   and	  
budget,	  it	  also	  must	  approve	  of	  all	  large	  contracts	  worth	  over	  25M	  Euro	  (Kausal	  et	  al.	  1999).	  	  	  
In	  Germany,	  programmes	  are	  managed	  by	  BWB.	  Respondents	  of	  this	  organisation	  noted	  this	  
difference	  between	  Germany	  and	  the	  other	  nations.	  According	  to	  a	  German	  NH	  90	  official,	  	  
	  
“We	  said	  at	  the	  beginning,	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  is	  like	  most	  other	  programmes	  run	  
by	  the	  BWB.	  In	  other	  nations,	  these	  programmes	  are	  run	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Defence.	  
So,	  if	  you	  run	   	  into	  fundamental	  decisions,	  which	  have	  to	  be	  taken,	  we	  need	  to	  go	  to	  
the	  Ministry	  of	  Defence.	  But	  in	  other	  nations	  they	  are	  already	  part	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Defence.	  It	  can	  influence	  the	  reaction	  time.”	  (German	  Director	  Division	  Air)	  
	   	  
	   Similar	   to	   the	   Netherlands	   and	   France	   (yet	   unlike	   Italy,	   as	   we	   will	   discuss	   later)	  
German	  programme	  management	   is	   delegated	   to	   the	  BWB.	   It	   has	   an	   integral	   programme	  
responsibility,	  which	  means	   that	   it	   responsible	   for	   all	   programme	   related	  decisions	  within	  
the	   budgetary,	   requirements	   and	   time	   framework.	   Yet,	   at	   a	   higher	   level,	   the	   German	  
procurement	   organisation	   appears	   to	   be	   remarkably	   more	   complex.	   Gannon	   and	   Pillai	  
(2009)	   have	   discussed	   the	   compartmentalisation	   characteristic	   of	   German	   society.	   This	  
compartmentalisation	  is	  clearly	  visible	   in	  the	  German	  procurement	  organisation.	  According	  
to	  a	  Dutch	  NH	  90	  programme	  official,	  	  
	  
“In	  Germany	  the	  programme	  manager	  delivers	  a	  product	  within	  a	  certain	  budget	  and	  
timeperiod.	  That	   is	   really	  a	  one-­‐dimensional	   line.	  The	  operational	   commands	  or	   the	  
	  training	   squadrons	   are	   placed	   at	   a	   distance.	  Well	   they	   [the	   operational	   commands	  
and	  trainings	  squadrons]	  receive	  it	  [the	  helicopter].	  ‘This	  is	  it.	  This	  is	  what	  you	  ordered	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a	  while	  ago.’	  We	  [the	  Dutch,	  author]	  would	  call	   it	  throwing	  it	  over	  the	  wall.”	  (Dutch	  
NH	  90	  	  Programme	  Official	  1)	  
	  
The	  complexity	  of	  the	  German	  procurement	  organisation	  is	  a	  remnant	  of	  the	  Second	  
World	  War.	  Allied	  forces	  were	  keen	  to	  restrict	  German	  rearmament.	  This	   is	  clearly	  seen	   in	  
the	  structure	  of	  the	  German	  procurement	  system	  with	  a	  very	  sharp	  separation	  between	  the	  
civilian	   procurement	   organisation,	   the	   armed	   forces	   and	   the	   political	   establishment,	   both	  
organisationally	  and	  geographically	  (the	  procurement	  organisation	  is	  located	  in	  Koblenz,	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Defence	  in	  Bonn	  and	  the	  MODs	  political	  level	  in	  Berlin).	  	  
 
Italy	  
A	  peculiar	  feature	  of	  the	  Italian	  programme	  management	  is	  the	  dispersal	  of	  decision-­‐making	  
authority.	  Italians	  working	  in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  often	  do	  not	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  take	  
decisions.	  An	  Italian	  NH	  90	  programme	  official	  also	  noted	  this.	  	  
	  
“But	  when	  we	  go	  at	  working	  group	  level	  some	  representatives	  have	  enough	  power	  to	  
	   take	  decisions	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  nation.	  And	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  Italy.	  In	  Italy	  mostly	  
	   the	  representative	  has	  not	  the	  power	  to	  take	  a	  decision	  during	  the	  meeting.	  He	  can	  
	   only	  take	  note,	  give	  the	  Italian	  position,	  take	  note	  of	  the	  proposal	  and	  come	  back	  to	  
	   get	  the	  authorisation.”	  (Interview	  Italian	  NH	  90	  Programme	  Official	  2)	  
	  
In	   the	   other	   nations	   there	   is	   an	   integral	   programme	   management	   responsibility.	  
Which	  means	  that	  there	  is	  a	  performance,	  budget,	  time	  framework	  in	  which	  the	  programme	  
officials	   have	   to	   take	   programmatic	   decisions.	   In	   Italy,	   this	   is	   somewhat	   different.	   Here	  
programme	   officials	   have	   to	   go	   back	   for	   approval	   of	   from	   the	   armed	   forces.	   As	   a	   Dutch	  
NAHEMA	  official	  told	  us,	  
	  
	  “It	   is	  how	  programme	  responsibilities	  are	  divided.	  And	  how	  you	  deal	  with	   that	  and	  
	   especially	  in	  a	  country	  like	  Italy	  that	  is	  very	  difficult.	  In	  the	  Netherlands,	  Germany,	  and	  
	   in	   France	   programme	   managers	   have	   an	   integral	   responsibility,	   time,	   money	   and	  
	   product…if	   you	   stay	  within	   that,	   you	   have	   an	   integral	   programme	   responsibility	   as	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   programme	   leader.	  That	   is	  not	   the	  case	   in	   Italy.	  The	   Italian	  programme	  manager	   is	  
	   actually	   a	   procurement	   leader.	   He	   procures,	   he	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	   contractual	  
	   aspects.	   But	   all	   other	   responsibilities	   are	   somewhere	   else	   in	   Italy.	   Often	   not	   even	  
	   within	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Defence,	   but	   at	   the	   airbases.	   And	   that	   programme	   leader	  
	   cannot	  direct	  them.	  So	  they	  can	  take	  a	  completely	  	  different	  position	  and	  say,	  ‘I	  do	  not	  
	   feel	   bound	   by	   a	   decision	   of	   the	   SC	   (Steering	   Committee,	   author)	   or	   the	   JEC	   (Joint	  
	   Executive	  Committee,	  author).’”	  (Interview	  Dutch	  NAHEMA	  Official	  1)	  
	  
This	  dispersal	  of	  authority	  in	  Italy	  makes	  it	  very	  difficult	  to	  nationally	  harmonize	  the	  
Italian	  position.	  An	  Italian	  NH	  90	  programme	  official	  told	  us	  that	  it	  is	  generally	  more	  difficult	  
to	   harmonize	   the	   position	   Italy	   internally	   than	   with	   the	   other	   nations	   in	   the	   NH	   90	  




In	   the	   Netherlands	   the	   parliament	   is	   strongly	   involved	   in	   programme	   management.	   All	  
programmes	  worth	  more	   than	  25	  million	  Euros	  are	  subdued	   to	  parliamentary	  oversight.	  A	  
yearly	   programme	   progress	   report	   has	   to	   be	   submitted	   to	   parliament.	   This	   strong	  
parliamentary	  programme	  oversight	  was	  also	  noted	  by	  a	  French	  official,	  who	  noted	  that	  this	  
was	  very	  ‘Dutchy’	  (Interview	  French	  NH	  90	  Official)	  in	  the	  programme.	  	  
In	   the	   Netherlands,	   the	   programme	   manager	   has	   an	   integral	   programme	  
responsibility	   as	   in	   France	   and	   Germany.	   Programme	   management	   is	   delegated	   to	   a	  
dedicated	   programme	   office	   within	   the	   Defence	   Materiel	   Organisation.	   Like	   in	   Germany	  
there	  is	  no	  direct	  link	  between	  NAHEMA	  and	  the	  Dutch	  armed	  forces.	  Yet,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  
subtle	   differences	   in	   the	   fulfilment	   of	   roles	   exist.	   Comparing	   his	   role	   to	   his	   German	  
counterpart,	  a	  Dutch	  NH	  90	  programme	  official	  noted	  the	  following	  difference.	  	  
	  
“The	  German	  has	   received	  a	   framework	   from	  his	  organisation.	  He	   is	   responsible	   for	  
this	   product,	   time	   and	   money.	   I	   have	   this	   as	   well,	   but	   here	   we	   really	   work	   in	   a	  
‘triangular	   structure’.	   We	   are	   talking	   about	   the	   ‘prioritiser’,	   maintenance	   and	   the	  
user.	  And	  this	  project	  	  is	   placed	   higher	   up	   in	   that	   trapezium	   and	   I	   often	   chair	   these	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meetings.	  We	  ‘polder’	  (a	  Dutch	  word	  to	  describe	  the	  consensus	  seeking	  attitudes	  and	  
communicative	   behaviours	   of	   individuals	   with	   divergent	   interests	   as	   described	   in	  
Chapter	   3,	   author)	   extensively,	   but	   it	   also	  means	   that	  we	  walk	   together	   on	   a	   very	  
broad	  tire.	  All	  the	  parties	  involved.	  So,	  when	  OPCO	  	  (Operational	   Command,	   author)	  
says,	  this	  is	  something	  that	  I	  cannot	  accept	  technically,	  I	  can’t	  say:	  ‘Well,	  this	  is	  how	  
we	   ordered	   and	   developed	   it	   ten	   years	   ago,	   that’s	   that.’	   Then	   I	   have	   to	   find	   out	  
whether	  we	  made	  a	  mistake	   in	   the	  programme,	  and	  then	   I	  have	  to	   find	  out	  how	  to	  
solve	   it.	  Or	  when	   it	   involves	  an	  additional	   requirement,	   I	   have	   to	   find	  money	   for	   it.	  
And	   I	  have	  to	  ask	  people	   from	  DOBBP	  (Directie	  Operationeel	  Beleid	  Behoeftestelling	  
en	  Plan,	  an	  entity	  within	  the	  Dutch	  DOD,	  author),	   the	  department	  that	  specifies	  the	  
orders,	   Do	   you	   want	   this?	   Do	   you	   want	   to	   allocate	   money	   for	   it,	   yes	   or	   no?	   They	  
[German	  programme	  	  management]	   say,	   ‘No,	   Contract	   is	   contract,	   Specification	   is	  
specification.’	  I	  don’t	  do	  that.”	  (Interview	  Dutch	  NH	  90	  Programme	  Official	  1)	  
	  
What	  the	  respondent	  seems	  to	  indicate	  here	  is	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  difference	  in	  how	  
Dutch	   and	   German	   programme	   managers	   perceive	   their	   duties.	   Whereas	   in	   Germany	   a	  
tendency	   seems	   to	   exist	   to	   act	   strictly	  within	   the	   confines	   of	   the	   performance,	   time,	   and	  
budgetary	   framework,	   in	   the	  Netherlands	   a	   broader	  perspective	   is	   invoked.	  A	  programme	  
manager	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  more	  of	  problem	  solver,	  even	  for	  problems	  
that	  lie	  somewhat	  outside	  his	  primary	  responsibility.	   
 
6.3	   Concluding	  Comment	  
 
In	  this	  chapter	  we	  presented	  our	  findings	  for	  the	  NH	  90	  nations.	  Table	  6.1	  summarises	  these	  
along	  two	  main	  dimensions	  we	  distinguished:	  defence	  industrial	  orientation	  and	  programme	  
control.	   In	   the	   NH	   90	   programme,	   France	   and	   Italy,	   have	   a	   strong	   defence	   industrial	  
orientation.	  The	  defence	  materiel	  organisations	  in	  these	  countries	  are	  very	  concerned	  with	  
national	   industrial	   interests.	   In	   Germany,	   national	   industrial	   considerations	   are	   also	  
important,	   but	   they	   seem	   to	   play	   a	   less	   important	   role.	   The	   Dutch	   defence	   materiel	  
organisation	   is	   less	  concerned	  with	  national	   industrial	  concerns.	  The	  Netherlands	  has	  since	  
the	  1990s	  pursued	  a	  more	  market	  oriented	  approach	  to	  the	  purchase	  of	  military	  equipment.	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It	  has	  a	   strong	  preference	   for	  buying	  military	  equipment	   that	  has	  already	  been	  developed	  
and	  produced	  elsewhere.	  Only	  when	  this	  approach	  is	  unfeasible	  it	  will	  look	  for	  international	  
cooperation	  or	  start	  a	  national	  development	  and	  production	  programme.	  	  
 Before	  the	  1990s	  most	  of	  the	  French	  industrial	  base	  was	  state-­‐owned.	  This	  was	  also	  
the	  case	  in	  Italy.	  In	  both	  countries	  a	  privatisation	  wave	  took	  place.	  Yet,	  in	  both	  countries	  the	  
government	   still	   holds	   a	   significant	   share	   in	   its	   primary	   suppliers.	   In	   Germany	   and	   in	   the	  
Netherlands	   a	   stronger	   separation	   between	   the	   government	   and	   its	   defence	   industry	   has	  
developed	   over	   the	   last	   decades.	   These	   differences	   are	   also	   reflected	   in	   the	   interaction	  
between	   the	   government	   and	   its	   defence	   suppliers,	   which	   take	   on	   a	   more	   cooperative	  
relationship	   in	  both	   Italy	   and	   in	   France.	   In	  Germany	  and	   in	   the	  Netherlands,	   governments	  
tend	   to	   take	   a	   more	   arms-­‐length	   distance	   towards	   their	   main	   defence	   suppliers,	   which	  
culminates	  in	  relationships	  characterized	  by	  a	  more	  business-­‐like	  character. 
 
 
Table	  6.1	   The	  dimensions	  of	  the	  institutional	  logics	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  nations	  
Nation/	  
Dimension	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   Strong	   Weak	  
Export	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   Weak	   N.A.	   Weak	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In	   the	   Netherlands,	   Germany	   and	   Italy,	   export	   is	   less	   promoted	   by	   the	   defence	  
materiel	   organisations	  of	   the	  nations.	   France	  has	  had	  a	   stronger	   export	  orientation	  and	   it	  
has	   been	   a	   strong	   advocate	   of	   greater	   European	   cooperation	   in	   the	   development	   and	  
production	  of	  military	  equipment.	  Germany	  also	  has	  a	  strong	  European	  focus.	   In	   Italy,	   this	  
appears	  to	  be	  less	  the	  case.	  The	  Netherlands	  used	  to	  favour	  a	  European	  focus,	  but	  over	  time	  
has	  become	  more	  U.S.	  oriented.	  	  
In	  France,	  Germany	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  the	  programme	  managers	  have	  an	  integral	  
programme	   management	   responsibility.	   This	   means	   that	   they	   have	   autonomy	   in	   making	  
decisions	   that	   do	   not	   negatively	   affect	   the	   performance,	   budget	   and	   time	   framework.	   In	  
Italy,	  responsibilities	  are	  dispersed.	  The	  Italian	  programme	  manager	  acts	  as	  a	  procurement	  
leader,	   while	   the	   responsibilities	   for	  making	   decisions	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   programme	   lie	  
elsewhere	  within	  the	  Italian	  armed	  forces.	  
With	  reference	  to	  the	  description	  we	  gave	  in	  chapter	  3,	  in	  this	  chapter	  we	  have	  seen	  





















































CHAPTER	  7 	  	   THE	  ALIGNMENT	  OF	  LOGICS	  	  
 
In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  we	  have	  described	  the	  logics	  of	  the	  programme	  actors	  in	  more	  detail	  
and	   classified	   them	   on	   a	   number	   of	   dimensions.	   In	   this	   chapter	   we	   will	   first	   start	   with	  
showing	  how	  these	  differences	  affected	  the	  cooperative	  efforts	  of	  the	  participating	  nations	  
and	   how	   the	   process	   of	   aligning	   occurred.	   Specifically,	   we	   will	   detail	   the	   influences	   of	  
national	   logics	  on	   the	   standardisation	  of	   the	  NH	  90,	   the	  management	  of	   the	  delays	   in	   the	  
programme	  and	  the	  division	  of	  work	  share	  between	  the	  nations.	  We	  will	   refer	   to	   these	  as	  
the	  “costs	  of	  alignment”.	   	  We	  will	  then	  proceed	  with	  our	  second	  research	  question	  dealing	  
with	  how	  actors	  try	  to	  align	  their	   logics.	  This	  analysis	  follows	  the	  argument	  we	  set	  forth	   in	  
paragraphs	   2.4	   till	   2.6	   in	   the	   theoretical	   chapter.	   There	   we	   suggested	   that	   underlying	  
alignment	   a	   sense-­‐making	   process	   of	   noticing,	   interpretation	   and	   action	   takes	   place.	  
Moreover,	   we	   will	   specify	   a	   number	   of	   mechanisms	   that	   facilitate	   these	   sense-­‐making	  
activities.	  Chapter	  4	  contains	  more	  detailed	  information	  on	  the	  respondents	  interviewed	  and	  
the	  data	  analysis	  methods	  we	  have	  used.	  	  
In	   chapter	   two	   we	   discussed	   the	   work	   of	   Bacharach,	   Bamberger	   and	   Sonnenstuhl	  
(1996)	   at	   some	   length.	   They	   maintained	   that	   for	   enduring	   and	   effective	   social	   exchange	  
relationships	   alignment	   of	   logics	   is	   required.	   Yet,	   their	   study	   focused	   on	   a	   hierarchical	  
exchange	   relationship.	   Here	  we	   focus	   on	   an	   interorganisational	   exchange	   relationship	   –	   a	  
cooperative	   effort	   of	   a	   number	   of	   nations	   represented	   by	   their	   procurement	   agencies	   –	  
dedicated	  to	  the	  development,	  production	  and	  logistics	  support	  of	  a	  new	  military	  helicopter.	  
We	  argued	   that	  hierarchical	  alignment	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  achieved	  more	  easily	   than	  horizontal	  
alignment	  since	  in	  the	  former	  situation	  superiors	  have	  more	  coercive	  means	  at	  their	  disposal	  
to	  ensure	  alignment	  by	  their	  subordinates.	  These	  coercive	  means	  are	  absent,	  although	  not	  
entirely	   as	  we	  will	   see	   below,	   in	   horizontal	   exchange	   relationships.	  Moreover,	  we	  posited	  
that	   full	   alignment	   in	   the	   latter	   condition	   might	   not	   be	   fully	   accomplished.	   Indeed	   the	  
analysis	  of	  our	  data	  revealed	  that	  full	  alignment	   is	  not	  a	  necessary	  requirement	  to	  achieve	  
desirable	   results.	   The	   NH	   90	   is	   currently	   flying,	   although	   it	   is	   not	   yet	   fully	   operationally	  
capable.	   Frequently,	   respondents	  pointed	   to	   the	   innovative	   features	  of	   the	  helicopter	  and	  
the	   success	   of	   the	   helicopter	   on	   the	   export	  market.	   Nevertheless,	   they	   also	   stressed	   the	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difficulties	   that	   they	   had	   encountered	   during	   their	   cooperative	   effort	   like	   the	   heavy	  
programme	  structures,	  on	  both	  the	  governmental	  and	  private	  side.	  	  
What	  emerged	  over	  time	  was	  a	  form	  of	  alignment,	  in	  which	  logics	  aligned	  to	  such	  a	  
degree	   that	   the	   cooperative	   effort	   could	   produce	   a	   helicopter	   that	   fulfilled	   most	   of	   the	  
needs	   and	   requirements	   of	   the	   armed	   forces	   of	   the	   participating	   nations.	   Nonetheless,	   a	  
number	   of	   difficult	   compromises	   had	   to	   be	   reached	   which	   manifested	   themselves	   in	  
programme	  delays,	  a	   lack	  of	  standardisation	  and	   issues	  around	  the	  division	  of	  work	  share.	  
Before	  we	   turn	   to	   the	  question	  of	   how	   the	  process	   of	   aligning	  occurred	  we	  discuss	   these	  
compromises	  and	  solutions	  reached	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  paragraph.	  	  	  	  	  
 
7.1	   ‘Costs’	  of	  Alignment	  
 
We	  were	  able	  to	  discern	  a	  number	  of	  instances	  of	  alignment	  among	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  NH	  90	  
programme	  that	  came	  with	  a	  ‘cost’.	  As	  suggested,	  these	  costs	  were	  primarily	  observable	  in	  
the	   lack	   of	   standardisation	   achieved	   in	   the	   helicopters,	   the	   delays	   that	   occurred	   in	   the	  
programme,	   and	   (dis)agreements	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   division	   of	   work	   share	   among	   the	  
nations.	   For	   reasons	   of	   clarity	  we	  will	   treat	   these	   instances	   separately.	   In	   reality	   they	   are	  
often	  interdependent.	  	  
	  
	  
Lack	  of	  Standardisation	  
‘Costs’	   of	   alignment	   are	   identifiable	   in	   the	   number	   of	   variants	   that	   have	   been	   under	  
development	   and	   production.	  We	   noted	   earlier	   that	   one	   of	   the	   primary	   objectives	   in	   the	  
programme	   was	   to	   achieve	   as	   much	   standardisation	   as	   possible	   within	   the	   NH	   90	  
programme.	  The	  idea	  was	  to	  build	  two	  different	  versions,	  a	  tactical	  transport	  helicopter,	  and	  
a	  naval	  variant	  based	  on	  a	  common	  design.	  Yet,	  over	  the	  years	  the	  number	  of	  variants	  grew	  
rapidly.	   Now	   there	   are	   about	   24	   different	   versions.	   The	   differences	   between	   the	   variants	  
range	  from	  alternative	  communication	  systems	  to	  different	  engines.	  Yet,	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  
is	  related	  to	  conflicting	  logics	  is	  not	  always	  easy	  to	  establish.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  communication	  
equipment	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  use	  the	  same	  communication	  systems	  that	  are	  already	  used	  in	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other	  equipment	  of	  national	  armed	  forces.	  This	  is,	  however,	  somewhat	  different	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  the	  engines	  of	  the	  helicopter.	  	  
In	  chapter	  5	  we	  already	  noted	  the	  original	   idea	  to	  have	  the	  NH	  90	  powered	  by	  the	  
Rolls-­‐Royce	  Turbomeca	  engine	  RTM	  322.	  Yet,	   Italy	   later	   insisted	  on	  using	  the	  GE	  T700-­‐T6E.	  
The	   GE	   T700-­‐T6E	   is	   an	   engine	   that	   was	   jointly	   developed	   and	   produced	   by	   U.S.	   General	  
Electric	  and	  Fiat	  Avio	   from	   Italy.	  The	   Italian	  government	  bared	   the	  non-­‐recurring	  costs	   for	  
the	   inclusion	  of	   this	   engine.	   Thus	   far,	   only	   Italy	   and	   Spain	   have	   selected	   the	  GE	   T700-­‐T6E	  
engine	  to	  power	  their	  NH	  90s.	  	  
A	   similar	   issue	  emerged	  during	   the	  selection	  of	   the	  sonar	   for	   the	  NH	  90	  NFH.	  Here	  
nations	   also	   proved	   unable	   to	   reconcile	   their	   divergent	   interests.	   Basically,	   the	   industrial	  
partners	  were	  responsible	  for	  making	  a	  proposal	  for	  the	  sonar	  to	  be	  used	  on	  the	  NH	  90.	  Yet,	  
the	   nations	   were	   unable	   to	   reconcile	   their	   diverging	   preferences.	   As	   a	   respondent	   from	  
Fokker	  noted,	  	  
	  
“And	  subsequently,	  you	  see	  that	  the	  country	  that	  did	  not	  get	  its	  way,	  that	  was	  France,	  
	   and	   you	  are	   talking	  at	   state	   secretary	   level,	   pushed	  a	   second	   sonar	   through.	   To	  be	  
	   sure,	   itself	   financing	   an	   important	   share	   of	   the	   costs,	   but	   also	   partly	   not.	   A	   lot	   of	  
	   trouble.	   So,	   finally	   there	   are	   two	   alternatives.”	   (Interview	   Executive-­‐Vice	   President	  
	   STORK)	   	  
	  
In	  this	  case	  Germany,	  Italy	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  preferred	  a	  sonar	  from	  ELAC	  Nautik	  
from	  Germany,	   France	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   had	   set	   its	  mind	   on	   a	   sonar	   supplied	   by	   Thales	  
from	  France.	  	  
	   	  	  
	  
Programme	  Delays	  
The	  delays	  in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme,	  in	  particular	  the	  delays	  occurring	  in	  the	  development	  
phase,	  could	  partially	  be	  explained	  by	  differences	  in	  logics	  among	  the	  nations.	  A	  German	  NH	  
90	   programme	   official	   noted	   how	   difficult	   it	   was	   to	   harmonize	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	  
different	  nations	  early	  on	  in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  	  
	  
 132
“Just	  after	  the	  signature	  of	  the	  development	  contract,	  and	  in	  the	  first	  years	  we	  had	  a	  
	   lot	  of	  problems	  among	  the	  nations.	  The	  requirements	  of	  the	  users	  were	  very	  different.	  
	   And	  it	  was	  a	  very	  hard	  fight	  to	  come	  to	  a	  conclusion	  we	  could	  give	  to	   industry.	  And	  
	   say,	  ‘Okay	  that	  is	  the	  	  way	  ahead.’”	  (German	  NH	  90	  programme	  official	  3)	  
	  
We	  have	  seen	  how	  some	  nations	  pressed	  for	  certain	  specific	  national	  requirements,	  
like	   the	   Italian	   requirement	   for	   an	   alternative	   engine	   to	   power	   the	   NH	   90,	   the	   use	   of	  
different	   communication	   systems	   by	   the	   nations,	   and	   the	   selection	   of	   another	   sonar	   by	  
France.	   The	   variance	   in	   these	   requirements	   generates	   additional	   income	   for	   the	   industrial	  
partners	  in	  NHindustries.	  The	  additional	  money	  that	  NHI	  receives	  does,	  however,	  come	  at	  a	  
cost.	  NHI	  has	  problems	  managing	  the	  different	  variants,	  as	  an	  NH	  90	  programme	  official	  of	  
Fokker	  mentioned,	  	  
	  
“I	  think	  that	  NHI	  has	  made	  a	  very	  big	  mistake	  by	  accepting	  so	  many	  variants,	  making	  
	   it	   extremely	   difficult	   for	   itself,	   especially	   in	   the	   qualification	   area.”	   (Interview	  
	   Executive-­‐Vice	  President	  STORK)	  	  
	  
The	  qualification	  concerns	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  nations	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  
helicopter’s	  requirements	  that	  the	  nations	  initially	  specified	  have	  been	  met.	  This	  involves	  a	  
substantial	   amount	   of	   work	   in	   terms	   of	   testing	   and	   providing	   the	   appropriate	  
documentation.	   Yet,	   this	   work	   as	   a	   number	   of	   respondents	   suggested	   has	   been	   grossly	  
underestimated	  by	  the	  industry.	  On	  top	  of	  that,	  the	  problem	  has	  been	  compounded	  because	  
all	   the	   nations	   have	   their	   own	   qualification	   process	   instead	   of	   just	   one	   international	  
qualification	  process.	  Moreover,	  the	  active	  selling	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  helicopter	  to	  non-­‐NAHEMO	  
nations	  by	  NHI	  increases	  the	  pressure.	  	  
It	   is	  also	  here	  where	  we	  see	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  diverging	  institutional	  logics	  of	  the	  
nations	  in	  how	  they	  deal	  with	  this	  problem.	  All	  the	  nations	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  delays	  in	  the	  
NH	  90	  programme.	  They	  all	  have	  to	  maintain	  a	  fleet	  of	  operational	  helicopters	  that	  are	  due	  
to	  be	   replaced	  by	   the	  NH	  90.	   Some	  nations	  have	  been	  considering	  a	   lifetime	  extension	  of	  
their	  helicopters.	  A	  French	  NAHEMA	  official	  described	  the	  situation	  in	  France	  as	  follows,	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“They	   [the	   NH	   90	   nations]	   have	   to	   look	   for	   other	   solutions	   like	   a	   life	   extension	  
	   programme	  for	  the	  old	  helicopter.	  You	  know	  that	  France	  is	  still	  using	  the	  Super	  Frelon	  
	   helicopter.	   Super	   Frelons	  were	  manufactured	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	   sixties.	   So	   some	  are	  
	   more	  than	  40	  years	  old.”	  (Interview	  French	  NAHEMA	  Official	  2)	  
	  
In	   France,	   helicopters	   that	   are	   almost	   half	   a	   century	   old	   are	   still	   operational.	   The	  
French	  DOD	  is	  investigating	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  midlife	  extension	  of	  these	  helicopters,	  while	  
they	  are	  awaiting	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  NH	  90.	  Similarly,	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  lifetime	  extension	  of	  
the	  old	  Lynx	  helicopters	  of	  the	  Dutch	  navy	  has	  been	  investigated	  by	  the	  Netherlands.	  Similar	  
problems	  also	  occur	  in	  Italy	  and	  in	  Germany.	  A	  German	  NH	  90	  programme	  official	  noted:	  	  
	  
“With	   the	  NFH	   it	   is	   the	  same	  for	  us,	  because	  we	   intended	  to	  have	  the	  contract	   two	  
	   years	  ago.	  Due	  to	  technical	  problems…	  the	  whole	  programme	  is	  delayed.	  The	  output	  
	   of	   this	   for	  example	   is	   that	  we	  are	  going	   to	   close	   the	   squadron	   in	  Kiel	  and	   the	  navy	  
	   intends	   to	   go	   to	   Nordholz,	   where	   there	   is	   another	   squadron	   in	   Northern	   Germany.	  
	   And	  they	  intended	  to	  introduce	  the	  	   new	   helicopter	   NH90	   in	   Nordholz.	   Since	   we	  
	   delayed	  the	  programme,	  they	  have	  to	  take	  their	  old	  Sea	  Kings	  and	  transfer	  them	  from	  
	   Kiel	  to	  Nordholz.	  It	  cost	  millions.”	  (Interview	  German	  NH	  90	  Programme	  Official	  3)	  
	  
The	   delays	   also	   seriously	   affect	   personnel	   planning,	   because	   some	   crews	   have	  
already	  been	  trained	   in	   flying	  and	  maintaining	   the	  NH	  90,	  yet	   they	  still	  have	   to	   fly	   the	  old	  
helicopters.	   Yet,	   where	   the	   difference	   in	   institutional	   logics	   sets	   in	   is	   in	   the	  way	   that	   the	  
different	   nations	   deal	   with	   these	   issues.	   The	   Netherlands	   has	   been	   particularly	   keen	   on	  
receiving	  their	  helicopters	  in	  time.	  As	  a	  Dutch	  Ministry	  of	  Defence	  official	  noted,	  	  
	  
“What	   is	   at	   stake	   here,	   is	   that	   every	   nation	   is	   closer	   to	   its	   own	   than	   to	   foreign	  
	   industry.	   When	   very	   sensitive	   decisions	   have	   to	   be	   taken,	   nations	   will	   position	  
	   themselves	  differently.	   To	  give	  an	  example,	  what	  bothers	  us	   from	   the	  Dutch	   side	   is	  
	   that	   there	   is	   so	  much	  energy	  being	   spent	  on	   the	   sale	   of	   new	  helicopters	   instead	  of	  
	   delivering	  helicopters	  on	  time	  to	  the	  launching	  customers.”	  (Interview	  Dutch	  Director	  
	   Projects	  and	  Procurement)	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The	  respondent	  notes	  how	  industrial	  political	  concerns	  influence	  the	  position	  of	  the	  
nations	   when	   important	   decisions	   have	   to	   be	   made.	   He	   notes	   the	   dissatisfaction	   of	   the	  
Dutch	  DMO	  with	  the	  active	  marketing	  of	  the	  helicopter	  by	  NHI	  to	  potential	  export	  countries	  
instead	   of	   delivering	   the	   helicopters	   to	   the	   original	   NAHEMO	   nations.	   The	   respondents	  
describes	  how	  The	  Netherlands	  has	  suggested	  to	  stop	  all	  contributions	  to	  the	  qualification	  
process	  of	  non-­‐NAHEMO	  nations,	  	  
	   	  
“The	  Netherlands	  says,	  ‘We	  will	  stop	  the	  contributions	  to	  the	  qualification	  process	  of	  
	   non-­‐NAHEMO	   countries.’	   Well,	   in	   the	   other	   countries,	   I	   think	   they	   will	   scratch	  
	   themselves	   behind	   their	   ears,	   because	   that	   is	   employment.	   They	   make	   a	   different	  
	   assessment.”	  (Interview	  Dutch	  Director	  Projects	  and	  Procurement)	  
	  
For	  the	  other	  countries,	  particularly	  in	  Italy	  and	  France,	  to	  stop	  the	  contributions	  of	  
the	   qualification	   process	   for	   the	   non-­‐NAHEMO	   countries	  would	   be	  much	  more	   viewed	   in	  
terms	  of	   industrial	  prosperity	  and	  employment,	  making	   it	   less	   likely	  for	  them	  to	  follow	  the	  
Dutch	  position	  on	  this	  matter.	  	  	   	  
	   	  
Division	  of	  Work	  Share	  	  
One	  of	  the	  primary	  motivations	  for	  the	  nations	  to	  cooperate	  on	  the	  NH	  90	  programme,	  and	  
to	  collaborate	  on	  development	  and	  production	  programmes	  more	  generally,	  is	  to	  save	  costs.	  
Research	   &	   Development	   money	   is	   spread	   out	   over	   a	   number	   of	   nations,	   and	   in	   the	  
production	   phase	   the	   unit	   costs	   decrease	   with	   increasing	   production	   numbers.	   Yet,	  
cooperation	  also	  induces	  inefficiencies.	  Participating	  nations,	  generally	  insist	  to	  spend	  their	  
money	  inside	  their	  own	  border,	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘no	  money	  across	  the	  border’	  principle.	  In	  this	  
regard,	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  does	  not	  pose	  an	  exception	  to	  this	  rule.	  	  
If	  a	  nation	  wants	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  programme	  it	  will	  demand	  a	  work	  share	  for	  its	  
national	   industry	   at	   least	   equal	   to	   the	   size	   of	   its	   contribution	   in	   funding.	   An	   important	  
inefficiency	   that	   this	   creates	   is	   that	   often	   industries	   have	   to	   be	   included	   that	   are	   not	  
necessarily	  the	  best	  suited	  for	  the	   job.	  Moreover,	   in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  two	  helicopter	  
manufacturers,	   AgustaWestland	   and	   Eurocopter,	   that	   on	   the	  world	   helicopter	  market	   are	  
fierce	  competitors,	  are	  working	  together.	  This	  is	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  division	  of	  work	  share	  
among	  the	  partners.	  This	  has	  also	  been	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  issues	  in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	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Dividing	   the	  work	   share	   is	   also	   one	   of	   the	   primary	   difficulties	   that	   have	   to	   be	   dealt	   with	  
between	   the	   nations	   and	   their	   national	   industries.	   It	   is	   also	   here	  where	   institutional	   logic	  
plays	  a	  dominant	  role.	  As	  a	  German	  NH	  90	  official	  explained	  to	  us,	  	  
	  
“Each	  cooperation	  is	  underlined	  in	  a	  MoU.	  In	  the	  MoU	  the	  rules	  for	  this	  cooperation	  
	   are	  fixed.	  And	  the	  rules	  normally	  say:	  the	  numbers	  which	  are	  intended	  to	  be	  procured	  
	   are	   leading,	   and	   following	   that,	   the	   work	   share	   and	   the	   cost	   share	   are	   divided.	  
	   Normally,	   the	   work	   share	   and	   the	   cost	   share	   are	   the	   same.	   If	   now,	   between	  
	   development	  and	  production,	  a	  nation	  decided	   to	  only	  procure	  half	  of	   the	   intended
	   helicopters,	   they	  have	  to	  give	  away	  work	  share.	  That	   is	  part	  of	   the	  rules.	  And	  some	  
	   nations	  play	  different	  than	  other	  nations.”	  (German	  Director	  Division	  Air)	  
	  
In	  the	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  the	  rules	  are	  specified.	  The	  work	  share	  was	  based	  on	  
the	  number	  of	  helicopters	  that	  a	  nation	   intended	  to	  procure.	  Thus,	   if	  a	  nation	   intended	  to	  
procure	  25%	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  initially	  agreed	  helicopters,	  it	  would	  receive	  25%	  of	  the	  
work	  share.	  Yet,	  a	  new	  issue	  for	  negotiation	  emerges	  when	  nations	  later	  decide	  to	  procure	  
fewer	  helicopters	  than	  originally	  intended.	  	  
In	  general,	  in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  nations	  tend	  to	  procure	  fewer	  helicopters	  then	  
they	  originally	  intended	  mostly	  because	  of	  budgetary	  reasons.	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  later	  on	  
the	  division	  of	  work	  share	  had	  to	  be	  adapted	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  cost	  share	  and	  work	  share	  
would	   be	   in	   balance	   again.	   Yet,	   as	   the	   respondent	   notes	   some	   nations	   play	   this	   game	  
differently	   than	   other	   nations.	   In	   chapter	   4,	   we	   discussed	   the	   budgetary	   restrictions	   that	  
Italy	   and	  Germany	   faced	   after	   the	   signing	   of	   the	   development	   and	   production	  MoU	   early	  
1990s.	  We	  also	  noted	   the	   subsequent	  agreement	  between	  France	  and	   the	  Netherlands	   to	  
increase	  their	  financial	  contribution	  in	  the	  development	  work	  of	  the	  programme.	  	  
Originally,	   France	   intended	   to	  procure	  220	  NH	  90s,	  but	  decided	   in	  1996	   to	  procure	  
only	  160	  helicopters.	  Germany	  also	  reduced	  its	  order	  to	  243	  from	  an	  originally	  planned	  off	  
take	  of	  272	  helicopters	  at	  that	  time.	  Italy	  increased	  its	  order	  from	  an	  originally	  planned	  214	  
to	   224.	   Another	   reduction	   in	   NH	   90	   procurement	   numbers	   occurred	   in	   1998,	   when	   Italy	  
reduced	   its	   order	   to	   196,	   later	   followed	   by	   Germany	   cutting	   its	   order	   to	   219.	   The	  
Netherlands	   never	   changed	   its	   order	   for	   20	  NH	  90s.	   These	   are	   the	   procurement	   numbers	  
that	   have	   been	   agreed	   upon	   in	   the	   Production/Production	   investment	   Memorandum	   of	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Understanding.	  These	  reductions	  in	  procurement	  numbers	  are	  not	  uncommon	  and	  can	  occur	  
for	  a	  variety	  of	   reasons.	   Industrial	   interests	  may	  play	  a	   role,	  yet	  over	  a	  period	  of	  20	   to	  25	  
years,	  requirements	  may	  have	  changed,	  or	  a	  nation’s	  budget	  is	  under	  pressure.	  Nonetheless,	  
this	  requires	  that	  the	  division	  of	  work	  share	  has	  to	  be	  adjusted	  to	  reflect	  the	  changed	  cost	  
share	  in	  the	  programme.	  This	  adjustment	  in	  work	  share	  creates	  additional	  inefficiencies.	  As	  a	  
German	  NH	  90	  programme	  official	  explained,	  	  
	  
“France	   is	   the	   global	   player	   in	   this	   programme.	   They	   had	   more	   than	   42%	   in	   the	  
	   development	  	   costs.	  So,	  in	  the	  development	  phase,	  they	  spend	  42%	  of	  the	  money	  and	  
	   they	  had	  42%	  of	  the	  work	  share.	  Now	  the	  work	  share	  is	  more	  going	  into	  the	  direction	  
	   of	  Italy	  and	  Germany	  who	  have	  more	  helicopters	  than	  France.	  But	  the	  work	  share	  has	  
	   to	  be	  adapted.	  And	  so	  the	  industry	  is	  forced	  to	  look	  sometimes	  to	  equipment,	  which	  is	  
	   more	  expensive	  but	  belongs	  to	  Germany	  or	  to	  Italy,	  so	  that	  is	  contradicting	  the	  idea	  to	  
	   save	  money.”	  (Interview	  German	  NH	  90	  Programme	  Official	  3)	  
	  
So,	  where	  France	   in	   the	  development	  phase	  had	  42%	  of	   the	  work	   share,	  Germany,	  
Italy	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  request	  an	  adjustment	  in	  the	  work	  share	  division	  in	  the	  production	  
phase	   and	   the	   in-­‐service	   support	   phase.	   Yet,	   as	   the	   German	   NH	   90	   programme	   official	  
argued	   this	   is	  not	  necessarily	  conducive	   to	   the	  efficiency	  motive.	   It	   sometimes	   results	   in	  a	  
situation	  in	  which	  the	  nations	  select	  alternative	  suppliers	  developing	  products	  that	  are	  more	  
expensive	  than	  when	  already	  existing	  products	  are	  used.	  
Moreover,	   there	  was	   some	  disagreement	  among	   the	  nations	  of	  how	  to	   resolve	   the	  
work	  share	   issue.	  Currently,	  Germany,	   Italy	  and	   the	  Netherlands7	  are	  behind	   in	   their	  work	  
share	  and	  are	  pressing	   for	  an	  adjustment.	  Yet,	   France	   seems	   reluctant	   to	  give	  up	   its	  work	  
share.	  One	  of	  the	  primary	  difficulties	  is	  that	  although	  the	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  is	  
rather	   clear	   on	   the	   division	   of	  work	   share	   among	   the	   partners,	   in	   practice	   controlling	   the	  
vendor	  work	   share	   is	   a	   daunting	   task.	   A	   respondent	   at	   Fokker	   referred	   to	   it	   as	   a	   ‘moving	  
target’.	   For	   every	   negotiated	   subcontract	   this	   work	   share	   division	   has	   to	   be	   taken	   into	  
                                                
7	   In	   February	   2008	   the	   Dutch	   Minister	   of	   Economic	   Affairs	   visited	   Eurocopter	   to	   address	   the	  
imbalance	   in	  work	   share	   in	   front	   of	   the	   directors	   of	   NHI	   and	   its	   partner	   companies.	   In	   December	  
2008	   this	  was	   followed	  by	  a	   letter	   from	  the	  Dutch	  Minister	  of	  Economic	  Affairs	   to	   the	  directors	  of	  
Eurocopter	  and	  NHI	  reminding	  them	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  progress	  made	  in	  the	  meantime	  (Tweede	  Kamer,	  
2009).	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account.	  A	  French	  NH	  90	  programme	  official	  noted	  that	  the	  Netherlands	  is	  pressing	  to	  align	  
the	  imbalance	  in	  work	  share	  division,	  	  
	  
“We	  noticed	  that	   the	  Netherlands	  are	  very	  picky	  on	  the	  work	  share	   issue…	  And	   it	   is	  
	   understandable	  that	  when	  tax	  payers	  put	  a	  lot	  of	  money	  in	  the	  program	  that	  a	  nation	  
	   expects	   that	   this	   amount	   of	   money	   or	   an	   equivalent	   amount	   of	   money	   will	   be	  
	   transformed	   into	   jobs	   in	   the	   country.	   But	   on	   the	   other	   side,	   we’re	   not	   putting	   too	  
	   much	  attention	  on	  this	  topic,	  because	  if	  today	  let’s	  say,	  the	  Netherlands	  are,	  I	  would	  
	   say,	  maybe	  1	  percent	  behind,	  it’s	  probably	  less	  than	  that,	  their	  cost	  share	  in	  terms	  of	  
	   work	  share,	  we’re	  not	  going	   to	   force	   industry	   to	   find	  a	  Dutch	  compromise	  or	  Dutch	  
	   products	  or	  Dutch	  industry	  other	  than	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  fair	  competition.	  So	  we	  are	  not	  
	   in	  favour	  of	  getting	  the	  precise	  digits	  on	  the	  work	  share	  report	  and	  force	  industry	  to,	  
	   instead	  of	  running	  a	  competition	  between	  European	  industries,	  to	  have	  a	  contract	  or	  
	   a	  subcontract	  with	  a	  Dutch	   industry	   if	   it’s	  not	  the	  best	  value	  for	  money.”	   (Interview	  
	   French	  NH	  90	  Official)	  
	  
As	  the	  respondent	  notes,	  in	  France	  they	  are	  not	  very	  concerned	  with	  the	  anomaly	  in	  
the	  division	  of	  work	  share.	  They	  are	  reluctant	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  imbalance	  between	  the	  
cost	  share	  and	  the	  work	  share,	  arguing	  that	   that	   if	   their	   industry	  would	   incorporate	  Dutch	  
equipment	  or	  industry,	  it	  would	  not	  necessarily	  be	  the	  best	  value	  for	  money.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  
institutional	  logics	  of	  the	  nations	  we	  described	  earlier,	  one	  can	  observe	  two	  points.	  	  
First,	  it	  seems	  here	  that	  the	  emphasis	  placed	  by	  Dutch	  NH	  90	  officials	  runs	  counter	  to	  
its	   general	   institutional	   logic	   that	   it	   does	   not	   place	   too	   much	   emphasis	   on	   industrial	  
interests.	   In	   chapter	  6	  we	  noted	   that	   industrial	   interests	  play	  only	  a	  minor	   role	  within	   the	  
Dutch	   Ministry	   of	   Defence.	   Here	   another	   dimension	   of	   the	   institutional	   logic	   of	   the	  
Netherlands	  comes	  into	  play,	  namely	  the	  parliamentary	  control	  on	  the	  management	  of	  the	  
programme.	  It	  is	  the	  Dutch	  parliament	  that	  is	  particularly	  keen	  on	  making	  sure	  that	  the	  work	  
share	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  original	  agreements.	  	  
Second,	   this	  French	   respondent	  motivates	   the	  French	   lack	  of	  attention	   to	   the	  work	  
share	  issue	  from	  a	  competition	  perspective.	  At	  first	  sight,	  this	  motivation	  also	  operates	  in	  an	  
opposite	  direction	  than	  the	  French	  institutional	  logic	  with	  its	  emphasis	  upon	  own	  industrial	  
interests	  would	  suggest.	  Possibly,	  their	  emphasis	  on	  the	  competition	  perspective	  is	  selective.	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This	   perspective	  may	  be	  useful	   in	   resisting	  Dutch	   claims	   for	   a	   relatively	   larger	  work	   share	  
commensurate	  to	  the	  number	  of	  helicopters	  the	  Netherlands	  ordered.	  But	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  
to	   apply	   to	   the	   size	   of	   the	   French	   work	   share.	   This	   reasoning	   fits	   well	   when	   the	   French	  
national	   industry	   has	   the	   largest	   part	   of	   the	   contract	   value	   in	   the	  NH	  90	   programme.	   For	  
example,	  a	  Dutch	  NH	  90	  programme	  official	  notes	  that	  France	  earns	  substantially	  more	  than	  
the	  other	  nations,	  	  
	   “When	   you	   look	   at	   the	   realisation	   of	   the	  work	   share,	   the	   French	   earn	   substantially	  
	   more	   than	   the	  Netherlands	  and	   Italy,	   for	  example.”	   (Interview	  Dutch	  NH	  90	  Official	  
	   2)	  
	  
The	  division	  of	  work	  share	  we	  discussed	  thus	  far	  concerns	  the	  share	  of	  work	  awarded	  
to	   the	   prime	   contractors	   in	   NHI.	   The	   imbalance	   in	   the	   division	   of	   work	   share	   at	   the	  
subcontractor	  level	  is	  substantially	  more	  as	  a	  respondent	  of	  Dutch	  Fokker	  suggests,	  	  
	  
“The	  intention	  of	  course	  was	  that	  in	  the	  same	  division	  you	  see	  here,	  32%,	  62%,	  5.5%	  
(Italy,	   France	   and	   Germany,	   and	   the	   Netherlands	   respectively,	   author)	   that	  
subcontractors	  would	  be	   involved.	  Well,	   it	  will	  be	  no	   surprise	   to	  you	   that	  when	  you	  
look	  at	  the	  total	  work	  package	  of	  NAHEMA	  and	  you	  look	  at	  France,	  that	  France	  has	  
about	   80%.	   They	   are	   very	   smart	   in	   this.	   So,	   French	   small	   and	   medium	   sized	  
	  enterprises	   profit	   relatively	   very	   well	   from	   the	   NH	   90.”	   (Interview	   Executive	   Vice-­‐
President	  Fokker)	  
	  
The	  respondent	  notes	  that	   the	  original	   intention	  was	  to	  have	  subcontractors	  of	   the	  
participating	  nations	   involved	   in	   the	  same	  division	  as	   the	  share	  holding	   in	  NHI.	  Yet,	  as	   this	  
respondent	  notes	  France	  has	  managed	  to	  receive	  about	  80%	  of	  the	  total	  work	  package.	  He	  
notes	  that	  the	  French	  were	  very	  cleaver	  in	  realising	  more	  work	  share	  than	  they	  were	  entitled	  
to.	   A	   question	   that	  may	   come	   to	  mind	   is	   how	   did	   they	  manage	   to	   acquire	   this	   industrial	  
share?	  There	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  answer	  to	  this	  question.	  France	  has	  a	  large	  industrial	  base	  and	  
especially	   in	   the	   aerospace	   industry	   its	   capabilities	   are	   generally	   considered	   to	   be	   greater	  
than	  the	  capabilities	  in	  the	  other	  countries.	  So,	  if	  the	  competition	  argument	  would	  apply	  this	  
could	   be	   a	   possible	   answer	   to	   the	   question.	   Yet,	   we	   already	   saw	   that	   the	   competition	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argument	   does	   not	   fully	   apply	   in	   these	   types	   of	   programmes.	   Alternatively,	   some	  
respondents	  pointed	  to	  the	  emphasis	  placed	  on	  the	   industrial	  benefits	  of	  collaboration	  for	  
the	   French	   economy.	   An	   NH	   90	   programme	   official	   from	   Fokker	   pointed	   to	   the	   issue	   of	  
‘common	  work’.	   Common	  work	   involves	   the	   work	   that	   is	   done	   for	   the	   NH	   90s	   of	   all	   the	  
NAHEMO	   nations.	   This	   respondent	   notes	   how	   in	   his	   opinion	   the	   Netherlands	   has	   been	  
‘fooled’	  here,	  	  
	  
“Before	   I	   forget,	   common	  work.	   I	   think	   that	   the	  Netherlands	   has	   been	   fooled	   here.	  
Indeed	   we	   started	   with	   two	   variants,	   the	   TTH	   and	   the	   NFH,	   and	   subsequently	   the	  
work	  share	  had	  to	  be	  	  in	   line	  with	   this.	  What	   you	   expect	   is	   that	   one	  way	   or	   another	  
there	  is	  a	  relation	  between	  contract	  volume	  and	  work	  share.	  The	  French	  have	  played	  
this	  extremely	  smart.	  They	  have	  based	  the	  definition	  of	  work	  share	  on	  common	  work.	  
Everything	  that	   is	  not	  common	  is	  also	  not	  a	  part	  of	  the	  work	  share.	  You	  will	  get	  the	  
situation	   that	   once	   a	   programme	   progresses,	   things	   will	   progressively	   become	   less	  
common.	  Also	   the	  variants	  ensure	   that	   things	  are	  not	   common.	  The	  consequence	   is	  
that	  matters	  that	  involve	  work	  share	  decrease	  over	  time.	  And	  especially	  in	  the	  vendor	  
packages	  that	  goes	  down	  quickly.	  So	  you	  can	  see	  that,	  for	  example	  Agusta,	  which	  has	  
32%	  of	   the	  work	   share,	   sometimes	   has	   less	   then	   10	   per	   cent	   share	   on	   a	   contract…	  
Subsequently,	   you	   will	   see	   that	   the	   largest	   part	   of	   the	   contract	   volume	   has	   been	  
placed	  in	  France.”	  (Interview	  Executive	  Vice-­‐President	  STORK)	  	  
	  
According	  to	  this	  respondent,	  France	  has	  managed	  to	  receive	  the	  largest	  share	  of	  the	  
total	  contract	  volume	  by	  defining	  the	  work	  share	  in	  the	  programme	  on	  common	  work,	  the	  
work	  that	  has	  to	  be	  performed	  for	  all	  the	  NH	  90s.	  Yet,	  over	  time	  the	  common	  work	  becomes	  
substantially	   smaller	   with	   the	   increase	   in	   the	   variance	   in	   the	   helicopters.	   Eventually,	   this	  
culminates	   in	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   the	   largest	   part	   of	   the	   total	   contract	   value	   has	   been	  
awarded	   to	   French	   companies.	   This	   is	   also	   clearly	   seen	   in	   table	   5.8	   which	   providing	   an	  
overview	  of	  the	  status	  of	  the	  division	  of	  work	  share	  early	  2011.	  At	  this	  point	  it	   is	  unclear	  if	  




7.2	   Sense-­‐making	  and	  the	  Alignment	  of	  Logics	  	  
	  
Our	   theoretical	   model	   (see	   chapter	   2)	   posited	   that	   alignment	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   facilitated	  
through	  sense-­‐making	  processes	  of	   the	  partners	   involved.	  Furthermore,	  we	  posited,	  based	  
on	  earlier	   observations	   from	   Jeorg	   and	  Brower	   (2008)	   that	   sense-­‐making	   could	   further	  be	  
differentiated	  as	  a	  process	  consisting	  of	  noticing,	   interpretation	  and	  action.	  We	  have	  used	  
these	  concepts	  as	  a	  coding	  procedure	  for	  our	  interview	  material.	  The	  results	  that	  our	  coding	  
procedure	  yielded	  indeed	  confirmed	  the	  significance	  of	  these	  processes	  (table	  7.1).	  Further	  
analysis,	   moreover,	   revealed	   that	   often	   the	   action	   component	   of	   a	   sense-­‐making	   cycle	  
triggered	  a	  subsequent	  sense-­‐making	  cycle	  among	  the	  partners	  and	  organisations	  instead	  of	  
resulting	  in	  joint	  action	  towards	  the	  obtainment	  of	  programme	  goals.	  
	  
	  




Noticing	   “I’ve	  noticed	  that	  for	  Belgium	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  it	  is	  very	  tough	  to	  get	  money	  
for	   this	   programme.	   They	   have	   to	   convince	   politicians	   and	   budgetary	  
committees	  over	  and	  over	  again.”	  
(Interview	  German	  NAHEMA	  Official	  1)	  
	  
“And	  we	  are	  suffering	  from	  the	  same.	  We	  are	  trying	  to	  get	  a	  mandate	  from	  the	  
nations,	   sometimes	  we	   succeed	   and	   sometimes	  NHI	   succeeds	   too.	   But	   for	   all	  
the	  main	   issues,	  you	  have	  the	   feeling	  you	  talk	   to	  somebody	  who	   is	  backed	  by	  
somebody	  else,	  and	  when	  they	  talk	  to	  us	  we	  are	  backed	  by	  somebody	  else.	  And	  
I	  don’t	  know	  why,	  but	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  obtain	  a	  mandate.	  “	  	  
(Interview	  French	  NAHEMA	  Official	  2)	  
	  
Of	  course,	  we	  see	  that	  as	  well.	  We	  also	  acknowledge	  that.	  We	  also	  see	  that	  only	  
a	  small	  share	  of	  our	  money	  goes	  to	  Fokker.	  But	  what	  we	  really	  have	  to	  watch	  
out	  for	   is	  that	  all	   the	  money	  we	  need	  for	  the	   in-­‐service	  support	  goes	  to	  those	  
other	  industries.	  Because	  there	  are	  the	  really	  large	  raises.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  we	  
also	  have	  proof	  that.	  	  
(Interview	  Dutch	  NH	  90	  Programme	  Official	  1)	  
	  
Interpretation	   “You	   can	   see	   that	   some	   countries	   still	   employ	   industrial	   politics	   and	   some,	  
because	   they	   don’t	   have	   industry	   or	   deal	   with	   it	   differently,	   less.	   …	   And	   the	  
problem	  with	  it	  is	  that	  when	  you	  look	  from	  a	  distance	  you	  see	  one	  NH	  90,	  but	  
when	  you	  look	  closer	  you	  have	  a	  Dutch	  NH	  90,	  a	  German	  NH	  90,	  and	  Italian	  NH	  
90….	  And	  they	  are	  as	  different	  as	  possible.”	  	  
(Interview	  Dutch	  Director	  Acquisition)	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“What	  we	  try	  to	  do	  is	  to	  anticipate	  the	  reaction	  of	  the	  others.	  …	  Try	  really	  to	  be	  
in	   their	   position	   and	   say,	   ‘Hey,	   in	   their	   position	   what	   would	   they	   say	   about	  
that?	  How	  do	   they	   react?	  What	  would	   block	   that?	  What’s	   the	  way	   out	   or	   to	  
deblock	  them?”	  	  
(Interview	  French	  NAHEMA	  Official	  3)	  
	  
“I	   understand	   that	   this	   is	   an	   Italian	  peculiarity.	   So	   for	   the	   time	  being	   there	   is	  
nothing	  that	  we	  could	  do	  really,	  because	  in	  our	  command	  line	  there	  is	  this	  kind	  
of	  approach	  and	  so	   it	   is	  a	  question	  of	  mental	  habit	  with	  the	  war	  organisation.	  
And	   it	   is	   not	   easy	   to	   say.	   “Ok,	   we	   could	   just	   change	   this	   for	   the	   NH	   90	  
programme.”	  It	  is	  very	  difficult.	  	  




“Sometimes	   you	  most	   have	   some	   ‘robust	   diplomacy’.	   Robust	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  
telling.	  ‘Okay,	  if	  you	  don’t	  come	  to	  a	  common	  conclusion	  right	  now,	  you’re	  out	  
of	   that	   issue.	   NAHEMA	   will	   never	   take	   care	   of	   this.	   You	   can	   take	   care	   of	   it	  
alone.”	  
(Interview	  German	  NAHEMA	  Official	  1).	  	  
	  
“What	  I	  used	  to	  do,	  also	  in	  my	  working	  group	  	  is	  having	  the	  German	  say	  yes	  or	  
no,	  and	  the	  French	  yes	  or	  no	  and	  in	  this	  way	  you	  try	  to	  get	  them	  together	  	  
(Interview	  Dutch	  NH	  90	  Official	  3)”	  
	  
“We	  are	  not	  happy	  with	  it,	  but	  through	  such	  a	  market	  negotiation	  strategy	  we	  
try	   to	  make	  something	  out	  of	   it.	  But	  when	  one	  of	   those	   larger	  countries	  says,	  
‘Yes,	  we	  understand.	  You	  are	  right,	  but	   I	  have	  here	  1000	  people	  working,	  and	  
you	  know	  things	  are	  not	  going	  well	  at	  EADS,	  the	  Airbus,	  the	  A380.’”	  	  




For	  example,	  an	  idea	  of	  a	  nation	  will	  be	  sent	  to	  the	  other	  partners	  and	  NAHEMO.	  These	  will	  
take	  note	  and	   interpret	   this	   idea.	  Hence,	  what	  actually	  happens	   is	   that	  several	  people	  will	  
engage	   in	   noticing,	   interpretation	   and	   action	   processes	   within	   the	   respective	   programme	  
offices	   of	   the	   receiving	   nations.	   These	   sense-­‐making	  processes	  will	   ultimately	   be	   assessed	  
within	   the	  constraints	  provided	  by	   the	   institutional	   logics	  of	   the	   receiving	  nations	  but	  also	  
within	  the	  material	  constraints	  that	  result	  from	  the	  formalisation	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  in	  
the	   NATO	   Helicopter	   Management	   Organisation	   and	   the	   organisational	   set	   up	   of	   the	  
programme	  offices	   including	   the	   division	   of	   responsibilities	   and	   the	   allocation	   of	   budgets.	  
Nevertheless,	   as	   our	   analysis	   of	   the	   institutional	   logics	   chapter	   6	   revealed,	   the	   division	   of	  
responsibilities	   is	   to	   some	  extent	   also	   largely	   constrained	  by	   the	   institutional	   logics	  of	   the	  
nations.	   In	  the	  case	  of	   Italy	  this	   is	  particularly	  problematic	  given	  that	  representatives	  of	   its	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programme	  offices	  often	  lack	  the	  authority	  to	  take	  decisions	  during	  meetings.	  They	  can	  take	  
note	  of	  what	   is	   said,	  but	  will	  need	  to	  elicit	  approval	   from	  the	   final	  users	  within	   the	   Italian	  
army	  before	   they	   are	   allowed	   to	  make	  a	  decision.	   In	   the	  other	   countries,	   the	  programme	  
managers	  have	  an	   ‘integral	  programme	  responsibility’.	  Which	  means	   that	  provided	  certain	  
constraints	   (budget,	   time,	  and	  requirements),	   they	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  take	  decisions	  on	  
behalf	  of	  their	  respective	  defence	  ministries.	  	  
 As	   we	   have	   noted	   in	   chapter	   6,	   in	   the	   Netherlands	   there	   is	   also	   relatively	   strong	  
programme	  oversight	  by	  the	  parliament.	  Which	  means	  that	  choices	  pertaining	  to	  changes	  in	  
or	   additional	   requirements	   and/or	   the	   allocation	   of	   additional	   resources	   are	   subject	   to	  
parliamentary	  approval.	  In	  the	  other,	  countries	  the	  degree	  of	  parliamentary	  oversight	  seems	  
less	   intrusive.	   The	   point	   is	   that	   cycles	   of	   noticing,	   interpretation	   and	   action	   often	   involve	  
actors	   from	  the	  different	  defence	  departments	  beyond	  the	   immediate	  programme	  offices.	  	  
In	  paragraph	  7.3	  we	  will	  see	  how	  one	  respondent	  describes	  this	  process	  as	  a	  ‘whirlpool’	   In	  
many	   instances	   these	  sense-­‐making	  processes	  account	   for	   the	  earlier	  mentioned	   ‘costs’	  of	  
alignment’.	  	  
	   Thus	   far,	  we	   have	  mainly	   focused	   on	   the	   cognitive	   aspects	   of	   sense-­‐making.	   For	   a	  
better	  better	  understandin	  of	  sense-­‐making	  processes	  in	  international	  cooperation	  we	  need	  
also	   to	   be	   sensitive	   towards	   the	   communicative	   aspects	   of	   sense-­‐making.	   To	   this	   end	  we	  
carried	  out	  an	  analysis	  based	  on	  the	  work	  done	  by	  Vlaar,	  Van	  Fenema	  and	  Tiwari	  (2008)	  and	  
Vaara	   and	  Monin	   (2010).	   In	   these	   studies,	   sense-­‐making	   processes	   are	   conceptualised	   as	  
communicative	  acts	  involving	  sense-­‐giving,	  sense-­‐demanding	  and	  sense-­‐breaking	  (Vlaar,	  Van	  
Fenema,	   and	   Tiwari	   (2008)	   and	   sense-­‐hiding	   (Kroon,	   201;	   Vaara	   and	   Monin,	   2010).	   The	  
sense-­‐making	   processes	   described	   by	   Jeorg	   and	   Brower	   (2008)	   focus	   primarily	   on	   how	  
individual	  actors	  come	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  certain	  discrepancies	  between	  their	  expectations	  of	  
events,	  consciously	  as	  well	  as	  unconsciously,	  and	  what	  is	  actually	  happening.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
sense-­‐giving,	   sense-­‐demanding,	   sense-­‐breaking	   and	   sense-­‐hiding,	   the	   emphasis	   is	   on	   the	  
communicative	   aspects	   of	   sense-­‐making.	   Hence,	   it	   is	   primarily	   associated	  with	   the	   action	  
component	   as	   elaborated	   by	   Jeorg	   and	   Brower	   (2008).	   	   Needless	   to	   say,	   noticing	   and	  
interpretation	  precede	  these	  communicative	  acts	  (or	  lack	  thereof).    
Our	   findings	   underscore	   the	   importance	   of	   sense-­‐giving,	   sense-­‐demanding,	   sense-­‐
breaking	   and	   sense-­‐hiding	   for	   sense-­‐making	  processes.	   Sense-­‐giving	   and	   sense-­‐demanding	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tend	  to	  be	  positively	   linked	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  sense-­‐making	  processes.	  Sense-­‐hiding,	  on	  the	  
other	   hand,	   tends	   to	   be	   more	   negatively	   associated	   with	   the	   quality	   of	   overall	   	   sense-­‐
making.	  	  Further	  analysis	  also	  revealed	  that	  sense-­‐hiding	  seems	  to	  take	  place	  in	  the	  almost	  
secretive	  talks	  and	  negotiations	  between	  government	  and	   its	   industrial	  partner	  as	   the	  two	  
quotes	  in	  table	  7.2	  from	  the	  French	  and	  Dutch	  NAHEMA	  officials	  indicate.	  Indeed,	  this	  points	  
to	  the	  more	  political	  dynamics	  when	  interorganisational	  sense	  making	  is	  involved.	  	  
Nevertheless,	   this	  would	  only	  be	  part	  of	   the	   story.	  Basically,	   the	   term	   sense-­‐hiding	  
seems	   to	   indicate	   a	   more	   or	   less	   conscious	   effort	   by	   one	   the	   partners	   to	   prevent	   the	  
development	  of	  a	  complete	  understanding	  of	  events	  and	  actions	  by	  the	  other	  partners.	  But	  
although	   this	   occurs,	   sense-­‐hiding	  may	   also	   stem	   from	   the	   intimate	   relationships	   that	   are	  
nurtured	  by	  some	  of	  the	  nations	  with	  their	  industrial	  partner	  in	  the	  programme.	  In	  chapter	  
6,	  we	   noted	   that	   this	  was	   particularly	   the	   case	   in	   France	   and	   Italy.	  Within	   these	   national	  
discussions,	  agreements	  may	  be	  reached	  by	  a	  nation	  and	  its	  industry	  that	  unwittingly	  affect	  
the	  whole	  programme,	  while	  the	  nation	  in	  question	  may	  not	  be	  fully	  aware	  that	  its	  national	  
agreements	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  programme.	  Thus,	  sense-­‐hiding	  may	  also	  be	  
the	  result	  of	  ignorance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  one	  the	  nations	  in	  the	  programme.	  	  
During	   our	   coding	   process	   we	   also	   became	   aware	   of	   a	   particular	   type	   of	   sense-­‐
making	  process	  that	  had	  connotations	  with	  sense-­‐giving,	  sense-­‐demanding	  and	  sense-­‐hiding,	  
but	   which	   could	   not	   easily	   be	   placed	   in	   one	   of	   these	   categories.	   Here,	   information	   and	  
advice	  on	  certain	  topics	  was	  being	  discussed	  between	  two	  partners	  and	  sense-­‐making	  had	  a	  
strong	   political	   component.	   The	   basic	   theme	   that	   seemed	   to	   underlie	   these	   instances	  we	  
have	  called	  sense-­‐colluding.	  This	  occurs	  when	  two	  or	  three	  partners	  exchanged	  information	  
on	   their	   respective	   positions	   without	   informing	   the	   others.	   The	   idea	   of	   sense-­‐colluding	  
underscores	   the	   importance	   of	   lobbying	   in	   these	   kinds	   of	   programmes,	   which	   will	   be	  
discussed	  in	  the	  next	  paragraph	  where	  we	  will	  focus	  more	  on	  the	  structural	  mechanisms	  that	  






Table	  7.2	   Sense	  making	  as	  a	  process	  of	  sense-­‐giving,	  sense–demanding	  and	  sense-­‐
breaking	  
Sense-­‐making	   Exemplary	  quotes	  	  
Sense-­‐giving	   “That	   is	   important.	   You	   know	   of	   each	   other	   today	   and	   not	   tomorrow	   that	  
something	  is	  up	  and	  don’t	  say:	  ‘We	  cannot	  sign	  next	  week.’	  ‘Why	  didn’t	  you	  say	  
so?’	  You	  inform	  each	  other	  of	  your	  national	  process.”	  	  
(Interview	  Former	  Dutch	  National	  Armaments	  Director)	  
	  
“You	   really	   have	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   discussion,	   and	   then	   try	   to	   direct	   the	  
discussion	  in	  the	  way	  you	  think	  is	  the	  right	  one.	  They	  do	  that	  as	  well.	  In	  this	  way	  
you	  try	  	  to	  influence	  each	  other	  and	  gain	  support.”	  
(Interview	  Dutch	  NAHEMA	  official	  2)	  
Sense-­‐demanding	   “Yes,	  sure:	   ‘Come	  on,	   Italy,	   if	  you	  have	  some	  problems,	  discovered	  by	  Agusta,	  
but	   if	   you	  have	   to	  discuss	  again	  and	  come	  up	  again	   to	  NAHEMA,	   that	  we	  can	  
check	  if	  this	  is	  aligned	  with	  the	  other	  nations.’	  So	  this	  is	  very	  sensitive	  again	  …	  
‘No,	  no	  way,	  come	  on.	  Discuss	  this	   in	   the	  dedicated	  workings	  groups	  we	  have	  
set	  up,	  and	  if	  you	  don’t	  want	  to	  do	  this,	  then	  make	  your	  own	  business	  case,	  but	  
not	  with	  NAHEMA.’	  ”	  	  
(Interview	  German	  NAHEMA	  Official	  1)	  
	  
“Talk.	  ‘Do	  you	  mean	  that?	  So	  you	  mean	  this?	  Then	  you	  basically	  mean	  the	  same	  
thing,	  right?	  In	  that	  case	  ,	  we	  agree	  with	  each	  other?	  Do	  I	  summarize	  it	  well?’	  	  
(Interview	  Dutch	  NAHEMA	  official	  2)	  
Sense-­‐breaking	   “If	  you	  can’t	  work	  it	  out,	  you	  go	  to	  your	  division	  leader.	  Then	  you	  try	  to	  come	  
up	  with	  a	  strategy.	   ‘What	  approach	  should	  we	  use?	  What	  other	   issues	  are	  on	  
the	   table?	   What	   can	   I	   use?	   …	   What	   pressure	   tools	   can	   I	   employ?	   To	   are	  
sensitive	  issues	  for	  them?	  	  
(Interview	  Dutch	  NAHEMA	  official	  2)	  
	  
“The	  other	  possibility	  of	  course	  is	  to	  convince	  other	  nations.	  Say	  look,	  although	  
this	  often	  a	  very	  hard	  point.	  And	  it	  takes	  a	  lot	  of	  time,	  to	  really	  convince	  other	  
nations	   because	   also	   they	   have	   their	   operational	   requirement	   and	   they	   have	  
their	  background	  and	  decision	  making	  process.”	  
(Interview	  German	  NH	  90	  Official	  1)	  
Sense-­‐hiding	   “The	  DGA,	  those	  people	  go	  from	  left	  to	  right	  and	  from	  right	  to	  left.	  The	  French	  
National	   Armaments	   Director,	   the	   director	   of	   the	   DGA	   was	   the	   director	   of	  
Thales	   at	   the	   time	  of	   the	   signing	  of	   the	   contract	   for	   the	   radar.	  And	  now	   that	  
radar	   doesn’t	   work	   and	   he	   has	   protected	   Thales	   for	   a	   long	   time”	   (Interview	  
Dutch	  NH	  90	  official	  1)	  
	  
“When	  we	   are	   negotiating	  we	   suddenly	   hear	   that	   Italy	   has	  made	   a	   deal	  with	  
Agusta.	  We	  didn’t	  know	  about	  that.	  That’s	  nice	  for	  Italy,	  but	  it	  hurts	  France,	  so	  
we	  cannot	  go	  along	  with	  it	  like	  that”.	  	  (Interview	  Dutch	  NAHEMA	  Official	  1)	  
	  
Sense-­‐colluding	   “I	   knew	   my	   colleagues	   that	   well.	   So,	   I	   would	   call	   them.	   We	   see	   each	   other	  
tomorrow	  and	  I	  hope	  you	  will	  support	  on	  that	  issue.	  That	  is	  a	  good	  thing.	  Or	  he	  
calls	   you	   and	   to	   tell	   of	   his	   problem.	   That	  would	  be	   communicated	  upfront.	   If	  
you	  don’t	  do	  that	  the	  relations	   in	  the	  meeting	  will	  not	  be	  good.	  But	  of	  course	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with	  Germany,	   that	   is	  historically,	   the	   relationship	  with	  Germany	   is	   that	  good	  
that	   you	   inform	   each	   other	   very	   well	   upfront	   with	   respect	   to	   each	   others	  
position.”	  	  
(Interview	  Former	  Dutch	  National	  Armaments	  Director)	  
	  
“When	   a	   shared	   feeling	   has	   evolved,	   it	   is	   likely	   to	   continue	   to	   exist.	   But	   that	  
shared	   feeling	  can	  also	  change	  now	  and	   then.	  …	  So	   that	  means	   that	  on	  some	  
issues	  we	  will	  be	  closer	  to	  the	  Italians	  and	  on	  others	  more	  to	  the	  French.”	  	  
(Interview	  Dutch	  NH	  90	  programme	  official	  1).	  	  
	  
7.3	   Mechanisms	  of	  Alignment	  	  
 
Earlier,	   we	   have	   introduced	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘costs’	   of	   alignment,	   its	   consequences	   and	   its	  
observable	   outcomes	   in	   terms	   of	   lack	   of	   standardisation,	   programme	   delays	   and	   issues	  
concerning	   the	   division	   of	   work	   share.	   We	   subsequently	   discussed	   the	   sense-­‐making	  
processes	  that	  underlie	  alignment.	  Next	  we	  will	  turn	  towards	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  facilitate	  
alignment.	  Given	  that	  logics	  carry	  the	  more	  deeply	  held	  beliefs,	  interests,	  values,	  and	  norms	  
of	   a	   collective,	   and	   may	   be	   codified	   in	   formal	   rules	   (e.g.	   in	   laws)	   and	   are	   reflected	   in	  
established	  practices	  of	  those	  affected	  by	  them,	  we	  certainly	  do	  not	  expect	  that	  alignment	  is	  
an	  easy	  and	  orderly	  process.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  some	  form	  of	  alignment	  of	  the	  logics	  has	  to	  
occur	  at	  the	  programme	  level	  if	  cooperation	  is	  to	  ensue.	  We	  have	  introduced	  the	  notion	  of	  
‘costs’	   of	   alignment	   to	   capture	   this	   form.	   While	   full	   alignment	   of	   logics	   has	   not	   been	  
accomplished,	   a	   compromise	   of	   the	   different	   logics	   that	   renders	   cooperation	   at	   least	  
temporarily	  viable	  has	  emerged.	  	  
This	  alignment	  appears	  to	  depend	  on	  a	  mixture	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  mechanisms.	  
Our	   model	   of	   alignment	   of	   logics	   proposed	   in	   chapter	   2	   conveys	   the	   notion	   that	   sense-­‐
making	  occurred	  primarily	  at	  the	  interface	  of	  the	  procurement	  agencies	  (the	  organisational	  
level)	   and	   NAHEMA	   (the	   NATO	   Helicopter	   Management	   Agency).	   We	   expected	   that	   this	  
interface	  would	  be	   the	  primary	   level	  at	  which	   the	  activities	  of	  noticing,	   interpretation	  and	  
action	  of	  the	  various	  nations	  would	  take	  place.	  Although	  our	  findings	  indeed	  indicate	  this	  to	  
be	   an	   important	   level	   for	   these	   processes,	   it	   captures	   only	   a	   portion	   of	   the	   noticing,	  
interpretation	  and	  action	  processes	  of	  the	  various	  actors	  in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	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Our	  data	  analysis	  revealed	  four	  main	  interdependent	  mechanisms	  that	  facilitate	  the	  
alignment	  and	  sense-­‐making	  activities	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  nations:	  
• Memoranda	  of	  Understanding	  in	  which	  the	  formal	  rules	  underlying	  the	  cooperation	  have	  
been	  established;	  
• formation	  of	  coalitions;	  
• role	  of	  NAHEMA;	  and	  
• escalation	  process.	  	  
This	   latter	  process	  corresponds	  the	  closest	  to	  our	  original	  expectations	  of	  how	  actors	  align	  
their	   logics.	   We	   will	   detail	   these	   mechanisms	   further	   below.	   Although	   we	   present	   these	  
mechanisms	   here	   as	   though	   they	   constitute	   independent	   processes,	   they	   in	   reality	   often	  
occur	  simultaneously.	  	  	  
	   Underlying	  each	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  a	  sense-­‐making	  process	  consisting	  of	  noticing,	  
interpretation	  and	  action	  occurs.	  Yet,	   these	  sense-­‐making	  mechanisms	  are	  geared	  towards	  
the	  attainment	  of	  different	  outcomes.	  	  
	  
The	   General	   Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   –	   Specifying	   the	   Formal	   Rules	   of	   the	   Game	  
(1991)	  
The	  General	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	   (MoU)	  between	   the	  nations	   specifies	  a	   large	  
number	  of	  substantive	  and	  procedural	  rules	  underlying	  the	  cooperation	  between	  the	  NH	  90	  
nations.	   Vlaar,	   Van	   den	   Bosch	   and	   Volberda	   (2006)	   have	   noted	   the	   importance	   of	  
formalisation	   such	   as	   contracts,	   decision	   making	   structures	   and	   the	   development	   of	  
procedural	  rules	  enabling	  participants	  in	  interorganisational	  relations	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  what	  
is	  going	  on.	  	  
The	  MoU	   specifies	   the	   functions	   and	   roles	   of	   the	   different	   programme	  bodies	   and	  
their	  decision	  making	  structures	  and	  processes.	  Yet,	  given	  the	  complexity	  and	  uncertainty	  of	  
the	  NH	  90	  programme,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  a	  priori	  specify	  all	  the	  possible	  contingencies	  that	  may	  
arise	  during	  the	  lifetime	  of	  the	  programme.	  Thus,	  many	  issues	  have	  to	  be	  resolved	  over	  the	  
course	   of	   a	   programme.	   There	   are	   several	   levels	   of	   meetings	   between	   the	   programme	  
members.	   At	   the	   lower	   level	   there	   are	   several	   technical	   working	   groups,	   responsible	   for	  
certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  helicopter	  (e.g.	  structures,	  armaments,	  logistics,	  etc.).	  Above	  these	  we	  
find	   the	   Joint	   Executive	   Committee	   (JEC)	   consisting	   of	   the	  national	   programme	  managers.	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The	   JEC	   is	   responsible	   for	  ensuring	   the	  adequate	  and	   timely	  execution	  of	   the	  programme.	  
The	   Steering	   Committee	   (SC)	   represents	   the	   highest	   official	   meeting	   level	   in	   the	   NH	   90	  
programme.	  The	  SC	  has	   the	  overall	   responsibility	   for	   the	  execution	  and	  supervision	  of	   the	  
programme.	  Programme	  related	  decisions	  have	  to	  be	  based	  on	  unanimity.	  The	  delegates	  of	  
the	  participating	  nations	  each	  have	  one	  vote.	  	  
The	   way	   the	   programme	   has	   been	   set	   up	   affects	   how	   some	   form	   of	   alignment	   is	  
achieved.	  The	  decision	  making	  rules	  force	  the	  partners	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement.	  	  Programme	  
exit	  becomes	  progressively	  less	  attractive	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  programme,	  because	  the	  
economic	   loss	   to	   be	   incurred	   in	   the	   case	   of	   exit	   increases.	   Production	   would	   have	   to	   be	  
transferred	   to	   the	   other	   nations	   and	   additional	   costs	   associated	  with	   the	  withdrawal	   of	   a	  
participant	   would	   need	   to	   be	   incurred	   by	   that	   participant.	   Besides	   these	   financial	   losses,	  
participants	   are	   likely	   to	   experience	   reputational	   damage	   by	   leaving	   a	   programme.	   Given	  
these	   constraints,	  moving	   ahead	  becomes	   the	   only	   perceived	   viable	   option.	   In	   effect,	   this	  
creates	   an	   interaction	   environment	   for	   participants,	   which	   is	   akin	   to	   the	   description	   of	   a	  
process	   of	   escalating	   commitment	   (Staw,	   1981).	   Some	   respondents	   indicated	   that	  
occasionally	   this	   serves	   as	   an	   important	   motivator	   for	   defence	   departments	   to	   seek	  
international	   cooperation	   since	   governments	   will	   be	   less	   inclined	   to	   abandon	   an	  
international	  programme	  (compared	  to	  a	  national	  programme)	  for	  these	  reasons.	  	  
But	  how	  are	  participants	  able	  to	  move	  ahead	  given	  their	  different	  logics?	  Earlier,	  we	  
have	  discussed	  the	   importance	  of	  sense-­‐making	  processes	   for	  alignment.	  Alignment	   in	  our	  
terms	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  logics	  have	  to	  be	  identical.	  That	  would	  almost	  be	  impossible	  in	  
multiparty	   negotiation	   settings.	   Yet,	   sense-­‐making	   in	   these	   contexts	   serves	   to	   ensure	   an	  
adequate	  understanding	  of	   the	   logics	  and	   interests	  of	   the	  partners.	  This	   is	   illustrated	  by	  a	  
quote	  from	  a	  German	  NH	  90	  official,	  	  
	  
“You	   need	   to	   establish	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   understanding	   of	   the	   interests	   of	   each	  
	   nation.	   Thatis	   the	   basis	   of	   collaboration.	   And	   the	  more	   you	   talk	   to	   each	   other,	   the	  
	   easier	  it	  is.	  That	  does	  	  not	  change	  your	  priorities	  and	  your	  interests,	  but	  you	  can	  easier	  
	   find	  ways	  to	  combine	  	  different	   interests	   in	   a	   common	   solution.”	   (Interview	   German	  
	   Director	  Air)	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Developing	   an	   adequate	   understanding	   of	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   different	   parties	   is	  
important	   for	  collaboration.	  Talking	   facilitates	   the	  development	  of	   this	  understanding.	  The	  
emergence	  of	  a	   reciprocated	  understanding	  does	  not	   immediately,	  nor	  necessarily	   change	  
the	   logics	  of	  participants	  but	  can	  make	  the	  attainment	  of	  a	  common	  solution	  on	  a	  specific	  
topic	  feasible.	  This	  process	  generally	  happens	  outside	  official	  meetings	  during	  coffee	  breaks	  
or	  at	  dinners.	  As	  one	  Dutch	  NAHEMA	  official	  explained:	  
	  
“Lobbying,	  during	   coffee	  breaks	   talking	   to	  people,	  what	   is	   really	   your	  problem?	  My	  
	   experience	   is	   that	   once	   you	   know	   the	   problem	   -­‐	  what’s	   behind	   it,	   what	   they	   don’t	  
	   openly	  tell	  you	  at	  the	   	  negotiation	   table	   of	   course	   –	   you	   can	   often	   build	   in	   an	  
	   arrangement	   that	   diminishes	   or	   solves	   your	   problem.”	   (Interview	   Dutch	   NAHEMA	  
	   Official	  1)	  
	  
Yet,	  the	  process	  through	  which	  such	  an	  understanding	  evolves	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  circular	  
and	  non-­‐linear	  one.	  It	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  proposing	  a	  number	  of	  alternatives	  and	  then	  
let	   the	   nations	   decide	  which	   one	   to	   pursue.	   They	   have	   to	   be	   psychologically	   and	   socially	  
involved	   in	   the	   negotiation	   process.	   A	   number	   of	   respondents	   noted	   that	   they	   found	   it	  
remarkable	   that,	   setting	   certain	   resource	   requirements	   such	  as	  money	  and	   time	  aside,	  no	  
matter	   how	   though	   the	   negotiations	   were,	   they	   almost	   always	   managed	   to	   succeed	   in	  
finding	  the	  larger	  common	  ground	  on	  an	  issue.	  	  A	  French	  NAHEMA	  official	  described	  such	  a	  
process	  as	  follows,	  	  
	  
“We’re	  precising	  it,	  and	  they’re	  also	  precising	  their	  requests.	  So	  we’re	  getting	  closer	  to	  
each	  other.	  This	  is	  why	  I	  say,	  it’s	  a	  whirlpool.	  Because	  everybody	  is	  getting	  to	  the	  point	  
at	   the	  end,	   some	  can	  go	  directly	  and	   say,	   ‘I	   have	  no	  money	  and	   I	  will	   not	  do	   that.’	  
Okay.	  Then	  it	  breaks.	  You	  know	  it’s	  a	  side	  of	  it.	  But	  for	  the	  others	  who	  try	  to	  say	  what	  
they	  want,	   you	   can	  precise	   the	  way	   to	  work	   together.	   Because	   if	  we	  did	   it	   another	  
way,	  which	  could	  be	  for	  example	  by	  writing	  a	  document	  with	  all	  the	  options	  and	  then	  
have	  the	  nations	  choose,	  nothing	  would	  happen.	  Because	  it’s	  too	  rigid.	  So	  they	  want	  
to	  be	  part	  in	  writing	  the	  story,	  they	  want	  to	  be	  involved.”	  (French	  NAHEMA	  Official	  3)	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While	  this	  process	  is	  a	  lengthy	  and	  tedious	  one,	  it	  serves	  an	  important	  social	  function.	  
It	   commits	   participants	   to	   the	   process	   of	   achieving	   alignment,	   and	   triggers	   a	   more	  
cooperative	  mode	  of	  interaction	  in	  which	  partners	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  compromise	  on	  issues.	  
It	  involves	  them	  in	  ‘writing	  the	  story’.	  	  
In	   this	   sense,	   the	  Memoranda	   of	  Understanding	   can	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   both	   the	  
outcome	  of	  an	  interorganisational	  sense-­‐making	  process	  as	  well	  as	  a	  driver	  for	  subsequent	  
interorganisational	   sense-­‐making	   processes.	   In	   the	   former	   sense	   it	   is	   the	   result	   of	   the	  
noticing	   and	   interpretation	   efforts	   of	   the	   representatives	   of	   the	   nations.	   This	   is	   clearly	  
illustrated	   in	   the	   quote	   from	   the	   German	   official	   presented	   above	   underscoring	   the	  
importance	   of	   frequent	   talking	   to	   achieve	   a	   common	   interpretation	   of	   the	   partners’	  
interests.	  	  
In	   the	   latter	   sense,	   it	   informs	   the	   subsequent	   noticing,	   interpretation	   and	   action	  
processes	   of	   the	   representatives	   of	   the	   nations.	   It	   does	   this	   in	   two	   main	   ways.	   First,	   it	  
designates	  the	  relevant	  actors	  that	  should	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  sense-­‐making	  process	  and	  the	  
structures	  in	  which	  this	  process	  should	  take	  place.	  Indeed,	  the	  quote	  of	  the	  Dutch	  NAHEMA	  
representative	  above	  shows	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  organisational	  structures	  put	  in	  place	  as	  
platforms	  for	  noticing,	  interpretation	  and	  action	  processes.	  	  Second,	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  reference	  
point	  when	  actors	  notice	  differences	  in	  their	  interpretation	  of	  certain	  requirements.	  	  
	  
Coalition	  Formation	  	  
In	  as	  far	  as	  the	  process	  described	  above	  failed,	  alignment	  may	  take	  on	  the	  form	  of	  coalition	  
building.	  As	  such	  a	  coalition	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  final	  action	  of	  sense-­‐making	  process	  in	  which	  
the	   different	   actors	   have	   formed	   a	   basic	   understanding	   of	   their	   differing	   interests	   in	   a	  
particular	  issue	  and	  have	  acted	  upon	  the	  distribution	  of	  these	  interests	  through	  allying	  with	  
actors	   close	   to	   them.	  We	   have	   noted	   earlier	   that	   the	   decision	   making	   within	   the	   NH	   90	  
programme	  is	  based	  on	  unanimous	  voting.	  Yet,	  given	  the	  different	  logics	  and	  interests	  of	  the	  
participants	   in	  practice	  that	  often	  proves	  difficult.	  Often	  participants	  noted	  that	   in	  practice	  
reaching	  decisions	  involves	  the	  building	  of	  a	  coalition	  on	  a	  particular	  issue.	  	  
	  	  	  	  
“If	  you	  have	  stronger	  disagreements	  in	  a	  working	  group	  on	  a	  certain	  subject	  then	  you	  
try	  to	  build	  up	  coalitions,	  and	  then	  you	  will	  automatically	  find	  those	  nations,	  that	  are	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close	  to	  you,	  to	  get	  them	  on	  your	  side.”	  (Interview	  German	  NH	  90	  official	  1)	  
	  	  
	  
When	  the	  process	  of	  alignment	  takes	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  coalition	  formation,	  ‘coercion’	  
in	  the	  sense	  of	  group	  pressure	  comes	  into	  play.	  	  
	   	  
“If	  you	  get	  a	  pool	  of	  2	  or	  3	  [nations,	  author]	  to	  promote	  an	  idea,	  then	  usually	  the	  rest	  
	   follows	  them.	  At	  least	  that’s	  how	  it	  should	  work.”	  	  (Interview	  French	  NH	  90	  official)	  
	  
Although	   in	   such	   a	   circumstance	   a	   nation	   could	   still	   hold	   on	   to	   its	   own	   viewpoint	  
given	  that	  decisions	  should	  be	  taken	  unanimously	  -­‐	  and	  this	  indeed	  occurs	  occasionally	  –	  the	  
partners	  tend	  to	  choose	  to	  advance	  this	  viewpoint	  only	  when	  they	  have	  very	  vested	  interests	  
in	  an	  issue.	  There	  is	  widespread	  recognition	  that	  this	  invariably	  will	  culminate	  in	  delays	  in	  the	  
programme.	  Respondents	  indicate	  that	  it	  takes	  little	  effort	  to	  hamper	  the	  continuation	  of	  a	  
large	  programme	  with	  heavy	  structures	  on	  both	  the	  nations	  and	  the	  industrial	  side.	  The	  key	  
mind-­‐set	   is	   to	   move	   the	   programme	   further.	   This	   mind-­‐set	   was	   particularly	   evident	   in	  
NAHEMA,	  which	  we	  will	  discuss	  next.	  	  
	   	  	  	  
NAHEMA	  as	  an	  Integrative	  Mechanism	  
One	   important	   facilitator	  of	   alignment	   is	   the	   role	  of	  NAHEMA.	  NAHEMA	  officials	   originate	  
from	  the	  respective	  procurement	  agencies	  of	  the	  participating	  nations.	  Yet,	  they	  are	  paid	  a	  
NATO	   salary.	  More	   important	   though,	   they	   all	   recognized	   that	   they	   are	   participants	   of	   an	  
international	  organisation.	  As	  a	  French	  NAHEMA	  official	  explained	  to	  us,	  	  
	  
“In	   an	   organisation	   like	   this	   one	   an	   important	   point	   for	  me	   is	   that	   we	   have	   to	   be	  
	  internationally	  minded.	  We’re	  not	  a	  programme	  manager,	  we’re	  not	  a	  deputy	  of	  the	  
national	   programme	   manager…	   I’m	   not	   here	   to	   support	   the	   French	   position.	   The	  
French	   programme	   manager	   was	   sometimes	   disappointed,	   because	   he	   was	   not	  
getting	  the	  expected	  support	  from	  my	  side,	  and	  I	  explained	  him	  at	  a	  meeting,	  that	   I	  
understand	   his	   position,	   but	   from	   a	   NAHEMA	   point	   of	   view,	   I	   cannot	   fully	   support	  
him…	  At	  an	  agency	   like	   this	   one,	  we	  work	   really	  with	  an	   international	  mind.	   So	  we	  
don’t	  fight	  inside	  the	  agency	  to	  support	  the	  national	  position.	  We	  will	  really	  lose	  a	  lot	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of	   time,	   if	   we’re	   negotiating	   inside	   the	   agency	   at	   some	   point.”	   (Interview	   French	  
NAHEMA	  Official	  1)	  
	  
The	  respondent	  notes	  that	  for	  NAHEMA	  to	  be	  effective	  it	  is	  important	  that	  NAHEMA	  
officials	  realise	  they	  are	  members	  of	  an	  international	  organisation.	  Although	  they	  originate	  
from	   the	   respective	   procurement	   agencies	   of	   the	   participating	   nations,	   they	   are	   there	   to	  
move	  the	  programme	  further.	  NAHEMA	  officials	  are	  not	  there	  to	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  their	  
country’s	  government.	  Similarly,	  another	  French	  NAHEMA	  official	  suggested,	  	  
	  
	  “Because	   before,	   I	   was	   the	   procurement	   officer	   for	   France	   and	   then	   I	   became	   a	  
NAHEMA	  contract	  manager,	  so	  I	  really	  have	  the,	  you	  know,	  background,	  and	  the	  way	  
I	   behaved	   that	  moment,	   I	   had	   to	   completely	   change	  my	  mind	  and	  become	  another	  
person	  here.	  Because	   there	   I	  was	  authoritarian	  and	  say,	   ‘I	  want	   that,	  and	  NAHEMA	  
you’re	  not	  doing	  the	  right	  thing.’”	  (Interview	  French	  NAHEMA	  Official	  3)	  
	  
This	   NAHEMA	   official	   notes	   how	   he	   completely	   had	   to	   change	   his	   mind-­‐set	   and	  
behaviour	  when	  he	  became	  a	  contract	  manager	  at	  NAHEMA.	  Before	  he	  was	  a	  procurement	  
officer	   for	  France.	   In	   that	  position	  he	  could	  be	  more	  directive,	  and	  make	  strong	  demands.	  
Yet,	   in	   his	   current	   position	   in	   NAHEMA,	   this	   type	   of	   behaviour	   is	   inappropriate	   if	   not	  
unacceptable.	  In	  many	  respects,	  people	  working	  for	  NAHEMA	  had	  to	  change	  their	  identities	  
and	  behavioural	  patterns.	  To	   some	  extent	  NAHEMA	  has	  developed	  a	   logic	  of	   its	  own,	  one	  
that	   is	   oriented	   towards	   the	  moving	   ahead	   of	   the	   programme,	   functioning	   as	   a	  mediator	  
between	   not	   only	   the	   nations	   and	   industry,	   but	   also	   between	   the	   different	   nations	  
themselves.	  They	  consider	  it	  to	  be	  one	  of	  their	  primary	  tasks	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  nations	  stay	  
together.	  This	  is	  clearly	  illustrated	  by	  the	  following	  quote	  from	  a	  NAHEMA	  official,	  	  
	  
“The	   role	   of	  NAHEMA	   is	   to	   try	   to	   understand	   each	   nation’s	   need	   and	   to	   look	   for	   a	  
common	  way	  that	  is	  suitable	  for	  all	  of	  them.”	  (Interview	  French	  NAHEMA	  Official	  2)	  
	  
NAHEMA	  representatives	  seek	  to	  understand	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  different	  nations	  and	  
try	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   nations	   achieve	   the	   largest	   commonality	   in	   the	   helicopters.	   They	  
consider	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  governments	  and	  their	  suppliers	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	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problems	   in	   keeping	   the	   nations	   together.	   Hence,	   NAHEMA	   representatives	   thus	   serve	   a	  
crucial	   role	   in	   the	   interoganisational	   noticing,	   interpretation	   and	   action	   processes.	   Its	  
primary	  purpose	   is	  to	  harmonise	  the	  different	  positions	  of	  the	  nations	  and	  find	  a	  common	  
solution.	   As	   such,	   much	   of	   the	   work	   conducted	   by	   NAHEMA	   representatives	   is	   directed	  
towards	   the	   noticing	   and	   interpretation	   of	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   nations	   and	   to	   either	  
reconcile	  or	  combine	  them.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  (Vertical)	  Escalation	  Process	  
Another	   mechanism	   that	   is	   used	   when	   problems	   and	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   emerge	   at	   a	  
particular	   level	   involves	   escalation.	   Escalation	   occurs	   when	   participants	   of	   a	   particular	  
working	  group	  perceive	  they	  have	  exhausted	  all	  available	  means	  at	  their	  disposal	  to	  solve	  a	  
particular	  issue	  and	  initial	  coalition	  building	  also	  proved	  difficult.	  At	  that	  time	  one	  or	  more	  of	  
these	  participants	  will	  involve	  his	  superior	  indicating	  that	  an	  issue	  cannot	  be	  resolved	  at	  his	  
or	  her	  level.	  	  
	  
“You	   can	   use	   the	   JEC	   meeting,	   The	   Steering	   Committee	   meeting.	   To	   discuss	   such	  
things	  and	  to	   	  bring	   something	   to	   the	   NAD	   level	   [National	   Armaments	   Director].	   It	  
must	  be	  a	  severe	  thing,	  I	  think.	  And	  under	  normal	  conditions	  you	  have	  to	  discuss	  such	  
things	  at	  the	  Steering	  Committee	  level	  before	  you	  bring	  it	  to	  the	  NAD	  level.	  This	  would	  
be	  the	  normal	  way.”	  (Interview	  German	  NH	  90	  Programme	  Official	  2)	  
	  
Although	   the	  escalation	  of	  an	   issue	   frequently	  occurred,	   respondents	   indicated	   this	  
to	  be	  a	  measure	  of	  last	  resort.	  As	  a	  Dutch	  NAHEMA	  official	  explained,	  	  
	  
“If	   the	  working	   level	  …	  can’t	  work	   it	  out,	   it	  escalates	  to	  a	  higher	   level.	  They	  will	  not	  
work	  it	  out	  either,	  because	  then	  you	  are	  at	  a	  level	  at	  which	  the	  people	  involved	  don’t	  
know	   exactly	   what	   it	   is	   about,	   content	   wise.	   And	   then	   they	   are	   afraid	   to	   take	   a	  
decision,	   because	   they	   are	   afraid	   to	   offend	   or	   insult	   -­‐	   I	   am	   not	   exactly	   sure	   –	   the	  
others.	  And	  finally	  the	  highest	  level	  says,	  ‘The	  working	  level	  has	  to	  solve	  it.’	  And	  then	  
you	  explain,	  ‘We	  have	  already	  tried	  that,	  we	  could	  not	  work	  it	  out.’	  ‘The	  working	  level	  
has	  to	  find	  a	  solution!	  That’s	  it.’	  ‘Okay,	  then	  we	  will	  work	  it	  out.’	  That	  means	  that	  my	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mandate	   has	   been	   expanded.	   And	   that	  mandate	   isn’t	   defined.	   It	   doesn’t	  work	   that	  
explicitly.”	  (Interview	  Dutch	  NAHEMA	  Official	  2).	  
	  
The	  escalation	  process	  in	  effect	  triggers	  a	  more	  intra-­‐organisational	  sense-­‐making	  process.	  It	  
can	   be	   seen	   as	   the	   action	   component	   when	   the	   interorganisational	   noticing	   and	  
interpretation	  activities	  have	  led	  to	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  respective	  actors	  have	  gained	  a	  
common	   understanding	   that	   harmonising	   their	   positions	   within	   current	   constraints	   is	  
infeasible.	   An	   issue	   is	   brought	   to	   the	   attention	   of	   superiors,	   who	   then	   often	   engage	   in	   a	  
sense-­‐making	  process	  with	  their	  respective	  counterparts.	  Yet,	  the	  problem	  with	  escalation	  is	  
that	  an	  issue	  becomes	  pulled	  out	  of	  the	  technical	  area	  and	  acquires	  a	  political	  meaning.	  The	  
people	  who	  then	  have	  to	  decide	  often	  lack	  the	  technical	  knowledge	  behind	  an	  issue	  to	  reach	  
a	   technical	   solution.	   They	   do	   possess	   the	   ability	   to	   allocate	   more	   resources	   in	   order	   to	  
overcome	  an	  issue,	  but	  this	  often	  has	  to	  be	  solved	  at	  the	  technical	  level.	  In	  essence	  it	  means	  
that	   the	   mandate	   of	   the	   members	   at	   the	   technical	   level	   became	   implicitly	   expanded.	  
Moreover,	   escalation	   often	   leads	   to	   significant	   delays.	   When	   a	   conflict	   of	   interest	   is	  
escalated	   to	   the	   Steering	   Committee,	   for	   example,	   it	   could	   easily	   take	   a	   half	   year	   until	   it	  
returns	  to	  working	  group	  level	  in	  which	  it	  originated,	  if	  only	  because	  the	  Steering	  Committee	  
convenes	  only	  two	  times	  a	  year.	  	  
The	  more	  severe	  problems	  may	  even	  escalate	  to	  the	  level	  of	  the	  National	  Armaments	  
Directors	   (NAD).	   The	   National	   Armaments	   Directors	   are	   generally	   not	   involved	   in	   the	  
programme.	   Yet,	  when	   there	   are	   issues	   that	   cannot	   be	   solved	   at	   the	   Steering	   Committee	  
level,	   the	   NADs	   will	   be	   involved	   through	   the	   internal	   escalation	   process	   within	   the	  
procurement	   agencies.	   They	   also	   keep	   themselves	   informed	   through	   their	   contacts	   with	  
their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  other	  nations.	  	  	  
	  
	   “But	  the	  NADs	  they	  see	  each	  other	  so	  frequently…	  At	  times	  I	  saw	  these	  people	  more	  
	   often	  than	  my	  own	  staff	  in	  the	  Netherlands.	  Because	  you	  would	  always	  run	  into	  them.	  
	   Also	  at	  	  those	  Weapons	  Conferences.	  There	  were	  five	  or	  six	  of	  those	  conferences	  each	  
	   year	   which	   I	   attended.	   And	   there	   rooms	   were	   reserved	   for	   meetings.”	   (Interview	  
	   Former	  Dutch	  National	  Armaments	  Director)	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Escalating	  a	  problem	  tends	  to	  activate	  the	  normative	  dimension	  of	  cooperation.	  The	  
formal	  rules	  as	  codified	  in	  the	  MoU	  cannot	  possibly	  cover	  all	  contingencies	  emerging	  during	  
the	   course	  of	   cooperation.	   The	   formal	   rules	   need	   to	  be	   accompanied	  by	   shared	  norms	  of	  
appropriate	   conduct.	   We	   have	   seen	   how	   this	   normative	   dimension	   is	   instilled	   in	   the	  
identities	   of	   NAHEMA	   personnel.	   At	   the	   political	   level	   these	   norms	   become	   even	   more	  
important.	   The	   development	   and	   perpetuation	   of	   a	   climate	   of	   trust	   seemed	   essential	   to	  
ensure	  the	  continuation	  of	  cooperation.	  	  
	  
“The	  essence	  of	  cooperation	  is	  that	  you	  prevent	  to	  put	  each	  other	  for	  great	  surprises.	  
It	  depends	  on	  the	  trust	  that	  you	  have	   in	  one	  another.	  That	   is	   important.”	   (Interview
	  Former	  Dutch	  National	  Armaments	  Director)	  
	  
At	  the	  political	  level	  much	  emphasis	  is	  placed	  on	  maintaining	  workable	  relationships	  
with	   the	   other	   partners.	   These	   norms	   have	   been	   established	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	  
repeated	   interaction	   and	   cooperation	   among	   nations	   on	   a	   number	   of	   programmes	   and	  
international	  forums.	  The	  NH	  90	  programme	  certainly	   is	  not	  the	  only	  issue	  common	  to	  the	  
agenda’s	   of	   the	   governments	   involved.	   The	  NH	  90	   nations	   cooperate	   on	   numerous	   issues	  
and	  within	   a	  multitude	   of	   international	   forums	   such	   as	   the	   EU,	   NATO,	   OCCAR,	   and	  more	  
recently	   the	  European	  Defence	  Agency	   (EDA).	  The	  NH	  90	  programme,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	   is	  
also	  not	  the	  only	  development	  and	  production	  programme	  in	  which	  these	  nations	  cooperate	  
(see	  chapter	  4	  for	  some	  examples).	  	  
	  
	   “We	  are	  all	   partners	   in	   the	  European	  Union.	  And	  we	  have	   learned	  a	   lot	   to	   tolerate	  
	   each	  other.	  To	  harmonise	  things	  together	  and	  I	  think	  none	  of	  the	  nations	  will	  take	  the	  
	   risk	   for	   disharmony	   in	   such	   a	   subordinate	   project	   at	   the	   political	   level.	   So,	  when	   it	  
	   really	   comes	   to	   a	   situation	   that	   one	  of	   the	   partners	   in	   the	   project	  will	   damage	   the	  
	   other	  ones,	  I	  think	  that	  the	  political	  level,	  will	  very	  soon	  find	  a	  way	  to	  be	  in	  harmony	  
	   again.	   For	   that	   reason,	   from	   a	   project	   perspective	   maybe	   you	   have	   to	   find	   some	  
	   things	   you	   don’t	   like.	   But	   that	   is	   not	   the	   relevant	   level	   from	   my	   perspective.	   The	  
	   relevant	  level	  is	  much	  higher.	  It	  is	  the	  political	  level.	  And	  from	  a	  political	  perspective	  
	   all	  of	  the	  projects	  will	  be	  very	  fine.”	  (Interview	  German	  NH	  90	  official	  2)	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While	  at	  the	  programme	  level	  there	  may	  be	  certain	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  between	  the	  
actors	   the	   escalation	   mechanism	   ensures	   that	   encountered	   problems	   and	   conflicts	   that	  
persist	  eventually	  involve	  the	  political	   level.	  Actors	  at	  the	  political	   level	  have	  the	  possibility	  
to	  make	  connections	  to	  other	  programmes	  and	  cooperative	  endeavours	  in	  which	  nations	  are	  
involved.	   Although	   the	   NH	   90	   programme	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   amount	   of	   money	   involved	  
constitutes	  a	  relatively	  large	  project	  it	  doesn’t	  have	  the	  magnitude	  to	  escalate	  into	  a	  conflict	  
between	  the	  nations.	  
 
7.4	   Concluding	  Comments	  
 
In	  this	  chapter	  we	  showed	  that	  alignment	  in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  comes	  at	  a	  price.	  
Manifestations	   of	   these	   ‘costs’	   of	   alignment	   included	   lack	   of	   standardisation,	   programme	  
delays,	   and	   challenges	   involving	   the	   division	   of	   work	   share.	   In	   paragraph	   7.2	   we	   have	  
discussed	   the	   sense-­‐making	   processes	   underlying	   the	   alignment	   of	   logics.	   We	   initially	  
focused	   our	   attention	   towards	   both	   the	   more	   cognitive	   and	   communicative	   aspects	   of	  
sense-­‐making.	   In	   paragraph	   7.3	   we	   distinguished	   a	   number	   of	   formal	   and	   informal	  
mechanisms	  underlying	  the	  sense-­‐making	  processes	  of	  the	  various	  national	  stakeholders	  in	  
the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  Here	  we	  would	   like	  to	  take	  stock	  and	  discuss	  the	  relation	  between	  
these	  mechanisms,	   the	   sense-­‐making	   efforts	   of	   the	   various	   national	   stakeholders	   and	   the	  
‘costs’	  of	  alignment.	  	  	  
The	  sense-­‐making	  efforts	  of	  the	  programme	  participants	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  don’t	  take	  
place	   in	   a	   vacuum.	   The	   structure	   of	   the	   programme	   provides	   for	   a	   basic	   sense-­‐making	  
platform	  for	  the	  various	  actors	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  The	  memoranda	  of	  understanding	  
provide	   for	   the	   basic	   rules	   that	   apply,	   such	   as	   the	   responsibilities	   of	   a	   dedicated	  
international	   programme	   office	   (NAHEMA	   in	   this	   case),	   who	   has	   the	   authority	   to	   take	  
decisions	  on	  particular	  subject	  matters,	  the	  minimum	  frequency	  of	  meetings	  to	  be	  held	  and	  
where	   they	  should	   take	  place.	  Accompanying	   these	   formal	   rules	  are	  a	  number	  of	   informal	  
rules.	  NAHEMA	  personnel	   serve	  as	   a	  main	   vehicle	   to	   keep	   the	  nations	   together.	  NAHEMA	  
personnel	  frequently	  reported	  the	  difficult	  position	  they	  found	  themselves	  in.	  Coming	  from	  
the	   different	   defence	   departments	   of	   the	   participating	   nations	   and	   now	   working	   for	   an	  
international	   programme	   office	   they	   noted	   that	   it	   is	   often	   difficult	   to	   remain	   objectively.	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Often	   they	   find	   themselves	   under	   pressure	   from	   their	   ministry	   of	   defence.	   Nevertheless,	  
they	   also	   expressed	   their	   awareness	   that	   fighting	   for	   national	   interests	   inside	   the	   agency	  
would	   seriously	   limit	  NAHEMA’s	   effectiveness.	   They	   share	   a	   general	   feeling	   that	   it	   is	   their	  
primary	  responsibility	  to	  keep	  the	  nations	  together.	  	  
Lobbying	  provides	  for	  another	  informal	  mechanism.	  This	  mechanism	  has	  the	  clearest	  
connotation	  with	  our	  sense-­‐making	  activity	  described	  as	  sense-­‐colluding.	  The	  memoranda	  of	  
understanding	   outlines	   a	   decision	   making	   structure	   which	   is	   based	   on	   the	   principle	   of	  
unanimous	  voting.	  In	  practice,	  this	  decision	  making	  rule	  results	  in	  efforts	  of	  sense-­‐colluding	  
since	  the	  national	  stakeholders	  are	  aware	  that	  no	  one	  ultimately	  has	  an	  interest	  in	  blocking	  a	  
particular	  subject	  indefinitely	  as	  this	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  programme	  can’t	  move	  forward.	  
As	  such	  an	  informal	  process	  of	  lobbying	  has	  replaced	  which	  basically	  stipulates	  that	  when	  a	  
coalition	   of	   two	   or	   three	   nations	   has	   formed,	   the	   others	  will	   follow	   or	   that	   they	  will	   pay	  
additionally	  for	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  their	  wishes.	  This	  latter	  instance	  is	  most	  visible	  in	  the	  lack	  of	  
standardisation	  of	  the	  helicopters.	  	  We	  will	  now	  turn	  to	  a	  final	  discussion	  of	  the	  process	  of	  
















CHAPTER	  8 	  	   DISCUSSION	  AND	  CONCLUSIONS	  
 
8.1	  	   Answering	  the	  Research	  Questions	  
 
In	  this	  thesis	  we	  set	  out	  to	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  two	  research	  questions.	  In	  the	  first	  research	  
question	  we	   asked	  what	   the	   logics	   of	   the	   actors	   (i.e.	   national	   governments	   and	   industrial	  
companies	  were	   in	   the	  NH	  90	  programme.	   In	  Chapter	  5,	  we	  presented	   the	  analysis	  of	   the	  
data	   and	   suggested	   two	  main	   dimensions	   on	  which	   these	   logics	   varied.	   The	   first	   one,	   the	  
defence	   industrial	   orientation,	   consisted	   of	   the	   export	   orientation,	   the	   degree	   to	  which	   a	  
nation	  was	  concerned	  with	  European	  cooperation	  in	  defence	  procurement	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	   relations	   between	   the	   government	   and	   its	   main	   defence	   suppliers.	   The	   second	  
dimension	  related	  to	  the	  management	  of	  the	  programme	  by	  the	  governmental	  actors.	  This	  
dimension	   consisted	   of	   the	   degree	   of	   parliamentary	   oversight	   of	   development	   and	  
production	   programmes	   and	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   programme	   responsibilities	   were	  
delegated	   to	   the	   programme	  offices	   of	   the	   nations	   studied.	  We	   have	   also	   noticed	   that	   in	  
some	   countries	   the	   logics	   have	   been	   changing.	   This	   is	   probably	   most	   noticeable	   in	   the	  
privatisation	  processes	  that	  some	  companies	  have	  been	  experiencing	  in	  late	  1990s	  in	  France	  
and	  Italy.	  Yet,	  in	  both	  countries	  the	  governments	  retain	  some	  governmental	  control	  in	  share-­‐
holding	  form	  in	  Finmeccanica	  (Italy)	  and	  Eurocopter	  (France	  through	  EADS).	  	  	  	   	  
 
8.1.1	   Forms	  of	  Alignment	  
The	   second	   research	   question	   dealt	  with	   the	   question	   of	   how	   the	   process	   of	   aligning	   the	  
logics	   of	   action	   unfolded.	   Underlying	   this	   question	   is	   the	   assumption	   that	   at	   least	   some	  
degree	   of	   consistency	   in	   the	   logics	   of	   the	   partners	   needs	   to	   emerge	   (e.g.	   Bacharach,	  
Bamberger	  and	  Sonnenstuhl,	  1996).	   In	  Chapter	  6,	  we	   introduced	   the	  notion	  of	  “alignment	  
that	  comes	  at	  a	  cost”	  to	  account	  for	  some	  of	  our	  empirical	  observations.	  It	  suggests	  that	  the	  
alignment	  of	   logics	   is	  a	  difficult	  and	  lengthy	  process.	  The	  alignment	  that	  we	  observed	  here	  
had	  some	  serious	  consequences	  for	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  programme,	  most	  visible	  in	  the	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lack	   of	   standardisation	   achieved	   in	   the	   helicopters,	   the	   delays	   that	   occurred	   in	   the	  
programme,	  and	  (dis)agreements	  concerning	  the	  division	  of	  work	  share	  among	  the	  nations.	  	  
A	   sceptical	   perhaps	   even	   a	   cynical	   perspective	   might	   suggest	   that	   due	   to	   these	  
“costs”	  alignment	  actually	  has	  not	  occurred.	  Another	   interpretation	  is	  that	  over	  the	  course	  
of	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  some	  form	  of	   ‘quasi-­‐alignment’	  has	  emerged.	   In	  this	  connection,	  
the	  word	  ‘quasi’	  can	  have	  two	  different	  meanings.	  Quasi	  can	  refer	  to	  something	  that	  looks	  
like	  alignment,	  but	   is	  actually	  not	  alignment.	  A	  second	  meaning	  of	  quasi-­‐alignment	   implies	  
that	  certain	  elements	  of	  the	  logics	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  programme	  have	  been	  aligned	  to	  
such	  an	  extent	  that	  it	  can	  proceed	  relatively	  successfully,	  but	  it	  also	  implies	  that	  some	  have	  
not	   been	   aligned.	   Here,	   the	   word	   ‘quasi’	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   ‘semi’,	   as	   Brown	   and	  
Eisenhardt’s	   (1997:	   28)	   study:	   “By	   semistructures	   we	   mean	   organizations	   in	   which	   some	  
features	  are	  prescribed	  or	  determined	   (e.g.	   responsibilities,	  project	  priorities,	   time	   intervals	  
between	  projects),	  but	  other	  aspects	  are	  not.	  Semistructures,	  exhibit	  partial	  order,	  and	  they	  
lie	  between	  the	  extremes	  of	  very	  rigid	  and	  highly	  chaotic	  organization.”	  	  
The	  first	  form	  of	  quasi-­‐alignment	  may	  result	  out	  of	  the	  ignorance	  of	  actors	  that	  their	  
logics	   diverge.	   Especially,	   during	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   cooperation	   with	   unfamiliar	   partners	  
actors	  may	  not	  be	  aware	  that	  they	  are	  operating	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  different	  values,	  beliefs	  and	  
interests.	   The	   first	   form	  of	  quasi-­‐alignment	   could	   also	   result	   out	  of	   intentional	   conduct	  of	  
programme	   actors.	   Actors	   could	   verbally	   conform	   to	   a	   certain	   logic,	  while	   pursuing	   other	  
interests.	   In	   this	   regard	   the	   ideas	  of	   (Brunsson,	  1993)	  come	  to	  mind.	  He	  distinguishes	   two	  
control	  mechanisms	   to	   deal	  with	   the	   inconsistency	   between	   ideas	   and	   actions,	   one	   being	  
‘justification’	   and	   the	   other	   one	   being	   ‘hypocrisy’.	   Obviously,	   this	   is	   generally	   difficult	   to	  
ascertain.	  The	   ‘intended’	  orders	  placed	  by	  nations	  may	   serve	  as	  a	   simple	   illustration	  here.	  
The	  intended	  orders	  provide	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  work	  share	  agreements	  are	  based.	  A	  nation	  
interested	   to	  obtain	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  work	  share	  could	  claim	  to	  procure	  an	  amount	  of	  
helicopters	  and	  at	  a	  later	  stage	  decide	  to	  procure	  fewer	  helicopters.	  	  
Some	  earlier	  European	  development	  and	  production	  programmes	  seem	  to	  resemble	  
the	   first	   form	  of	  quasi-­‐alignment.	   Lorell	   (1980)	  argued	   that	   the	  French-­‐German	  Transall	  C-­‐
160	   programme	   constituted	   “the	   first	   genuine	   codevelopment	   aircraft	   programme.”	   	   He	  
offered	   a	   number	   of	   explanations	   for	   the	   substandard	   performance	   of	   the	   Transall	  
programme:	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• serious	  disagreements	  over	  the	  requirements	  and	  specifications	  of	  both	  France	  and	  
Germany;	  
• heavy	  politicised	  programme	  environment;	  
• lack	  of	  a	  unified	  government	  and	  industrial	  management	  structure;	  and	  
• ignorance	  of	  both	  partners	  to	  the	  costs	  benefits	  of	  cooperation.	  	  
	  
Some	   of	   these	   issues	   emerged	   in	   our	   case	   too.	   In	   the	   NH	   90	   case,	   the	   nations	  
experienced	   difficulties	   harmonizing	   their	   requirements	   and	   specifications.	   Nevertheless,	  
unlike	  France	  and	  Germany	   in	   the	  Transall	  C-­‐160	  programme,	   they	  managed	   to	  produce	  a	  
product	   that	   fitted	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   participating	   nations	   quite	   reasonably.	   In	   the	  
Transall	  C-­‐160	  programme,	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  two	  nations	  appeared	  so	  different	  that	  
combining	   them	  would	   almost	   necessarily	   have	   resulted	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   proverbial	  
‘sheep	  with	  five	  legs”	  (Lorell,	  1980).	  	  
In	   the	  NH	  90	  case,	   the	  environment	  was	   less	  politicised	   than	   the	  earlier	  Transall	  C-­‐
160.	   The	   Transall	   programme	   took	   place	   in	   a	   period	   in	  which	   both	   the	  United	   States	   and	  
France	   competed	   for	   political	   influence	   in	   West	   Germany.	   As	   Lorell	   (1980)	   noted,	   the	  
German	   decision	   to	   go-­‐ahead	   with	   the	   programme	   despite	   reservations	   towards	   the	  
fulfilment	  of	  the	  requirements	  for	  the	  Luftwaffe	  had	  much	  to	  do	  with	  a	  perceived	  obligation	  
of	  the	  German	  government	  to	  restore	  the	  balance	  in	  the	  Franco-­‐German	  axis	  that	  followed	  
the	   1963	   Elysee	   Treaty	   between	   French	   President	   de	   Gaulle	   and	   German	   Chancellor	  
Adenauer.	   In	   France,	   concerns	   had	   arisen	   with	   German	   commitment	   to	   their	   political	  
cooperation.	  Lorell	  1980,	  for	  example	  concluded:	  	  
	   	  
“At	   times	   regional	   political	   considerations	   appear	   to	   have	   heavily	   influenced	   the	  
	   origin	  	   and	   the	   evolution	   of	   most	   European	   codevelopment	   programs.	   Nearly	   all	  
	   aircraft	  codevelopment	  program	  starts	  occurred	  during	  the	  presidency	  of	  Charles	  the	  
	   Gaulle.	  All	   of	   the	   large	  aircraft	   programs	  were	   initiated	  by	   the	   French,	   used	   French	  
	   designs,	  or	  were	  dominated	  by	  the	  French.	  To	  a	  large	  extent	  the	  programs	  served	  as	  a	  
	   tool	   of	   Gaullist	   foreign	   policy.	   This	   was	   particularly	   true	   of	   the	   Franco-­‐German	  
	   programs.”	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Although	   politics	   inherently	   dominates	   many	   international	   collaborative	  
programmes,	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  ones	  noted	  by	  Lorell	  (1980)	  did	  not	  readily	  emerge	  in	  the	  NH	  
90	  programme.	  In	  many	  respects,	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  together	  with	  the	  French-­‐German	  
(and	   later	   Spain)	   Tiger	   attack	   helicopter	   programme	   paved	   the	  way	   for	   deeper	   European	  
defence-­‐industrial	  cooperation.	  Without	  these	  programmes	  it	  would	  have	  been	  unlikely	  that	  
the	   helicopter	   divisions	   of	   Aerospatiale	   and	  Messcherschmitt-­‐Bölkow-­‐Blohm	   (MBB)	  would	  
have	  been	  merged	  to	  form	  Eurocopter.	  	  
	   Where	  foreign,	  security	  and	  industrial	  policy	  were	  often	  given	  primacy	  in	  the	  Transall	  
C-­‐160	  programme	  over	  economic	  considerations,	  the	  latter	  play	  an	  equally	  important	  role	  in	  
the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  At	  times,	  some	  of	  these	  issues	  emerged	  in	  the	  NH	  90	  programme,	  as	  
we	  have	  seen.	  Yet,	  most	  often	  these	  related	  to	  certain	  industrial	  considerations	  of	  nations.	  
The	   inclusion	   of	   two	   different	   engines	   to	   power	   the	   helicopter	   probably	   offers	   the	   best	  
example	  thereof.	  Yet,	  on	  the	  whole	  the	  nations	  have	  been	  able	  to	  keep	  the	  programme	  costs	  
down.	  Although	  cost	  overruns	  in	  these	  programmes	  are	  generally	  difficult	  to	  ascertain,	  the	  
nations	  have	  been	  able	  to	  run	  the	  programme	  within	  their	  budgets.	  	  
	   Therefore,	  we	  consider	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  according	  to	  the	  
first	   form	  of	  quasi-­‐alignment	  as	   too	  cynical.	  For	   sure,	   the	  multinational	   cooperation	   in	   the	  
NH	  90	  programme	  has	  clearly	  been	  more	  successful	  than	  the	  earlier	  binational	  Transall	  C160	  
programme.	  What	  seems	  to	  suit	  our	  case	  better	   is	  the	  second	  form	  of	  quasi-­‐alignment,	  by	  
which	  we	  mean	  that	  certain	  elements	  of	  the	  logics	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  programme	  have	  
been	  aligned	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  it	  can	  proceed	  relatively	  successfully	  even	  though	  other	  
elements	   have	   not	   been	   aligned.	   It	   bears	   a	   connotation	   to	   the	   observation	   of	   some	   our	  
respondents	   that	   assessing	   the	   course	  and	  performance	  of	   the	  NH	  90	   is	   akin	   to	   “seeing	  a	  
glass	  half	  full	  or	  half	  empty”.	  There	  is	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  indismissible	  obliquity	  in	  achieving	  
this	  second	  form	  of	  alignment	  of	  logics.	  The	  British	  economist	  John	  Kay	  recently	  celebrated	  
oblique	   approaches	   to	   complex	   and	   uncertain	   decision-­‐making	   situations.	   “Obliquity”,	   Kay	  
asserts,	  “describes	  the	  process	  of	  achieving	  complex	  objectives	  indirectly…	  In	  general,	  oblique	  
approaches	   recognise	   that	   complex	   objectives	   tend	   to	   be	   imprecisely	   defined	   and	   contain	  
many	  elements	  that	  are	  not	  necessarily	  or	  obviously	  compatible	  with	  each	  other,	  and	  that	  we	  
learn	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  objectives	  and	  the	  means	  of	  achieving	  them	  during	  a	  process	  of	  
experiment	  and	  discovery”	  (Kay,	  2010:	  3-­‐4).	  	  	  
 161 
	   Zabusky	  (1995)	  in	  her	  study	  of	  the	  European	  Space	  Agency	  (ESA)	  describes	  a	  similar	  
process	   of	   quasi,	   or	   perhaps	   semi-­‐alignment	   among	   the	   communities	   that	   represent	   ESA.	  
“Both	  technology	  and	  cooperation,	  albeit	  in	  different	  ways,	  thus	  meet	  the	  challenges	  posed	  
in	  working	  together	  by	  the	  diversity	  resulting	  from	  the	  division	  of	  labor….	  Each,	  as	  structure,	  
provides	  a	  means	  of	  organizing	  contradictions,	  connecting	  diverse	  pieces,	  and	  so	  crystallizing	  
harmony	  out	  of	   the	  disunity	  and	  ambiguities	  of	   conflict.	   They	  achieve	   this	  without	  entirely	  
eradicating	  the	  sources	  of	  conflict,	  namely,	  the	  distinctions	  among	  people,	  things,	  institutions	  
and	  values.”	  (p.	  194).	  She	  seems	  to	  be	  indicating	  that	  a	  form	  of	  semi-­‐alignment	  is	  perhaps	  all	  
one	  can	  wish	  for	  in	  such	  international	  collaborative	  programmes.	  	  
 
8.1.2	   Quasi-­‐alignment	  and	  the	  Nature	  of	  Sense-­‐Making	  
How	   did	   this	   second	   form	   of	   quasi-­‐alignment	   in	   the	   NH	   90	   programme	   came	   about?	  We	  
proposed	  a	  model	  in	  which	  the	  institutional	  logics	  of	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  programme	  inform	  the	  
noticing,	   interpretation	   and	   action	   of	   events	   by	   organisational	   actors	   involved	   in	   an	  
interorganisational	   exchange	   relationship.	   We	   also	   focused	   our	   attention	   on	   the	  
interorganisational	  sense-­‐making	  dynamics.	  Here,	  we	  focused	   less	  on	  the	  cognitive	  aspects	  
of	   sense-­‐making	   	   but	  more	   on	   the	   communicative	   aspects.	   This	   analysis	  was	   grounded	   in	  
earlier	   work	   by	   Vlaar,	   Van	   Fenema	   and	   Tiwari	   (2008)	   and	   Vaara	   and	   Monin	   (2010).	  
Synthesizing	   and	   extending	   their	   ideas	   led	   to	   a	   model	   in	   which	   sense-­‐making	   is	  
conceptualised	   as	   consisting	   of	   the	   activities	   of	   sense-­‐giving,	   sense-­‐demanding,	   sense-­‐
breaking	   and	   sense-­‐hiding.	   Our	   analysis	   indeed	   revealed	   the	   importance	   of	   these	  
communicative	  acts.	  Vaara	  (2003),	  Vaara	  and	  Monin	  (2010)	  underscored	  the	  importance	  of	  
politics	   in	   the	   interorganisational	   relations.	   In	   their	   analysis	   of	   post-­‐merger	   integration	  
processes	  this	  was	  particularly	  visible	  in	  the	  active	  hiding	  of	  potentially	  relevant	  information	  
in	  various	   factions	   that	  emerged	  during	   the	  post-­‐merger	  phase.	   In	   the	  work	  by	  Vlaar,	  Van	  
Fenema	   and	   Tiwari	   (2008)	   these	   political	   dynamics	   seemed	   to	   play	   a	   less	   important	   role.	  
Indeed,	   an	   explanation	   can	   be	   found	   that	   their	   research	   focused	   on	   geographically	  
distributed	  work	  teams	  within	   in	  one	  organisation.	  As	  such,	  politics	  are	   likely	  to	  play	  a	   less	  
prominent	   role	   (although	   they	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   not	   completely	   absent.	   Political	   dynamics	  
played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  our	  research	  context	  though.	  Indeed,	  sense-­‐hiding	  occasionally	  
indicated	   the	   existence	   of	   power	   plays	   among	  partners.	  Nevertheless,	  we	   also	   noted	   that	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sense-­‐hiding	  need	  not	  always	  have	  a	  political	  intention.	  It	  may	  also	  simply	  reveal	  ignorance	  
on	  the	  part	  of	  one	  the	  partners	  in	  the	  programme.	  	  
Moreover,	  we	  identified	  another	  sense-­‐making	  activity	  not	  yet	  previously	  discussed.	  
We	  have	  called	  this	  activity	  sense-­‐colluding.	  Sense-­‐colluding	  described	  instances	  where	  two	  
or	  a	  few	  partners	  exchanged	  information	  between	  themselves	  without	  informing	  a	  number	  
of	  other	  partners.	  Basically,	  it	  points	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  lobbying	  between	  the	  partners	  in	  
order	  to	  mobilise	  support	  for	  their	  positions.	  	  
In	  paragraph	  7.3	  we	  enumerated	  a	  number	  of	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  actors	  try	  
to	  align	  their	   logics.	  The	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  established	  the	  basic	  rules	  of	  the	  
game	  including	  the	  decision-­‐making	  structure	  and	  procedures.	  These	  formal	  decision	  making	  
structures	   and	   procedures	   in	   turn	   inform	   the	   two	   interpersonal	   alignment	  mechanisms	   in	  
which	   the	   main	   sense	   making	   activities	   of	   the	   actors	   takes	   place.	   Coalition	   formation	  
involves	  a	  horizontal	  alignment	  mechanism.	  Here	  actors	  try	  to	  gain	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  
of	   a	   partner’s	   logic,	   interests	   and	   motivation	   and	   try	   to	   find	   a	   common	   position	   on	   a	  
particular	  subject.	  Vertically	  actors	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  escalate	  a	  problem	  to	  a	  higher	  
level.	   Yet,	   as	  many	   of	   our	   respondents	   indicated,	   this	   is	   a	  mechanism	   of	   last	   resort.	   The	  
escalation	  mechanism	   is	   used	   only	  when	   individuals	   at	   a	   particular	   organisational	   level	   at	  
some	  point	  notice	  they	  are	  not	  going	  to	  agree	  on	  a	  common	  understanding	  and	  way	  ahead	  
because	  their	  logics	  and	  interests	  diverge	  too	  much. 
 
8.2	  	   Contributions	  to	  Theory	  	  
 
A	  debate	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  has	  been	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  individuals	  and	  organisations	  
are	  	  
constrained	  by	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  environments	  in	  which	  they	  operate.	  Neo-­‐institutional	  
theory,	  which	  provided	  the	  theoretical	  background	  for	  this	  study,	  has	  tended	  to	  be	  criticised	  
for	   an	  overly	   socialised	   conception	  of	   human	  behaviour.	   The	   sense-­‐making	  perspective	   as	  
developed	   by	   Karl	  Weick	   has	   tended	   to	   be	   criticised	   for	   the	   opposite.	   That	   is,	   it	   tends	   to	  
neglect	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  aspects	  that	  inform	  the	  sense-­‐making	  activities	  of	  individuals.	  
A	   number	   of	   scholars	   (Weber	   and	   Glynn,	   2006;	   Weick,	   1995)	   have	   provided	   theoretical	  
arguments	  for	  a	  reconciliation	  of	  these	  different	  perspectives.	  We	  have	  empirically	  –	  within	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the	   constraints	   of	   our	   study	   –	   demonstrated	   that	   there	   is	   room	   for	   such	   a	   reconciliation	  
between	   these	   divergent	   perspectives.	   The	   concept	   of	   quasi-­‐alignment	   of	   logics	   as	  
introduced	   in	   this	   thesis	   captures	   both	   the	   agentic	   propensities	   of	   individuals	   and	  
organisations	   and	   the	   constraining	   effects	   of	   institutional	   logics	   on	   the	   behaviour	   of	  
individuals	  and	  organisations.	  	  
Part	   of	   the	   criticism	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   overly	   socialised	   conception	   of	   human	  
behaviour	   in	   neo-­‐institutional	   theory	   stems	   from	   its	   focus	   on	   the	   cultural-­‐cognitive	  
dimension	  of	  institutions,	  the	  values	  and	  beliefs	  that	  inform	  the	  behaviour	  of	  actors	  (Powell	  
and	  DiMaggio;	  1991).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  regulative	  and	  normative	  aspects	  of	  institutions	  play	  
a	  very	  powerful	  role	  in	  interorganisational	  relations	  as	  discussed	  here.	  The	  institutional	  logic	  
of	   a	   nation	   is	   reflected	   in	   its	   laws,	   rules	   and	   policies,	   which	   in	   turn	   limit	   actors’	   room	   to	  
manoeuvre	   in	   international	   programmes.	   These	   regulative	   aspects	   may	   even	   continue	   to	  
exert	  pressure	  when	  an	  institutional	  logic	  is	  changing.	  	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   success	   of	   collaboration	   is	   also	   largely	   dependent	   on	   the	  
development	  of	  new	  rules	  and	  norms.	  In	  our	  study,	  we	  have	  seen	  this	  in	  the	  function	  of	  the	  
Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   between	   the	   nations	   and	   the	   role	   of	   NAHEMA.	  Many	   of	  
these	   rules	   and	   norms	   serve	   to	   mitigate	   against	   the	   pursuit	   of	   interests	   governed	   by	  
institutional	  logics.	  These	  also	  operate	  at	  multiple	  levels	  of	  analysis.	  In	  our	  case,	  between	  the	  
different	   programme	  offices	   and	  NAHEMA,	   the	  National	   Armaments	  Directors,	   and	   at	   the	  
political	   level	   between	   the	   political	   representatives	   of	   the	   defence	   departments.	   At	   the	  
fringes	   of	   institutional	   orders,	   interdependencies	   thus	   may	   create	   the	   development	   of	  
certain	  rules	  that	  in	  a	  way	  alter	  or	  set	  aside	  elements	  of	  institutional	  logics,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
actors	  may	  need	   to	   compromise	  on	   their	   logics.	   In	   this	   sense	  we	  have	  provided	  empirical	  
support	  for	  recent	  theorising	  in	  neo-­‐institutional	  theory	  that	  suggest	  that	  logics	  may	  not	  be	  
as	   robust	   and	   stable	   as	   prior	   research	   has	   tended	   to	   suggest.	   Actors	   do	   not	   necessarily	  
conform	   mindlessly	   to	   institutional	   scripts,	   but	   are	   likely,	   at	   least	   under	   certain	  
circumstances,	  to	  reflect	  and	  elaborate	  upon	  them	  as	  well	  as	  occasionally	  dismiss	  them.	  	  In	  
this	   study,	   the	   mere	   exposition	   of	   actors	   to	   other	   actors	   with	   different	   beliefs	   and	  
convictions	   is	  a	   likely	  mechanism	  that	   triggers	   this	  noticing,	   interpretation	  and	  action.	  The	  
noticing	   and	   interpretation	   of	   differences	   between	   national	   actors,	   individually	   as	  well	   as	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organisationally,	  in	  effect	  triggers	  also	  a	  noticing	  and	  interpretation	  of	  one’s	  own	  dominant	  
logic.	  	  
With	   respect	   to	   the	   literature	   on	   sense-­‐making	   we	   have	   made	   a	   number	   of	  
contributions.	   First,	   we	   have	   provided	   empirical	   support	   that	   sense-­‐making	   is	   affected	   by	  
wider	   social	   context	   and	   that	   institutional	   logics	   inform	   the	   sense-­‐making	  process.	  Hence,	  
inasmuch	   as	   Weick	   (1995:	   36)	   suggests	   that	   “sense-­‐making	   is	   the	   feedstock	   of	  
institutionalization”,	   the	   opposite	   seems	   equally	   plausible.	   Institutional	   logics	   and	  
institutions	  in	  general	  inform	  the	  sense-­‐making	  process	  (Weber	  and	  Glynn,	  2006).	  We	  have	  
suggested	   that	   the	  exposition	  of	  actors	   to	  different	   institutional	   logics	   is	   likely	   to	   trigger	  a	  
cognitively	  oriented	  sense-­‐making	  process	  consisting	  of	  noticing,	   interpretation	  and	  action.	  
We	  have	  also	  noted	  that	  this	  latter	  action	  component	  consists	  of	  communicative	  acts.	  Based	  
on	  earlier	  work	  we	  have	  suggested	  that	  these	  acts	  consisted	  of	  acts	  of	  sense-­‐giving,	  sense-­‐
demanding,	  sense-­‐breaking	  and	  sense-­‐hiding	  Gioia	  and	  Chittipetti,	  1992;	  Vaara	  and	  Monin,	  
2003;	  Vlaar,	  Van	  Fenema	  and	  Tiwari,	  2008).	  We	  have	  also	  suggested	  another	  communicative	  
act,	  sense-­‐colluding	  that	   is	   likely	  to	  occur	   in	  multi-­‐party	  negotiations.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  we	  
have	   tried	   to	  expand	   recent	   theorising	  on	  sense-­‐making	   in	   interoganisational	   relationships	  
by	   providing	   empirical	   evidence	   of	   the	   significance	   of	   formalisation	   in	   interorganisational	  
relationships	  as	  a	  means	  to	  make	  sense	  (Ring	  and	  Ven	  de	  Ven,	  1994;	  Vlaar,	  Van	  den	  Bosch	  
and	   Volberda,	   2006).	   Moreover,	   we	   have	   identified	   a	   number	   of	   mechanisms,	   the	  
Memoranda	  of	  Understanding,	  the	  role	  of	  NAHEMA,	  lobbying	  and	  escalation	  processes	  that	  
enhance	  sense-­‐making	  processes.	  	  
We	  have	  tried	  to	  expand	  past	  theorising	  on	  the	  alignment	  of	   logics.	  Specifically,	  we	  
have	  suggested	   that	   in	   international	  programmes	  such	  as	   the	  ones	  discussed	   in	   this	   thesis	  
full	   alignment	   of	   logics	   is	   possibly	   a	   utopia.	   Instead,	   we	   have	   introduced	   two	   alternative	  
forms	  of	  what	  we	  have	  called	  ‘quasi-­‐alignment’	  to	  account	  for	  our	  findings	  in	  this	  study.	  The	  
first	   form	   of	   quasi-­‐alignment	   describes	   a	   form	   of	   alignment,	   in	  which	   logics	   appear	   to	   be	  
aligned,	  but	  are	  actually	  not	  aligned.	  The	  second	  form	  of	  alignment	  distinguished,	  is	  one	  in	  
which	   certain	   elements	   of	   logics	   are	   aligned	  while	   others	   are	   not.	  With	   respect	   to	   cross-­‐
cultural	  dynamics	  in	  interorganisational	  relations	  researchers	  have	  examined	  that	  not	  all	  of	  
Hofstede’s	   cultural	   dimensions	   are	   likely	   to	   equally	   affect	   cooperation	   (Barkema	   and	  
Vermeulen,	  1997).	   In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  we	  propose	  here	  that	  not	  all	  of	  the	  dimensions	  of	  the	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logics	   of	   the	   partners	   equally	   affect	   the	   extent	   of	   alignment	   that	   can	   be	   achieved.	   The	  
manner	  in	  which	  programme	  responsibilities	  are	  divided	  within	  the	  ministry	  of	  defence	  (an	  
element	  of	  programme	  control)	   in	  our	  study	  hampers	  the	  speed	  of	  decision	  making	  within	  
the	  programme.	  Moreover,	   it	   also	   affects	   the	  propensity	  of	   a	   nation	   to	   collaborate	   in	   the	  
sense	   that	   it	   can	   enable	   or	   constrain	   the	   active	   involvement	   of	   its	   representatives	   in	  
interorganisational	  sense-­‐making	  processes.	  	  
With	  respect	  to	  the	  defence	  industrial	  policy	  and	  its	  constituting	  elements	  the	  ‘costs’	  
of	   alignment	   manifest	   themselves	   in	   the	   number	   of	   variants,	   programme	   delays	   and	   the	  
division	   of	   work	   share.	   The	   elements	   of	   this	   dimension	   that	   seem	   to	   have	   the	   strongest	  
impact	  are	   the	  degree	   to	  which	  a	  government	  actively	   stimulates	   its	  defence	   industry	  and	  
the	  closeness	  of	  the	  government	  and	   its	  defence	   industry.	  We	  would	   like	  to	  add	  here	  that	  
the	   logics	   of	   the	   nations	   appear	   to	   be	   converging,	   at	   least	   among	   the	   larger	   nations	   in	  
Europe.	  Programmes	  such	  as	  the	  development	  and	  production	  of	  the	  Tornado	  and	  later	  the	  
Eurofighter	   Typhoon,	   the	   Tigre,	   and	   the	   NH	   90	   among	   others	   have	   provided	   ample	  
opportunity	   for	   nations	   to	   learn	   from	   each	   other,	   not	   only	   on	   how	   to	   manage	   these	  
programmes	  but	  also	  the	  institutional	  logics	  underlying	  their	  management.	  	  
But	  not	  only	  at	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  programmes	  can	  we	  discern	  some	  convergence.	  
Various	  governments	  have	  expressed	  the	  need	  for	  a	  greater	  extent	  of	  collaboration	  between	  
nations	   in	  arms	  development	  and	  production.	  Concretely	   this	  has	   resulted	   in	  a	  number	  of	  
bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  agreements	  between	  European	  nations	  such	  as	  the	  Letter	  of	  Intent,	  
the	   Framework	   Agreement,	   OCCAR	   (Joint	   Organisation	   for	   Arms	   Collaboration),	   and	  most	  
recently	  the	  European	  Defence	  Agency).	  	  
Another	  source	  of	  convergence	  stems	  from	  the	  increase	  in	  multinational	  operations	  
(e.g.	   in	   Bosnia,	   Iraq,	   and	   Afghanistan).	   Soeters	   (2008)	   has	   documented	   the	   effects	   of	  
experiential	   isomorphism	   between	   national	   military	   establishments	   resulting	   from	  
cooperation	   among	   military	   forces.	   Indeed,	   these	   have	   forced	   national	   military	  
establishments	   to	   adapt	   some	   form	   of	   both	   administrative	   and	   technical	   isomorphism	   in	  




8.3	   Limitations	  and	  Future	  Research	  
 
During	  the	  course	  of	  any	  research	  project	  choices	  have	  to	  be	  made	  about	  the	  questions	  to	  
be	  addressed,	  types	  of	  data	  to	  be	  collected,	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  data	  will	  be	  analysed.	  
Our	  project	  in	  this	  respect	  is	  no	  difference.	  Yet,	  the	  choices	  that	  have	  been	  made	  determine	  
to	  a	  large	  extent	  the	  limitations	  of	  a	  study.	  Our	  decision	  to	  conduct	  an	  in-­‐depth	  case	  study	  
into	   a	   European	  military	   programme	  has	   emphasised	   accuracy	  over	   the	   generalisability	   of	  
the	  findings	  presented	  here.	  	  In	  addition,	  international	  military	  industrial	  cooperation	  takes	  
place	   in	   a	   highly	   context-­‐dependent	   environment	  with	   its	   own	   institutional	   and	   structural	  
characteristics	  and	  dynamics.	  Hence,	  our	  findings	  are	   likely	  not	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  transferable	  to	  
other	  settings.	  	  
Our	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  content	  of	  the	  logics	  of	  the	  nations	  and	  organisations	  included	  
in	  our	  study,	  limits	  the	  generalisability	  of	  our	  findings	  even	  further.	  The	  dimensions	  that	  we	  
derived	  from	  our	  documentary	  and	  interview	  data	  may	  not	  be	  the	  only	  relevant	  dimensions.	  
In	  other	  settings,	  dependent	  on	  the	  actors	  and	  institutions	  involved,	  different	  principles	  and	  
belief	  systems	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  relevant	  and	  operative.	  	  
We	  would	  also	  like	  to	  emphasise	  the	  relatively	  conservative	  nature	  of	  our	  case	  study.	  
In	  our	  quest	  to	  discern	  differences	  between	  the	  countries	  covered	  in	  our	  study,	  we	  may	  have	  
overlooked	  and	  dismissed	  many	  of	  the	  striking	  similarities	  between	  the	  nations	  collaborating	  
in	   the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  They	  are	  all	   European	   countries	   that	   in	  many	  ways	   shaped	  and	  
shared	  one	  another’s	  developmental	   trajectories	   through	  many	  centuries.	  Currently,	   these	  
countries	   are	   all	  members	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   and	   have	   adopted	   the	   same	  monetary	  
currency.	  	  
Another	   limitation	   of	   our	   study	   is	   the	   uneven	   distribution	   over	   the	   countries	   in	  
interview	   respondents	   and	   documentary	   material.	   Given	   access,	   resource	   and	   time	  
constraints	   inherent	   in	  any	  study,	  our	  data	  has	   largely	  been	  collected	   from	  Dutch	  sources.	  
Although	  we	  have	  tried	  to	  triangulate	  our	  data	  wherever	  possibly,	  this	  may	  have	  somewhat	  
coloured	  the	  findings	  that	  we	  have	  presented	  here.	  	  
Similarly,	  we	  would	   like	   to	   stress	   the	  on-­‐going	  nature	  of	   the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  At	  
the	  time	  of	  writing,	  the	  first	  NH	  90	  helicopters	  have	  been	  delivered	  to	  the	  founding	  nations	  
and	  new	  customers.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  development	  phase	  has	  not	  been	  completely	  finished	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as	  some	  problems	  still	  needed	  to	  be	  solved.	  The	  production	  phase	  has	  only	  just	  begun,	  and	  
the	  negotiations	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  in-­‐service	  support	  phase	  are	  continuing.	  
	   Our	   research	   has	   been	   largely	   of	   a	   descriptive	   and	   explorative	   nature.	   We	   have	  
examined	   one	   specific	   case,	   the	   NH	   90	   programme	   in-­‐depth.	   A	   first	   possible	   avenue	   for	  
future	   research	  would	   be	   to	   examine	  how	  our	   notion	  of	   semi-­‐alignment	   upholds	   in	   other	  
cases	   and	   or	   contexts.	   Similarly,	   the	  mechanisms	   of	   alignment	   that	  we	   found	   in	   this	   case	  
study	  might	  not	  and	  probably	  will	  not	  be	  the	  only	  mechanisms.	  A	  second	  avenue	  of	  future	  
research	  could	  be	  to	  explore	  whether	  there	  are	  more	  alignment	  mechanisms	  than	  the	  ones	  
that	  emerged	  during	  this	  study.	  	  
	   Another	   issue	   that	   seems	   worthwhile	   for	   further	   analysis	   concerns	   the	   positional	  
nature	   of	   actors.	   Bachararch,	   Bamberger	   and	   McKinney	   (2000)	   have	   suggested	   that	   an	  
actor’s	   social	  position	  within	  organisations	  determine	   their	  adoption	   for	  more	   tactically	  or	  
strategically	   oriented	   logics.	   We	   believe	   that	   this	   may	   an	   important	   function	   of	   the	  
escalation	  process	  in	  which	  actors	  at	  lower	  levels	  tend	  to	  focus	  more	  or	  less	  on	  the	  means,	  
while	  higher	  positioned	  actors	  tend	  do	  adopt	  a	  more	  strategically	  oriented	  logic.	  	  
	   The	  emphasis	  that	  we	  have	  placed	  on	  the	  differences	   in	  national	   institutional	   logics	  
has	  had	  the	  unintentional	  side	  effect	  of	  not	  fully	  exploring	  another	  important	  difference	  in	  
logics;	   the	   public	   –	   private	   dimension.	   Bryson,	   Crosby	   and	   Stone	   (2006)	   argued	   that	   the	  
difference	  in	  institutional	  logics	  between	  the	  private	  and	  public	  sector	  could	  have	  important	  
implications	  for	  the	  performance	  of	  cross-­‐sector	  collaborations.	  In	  our	  study,	  we	  have	  seen	  
that	   nations	   vary	   in	   the	   degrees	   and	   forms	   of	   government-­‐company	   relationships.	   Future	  
research	  could	  study	  these	  interactions	  more	  carefully	  to	  see	  how	  logics	  among	  companies	  
and	  governments	  vary	  in	  different	  national	  contexts.	   
  
8.4	   Concluding	  Comment	  
 
We	  initially	  started	  out	  with	  two	  main	  research	  questions	  that	  were	  informed	  by	  an	  effort	  to	  
gain	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  alignment	  of	  different	  national	  institutional	  logics	  of	  the	  
founding	  nations	  of	  the	  NH	  90	  programme.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  presented	  
in	   chapter	   5	   indeed	   revealed	   variation	   in	   the	   national	   institutional	   logics	   of	   the	   NH	  
programme	   partners.	   We	   then	   sought	   to	   understand	   the	   alignment	   process	   better	   and	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discovered	   a	   number	   of	   mechanisms	   that	   facilitated	   alignment.	   Moreover,	   we	   initially	  
suggested	   the	   term	   of	   ‘alignment	   that	   comes	   at	   a	   cost’	   to	   account	   for	   some	   of	   our	  
observations,	  such	  as	  the	  lack	  of	  standardisation	  achieved	  in	  the	  helicopters,	  the	  delays	  that	  
occurred	  in	  the	  programme,	  and	  (dis)agreements	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  division	  of	  work	  share	  
among	  the	  nations.	   In	  the	  present	  chapter,	  we	  elaborated	  upon	  this	  notion	  and	  suggested	  
some	   alternative	   forms	   of	   alignment	   that	   seemed	   to	   fit	   our	   observations	   of	   the	   NH	   90	  
programme.	  Although	  the	  NH	  90	  programme	  is	  likely	  to	  continue	  for	  a	  years	  or	  decades	  to	  
come,	  we	   have	   now	   come	   to	   the	   end	   of	   our	   journey	   throughout	   the	   NH	   90	   programme.	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